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1. Introduction?
On?8?August?2008,? the? conflict? in? South?Ossetia? turned? into?war? for? the?
second?time?since?Georgia’s?independence?from?the?Soviet?Union?in?1991.?
When?reports?of?international?media?confirmed?heavy?skirmishes?between?
Georgian,?Ossetian?and?Russian?troops?near?South?Ossetia,?about?an?hour’s?
drive?from?Georgia’s?capital?Tbilisi?(Syukaeva?2010,?Karumidze?and?Wertsch?
2009,? BBC? News? Special? reports),? it? took? nearly? everyone? –? from?
international? and? domestic? observers? to? local? residents? –? by? surprise.?
However,?escalation?did?not?occur?out?of? the?blue.?For?months?prior? the?
war,?residents?of?the?conflict?affected?areas?had?been?queuing?up? in?front?
of?notaries?in?Tskhinvali?to?make?their?wills?(Conciliation?Resources?2009).??
?
In? fact,? the? region? of? South? Ossetia,? which? is? currently? internationally?
recognized? as? part? of? Georgia’s? territory,? has? undergone? a? continuous?
history? of? violence? since? the? break?up? of? the? Soviet?Union.? In? 1989,? the?
Ossetian? and? Georgian? independence?movements? escalated? the? conflict?
between? the? two?groups? for? the? first? time.?Subsequently,? the? leaderships?
engaged?in?a?war?that?was?ended?by?a?Georgian?Russian?peace?agreement?
in?1992?and? that? left?South?Ossetia?de? facto? independent? from?Georgian?
central?rule? (HRW?1992,? ICG?2004).?Meanwhile,?Georgia? itself?had?gained?
independence?from?the?Soviet?Union?and?prepared?to?align?itself?with?the?
West.?Whereas? the?conflict? in?South?Ossetia? seemed?under?control,?with?
the? OSCE? facilitating? political? talks? and? monitoring? the? ceasefire?
agreement,?Georgia?endured?a? civil?war,? a? severe?economic? crisis,? and? a?
war?in?Abkhazia,?which?ended?in?1994?(Coppieters?and?Legvold?2005).?
?
When? Georgia’s? leadership? changed? for? the? third? time? in? 2003? from?
Shevardnadze? to? the? Western?oriented? leader? Saakashvili,? the? country?
finally?seemed?on?track?toward?stability?(i.a.?Stewart?et?al.?2012).?However,?
four?months?after?the?new?government?had?taken?power,?in?May?2004,?the?
conflict? in? South? Ossetia? escalated? again? due? to? anti?smuggling? raids.?
Subsequently?and?despite? intense?domestic?and? international?efforts,? the?
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situation? in? the?deteriorated? year? after? year? through? increasing? violence?
and? radicalizing? rhetoric? (Asmus?2010,?Garthon?2010).?The?wide? range?of?
efforts?to?resolve?the?conflict?included?peace?plans?promoted?at?the?United?
Nations? (UN)? and? the? Council? of? Europe? and? widely? supported? by? the?
United? States? of? America? (US)? and? European? leaders? of? the? European?
Union? (EU)? and? EU? member? states;? enormous? reform? efforts? curbing?
corruption? on? the?Georgian? side? and? progress?within? the?North? Atlantic?
Treaty? Organization? (NATO)? framework;? ongoing? political,? negotiations?
facilitated? through? the? Organization? for? Security? and? Cooperation? in?
Europe? (OSCE)?with? the?Russian? and?Ossetian? sides?of? the? South?Ossetia?
conflict;?and?a?joint?Georgian?Ossetian?economic?rehabilitation?program.??
?
Nevertheless,? the? conflict? escalated? into? a? short?but?devastating?war? for?
the?second?time? in?August?2008.?This?time,?the?end?of?the?war?cemented?
South? Ossetia’s? separation? from? Georgia? even? more,? with? the? Russian?
Federation?recognizing?South?Ossetian?independence?and?the?OSCE?ending?
its? mission? as? a? facilitator? in? the? conflict.? As? of? 2012,? the? threat? of?
escalation?is?unmitigated?and?the?situation?in?the?conflict?area?is?as?volatile?
as?ever?(RFE/RL?2012).?
?
Considering? the? dynamic? state? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict,? this?
dissertation? attempts? to? propose? a? plausible? explanation? as? to?why? the?
conflict? recurrently? escalates.? In? face?of? the? extensive? settlement? efforts?
undertaken? by? Georgian,? Ossetian,? Russian? and? Western? actors,? the?
conflict?could?have?been?expected?to?be?resolved?by?one?plan?or?another,?
be? it?annexation?by?the?Russian?Federation,?re?establishment?of?Georgian?
central? control,? or? international? recognition? of? Ossetian? independence.?
Instead,? the? conflict? remains? an? impediment? to? Georgian? statehood,? a?
source? of? instability? on? Russia’s? border,? a? constant?worry? for? European?
leaders?on?the?outskirts?of?Europe’s?polity,?and?a?burden?on?the?livelihood?
of?Georgians?and?Ossestians?alike.?
?
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Importantly,? the? setting? of? the? conflict? exhibits? persistent? key?
characteristics? over? time:? Russia? and? Georgia? struggle? over? control? of?
Georgia’s? unaccomplished? statehood,?Western?Georgian? ties? increasingly?
intensify? in? the?post?Soviet?period,? and? control? in? the? conflict? remains? a?
beacon?of?power? to?nationalist?Georgian? leaders.? Simultaneously,? ready?
made? arguments? as? to? why? the? conflict? persists? dominate? the? general?
debate,? among? them? Russia’s? assumed? political? aim? to? regain? influence?
over? its?neighbors,?Georgian?nationalist?ambitions? to?reunify? the? territory?
of?Georgia,?and? a?Western?Russian? struggle? for?dominance? in? the? region?
(Fischer?2009).?However,?neither? the?persistent?properties?of? the?conflict?
nor?any?of?these?argumentative?perspectives?succeed?in?explaining?why?the?
conflict?recurrently?escalates.??
?
This? introduction?approaches? the? research? interest? from? two?angles,? first?
discussing?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?in?the?post?Soviet?context?and?then?in?
the? global? context.? Thereafter,? the? discussion? introduces? the? central?
argument?and?presents?the?study?with?the?road?map?of?the?dissertation.?
?
South?Ossetia?in?the?post?Soviet?context?
The? factors? contributing? to? the? continuous? re?escalation? of? the? South?
Ossetia? conflict? are? not? unique? as? to? this? particular? case? but? pertain? a?
variety?of?conflicts? in? the?post?Soviet?space,? including?Nagorno?Karabakh,?
Transnistria,? and? Abkhazia,? the? second? secessionist? conflict? with? which?
Georgia?grapples?(for?an?overview?of?the?context?of?secessionist?conflicts?in?
the?post?Soviet?context,?see?for?example:?De?Waal?2010,?King?2001,?Lynch?
2002,?Zuercher?2007).?Likewise,?conflicts?north?of?the?Caucasus,?such?as?in?
Chechnya? and? Circassia,? or? the? Ingush?Ossetian? conflict,? reveal? similar?
patterns? such? as? Russia’s? claim? to? regional? power? spots,? post?Soviet?
strongmen’s?and?elites’?grip?on?power,? the? rise?of?nationalisms?based?on?
self?determination?and? territorial?claims,?or,?depending?on? the? legitimacy?
of?these?arguments,?local?populations’?search?for?independence?by?building?
new?states,?and?Europe’s?sometimes?vague?attempts?to?manage?stability?in?
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its? bordering? regions? (King? and? Menon? 2010,? Tishkov? 1999? and? 2002,?
Schultz?2010).?Many?of?the?new?actors?in?the?post?Soviet?space,?above?all?in?
Eastern?Europe?and?the?South?Caucasus,?turn?to?either?to?Russia?or?to?the?
Western?axis?of?the?EU?and?the?US?to?secure?independence?(Fischer?2010,?
Markedonov? 2008).? The? fact? that? these? characteristics? are? pervasive?
throughout? the? post?Soviet? space? points? to? the? decisive? and? sustained?
impact?of? the? regional?and? international?context?on? local?development? in?
individual?countries.?Policy?patterns?established?over? long?periods?of?time?
can?be?expected?to?continuously?exert?similar?effects?on?different?settings.?
?
The? case? of? Georgia? and? the? South? Ossetian? conflict? varies? in? specific?
aspects? from? similar? cases? in? the?post?Soviet?area.?A?brief?discussion?will?
show? why? outcomes? are? expected? to? be? influenced? considerably? by? a?
number?of? factors? that? set? the?South?Ossetian?case?apart? from? the?post?
Soviet?setting.?First,?Georgia’s?relations?with?Russia?during?the?Soviet?Union?
were?close?in?terms?of?economy?and?culture?(De?Waal?2010).1?The?break?of?
this? link,?and? the? shift? to?adversarial?policies,?exposed? conflicting? lines? in?
Georgian?society?that?had?been?suppressed?for?decades.?Parts?of?Georgian?
society? had? benefitted? from? close? ties? with?Moscow? during? the? Soviet?
period,? whereas? other? groups? were? persecuted? or? disregarded? by? the?
Soviet?bureaucracy.?A?bitter? sense?of? competition? took?hold? in?Georgia’s?
political? environment.2? Therefore,? issues? of? redistribution? between?
formerly? advantaged? Soviet? elites? and? newly? emerging? elites,? as?well? as?
                                                          
1?Georgia?marked?the?biggest?share?of?exports?in?wine,?vodka,?and?mineral?water?of?all?of?
the?Soviet?republics?and?was?the?most?prestigious?vacation?destination?(Derluguian?2007).?
Many?Russian?writers?who?are?a?source?of?Russian?national?pride?resided?in?Georgia?over?
the?years?and?highly?valued? the?place.?Russian?Georgian?marriages?were? commonplace.?
The? Georgian? communist? elite? received? enormous? endowments? over? the? decades? to?
ensure? loyalty,? and? throughout? the? Soviet? conquest?of? the?Caucasus? from? the?mid?19th?
century,?Georgian?elites?played?a?crucial?role?in?supporting?Russia?militarily.?
2?This?struggle?became?evident?in?its?most?devastating?form?during?the?civil?war?after?1993?
when?the?Mkhedrioni? forces?backed?president?Shevardnadze?against?the?Russian?ousted?
previous?president?Gamsakhurdia’s?Zviadist?groups.?The? struggle?was?carried? forward? in?
various? forms,?such?as? the?Soviet? intelligentsia’s?aversion? for? the?Saakashvili?elite?or? the?
continuous?allegations?against?political?opponents?of?being?paid?by?and?acting?on?orders?
from?Russia.?
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?
anti?Russian? policies? in? the? South? Ossetia? context,? both?mingled? in? the?
competing?groups’?struggle?for?power.?
?
Second,?the?first?Georgian?president?Zviad?Gamsakhurdia’s?very?first?step?to?
bolster?Georgian? self?determination?was?an?attempt? to?push?Russia? from?
South?Ossetia?and?bring? the? region?back?under?Georgian? rule.?When? the?
conflict? in? South?Ossetia? turned? into?war? in? 1990,? this? contributed?most?
strongly? to? the? falling?out? between? Georgia? and? Russia.? Crucially? for?
Gamsakhurdia,? losing? South? Ossetia? meant? losing? power,? and? he? was?
subsequently?ousted?and?in?1992?replaced?by?the?second?president,?Eduard?
Shevardnadze.?Therefore,?the?conflict?over?South?Ossetia?holds?a?particular?
importance? for? Georgian? domestic? leaders,? both? with? regard? to? anti?
Russian?politics?and?in?terms?of?legitimizing?their?rule?through?attempts?to?
integrate?the?state.?
?
Third,?Georgians’? relations?with?Ossetians?during? the? Soviet? period?were?
culturally? closer? than?with? the?Abkhaz?minority.?Ossetian?communities? in?
the? oblast? of? South? Ossetia? and? in? villages? in? central? Georgia? were?
geographically? closer? to? Georgians? than? Abkhazian? communities,? and?
infrastructural? and? social? links? through? marriages? and? trade? were?
particularly? tight? (HRW? 1992).? The? history? of? close? Georgian?Ossetian?
relations?contributes?to?the?strength?of?Georgia’s?claim?on?the?territory?of?
South?Ossetia.?
?
Fourth,?of?all?the?former?Soviet?republics,?Georgia?has?enjoyed?(or?suffered,?
depending? on? one’s? point? of? view)? the? largest? amount? of? international?
engagement,? with? the? highest? level? of? US? financial? support,? two?
international?missions?–?UN?and?OSCE?–?deployed?on?its?territory,?and?the?
most? institutionalized? ties?with?European? structures?within?EU?and?NATO?
frameworks? (Fischer? 2010,? Cooley? and?Mitchell? 2010b,? Hanf? and? Nodia?
2000).?Georgia’s?reform?efforts?were?awarded?with?high?levels?of?financial,?
economic,?military?and?political?support?from?the?international?community.?
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International? engagement? included? the? conflict? in? South?Ossetia? (Koenig?
2005,?Jawad?2008)?but?also?and?in?particular?focused?on?the?liberal?project?
of?building?the?Georgian?state?and?democracy?(Lazarus?2010,?Broers?2005).??
Fifth,? South?Ossetia? is,? in? stark? contrast? to?other?post?Soviet? secessionist?
territories,? extremely? secluded? from? the? outside?world,?with? little? or? no?
access? to? international? organizations,? and?mostly? dependent? on? Russian?
assistance?and? illicit? trade? (US?Department?of?State?Report?2011).?Within?
this? context,? the? dynamics? of? the? conflict? are? significantly? swayed? by?
regional? stakeholders’? policies? and? generally? external? influence? in? the?
dynamics?of?the?conflict.??
?
Sixth,? among? the? former? Soviet? republics,?Georgia?experienced? the?most?
severe?outbursts?of?violence?after?the?split?from?the?Soviet?Union,?with?the?
two?wars?in?South?Ossetia?in?1992?and?2008,?one?in?Abkhazia,?one?civil?war,?
and? ongoing? violence? in? the? separatist? areas.? Therefore,? the? political?
context?of?Georgia?and?the?dynamics?of?violence?in?South?Ossetia?provide?a?
particularly?significant?setting?for?the?study?of?re?escalation?of?violence.?
?
Seventh,? the?conflict? in?South?Ossetia? is?nourished?considerably?by?South?
Ossetian? links?with? its?adjacent?“brother?nation”?North?Ossetia,? located? in?
the?Russian?Federation?(see?for?North?South?Ossetian?history?for?example:?
King? and?Melvin? 2000,? Higgins? and?O’Reilly? 2009).? Cross?border? cultural?
and?political?ties?are?strong,?and?appeals?for?unification?of?North?and?South?
Ossetia?into?‘Greater?Alania’?recur?throughout?both?territories.?None?of?the?
other?ongoing?post?Soviet?conflicting?parties,? including?Abkhazia,? can?call?
on? as? strong? a? cross?border? diaspora? as? the?Ossetians? in? South?Ossetia.?
Claims?of?self?determination?and?territorial?separation?from?Georgia?stress?
Ossetian? links? across? the? Caucasus? and? reinforce? the? impetus? for? South?
Ossetian?secessionism.?
?
Eighth,?both?Georgia?and?South?Ossetia?border?the?Russian?Federation,? in?
contrast?to?Transnistria?or?Nagorno?Karabakh,?which?also?receive?extensive?
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amounts?of?political?and?financial?resources?from?the?Russian?Federation?to?
bolster? political? rule.? This? not? only? provides? Russia? the? opportunity? to?
influence? South? Ossetia? and? Georgia? via? North? Ossetian? politics? and?
territory,? but? also? puts?Moscow? in? a? state? of? alert? as? to? international?
activities? at? the? southern? borders.? This? circumstance? is? particularly?
significant?to?Western?external?activity?in?Georgia.?
?
In?all?of?these?respects,?the?case?of?the?South?Ossetian?conflict?differs?from?
its?siblings?in?the?post?Soviet?context.?The?issues?discussed?above?highlight?
the? key? factors? that? reinforce? conflict? dynamics,? such? as? territorial?
proximity,?Western?and?Russian? interests,?and?Georgia’s?historically?close?
Soviet? ties.?Moreover,? these? factors?emphasize? that?1)? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict?impacts?local?power?politics?in?post?Soviet?Georgia,?and?2)?Western?
external? influence? plays? a? key? role? in? Georgia? and? the? South? Ossetia?
conflict.?As?will?be?shown,?the?discussion?will?establish?these?two?factors?as?
key? components? of? the? central? argument,? after? discussing? the? South?
Ossetia?case?in?the?global?context.?
?
South?Ossetia?in?the?global?context?
The? puzzle? of? recurring? violence? in? South? Ossetia,? however,? is? not?
exclusively? relevant? to? the? post?Soviet? context.? Recurring? violence? is? an?
issue? of? wider? importance? beyond? this? particular? case,? as? even? upon?
superficial?examination?we?can? find?examples?of? re?escalating?conflicts? in?
similar?settings,?such?as? in?Kashmir,?Sri?Lanka,?Lebanon?or?East?Timor?(see?
i.a.?Habibullah?2004,? Shastri?2005,?Cederman?et? al.?2010,?Wimmer?et? al.?
2010).? All? of? these? conflicts? experienced? recurring? violence? after?
stalemated?periods?of?low?level?or?absent?violence.?They?are?also?subject?to?
ethnic?strife?over?territory?within?the?boundary?of?a?state?and?experience?
varying?levels?of?Western?influence?and?domestic?power?struggle.??
?
First,? the? subject? of? recurring? violence? in? ongoing? conflicts? forms? a? key?
aspect?of?the?study?of?the?dynamics?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?and?sets?
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this?study?apart?from?studies?seeking?to?explain?the?onset?of?violence.?Why?
violence?recurs?is?a?subset?of?the?question?of?why?violence?occurs?at?all?(see?
the? seminal?work? of? Kalyvas? 2006).? In? this? respect,? the? re?escalation? of?
violence?differs? from?violence? that?emerges?out?of?previously?non?violent?
contexts? (Cederman?et?al.?2010,?Eck?2009,?Zartman?2002).? In?an?ongoing?
conflict,? a? system? of? patterns? and?mechanisms? has? evolved? and? can? be?
expected? to? have? a? determining? and? even? intensifying? effect? on? the?
occurrence?of?events? (Cederman?et?al.?2010:?1).?Therefore,? in?systems?of?
recurring? violence,? these? factors? are?held? to? explain? re?escalation?only? if?
examined? at? different? points? throughout? the? process? as? they? can? be?
expected? 1)? to? be? part? of? the? explanation? why? violence? recurs? and? 2)?
change? their? retraining? and? incentivizing? effects? on? actions,? policies? and?
choices?over?time.?
?
Second,?external?and?specifically?Western?engagement?in?domestic?conflict?
contexts?is?a?common?phenomena.?Western?agendas?inside?volatile?states?
largely? overlap,? as? Western? countries? mostly? dedicate? their? efforts? to?
incentivizing? democratic? reform? and? state? formation? (Duffield? 2002,?
Carothers?2000,?Crawford?2002,?Bader?2010,?Levitsky?and?Way?2010).?This?
is?also?the?case? in?the?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?and?Georgia’s?
political?process,?as?European?states?and?the?US?have? launched?enormous?
efforts? to?Westernize? the?political?system? in?Georgia?after? the?end?of? the?
Soviet?Union?(Lazarus?2010,?Fairbanks?2012).?In?this?respect,?Georgia?is?one?
of?Western?states’?post?Cold?War? ‘projects’?of? liberal?governance? (see? for?
example? Anderson? 2012).? However,? little? is? known? about? the? specific?
effects?of?Western?engagement? in?the?context?of? local?violence,?and?even?
less? is?known?about? its?effects?on?re?escalation?as?Goodhand?and?Walton?
(2010)? show? this? in? ? the? case? study?on? Sri? Lanka.?Moreover,? the? specific?
policies?Western?actors?utilize? and? their? impact?on?particular?events? is?a?
field? largely? unaddressed? by? social? research.? The? following? study? will?
address?some?of?these?issues?and?discuss?the?findings?in?light?of?the?conflict?
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contexts? in? Sri? Lanka? and? Kashmir? to? illustrate? the? general? scope? of? the?
results.?
?
?
Argument?of?the?study?
The? above?listed? characteristics? of? the? dynamics? of? recurring? violence? in?
South?Ossetia,?both? in? the? global? and? the? regional? context,?highlight? the?
importance?of?external?Western?engagement,?the?domestic?power?setting,?
and? historical? relations?with? Russia.? However,? none? of? these? arguments?
provides?an?explanation?as? to?why?escalations?occur?at? specific?points? in?
time? and? why? they? recur.? Escalations? do? not? necessarily? coincide? with?
agency? of? the? Russian? Federation? or? shifts? in? power.? Those? factors? only?
explain? that? the? context? deteriorated? in? favor? of? escalation,? but? do? not?
explain?or?provide?credible? links?why?and?how?escalations?occurred?at?the?
points? in?time?observed.?Therefore,?these?studies?refrain? from?addressing?
the? specific? conditions? of? the? South? Ossetia? case? and? link? secession? to?
exogenous? factors.? This? view? represents? the? dominating? perspective? of?
scholars,? politicians? and? the? public? in? European? states? and? the?U.S.,? but?
clouds?the?view?to?the?actual,?powerful?triggers?of?violence?in?the?conflict.?
As? a? result,? no? systematic? study? on? violence? in? South?Ossetia? has? been?
done.?
This?dissertation?will?argue?that?the?policies?of?Western?external?actors?at?
specific? points? in? time? repeatedly? encouraged? or? allowed? local? state?
leadership? in? Georgia? to? shift? toward?more? assertive? policies,? with? the?
result?of?escalation?of?violence? in?South?Ossetia.?The?study?argues?further?
that?Western?policies?significantly?affect?domestic?power?options.?Because?
the?South?Ossetia?conflict?places?territorial?claims,?competing?group?issues,?
international?and?domestic?political?support,?and?financial?assets?at?stake,?
external?policies?incentivize?Georgian?state?elites?to?utilize?and?comply?with?
external? influence? in?the?context?of?the?conflict.?The?argument?holds?that?
Western?policies? thereby? trigger? shifts? in? the?behavior?of?Georgian? state?
leadership?and? in? this?way? create? the? context? for? repeated? shifts? toward?
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escalation.? On? this? basis,? the? study? further? contends? that? recurring?
patterns?of?external? influence?can?be?seen?prior?to?more?than?one? instant?
of? escalation.? These? patterns? are? chains? of? actions?which?work? through?
local? state? policies? and? translate? into?mechanisms? of? external? influence?
that?enable?the?dynamics?of?re?escalation?in?the?conflict.?
?
In?the?first?chapter,?the?discussion?will?deal?in?depth?with?the?empirical?and?
theoretical? aspects? of? the? argument,? based? on? the? review? of? existing?
arguments?as?to?why?violence?in?ethnic?conflicts?re?escalates?and?empirical?
considerations?of?the?South?Ossetia?case.?
?
Roadmap?of?the?dissertation?
The?dissertation?begins?with? the? review?of?existing?arguments?as? to?why?
violence? in? ethnic? conflicts? re?escalates? and? critically? discusses? these? in?
light?of?their?applicability?to?re?escalation? in?South?Ossetia.?Subsequently,?
the?chapter? juxtaposes? the?causal?argument?against?existing?explanations?
and? introduces?the?analytical?framework?of?the?study.?The?discussion?first?
sustains? the?argument? through? theoretical?considerations?and?establishes?
working?hypotheses? to? guide? the? empirical? analysis.? Then? the? discussion?
addressed? the?methodological?considerations?of?conducting? the?empirical?
analysis? and? concludes? the? introductory? chapter? with? the? model? of?
analysis.??
?
Thereafter,? the? second? chapter? covers? the? empirical? analysis? of? the?
influence?of?Western?policies?on? the?power?politics?of? local? leadership? in?
Georgia? prior? to? escalations? in? 2002,? 2004? and? 2008.? The? chapter?
comprises?two?parts:?First,?the?text?gives?an?overview?of?the?background?of?
political? development? in? Georgia? and? the? events? of? violence? in? South?
Ossetia? between? 1989? and? 2008.? This? part? reflects? the? local? context? of?
events?and?agency?related?to?the?three?points?of?escalation? in?2002,?2004?
and? 2008.? For? this? purpose,? the? text? discusses,? prior? to? the? background?
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account,?the?data?collection?and?casing?of?the?three?points?of?escalation?in?
2002,?2004?and?2008.??
?
The?second?part?of?the?chapter?conducts?the?empirical?analysis?of?Western?
policies?prior? to? the? three?points?of?escalation?by?using? the?method?of?a?
narrative?account.?Here,?the?chapter?proceeds?by?chronologically?depicting?
the?impact?of?Western?policies?on?Georgian?leadership’s?power?politics?for?
each?of?the?three?re?escalation? instances.?The?analysis?takes? into?account?
reinforcing?factors?of?conflict?dynamics?prior?to?escalations,?such?as?Russian?
or? Ossetian? agency,? as? well? as? domestic? constraints? such? as? private?
interests,?nationalist?claims?and?demands?of?the?population.?However,?the?
focus?of?the?account? is?on?depicting?Western?policies’? impact?on?Georgian?
leaderships’?power?consolidation?attempts?in?the?context?of?the?conflict,?in?
order?to?sustain?the?argument?claiming?a?causal?link?here?that?provides?for?
re?escalation.?The? chapter? concludes?by?proposing?an?explanatory?model?
for? violence? re?escalation? between? 1989? and? 2008? in? the? South?Ossetia?
context.?
?
The? third? and? final? chapter? discusses? the? theoretical? and? empirical?
applicability? of? the? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? case,? first? in? light? of?
existing? theories? of? violence? in? ethnic? conflicts,? and? second? in? light? of?
violence? in?the?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?conflicts.?The?discussion?specifically?
turns?to?the?enhancement?of?existing?mechanisms?of?violence,?pointing?out?
their? specific? functions?under? given? circumstances,? and? concludes?with? a?
critical? reflection? on? the? theoretical? aspects? of?Western? engagement? in?
internal?contexts?of?violence.?The?conclusion?summarizes?the?findings?and?
points?to?suggestions?for?further?research.?
?
Altogether,?the?study?finds?that?the?future?of?the?conflict? in?South?Ossetia?
depends? largely?on?Georgian?Western? relations.?The? study,? in?a?nutshell,?
finds?that?Western?policies?repeatedly?trigger?escalations? in?South?Ossetia?
by? providing? strong? incentives? for?Georgian? leaderships? to? enact? power?
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consolidation? policies? in? the? context? of? the? conflict.? Therefore,?Western?
policies? repeatedly?provide? the? impetus? to? shift? toward?assertive?policies?
prior?to?escalations,?especially?by?promoting?a?high?level?of?inconsistency?in?
terms?of?political?agency?and?claims?prior?to?escalations.?
?
The?Western?agenda?of?both?US?and?European?actors?generally?appears?to?
reinforce?local?dynamics.?In?a?careful?distinction?between?US?and?European?
policies,?US?policies?appear?to?take?effect?particularly?through?their?direct?
political?impact?on?policies?of?the?Georgian?state?leaderships?in?the?context?
of? the? conflict.? European? agencies? appear? to? rather? take? effect? through?
institutional? frameworks? that? then? seem? to? shape? Georgian? leaderships?
choices,? such? as? starting? with? the? CSCE? (Conference? for? Security? and?
Cooperation?in?Europe)?framework?at?the?very?beginning?of?the?conflict?in?
1992.??
?
In? this? respect,? the? findings? suggest? that? in? order? to? help? overcome? the?
deep?set?patterns?of?conflict?and?violence? in?the?Georgian/South?Ossetian?
context,? the? European? Union? should? decentralize? competencies? and?
strengthen? its? locally? based? institutions,? namely? the? EU? Delegation? to?
Georgia?and? the?EU?Special?Representative? to? the?South?Caucasus.?These?
institutions? should? be? given?more? responsibility? for? decision?making? and?
policy?formation? vis?à?vis? Georgian? actors.? Greater? efficiency? and?
consistency? of? EU? policies? through? a? clear? separation? of? competences?
between?EU?agencies?would?greatly?enhance?the?effect?of?such?policies,?as?
1)?the?same?actors?would?act?at?one?level?and?be?a?consistent?addressee?for?
local? concerns,? and?2)? agendas?would?not?be? shuffled?between? agencies?
and?localities,?thereby?increasing?the?consistency?of?claims.?
?
This?first?step?of?providing?reliable?grounds?for?EU?Georgia?relations?would?
greatly?diminish?the?harm?inflicted?by?European?policies.?In?a?second?step,?
with? strengthened? consistency,? the? European? Union? would? be? able? to?
introduce?a?legitimized?system?of?sanctions?in?case?of?local?encroachments.?
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The?system?would?take?effect?on?eye? level?with? local?actors?and?therefore?
not?punish?in?hindsight,?but?rather?capacitate?a?political?contract?including?
a?priori?fixed?sanctions?in?transparent?cases.?
? ?
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2. Analytical?framework?
The?following?chapter?serves?to?build?the?causal?argument?of?this?study?and?
develop?an?analytical?framework.?For?this?purpose,?the?chapter?presents?a?
review?of? literature?on?ethnic?violence?and?a? critique? thereof,? the?causal?
argument?of?the?study,?and?theoretical?and?methodological?considerations?
regarding? the? key? aspects? of? the? argument? in? order? to? conduct? the?
empirical?analysis.?The?chapter?concludes?with?a?presentation?of?the?model?
of?analysis?and?an?account?of?expected?outcomes.?
?
2.1. Literature?review?
The? existing? literature? on? ethnic? violence? differs? mainly? as? to? where?
explanations?identify?the?“culprit”?to?which?the?occurrence?of?violence?can?
be? assigned.?Many? arguments? follow? the? agency?oriented? turn? from? the?
late?1990s?(Beissinger?2000:?24),?examining?the?political?conditions?of?how?
actors’?interests?and?subsequent?actions?lead?to?violence.?Other?arguments?
focus?rather?on?contextual? factors?as?determining?violent?outcomes,?such?
as? regime? change,? resources,? and? external? influence.? However,? most?
studies?dealing?with?explaining?ethnic?violence?include?both?structural?and?
agency?based?features?and?rather?lean?to?one?side?or?the?other?(see?for?this?
argument? for?example?Brass?1996).?Even? if?we? identify?who? is?pulling? the?
trigger,? the? “culprit”? of? emerging? violence? is? not? easily? located? if? we?
consider? the? dynamics? and? interactions? prior? to? outbreaks? of? violence.?
Whereas?the?existing?literature?seems?to?widely?acknowledge?this,?this?is?at?
the? same? time? not? reflected? in? the? research? agenda? of?most? studies? on?
ethnically?based?violence,?as?will?be?discussed?below.?
The? following? literature? review? discusses? existing? arguments? aiming? to?
explain? violence? in? ethnic? conflicts.? The? review? identifies? four? core?
arguments:?1)?Democratization?and?elections? leading? to?violence,?2)? Illicit?
economies? leading? to? violence,?3)?Grievances? leading? to? violence,?and?4)?
Involvement? of? external? actors? leading? to? violence.? The? discussion? will?
review? how? those? arguments?may? help? to? explain? recurring? violence? in?
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ethnically? framed?contexts.?With? regard? to? forming? the?causal?argument,?
the?discussion?will?focus?on?the?explanatory?scope?of?existing?research?for?
recurring?violence?in?the?case?of?South?Ossetia?and?in?which?respects?these?
studies?are?or?are?not?helpful.?
?
Existing?literature?on?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?and?politics?in?Georgia??
A?narrow,?but?well?informed?strand?of?studies?accounts? for?events?of? the?
conflict?in?South?Ossetia.3?An?increasing?number?of?studies?accounts?for?the?
South?Ossetia?conflict,?however,?with?most? studies? focusing?on?Georgia’s?
political? context? and? including? South? Ossetia? merely? as? a? marker? of?
Georgia’s? transitional? problems.4? By? discussing? the? Georgian? post?Soviet?
and? in?particular?the?post?Rose?Revolution?political?system,?studies?largely?
focus?on?two?juxtaposing?topics?relating?to?the?conflict,?first,?state?building?
and?democratization5,?as?well?as,?second,?ethnic?groups?and?nationalism.6?
The? first? field?highlights? the?conflict?as?a? result?of? local?and? international?
efforts? in?the?realms?of?state?building?and?democratization.?State?building?
policies? thereafter? fuel? the? conflict?by?pushing? territorial? integration? (see?
Mitchell? 2009? and? Lazarus? 2010).? Democratization,? on? the? other? hand,?
might? deteriorate? the? conflict? if? key? reforms? such? as? integration? of?
minorities?and?institutional?rights?fail?(see?Huber?2004?and?Broers?2005).?
The?second?field?stressing?ethnic?groups?and?nationalism?in?relation?to?the?
conflict?more? specifically?discusses?causes?of?South?Ossetian? secession? in?
light? of? post?Soviet? nationalisms7,? as? a? by?product? of? Western?Russian?
                                                          
3? For? literature?encompassing?different? instants?of? the? conflict? in? South?Ossetia? see? for?
example:?English?2008,?Birch?1996?and?1999,? ICG?2004,?HRW?1992,?Mayorov?2002,?Kolst?
and? Blakkisrud? 2008,? Higgins? and? O’Reilly? 2009,? Saparov? 2010,?Welt? 2010,? Cheterian?
2008a,?also?see?Fuller?2005,?Peuch?2005.?
4?For?literature?dealing?with?the?conflict?in?or?history?of?specifically?South?Ossetia?see:?Suny?
1994,? Beissinger? 2002,? Nodia? 1995,? Coppieters? 1996,? Coppieters? and? Legvold? 2005,?
Zuercher?2007,?Hanf?and?Nodia?2000,?Cornell?1999,?Bremmer?and?Taras?1997,?Karumidze?
and?Wertsch?2005,?Hensel?2009,?Slider?1997,?Mitchell?2004.?
5?Huber?2004,?Jones?1993,?Cheterian?2008,?Lazarus?2010,?Mitchell?2009,?Areshidze?2007,?
Tatum?2009,?Welt?2009,?Kalanadze?and?Orenstein?2009,?Broers?2005.?
6?See?Suny?1994,?Jones?2005,?Zhorzholiani?et?al.?1992,?Beissinger?2002.?
7? See? for?example:?Birch?1996?and?1999,? Shatirishvili?2003,?Khinchagashvili?2006,? Jones?
1997,?Aves?1992,?HRW?1992.?
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competition?over?influence?in?the?region8,?or?as?caused?and?upheld?through?
Russian?influence?in?Georgia.9??
These?studies?do?not?provide?an?explanation?as?to?why?escalations?occur?at?
specific?points? in?time?and?why? they?recur.?Escalations?do?not?necessarily?
coincide?with?agency?of? the?Russian?Federation?or?shifts? in?power.?Those?
factors?only? explain? that? the? context?deteriorated? in? favor?of? escalation,?
but? do? not? explain? or? provide? credible? links? why? and? how? escalations?
occurred?at? the?points? in? time?observed.?Therefore,? these? studies? refrain?
from?addressing?the?specific?conditions?of?the?South?Ossetia?case?and? link?
secession? to? exogenous? factors.? This? view? represents? the? dominating?
perspective?of?scholars,?politicians?and? the?public? in?European?states?and?
the?U.S.,?but?clouds?the?view?to?the?actual,?powerful?triggers?of?violence?in?
the?conflict.?As?a?result,?no?systematic?study?on?violence? in?South?Ossetia?
has?been?done.??
Studies?on? corruption?and? smuggling? in? the?context?of? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict?reflect?stability?and?forms?of?political?rule?in?post?Soviet?Georgia10,?
holding? that? corruption? triggers? escalation? or? protracts? violence.11? These?
studies?provide?solid? insight? into?domestic?power?functions?that?trigger?or?
alleviate? violence? through? corruption,? however? neglect? to? systematically?
encompass? external? influence? on? violence?triggering? policies.? Studies? on?
Western? influence? in? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? rarely? move? beyond?
specific? sectors? of? engagement,? performance? of? individual? actors,? or?
specific?events?such?as?the?2008?war12,?with?the?noteworthy?exception?of?
Lazarus’?paper?(Lazarus?2010)?that?will?help?to?frame?the?findings.??
                                                          
8? For? this? specific? view? see? for? example:? Fischer? 2009,? Nichol? 2008,? Sabanadze? 2002,?
Gower?and?Timmins?2009,?Haukkala?2008,?Sikorski?2009,?Loewenhardt?2005,?Cooley?and?
Mitchell?2010a?and?2010b,?Allsion?2008,?Blank?1995.?
9?For?literature?centering?on?Russia’s?influence?on?Georgia’s?development?see?for?example:?
Mayorov? 2002,? Olcott? Brill? et? al.? 1999,? Cummings? 2001,? Gower? and? Timmins? 2009,?
Haukkala?2008,?Sikorski?2009.?
10?See?for?example:?Easter?1996,?Holmes?1997,?Gordadze?2003,?Hensell?2009,?Christophe?
2005,? ICG? 2004,?Vilanishvili? 2005,? Chkhartishvili? et? al.? 2004,? Timm? 2012,?Hensell? 2012,?
Gordadze?2003,?Turmanidze?2001,?Cheterian?2008b.?
11? For? literature?on? this? specific?argument? ?George?2009,?Baev?2003,?Wennmann?2004,?
Kukhianidze?et?al.?2006;?Kukhianidze?2003,?2004?and?2007.?
12?For? literature?encompassing?the?South?Ossetia?within?these?confined?aspects?see:?King?
2008,? Asmus? 2010,? Jones? 2008,? Garthon? 2010,? Allison? 2008,? Cornell? and? Starr? 2009,?
Cooley?and?Mitchell?2010b,?Jawad?2005?and?2008,?Nichol?2009,?Bounds?and?Hendrickson?
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The? dissertation? will? selectively? draw? on? these? studies? to? support? the?
causal? argument? by? sustaining? the? statements? over? the? course? of? the?
discussion,?particularly?in?the?theoretical?discussion?of?the?argument?and?in?
the?empirical?chapter.?Given?that?for?the?purposes?of?this?study?there?is?an?
insufficient? scope? of? literature?which? focuses? on? the? case,? the? following?
discussion?will?draw?on?main?arguments?in? literature?that?seeks?to?explain?
ethnic?violence?and?will?critically?reflect?on?their?usefulness?for?studying?re?
escalation? in? South?Ossetia.?At? the? end? of? the? discussion,? the? study?will?
present?a?causal?argument? for?re?escalating?violence? in? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict.?
1) Argument? 1:? Democratization? and? elections? leading? to? violence? –?
“Playing?the?ethnic?card”?(Mansfield?and?Snyder?2005:?70)?
With? the? Soviet? Union? disintegrating? and? post?colonial? processes? taking?
effect,? newly? formed? states? emerged? and? endeavored? to? establish?
democratic?systems.?Considered?a?pillar?of?democracy,?elections?were?held?
in? these? new? entities? to? choose? new? leaders? to? these? states.? However,?
many? of? the? electoral? processes? proved? not? only? to? lack? democratic?
standards? of? being? free? and? fair,? but? also? coincided? with? outbreaks? of?
violence.?Moreover,?violence?often?seemed?to?occur?along?ethnic?lines.?
Subsequently,?a? large?strand?of?studies? took? to?explain? the?occurrence?of?
violence? in? these? newly? emerging? contexts? examining? the? link? between?
democratization?and?ethnic?violence?(see?above?all:?Snyder?and?Mansfield?
1995,? Snyder? 1993? and? 2000,? Brubaker? 1996,?Woodward? 2003,?Walter?
1999):?Is?there?any?link,?or?are?the?factors?leading?to?violence?hidden?to?the?
eye,?and?not?necessarily?related?to?democratization?itself??Who?is?involved?
with? violence,? and? does? this? explain? why? violence? breaks? out? and? why?
violence? coincides? precisely? with? periods? of? elections?? Does? ethnicity?
actually?play?the?key?role?it?seemingly?has??
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2009,?Huber?2004,?Milcher?and?Slay?2005,?Barbe?and? Johansson?Nogue?2008,?Whitman?
and?Wolff?2010.?
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Largely,?the?argument?can?be?summarized?as?follows:?Local?groups?struggle?
for?power?in?the?emerging?order?and?make?use?of?instable?structures?such?
as? media,? resentments? toward? minorities,? unequal? distribution? of?
resources? and? the? like.? Through? these? means,? and? often? strategically,?
actors?striving?for?power?embark?on?mobilizing?their?constituencies? in?the?
processes?of?electoral?competition,?often?by? inciting?violence.?As?a?result,?
violence?escalates,?mostly? in?form?of?civil?strife? involving?ethnic?riots,?and?
fosters?and?sustains?inequalities?and?conflict?along?ethnic?lines.?
?
The? link? between? the? democratization? processes? and? violence? does? not?
become?clear?immediately.?In?the?beginning?of?the?1990s?when?new?states?
started? to? establish? democratic? systems,? democracy?was?widely? held? to?
foster?peace?(for?studies?discussing?this?argument?see:?Kaldor?and?Vejvoda?
1997,?Russett?1995).?But? the?paradigm?of?“democratic?peace”? took? inter?
state? relations? into? focus,? without? taking? into? consideration? internal?
conditions? of? democratizing? states? that? had? not? yet? been? enshrined? in?
theory.? Social? research? throughout? the?1990s? came? to?acknowledge? that?
transitional?phases?of?political?systems?are?predominantly?characterized?by?
instability,? regularly? involving? outbreaks? of? violence? (see? for? a? seminal?
study? on? this? argument:? Snyder? 1998).? Hence,? the? context? in? which?
democratizations?take?place?is?highly?volatile,?as?new?groups?emerge?out?of?
the? fading?order,?often? through? forming?new?alliances?which? struggle? for?
power? in?the?emerging?order? (see? for? literature?discussing?this?argument:?
Snyder? and? Ballantine? 1996;?Wucherpfennig,? Cederman,?Metternich? and?
Gleditsch?2010:?3;?Gagnon?1995?and?2007).??
Gaining? power? in? democratizing? orders? largely? hinges? on? securing?
resources? which? groups? can? make? use? of? in? political? competition?
(Cederman,?Wimmer? and?Min? 2010:? 106;? also? see:? Brubaker? and? Laitin?
1998).?Here,? a? key? resource? is? support? of? respective? constituencies? (see?
above? all?Wilkinson? 2004:? 21?22),? as? holding? office? gives? authority? over?
decisions?about?the?distribution?of?resources.?In?new?states,?power?seekers?
tend?to?form?identities?by?“playing?the?ethnic?card”?(Mansfield?and?Snyder?
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2005:?70).? If?a?group? striving? for?power?can?unify?a?constituency?over?an?
identity?forming?claim?under?its?banner?a?powerful?resource?is?at?the?hands?
of? the? power? elite.? Thereby,? ethnicity? functions? as? a? group?constituting?
force? when? promoted? against? an? adversary,? an? ethnic? “other”? in?
competitive?contexts?(see?above?all:?Anderson?1991,?Ignatieff?1993).?
?
Social? sciences?widely? accept? the? perception? of? identities? to? be? part? of?
group? membership? processes? (see? the? study? of? Berger? and? Luckmann?
1987).? Particularly? David? Laitin? has? specified? that?mechanisms? of? inter?
group? conflict? promoted? by? elites? tie? groups? internally? together,? or?
respectively,?that? intra?group?policing?by?vilifying?competing?elites,?ethnic?
groups?or?any?oppositional?forces?and?“enemies?of?the?nation”?(Laitin?1995?
in? Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998:? 433)? can? play? a? crucial? role? for? securing?
support? of? constituencies.? Hence,? if? leaders? succeed? in? forging? strong?
group? identification? among? the? respective? members? and? if? they?
successfully? link? these? categories? to? a?power? bid,? constituencies? tend? to?
provide? support? (Walter? 2009:? 71,? also? see?Mansfield? and? Snyder? 2005,?
Goemans? 2000).? Further,? if? leaders? make? use? of? “elite? manipulation”?
(Ballantine?and?Snyder?1996:?22)?by?staging?a?threat?to?the?group?through?a?
second?group?under?the?claim?to?be?able?to?protect?their?peer?group?from?
harm,? constituencies? tend? to? provide? even? stronger? support? (on? this?
argument? see? for? example:? Toft? 2003,? Figueiredo? and? Weingast? 1997,?
Brown?1996).?Other?manipulative?mechanisms?in?the?electoral?process?may?
be? the?misrepresentation?of?one’s?own?players?and?capacities? in?order?to?
gain? support? (Snyder?2000:?67,?also? see?Walter?2003,? Fearon?1995),? and?
the?weak?brokerage?of?political?bargains?(Mansfield?and?Snyder?2005:?67).??
?
Therefore,? the? debate? on? democratization? and? elections? sees? ethnicity?
through?the?creation?of? identities?as?a?strategic?power?resource? for?those?
competing?at? the?core?of?power?struggles.?Ethnicity? is?viewed?as?but?one?
power? resource,? though? possibly? the? most? powerful? in? democratizing?
contexts?(for?this?argument?see?for?example:?Kendhammer?2010,?Holliday?
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2008).?If?this?is?the?case,?how?do?ethnically?framed?electoral?processes?lead?
to? violence?? Studies? explore? which? mechanisms? work? through? political?
actors?that?then?lead?to?mobilization?and?escalation.??
Characteristically,?actors? competing? for?power? strategically?work? through?
ethnic? entrepreneurs? fomenting? sentiments? among? constituencies? (Brass?
1997:?31,?Brubaker?and?Laitin?1998:?440),?for?example?introducing?“ethnic?
wedges”? into? public? debate? to? stress? the? salience? of? ethnic? issues?
(Wilkinson? 2006:? 23,? Gagnon? 1998),? or? utilize? media? to? direct? public?
awareness? in? their? favor? (Snyder?and?Ballantine?1996:?14).?Political?elites?
make?use?of? institutions?established?during?democratization,? such?as? the?
electoral? or? constitutional? system? or,? political? parties.? A? well?studied?
example? of? institutional? manipulation? of? the? electoral? process? is? vote?
pooling?through?ethnic?outbidding?(on?this?mechanism?see:?Horowitz?1985:?
chapter?8,?Brubaker?and?Laitin?1998:?434)?or?inbidding?(Wilkinson?2004:?4)?
by? overstating? claims? of? liberalism,? or? logrolling? with? minority? parties?
(Snyder? 2000:? 67).? Furthermore,? the? debate? identifies?mechanisms? not?
necessarily? related? to? ethnic? framing,? such? as? elite? manipulation? of?
constituencies?through?waging?war?in?a?foreign?crisis?to?consolidate?power?
by?fomenting?fear?among?constituencies?(for?this?argument?see?above?all:?
Walter?2009,?Mansfield?and?Snyder?2006,?Brass?1997,?Wilkinson?2006).?
Escalations?of?violence?in?electoral?competition?of?democratizing?states?are?
usually? precipitated? by? a? combination? of? several? of? these? mechanisms?
(Mansfield? and? Snyder? 2005:? 67? and? 169ff.).? The? debate? does? not?
systematically?examine? re?escalation?of?violence,?but? juxtaposes? that? the?
potential? for? violence? to? escalate? recurs?with? each? election? cycle? unless?
gains?of?the?use?of?violence?for?power?elites?becomes?obsolete.??
?
2)?Argument?2:? Illicit?economies? leading?to?violence?–?“Ethnic?warfare? is?
simply?a?cover?story?for?criminal?violence?and?predation”?(Brubaker?2004:?
19)?
The?argument? that? illicit?economies?explain? the? recurrence?of?violence? in?
ethnic?conflicts?emerged?during?the?course?of?the?1990s?as?a?response?to?
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the? assumption? that? ‘ancient? hatreds’? between? ethnic? groups? lie? at? the?
heart?of?inter?group?warfare?(Kalyvas?2001:?102ff.,?also?see?Schlichte?2006).?
Seminally?for?the?debate,?Fearon?and?Laitin?made?the?case?that?economic?
interests?significantly?outdo?ethnic?factors?in?their?impact?on?the?likelihood?
of?armed?conflict? (Fearon?and?Laitin?2003:?75,?also?see?Fearon?and?Laitin?
1998? and? the? instrumentalist? approaches? of? Brubaker? 2004? and? Keen?
1998).?A?new?strand?of?debate?took?to?defending?the?so?called?“new?wars”?
of?the?1990s?not?to?be?the?result?of?ethnic?and?cultural?differences,?but?to?
be? the? result? of? strife? over? newly? accessible? resources? serving? groups’?
power? claims? (Kalyvas? 2001:? 103,? also? see? Kalyvas? 2008,? Sinno? 2008,?
Cunningham?et?al.?2009?and?Sambanis?2000).?
Similar?to?the?ethnicity?argument,?the?violent?potential?of?illicit?economies?
is? rooted? in? the?existence?of? resources? that?can?be?exploited? for?political?
gains.? Competing? groups? predate? resources? through? diasporas,? state?
capture,? and? smuggling? as? these? supply? lines? bypass? controlled?markets?
(for? this?argument? see? the?excellent? study?on? Sarajevo?of?Andreas?2008,?
also? see?Wennmann? 2004,?Demmers? 2007).?Hence,? the? illicit? economies?
argument? contends? that? it? is? not? perceptions? of? social? inequality? arising?
from?ethnic?diversity?that?trigger?conflict?(Wilkinson?2006:?32,?Cederman?et?
al.? 2010:? 92),? but? rather? the? goal? of? financing? inter?group? warfare? of?
insurgent? rebellion? or? self?enriching? war? lords? (for? this? argument? see:?
Collier?and?Hoeffler?2001,?Weinstein?2007,?Walter?2006).?
The?debate?puts?a?clear?emphasis?on?groups?capturing?the?state?in?order?to?
gain?access?to?resources?that?serve?as?proxies?for?state?power?(Fearon?and?
Laitin?2003:?76,?Cederman?et?al.:?87,?also?see?Woodward?2003).?Schlichte?
points?out?that?gaining?legitimacy?enables?agents?of?violence?to?gain?access?
to?state? resources? through?office,? to?access? local?constituencies,?or? to?be?
entitled? to?use? violence? for? these?purposes? (Schlichte? 2009,? first? version?
2007:?7).??
?
This? argument? offers? various? explanations? for? recurring? violence? over?
extended?periods?of?time.?The?core?of?the?argument?supports?that?actors?
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persistently?engage? in?violence,?because?they?1)?gain?material?assets?from?
the?use?of?force?and?2)?become?a?habitual?part?of?an?economy?of?violence?
(for? this? strand? of? debate? see? above? all:? Elwert? 1997? and? 1999;? Jung,?
Schlichte? and? Siegelberg;? Schlichte?2005;? Zuercher?and?Koehler?2003).? In?
markets? of? violence,? violence? becomes? both? a? resource? to? extract?more?
resources?and?a?currency?that?can?be?used?by?actors?to?pursue?their?goals?
and?simultaneously?perpetuates?the?instable?context?necessary?to?maintain?
shadow? economies.? Weinstein? points? out? that? violence? from? rebel?
organizations?tends?to?recur? if?resources?become?available?(see?Weinstein?
2007).??
The? tipping? moment? of? a? system? skipping? from? armed? conflict? into? a?
market? or? an? order? of? violence? occurs? when? actors? not? only? opt? for?
violence?as?a?low?cost?means?to?achieve?their?goals,?but?when?maintaining?
power?requires?actors?to?engage?in?armed?action.?The?debate?offers?largely?
differing?explanations?for?this:?Rational?choice?based?explanations?contend?
that?state?elites?may?opt?for?resurrection?through?warfare?(Mansfield?and?
Snyder? 2005:? 43,? Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998:? 434,? also? see?Walter? 2003).?
Process?centered?perspectives?argue?that?violence?starts?out?as?motivated?
by?greed,?but?transgresses?over?time? into?a?self?reinforcing?mechanism?of?
needs? and? thus?perpetuate? violence? (Kalyvas? and?Balcell?2010:?416,? also?
see?Berdal?and?Malone?2000,?Arnson?and?Zartman?2005).?A? few?valuable?
studies? on? international? engagement? in? conflicts? with? illicit? economies?
show?how?external?engagement?tends?to?aggravate?the?level?or? likelihood?
of?violence?and?often?maintains?predatory?elites? in?specific?cases? (see? for?
example:?Andreas?2008,?Cockayne?and?Lupell?2009).?
?
Critique? of?Arguments? 1? and? 2:? Predatory? policies? of? local? state? elites? in?
Georgia?
In?the?course?of?2004,?criticism?of?new?president?Saakashvili’s?policies?took?
hold.13?The?re?escalation?of?the?conflict? in?South?Ossetia?was?held?to?be?a?
                                                          
13? For? a? detailed? account? of? the? background? of?Georgian? politics? in? the? context? of? the?
South?Ossetia?conflict,?please?see?the?first?section?of?the?empirical?analysis,?accounting?for?
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result? of? more? assertive,? nationalist? policies? of? the? new? Georgian?
leadership?striving? for? territorial? reintegration? (see? for?example?Wheatley?
2005).?The?newly?emerging?elite?announced?a?plan?to?establish?Georgia?as?
a? viable?member?of? the?Western? community,?making? the? country? fit? for?
NATO?and?EU? integration,?and? claiming? to?wrestle? it? from? the?paralyzing?
grip? of? the? status? quo? imposed? by? Russia? throughout? the? 1990s? (Nodia?
2000).? Because? settlement? prospects? were? dim? and? there? was? time?
pressure?to?keep?up?with?the?population’s?and? international?expectations,?
it?was?understood?that?the?Georgian?government?took?an?impatient?course?
that? led? to? hawkish? policies? and? engaged? in? a? cycle? of? armed? atrocities?
involving?Russian?and?Ossetian?forces?(see?for?example:?Jones?2009).?After?
2004,?illicit?practices?deteriorated?the?balance?of?interests?in?the?conflict,?as?
Georgian? and? Ossetian? groups? aimed? to? gain? control? over? smuggling?
through?the?South?Ossetia?region.?
?
There? is? an? appealing? scope? of? explaining? escalation? through? predatory?
power?policies:?Many?observers?hold?that?the?Georgian?government?made?
the? situation? in? the? conflict?worse?by? atrocious?policies,?with? the? aim? to?
prove? themselves? in? their? new? positions? of? power.? In? addition,? it? was?
widely? held? that? high?ranking? state? actors? and? regional? state? actors?
attempted?to?gain?control?over?illicit?assets?in?the?conflict?area?(Fuller?2005,?
also?see?interviews?in?chapter?2).?
?
The? explanation? is? however? flawed? as? it? does? not? grasp? why? Georgian?
politics? under? the? second? president? Shevardnadze? were? more? peaceful?
than?under?the?third?president?Saakashvili’s?rule.?Both?presidencies?ranked?
territorial? re?integration? and? integration? into?Western? structures?high?on?
their?agendas?and?both?administrations?included?members?who?personally?
gained? from? the? conflict? (see? for? this? view? for? example?Wheatly? 2005,?
George?2009).?When?the?power?shift?to?Saakashvili?took?place?in?2004,?the?
                                                                                                                                                                                     
key?events?and?trajectories?between?1989?and?2009.?The?account?given?here?serves?solely?
to? support? the?argument?of? the? study?and? choses? therefore?a? selective?account?on? the?
basis?of?selective?literature.?
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new?elite?enjoyed?similar?scopes?of?financial?and?political?support?from?the?
international? community? and? even? far? more? from? the? population? than?
Shevardnadze’s? administration? had? at? its? peak.? Why? then? did? the?
stalemated? conflict? turn? into? repeated? escalations? over? the? successive?
years???
?
The?argument?could?explain?the?re?escalation?of?violence?out?of?predatory?
policies.?The?new?Saakashvili?elite,?first?under?Saakashvili?as?the?Minister?of?
Justice?then?as?president,?attempted?to?overhaul?the?old?order?and?to?gain?
control?over? smuggling? activities? in? the? contested? areas?bordering? South?
Ossetia.??
In? this? instant,? the? argument? cannot? explain? why? the? 2008? escalation?
occurred:?Smuggling?margins?explicitly?depended?on?uncontrolled?borders?
provided?by?the?status?quo?of?the?conflict?and?a?low?level?of?violence.?The?
escalation? in? 2008? created? disorder,? which? undermined? smuggling?
activities,?harmed?and?business?relations?with?partners?on?the?other?side?of?
the?bargain?as?access? routes?were?closed?down.? If?gains? from? illicit? trade?
had?been?the?motivation?for?policies?of?violence,?attempts?at?reintegration?
of?the?area?would?not?have?been?a?viable?policy.?Hence,?interest?in?gaining?
control?over? illicit?assets?can?at?most?partially?explain?why?the?conflict?re?
escalates?at?different?points?in?time.??
?
Similarly,?the?argument?that?elections?lead?to?violence?does?not?hold?in?this?
case.? The? core? aspect? of? this? argument? contends? that? violence? emerges?
prior? to? or? in? the? context? of? elections.?Most? of? the? studies? concur? that?
election?cycles?coinciding?with?mobilization?cycles?can?result? in?violence.14?
What? if? escalation? occurs?without? elections? in? temporal? proximity?? The?
recurrence?of?violence?in?the?South?Ossetia?case?is?not?always?or?often?not?
clearly?linked?to?election?periods:?Violence?in?the?conflict?peaked?after?the?
new?post?Soviet? elite?had? taken?power? after?1989? (see? the?discussion? in?
chapter?2).?Also,?violence? re?intensified?after?elections?were?held? in?2000?
                                                          
14? Beissinger? identifies? escalation? toward? the? end? of? the?mobilization? cycle,? though? in?
terms?of?mobilization?towards?a?political?goal,?not?necessarily?elections?(Beissinger?2002).?
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and? escalated? only? after? the? regime? change?was? settled? in? 2004.?Many?
mechanisms? linked? to?election?cycles?may?occur?continuously? throughout?
the?process,?but?they?might?not?1)?be?specific? for?election?contexts,?or?2)?
lead?to?escalation,?unless?under?additional?circumstances.?
3) Argument?3:?Emotions?leading?to?violence?–?“Whether?Resentment?
produces? violence?or?not?depends? in? large?part?on? the? intensity?of? the?
emotion”?(Petersen?2002:?256)?
The? debate? on? grievances? emerging? from? political? inequalities? gained?
influence?when?at?the?start?of?the?1990s?atrocities?between?ethnic?groups?
broke?out?across?the?world,?such?as?prominently? in?the?former?Yugoslavia?
(for? this?argument? see? for?example:?Kaufman?1996?and?2001;?Gurr?1970?
and?2000;?Kaldor?1999;?Westley?1966).? Strong?emotions?based?on?group?
identity?were?held? to? trigger? acts?of? violence?by? group?members? in? case?
their? peer? group? is? –? real? or? perceived? –? subject? to? an? outside? threat,?
mostly? from? a? second? ethnic? group.15? Ethnicity? is? held? to? be? a? naturally?
inherited? type? of? affection? to? the? kin? or? cultural? group? into? which? an?
individual? is?born,?and?thus?endows?especially?strong?emotional?bonds?on?
its?members? (see? for?example:?Huntington?1996,? Ignatieff?1993,?Westley?
1966).?To?this?end,?notions?of?ethnicity?are?held?to?intensify?emotions?and?
thus? the? likelihood? of? the? use? of? violence?when? group?members? act? on?
their?emotions?to?protect?the?group.?
Also,?after? the?debate? turned? to?seeking?explanations? for?ethnic?violence?
not? in? identity?based? approaches,? but? in? political? or? private? interests? of?
actors?or?at? least?a?nexus?of?private?gains?and?political?goals? (for?some?of?
these?critical?views?see:?Kalyvas?2001;?Collier?and?Hoeffler?2001;?Korf?2005;?
Regan? and? Norton? 2005),? studies? often? have? drawn? on? emotion?based?
explanations? (Jeffrey? 2007,? Dion? 1996).? Proponents? of? this? approach?
suggest? that? grievances? take? hold? over? time? if? volatile? inter?group?
relationships? are? protracted? through? continuous? –? real? or? perceived? –?
                                                          
15?Forms?of?violence? such?as?domestic?violence,?gang?violence,? street? criminality?can?all?
depend?on?group?identification,?but?are?not?relevant?for?contexts?of?nationalist?violence.?
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subjugation? of? one? group,? for? instance? through? unequal? distribution? of?
power? or? goods? or? direct? acts? of? physical? violence? (see? for? example:?
Petersen?2002,?Wood?2003).?The? longer?and? the?more?gravely?one?group?
sees? itself? oppressed? by? another,? the? higher? the? likelihood? of? violence.?
‘Ancient?hatreds’?between?groups,?based?on?narratives?often?dating?back?
centuries,? motivate? patterns? of? grievances? that? then? lead? to? acts? of?
violence.??
?
Thereby,? the? argument? focuses? on? social? inequalities,? often? within? the?
boundaries?of?a? state? that?cause?violence? in? the? long? run.? In?many?cases?
those?–?perceived?or?real?–?inequalities?are?held?to?follow?ethnic?lines,?and?
can? be? reinforced? through? strategic? state? policies.?Wucherpfennig? et? al.?
point? out? that? “Ethnicity? can? indeed? prolong? civil? wars.? This? effect? is?
entirely? driven? by? conflicts? with? state?induced? grievances,? in? cases? of?
systematically?excluding?specific?ethnic?groups?from?access?to?state?power”?
(Wucherpfennig? et? al.? 2010:? 3).? Institutional? approaches? hold? that?
institutions,? often? used? by? elites,? may? trigger? or? prevent? violence?
depending?on? their?scope?of?social?equality?promotion?and?prevention?of?
grievances?(Wilkinson?2006:?203).?
?
Violence?is?held?to?break?out?when,?both,?emotions?intensify?to?the?tipping?
point? and? when? context? provides? the? opportunity? (Petersen? 2002:? 18).?
Therefore,? violence? is? more? likely? to? occur? when? the? social? context?
changes,?such?as?when?social?hierarchy? is?altered,?new?resources?become?
available,?or?authority?at?the?social?center?weakens?(ibid.:?40).?Proponents?
of?the?grievance?argument?particularly?point?to?the?end?of?the?international?
system?during? the?Cold?War? as?having? given? rise? to? inter?group? conflicts?
within? new? states? through? the? absence? of? a? sovereign.? The? Security?
Dilemma?argument?holds? that? fear? triggers?armed?group?conflict? (for? this?
argument? see? above? all:? Figueiredo? and?Weingast? 1997).? Strands? of? this?
approach?points? to? the?use?of? ethnicity?by? political? elites,?which? lead? to?
assumptions? about? the? adversary? group’s? behavior? which? then? has? an?
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effect?on?the?processes?of?violence?(see?for?example:?Fearon?1995,?Posen?
1993,?Mearsheimer?1990,?Harff?and?Gurr?1994,?Walter?2003).?Primordialist?
approaches? hold? that? the? friction? ensuing? from? the? erosion? of? the?
traditional?structure?of?social?relationships?results? in? inter?group?struggles?
over?self?determination?or?self?preservation?(Isaacs?1975).?
?
Similar? to? the? illicit?economy?argument,?once?grievance?induced?violence?
has?started? it? introduces?a?deterministic?self?reinforcing?cycle?of?atrocities?
based? on? revenge.? The? longer? the? process? drags? on,? the? higher? the?
likelihood? of? an? order? of? violence? to? take? hold:? the? more? incidents? of?
casualties,? inequalities? and? sufferings? amass? and? again? turn? into?
grievances,?the?more?this?enforces?group?identity,?incentives?for?the?use?of?
violence?and?for?re?escalation.?
?
Critique?of?Argument?3:?Russia’s?claim?of?regional?dominance?
Russia’s? role? in? the? Caucasus? has? been? contested? latest? since? resistance?
against?Russian?led?rule?started?north?and?south?of?the?Greater?Caucasus?in?
the?18th?century.16?The?common?explanation?for?recurring?violence?in?South?
Ossetia? centers?on?Russian?historical? influence? fuelling?ethnic? tensions? in?
the?Caucasus?(Popescu?2007:?6,?also?see?Markedonov?2008,?Tishkov?2002,?
Blank? 1995).? Russia? holds? a? tight? political,? economic? and? occasionally?
military?grip?on?the?former?Soviet?republics?(see?for?example:?Fischer?2010)?
as? it? sees? its? influence? threatened? by? Westernizing? efforts? in? its? near?
abroad.?To?maintain? influence?over?Georgia’s?course,?Russia?supports? the?
breakaway? entities? of? South? Ossetia? and? Abkhazia,? a? divide?and?rule?
strategy? supporting? titular? nations? over? others.? Russia’s? meddling,?
according? to? this?argument,?destabilizes? the? context,?or?prevents? it? from?
stabilizing? in? the? first? place,? to? the? extent? that? re?escalation? of? violence?
became?imminent?(Nichol?2008:?9?and?27).?
                                                          
16?The?above?critique?of?the?election?and?illicit?economy?arguments?has?already?raised?the?
critique?of?the?grievance?argument,?seminally?in?the?debates?between?Collier?and?Hoeffler?
and?Fearon?and?Laitin.?It?shall?not?be?repeated?here?as?this?discussion?aims?at?the?use?of?
the?grievance?argument?in?light?of?re?escalation?in?South?Ossetia.?
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The?historical? legacies?of?grievances?experienced?an? important? shift?after?
the? disintegration? of? the? Soviet? Union.? Soviet? institutions? fuelled?
competition? among? titular?nations? in? the?Caucasus,? and? led? to? territorial?
claims? based? on? self?determination? after? the? patronage? of?Moscow? had?
ended?(see?for?example:?De?Waal?2010,?Shatirishvili?2009).?To?this?end,?the?
Soviet? period? laid? the? foundations? for? inter?group? relations? that? were?
deeply?entrenched?with?real?and?perceived?inequalities.?The?South?Ossetia?
conflict? entails? a? compelling? history? of? grievances? of? Georgians? and?
Ossetians,? including? narratives? of? the? right? to? live? in? a? certain? place,?
unequal? rights? during? the? Soviet? period? and? beyond,? extend? to? ethnic?
cleansing?and?accounts?of?mutual?atrocities?(for?seminal?studies?see:?Birch?
1996?and?1999).?
?
The? debate? offers? an? explanation? of? how? emotions? that? turn? into?
grievances?over?extended?periods?of?time?can?then?cause?violence.? In?this?
respect,? Jeffrey? brings? up? for? debate? the? representative? argument? that?
“reescalation?of?conflict?and?failure?of?post?settlement?democratization?are?
more?likely?when?there?are?incompatible?national?identities”?(Jeffrey?2007:?
679).? However,? the? above? discussed? widespread? argument? of? assertive?
Russia? triggering?domestic?and?external?conditions?of? (re?)escalation?does?
not?provide?an?explanation?as? to?why?escalations?occur?at? those? specific?
points?in?time?and?why?they?recur.?Russian,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?policies?
have? been? assertive? ever? since? the? breakup? of? the? Soviet? Union.? The?
potential,? the? will? and? the? attitude? to? use? force? in? the? context? of? the?
conflict?existed?at?all?points?in?time?after?1989?among?all?the?stakeholders.?
As?argued?above,?escalations?also?do?not?necessarily?coincide?with?shifts?in?
power?which?might?point?to?grievances?as?a?cause:?Georgian?relations?with?
Russia?deteriorated?after?Russian?president?Putin?came?into?power?in?2000?
and?again?after?the?regime?change?in?Georgia?in?2004.?This?does?not?explain?
why? the? conflict? never? escalated? after? changes? in? power? among?
stakeholders?between?1992?and?2002.? In?addition,? this?only?explains? that?
the? context? deteriorated? in? favor? of? escalation,? but? does? not? explain? or?
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provide?credible? links?why?and?how?escalations?occurred?at? the?points? in?
time?observed.?
?
Yet?another?weakness?shows? in? the?grievance?argument?when? looking?at?
South?Ossetia?in?its?regional?context:?Historical?legacies?of?Russian?regional?
dominance? relate? to? all? regional? conflicts? such? as? in? Nagorno?Karabakh,?
Transnistria?and?Abkhazia.?However?as?pointed?out?in?the?introduction,?the?
South?Ossetia?conflict?proves?to?be?the?most?dynamic?and? intense?among?
its? siblings? and? the? grievance? argument? does? not? help? explain? how? this?
came?about.?Therefore,? the?discussion? turns? to? the?external? influence?of?
international? actors? as? a? possible? explanation? for? re?escalation? in? South?
Ossetia.?
4) Argument?4:? Involvement?of?external?actors? leading? to?violence?–?
“The?West?did?not?do?enough”?(Asmus?2010)?
The? impact? of? external? influence? on? domestic? events? is? a? rarely? studied?
subject.?Theories?of?external?influence?in?the?post?Cold?war?period?discuss?
rapid?diversification?of?foreign?relations?of?post?Soviet?successor?state?after?
they? lose? Moscow? as? their? external? patron? (for? this? approach? see? for?
example:?Stein?and?Lobell?1997,?Wallensteen?and?Axell?1993,?Byman?et?al.?
2001).?With? regard? to?external?engagement? in? internal?armed?conflicts? in?
the?post?Soviet?area?and?beyond,?studies?deal?with?forms?of?influence?such?
as? outside? military? intervention? (see? for? example? Zuercher? 2007,?
Markedonov? 2008),? international? assistance? through? financing? or?
humanitarian? aid? (Crawford? 1997? and? 2000),? peace?keeping? missions?
(Koenig? 2005,? Jawad? 2005),? diaspora? support? (Cederman,? Girardin? and?
Gleditsch? 2009),? and? cross?border? relations? of? ethnic? communities? (King?
and?Menon?2010,?Schultz?2010,?Carment?and?James?1995,?Saideman?1998).?
?
Representative?literature?perceives?the?post?communist?space?as?a?sphere?
of? interest? for? the? West? and? Russia? (for? example? see:? Blank? 1995,?
Markedonov? 2008).? The? debates? differ? in?which? forms? of? influence? they?
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assign? to? both? the? West? and? Russia? in? pursuing? their? political? goals.?
Western? agency? is? said? to? rely? on? conditionality? policy? that? ties? the?
implementation?of?stability?enhancing?measures?to?political,?economic?and?
financial? support? for? state? elites? (Sasse? 2008,? Levitsky? and? Way? 2007,?
Schimmelfennig?2005,?Crawford?2000,?Milcher?and?Slay?2005).?The?US?and?
EU’s? focus? their?global?efforts?on?a?state?building?agenda? (Jung,?Schlichte?
and? Siegelberg? 2003;? Schlichte? 2005)? through? which? integration? into?
Western?structures?such?as?NATO?or?EU?depends?on?territorial?integration.?
Although?Western?policies?of?the?U.S.,?EU?and?individual?EU?member?states?
differ?at?great? length,?Western?conditional?policy? in?the? field?of?territorial?
integration? largely? focuses? on? enhancing? stability? through? strengthening?
central?state?power.?
?
Altogether,? the? scope? of? external? impact? on? internal? violence? is? not?
systematically?explored?beyond,?either,?specific?forms?of?action?or?agendas?
of? interests,?or? structural? influence?on?domestic?politics? (Carment,? James?
and?Taydas?2009:?72).?International?Relations?theory?was?the?first?strand?of?
debate? to? theoretically? grasp? the? role? of? external? influence? in? changing?
domestic? landscapes? (see? above? all:? Putnam? 1990,? Gourevitch? 1978,?
Suhrke? and? Noble? 1977).? Studies? focus? on? the? proximity? of? military?
competition?or?democratic?states?that?can?result?in?diffusion?of?norms?and?
values? through? ‘spill? over’? or? ‘contagion’? effects? enhancing? trends? in?
transitional? states? (Jacoby? 2006,? Snyder? 2000:? 74? and? 341? ff.,? also? see:?
Checkel?1999,?Gleditsch?and?Ward?2006,?Whitehead?1996).?
However,?these?studies?focus?on?structural?external?influence?on?domestic?
political?conditions?and?remain?vague?in?terms?of?their?function?(Carment,?
James? and? Taydas? 2009:? 70;? also? see:? Heraclides? 1991;? Zartman? 1992;?
Saideman?1997;?Keohane?and?Milner?1996)?or?provide?weak?explanations?
for? the? influence?of? external? policies?on? internal? conflicts? as? opposed? to?
triggering? inter?state?strife? (Carment,? James?and?Taydas?2009:?72).? In?this?
respect,? a? large? strand? of? single? case? studies? exists? that? explore? specific?
characteristics?of?violence?through?external?and?internal?actors?at?the?same?
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as?acknowledging?commonalities?between?conflict?contexts?across?regions?
(Sorli,? Gleditsch? and? Strand? 2005;? Korf? 2005;? Sanchez? R.? 2006;? Bohara,?
Mitchell? and? Nepal? 2006).? However,? they? remain? confined? in? their?
conclusions? to? individual? contexts,? or? respectively? explore? how? external?
Western? influence? affects? failed? democratization? and? authoritarian?
regimes,? but? do? not? systematically? focus? on? the? effects? of? external?
engagement? on? the? processes? of? violence? (for? example? see:? Crawford?
2005,? Olsen? 1998,? Presnall? 2009,? Lewis? 1996).? Therefore,? even? when?
employing?an?explorative?approach,?studies?refrain?from?generalizing?their?
findings? across? cases? (Sambanis? 2004b,? Lawson? 2006:? 409).? Here,? these?
studies? mostly? confine? themselves? to? testing? or? confirming? existing?
hypotheses? (i.a.? Senechal? de? la? Roche? 2001,? Lawson? 2006,? Beissinger?
2009).?
?
Critique?of?Argument?4:?Policies?of?Western?negligence?
As?to?the?question?of?external?influence?in?the?South?Ossetia?conflict,?there?
are? usually? two? sets? of? opposing? opinions.? The? first? holds? that? external?
engagement? does? too? little? to? end? conflict,? the? second? that? it? does? too?
much,?both?held?by?local?and?international?observers.?The?first?perspective?
describes?recurring?violence?in?the?conflict?as?a?result?of?the?lack?of?interest?
of?the?Western?international?community?(above?all?see:?Asmus?2010,?Nodia?
2004),? holding? that? if?Western? actors? had? put?more? and? different? effort?
into?resolving?the?conflict,?the?situation?could?have?remained?calm?and?the?
conflict?could?have?been?settled?after? the? first?war? in?1992.?Nonetheless,?
international?and?local?actors?engaged?in?the?conflict?on?an?intense?level?all?
through? the? period? since? 1992,? through? negotiations,? monitoring? the?
peace?keeping? force,? and? initiating? conflict?related? institutions? and?
roadmaps.? The? second? perspective? criticizes? overly? intense? engagement?
aiming? at? realizing? geopolitical? interests?by?Russia? and? the?U.S.?with? the?
result? of? fuelling? the? conflict? in? South? Ossetia? (for? this? view? see:?
MacFarlane?1999,?Cornell?and?Starr?2009).?Thereby,?the?territory?of?South?
Ossetia? serves? as? a? proxy? for? underlying? superpower? interests? of?
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hegemonic? claims? to? the? Caucasus? region.? In? addition,? the? secessionist?
entities? enjoyed? external? support? through?Russia? and? bordering? entities,?
such?as?North?Ossetia?supporting?South?Ossetia?(see?the?studies?of?Schultz?
2010?as?well?as?King?and?Menon?2010).?However,?similar?to?the?grievance?
argument,? these?attitudes?do?not?explain?why?dynamics? in?South?Ossetia?
differ?from?Abkhazia?or?other?post?Soviet?conflicts?which?all?are?subject?to?
these?interests.?
?
Existing? studies? largely? focus? on? the? likelihood? of? outcomes? through?
specific? factors,? as? well? across? cases,? and? not? on? particular? policies?
initiating?processes? in?a?recurring?manner?(see?above?all:?Crawford?2000).?
As?a? result,? the?mechanisms? these? studies?offer? remain?highly?opaque? in?
their?functioning,?offering?diffuse?causal?links?between?external?actors?and?
violent? outcomes? (Bader? 2010:? 22).? How? specifically? external? influence?
plays? out? in? different? arenas? to? lay? open? causal? links? should? be?
systematically? embraced.? Studies? usually? do? not? focus? on? external?
engagement?as?such,?but?on? individual?events?such?as?one?group?rising?to?
power?or?a?decision?to?go?to?war,?and?also?do?not?embrace?why?patterns?
recur?persistently.?The? studies?of? Levitsky?and?Way? (2010),?Bader? (2010)?
and?Goodhand? and?Walton? (2009)? for? the? Sri? Lanka? case? form?welcome?
exceptions.?Levitsky?and?Way?focus?on?mechanisms?of?influence?of?external?
policies? that? are? used? by? local? state? elites? in? transitional? states? in? their?
favor.? Levitsky?and?Way?as?well?as?Bader?propose? to? specifically? conduct?
analyses?at?the?level?of?leadership?agency?and?carve?out?repetitive?patterns?
of?policies?at?the? local? level.?The?discussion?of?findings?will?draw?on?these?
studies?to?frame?the?findings?of?the?South?Ossetia?case.?
?
Conclusion?of?the?critique?of?existing?arguments?
The? arguments? in? the? existing? literature? give? a? fair? picture? of? the?
predominant? reasoning? on? escalations? in? ethnically? framed,? internal?
conflicts.? However,? they? are? not? able? to? adequately? address? why? the?
conflict? in? South? Ossetia? re?escalated? at? those? points? in? time? and?
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repeatedly?escalates.?Most?importantly,?the?arguments?confine?themselves?
to? analyzing? the? political? factors,? and? treat? violence? as? an? outcome? of?
conflict,?but?not?as?a?subject?of?study.? In?the?same?vein,?arguments? loose?
themselves?at?a?merely?situational?or?psychological? level,?holding?that?the?
conflict? escalated? because? individuals? acted? irrationally.?Also,? arguments?
crumble? at? the? macro? level? holding? powers? responsible? with? barely? a?
traceable? connection? to?events?on? the? ground,? relating? to?decisions? that?
are?made?in?far?away?places.?
?
The?critique?of?these?and?other?recent?studies?on?ethnic?violence?begs?for?
inclusion?of?the?study?of?dynamics?of?ethnic?conflicts? in?the?general?study?
of? ethnic? violence? (for? studies? raising? this? critique? see? for? example:? Eck?
2009,? Zartman? 2004? and? 2007,? Kalyvas? 2006,? Balcell? and? Kalyvas? 2010,?
Walter? 2003? and? 2009,? Schlichte? 2005)? and? also? will? enhance? existing?
theories?with?generalized?hypotheses?about?the?triggers?of?ethnic?violence.??
This? assessment? is? supported? by? the? critique? of? two? recent? and? seminal?
papers?by?Cederman?et?al.? (2010)?and?Wucherpfenning?et?al.? (2010):?The?
debates?about?ethnic?violence?neglect?to?account?for?historical?patterns?of?
ethnic?conflict?leading?to?violence?and?protracting?armed?conflict?(also?see?
Cederman?et?al.?2010:?97,?Wimmer?and?Min?2006).?Most?studies?focus?on?
singular?events,? isolated?or?exogenous? factors?or?decisions? taken,?or?very?
specific? forms?of? violence.?Accordingly,?Capoccia? and?Keleman? stress? the?
importance?of? longitudinal?comparison?of? two?or?more?events?within? the?
same?unit?of?analysis?(Capoccia?and?Kelemen?2007:?360).??
As? a? result,? the? seemingly?differently? vectored? explanations? for?Western?
behavior? in? the? South?Ossetia? context? all? rely? on? a?hypothetically? stable?
relationship? between? the? explanatory? factors? and? their? impact? on?
processes?of?violence.?This?means,?1)? the?course?of?events? is?expected?to?
change?only?when?these?factors?change?(and?not?if?they?interact?differently?
in?the?course?of?the?process)?and?2)?the?change?in?impact?of?these?factors?is?
not? assumed? to? happen? outside? the? system,? but? not? through? their?
interaction?with?each?other?or?the?process?of?violence.?
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The?discussion? reveals? that? recurring?violence? in? stalemated?conflicts? is?a?
very?rarely?studied?subject?and?requires?the?input?of?an?in?depth?empirical?
inquiry? into? political? agency.?Also? very? little? research? has? been? done? on?
how? international? influence?affects?dynamics?of?violence,?considering? the?
key? role?of?external? actors? in? internal? conflicts?over?extended?periods?of?
time.? The? extent? to?which? external?policies? frame? local?developments? in?
the? context?of? the? South?Ossetia? conflict? since? at? least?1991,? suggests? a?
continuous?and?significant?impact.??
?
Altogether,?these?arguments?neglect?or?do?not?account?for?1)?the?effects?of?
international?engagement,?2)? the? interaction?of?external?Western?policies?
with?Georgian?state?agency,?and?3)?specific?characteristics?that?apply?to?the?
conflict? in? South? Ossetia,? such? as? continuous? re?escalation? in? a? highly?
intense? setting.? The? larger? bulk? of? studies? on? violence? in? stalemated?
conflicts?does?not?embrace?these?characteristics?of?the?South?Ossetia?case.?
In?this?respect,?the?debate? is?not?clear?about?when?violence?happens?and?
how? shifts? in? dynamics? come? about.?Based? on? these? considerations,? the?
study?will?present?a?causal?argument.?
?
2.2. The?argument?
Altogether,? the? literature? offers? a? rich? debate? on? factors,? causal? chains,?
history,?and? context? influencing?violence? in?ethnic? conflicts.?Nonetheless,?
the? previous? discussion? tried? to? show? why? those? arguments? do? not?
adequately?address?the?dynamics?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict.?Therefore,?
the? study? presents? its? own? argument? pertaining? to?why? violence? in? the?
South?Ossetia?conflict?re?escalates.?
?
The?dissertation?argues?that?policies?of?external?actors?at?specific?points?in?
time? provided? for? behavior? of? local? state? elites? in? Georgia? to? shift? to?
assertive? policies? with? the? result? of? escalation.? External? policies?
significantly? affect? domestic? power? options? as? the? South?Ossetia? conflict?
puts?territorial?claims,?competing?group?issues,?international?and?domestic?
45?
?
political? support? and? financial? assets? at? stake.? Thereby,? external? policies?
incentivize? Georgian? state? elites? to? utilize? and? to? comply? with? external?
influence? in? the? context? of? the? conflict.? The? argument? holds? that? this?
scheme?repeatedly?provides?for?escalation?throughout?the?process.?On?this?
basis,?the?study?further?contends?that?patterns?of?external?influence?show?
prior? to? escalations.? These? patterns? are? chains? of? actions? which? work?
through? local? state? policies? and? translate? into? mechanisms? of? external?
influence?that?enable?dynamics?of?re?escalation?in?the?conflict.?
?
The?purpose?of? the? following? study? is? to?plausibly? sustain? the?argument.?
Therefore,? I? would? like? to? conclude? the? presentation? of? the? argument?
based?on?an?extensive? literature?review?and? its?critique?and? introduce?the?
methodological?part? that? informs? the? analytical? framework?of? the? study.?
The?analytical?framework?will?present?working?hypotheses?and?methods?to?
implement?the?subsequent?empirical?analysis.??
?
2.3. Analytical?framework?
The?following?section?presents?the?analytical?framework?of?the?study.?First,?
I?will? discuss? and? present? the?working? hypotheses? that? derive? from? the?
causal? argument.? Further,? I?will?present? a? theoretical? foundation? for? the?
causal?link?that?ties?agency?recurrently?to?its?violent?outcome.?This?includes?
a? discussion? of? identifying? shifts? in? dynamics,? defining? the? causal? link,?
locating? the? causal? link,? presenting? analytical? tools? and,? finally,? ascribing?
meaning?to?causal?links?through?the?concept?of?social?mechanisms?that?will?
help? conducting? the? empirical? analysis.? The? section? concludes? with? the?
presentation?of?the?analytical?framework.?
?
?
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a) Key?aspects?of?the?argument?and?working?hypotheses?
Violence?in?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?
The? debate? on? armed? conflict? explores? the? issue? from? various? analytical?
angles,? such? as?why? violence? occurs? in? a? particular? location,? but? not? in?
another?(Wilkinson?2004:?20?and?58,?also?see:?Kalyvas?2006),?why?violence?
occurs?within?the?same?conflict?at?a?particular?point? in?time?and?not?at?an?
earlier? or? later? point? in? the? process? (Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998:? 432,?
Beissinger? 1998:? 39,?Wilkinson? 2004:? 26),? why? violence? occurs? in? some?
cases,? but? not? in? others? (Figueiredo? and? Weingast? 1997:? 1,? also? see:?
Weinstein?2007,?Fearon?and?Laitin?1996),?why?some?groups?or? individuals?
participate?in?violence?while?others?do?not?(for?this?large?strand?of?debate?
see? for?example:?Wucherpfennig?et?al.?2010:?4,?Kalyvas?2006,?Humphreys?
and? Weinstein? 2008,? Walter? 2006,? Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998),?
intensification? of? armed? conflict? in? ethnic? contexts? (Ben?Yehuda? and?
Mishali?Ram? 2003;? Brecher? and? Wilkenfeld? 1997;? Bueno? de? Mesquita,?
Morrow,? and? Zorick? 1997;? Eberwein? 1981;? Fearon? 1994;?Morgan? 1994;?
Reed?2000;?Senese?1997),?and?why? in?particular?conflicts?particular? forms?
of?violence?occur?(Beissinger?1998:?8,?also?see:?Fearon?and?Laitin?1996).??
Fundamentally,? this? study? examines? violence,? not? war? or? conflict.? The?
violence? that? is? subject? to? the? study? is? carried? out? by? state? actors? and?
occurs? in? the? context? of? armed? inter?group? conflict.? The? debate? likes? to?
distinguish? between? types? of?warfare,? and? the?more? recent? discussions?
center? on? organized? violence? often?within? state? boundaries? including? at?
least?one?non?state?party?(Kalyvas?2001:?102?103,?also?see:?Sambanis?2000?
and? 2004,? Kaldor? 1999).? Older? definitions? focus? on? conventional? wars?
involving? state? actors? engaging? in? armed? action? across? international?
borders? (see? for? example:? Holsti? 1996,? Kaldor? 1999).? In? addition,?many?
studies?assume?violence?to?be?a?linear?part?of?the?processes?of?any?kind?of?
warfare:?Once?violence?has? started,?dynamics?progress?via? intensification?
to?escalation?until?violence?decreases.?Moreover,?most?studies?encompass?
only?a? single? cycle?of?escalation? (for? this?critique? see:?Eck?2009,?Zartman?
2007).??
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However,? this? definition? excludes? three? important? features? worthy? of?
study:? First,? it? excludes? violent? incidents? that? can? trigger? (re)escalation?
prior? to?war? or? other? forms? of? escalations? of? violence.? These? categories?
omit? characteristics?of?violence? such?as? intensity?of?violence,?duration?of?
wars,?and?effects?of?violence?at?particular?points?in?time.?Second,?the?more?
recent?definition?of?wars?within?boundaries?of?the?state?as?‘internal’?limits?
the?study?of?external?dimensions?of?internal?wars.?Third,?the?‘old’?definition?
of? conventional?war? omits? the? politics? of? domestic? power? consolidation?
leading?to?violence.??
That?said,?violence?seems?to?be?likely?to?occur?under?certain?circumstances.?
As? discussed? above,? recurring? violence? is? a? powerful? characteristic? of?
ethnonationalist?conflicts?and,?conversely,?ethnonationalist?contexts?make?
for? protracted,? highly? dynamic? and? intense? contexts? for? violence.? The?
debate? is?most? vivid? in? the? attempts? at?making? a? legitimate? distinction?
between?ethnic?and?non?ethnic?wars.?If?we?assume?ethnicity?not?as?located?
within? individuals,?but?within? issues?over?which?actors?struggle? (above?all?
see:?Brubaker?2004?and?2009),?we?can?come?to?an?empirical?definition?of?
ethnic? conflict:? “For? a? conflict? to? be? classified? as? ethnic,? armed?
organizations?must?both?explicitly?pursue?ethnonationalist?aims?and?recruit?
fighters?and?forge?alliances?on?the?basis?of?ethnic?affiliations.”?(Cederman?
et?al.?2010:?101).?As?a?result,?this?study?sees?ethnicity?not?as?a?characteristic?
that? determines? dynamics? and? motivations,? but? as? a? claim? that? is?
instrumentalized?by?actors? to?pursue? their?private?and?political?goals?and?
that,? thus,? alters? the? dynamics? of? a? conflict? toward? escalation? through?
agency?with?the?aim?of?power?consolidation.?Therefore,?this?study?chooses?
to?employ?the?term?ethnically?framed?conflicts.?
?
Therefore,? ethnically? framed? conflicts? exhibit? characteristics? that? other?
types?of?armed?struggles?do?not?exhibit:?1)?Ethnic?claims?can?prolong?civil?
wars? if? the? state? induces? grievances? by? systematically? excluding? ethnic?
groups?from?access?to?power?(Wucherpfennig?et?al.?2010:?3,?Cederman?et?
al.?2010:?87),?2)?Ethnonationalist?claims?play?a?pervasive?role? in?change? in?
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motivations?of?actors? in?the?process?of?a?conflict?and?can? lead?to?shifts? in?
dynamics?(see?the?seminal?study?of?Kalyvas?2008),?3)?Violence?in?ethnically?
framed?conflicts? is?more? intense?as?various? forms?of?violence?can?concur,?
including? riots,? looting,?and?genocide,?and? fighters?are? found? to?be?more?
committed? (see?above?all:?Eck?2009),?4)?The?process?of?violence? in?ethnic?
conflicts? is? dynamic? and? not? linear:?As? ethnic? claims? can? be? deliberately?
manipulated? by? political? elites,? historical? path?dependencies? sustain? the?
spoilers? of? violence? that? act? as? sleeper? agents? continuously? enabling?
breakouts? of? violence? (Cederman? et? al.? 2010:? 97,? also? see:? Snyder? and?
Ballentine?1996,?Wimmer?and?Min?2006).??
?
To? this? end,? the? study? conceives? of? the? emergence? of? violence? 1)? as? an?
indicator? in? the? process? leading? to? re?escalation,? 2)? as? including? triggers?
external?and? internal?to?state?boundaries,?and?3)?as?relevant?to?explaining?
re?escalation? independent? from? whether? violence? takes? place? as? an?
incident?of?war,?civil?uprising,?insurgency?etc.?Further,?this?study?centers?on?
re?escalation? of? violence,? and? accordingly? assumes? violence? to? recur,?
because?the?causes?of?violence?protract?and?prolong? legacies?that?sustain?
the?permanent?possibility?of?re?escalation,?taking?effect?over?periods?of?low?
intensity? or? absence? of? violence? (Wucherpfennig? et? al.? 2010:? 5).? To?
conclude,? the? study? centers? on? violence? carried? out? by? state? actors? in?
ethnically? framed,? re?escalating? contexts? of? armed? conflict? within? the?
boundaries?of?a?state.?
?
The?Georgian?state?and?its?leaderships?
Two? recent? and? seminal? papers? by? Cederman? et? al.? (2010)? and?
Wucherpfenning?et?al.?(2010)?complain?that?the?debate?on?ethnic?violence?
largely? neglects? the? role? of? state? actors? in? fuelling? ethnic? violence? both?
strategically?and? indirectly? (Cederman?et?al.?2010:?88,?Wucherpfenning?et?
al.?2010:?4;?also? see:?Brass?1991,?Wimmer?2002).?This? study? closely? links?
the?notion?of?violence?and?the?property?of?the?state?and?its?agents?striving?
to?consolidate?power.?Secessionist?violence?often?occurs?in?the?contexts?of?
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ethnic?conflict?and? for?state?actors,? territory?becomes?a? resource?beyond?
its?nominal?economic?or?strategic?value?(Walter?2006:?313).??
Particularly?in?the?contexts?of?state?formation?as?in?the?post?Soviet?context?
of?Georgia,?territory?is?the?central?claim?to?power.?In?this?respect,?Schlichte?
proposes? the? concept? of? empirical? statehood? to? analytically? grasp?
processes? in? the?newly? forming?states?of? the?1990s.?Schlichte?applies? the?
concept?of?“empirical?stateness”?in?order?to?analytically?grasp?and?identify?
practices? emerging? from? purposeful? action? in? violence?prone? state?
formation?processes? (Schlichte?1998:?107? ff.,?also? see?Migdal?1988).?This?
study? agrees?with? Schlichte’s?definition?of? the? state? as? “a? field?of?power?
whose?borders?are?fixed?also?by?means?violence,?and?whose?dynamic?(…)?is?
informed?by?the?practices?of?social?actors”?(Schlichte?2005:?106).??
?
During?the?breakup?of?the?Soviet?Union,?secessionist?claims?such?as?those?
over? the? territory? of? South?Ossetia? came? to? pose? a? direct? threat? to? the?
authority?of? the?central?state? in?Georgia? (e.g.?Nodia?1989?and?2000).?The?
claim? to? the?Georgian? state? showed? in? several? instances:?First,? it? showed?
the? importance?of?control?over? the? territory.?For? the?new?Georgian?state?
elite,?control?of?the?territory?acted?as?a?marker?of?Georgian?independence?
from?Russian?domination;?for?South?Ossetian?leaders?the?territory?enabled?
claims? of? political? self?determination? vis?a?vis? Georgian? rule;? for? Russian?
actors? control? over? the? territory’s? status? equaled? influence? over? the?
independent?Georgian?state?and?a?hold?on?Western?influence?in?the?region;?
and?Western?actors?saw?the?territorial?reintegration?of?Georgia?as?a?priority?
on?the?way?to?statehood.?
In? Georgia,? each? of? the? three? post?independence? presidents? put? the?
territorial? re?integration?of? South?Ossetia? at? the? top?of?his? agenda? in? an?
attempt? to? legitimize? rule.?The? three?post?independence?governments?all?
relied?on?an? internal? circle,?a? leadership?or?elite?within? the?executive,?of?
hand?picked? personalities? at? the? core? of? presidential? power? (Christophe?
2005,? draft? version? 2003:? 74ff.).? The? key? ministries? occupied? by? the?
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leadership?were? in? all? three?presidencies? specifically? tasked? to? attend? to?
operations? in? the? conflict? area,? negotiations? with? Russia? or? Western?
engagement?(Sigwart?2006).?
Second,? state? actors?had? the?most? effective? influence?over? the? conflict’s?
dynamics? and? outcomes.? Formal? entitlement? via? state? institutions? gave?
military? and? police? actors? varying? degrees? of? legitimacy.? International?
actors? endowed? far? more? legitimacy? to? official? actors? than? to? the?
mercenaries,? militias,? political? representatives? or? other? forces? of? the?
separatist? leaderships.?In?addition,?material?and?symbolic?resources?of?the?
state?enabled?the?efficiency?of?state?agency.17?
Third,? control? over? the? territory? of? and? around? South? Ossetia? gave?
economic? advantages? to? the? state? and? its? actors.? In?Georgia? as? in? other?
post?communist?countries?the?main?source?of?state?income,?together?with?
externally?driven?financing?were?shadow?economies?(see?Gordadze?2003).?
Until? 2004,? smuggling? was? the? largest? source? of? income? of? the? South?
Ossetian? leadership? and? a? big? asset? of? Shevardnadze’s? state? employees?
(Christophe?2005,?draft? version?2003:?85?87;? also? see:?Kuhkianidze?et? al.?
2004,? George? 2009).? International? funding? relates? in? large? scales? to? the?
conflict,?such?as?rehabilitation?payments,?payments?for?displacements?and?
financing? through?development?assistance?projects.?These?assets?all?went?
through?the?hands?of?state?actors,?often?to?their?personal?gain.?
Fourth,? the? conflict?gave? the?Georgian? state? international? leverage.?Post?
Soviet?Georgia?came?under?pressure?to?reintegrate?territorially?in?order?to?
form?a?Western?style?state.?However,?Georgia?received?enormous?amounts?
of? attention? and? financial? incentives? as? a? result? of? this? flaw.? Western?
engagement?and?support?came?to?be?fundamentally?linked?to?the?existence?
of?secessionist?conflict?in?Georgia.?
?
                                                          
17? The? aftermath? of? the? 2008? war? provided? a? salient? example? of? yhis? inadvertent?
legitimization?of?state?actions?at?an?international?level:?Both?Russian?and?Georgian?actions?
were? backed? by? claims? of? their? statehood,? as? Russia? asserted? defending? its? citizens?
(though?on?de?jure?foreign?territory),?and?Georgia?argued?self?defense?against?an?external?
threat?to?its?sovereignty?(Tagliavini?report?2009).?
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As?a? result,? the? state,?as?a?normative? factor?and?pro?active?organization,?
relates? in?an? intense?manner? to? the?South?Ossetia? conflict:?Territory?and?
ethnic?claims?served?as?hinge?categories?of?self?determination?in?Georgian?
recent?history,?new? leaders?put? the? conflict? at? the? top?of? their?domestic?
and? international? agendas,? and? state?related? resources? were? most?
effective? for?gaining? control? in? the? conflict?and? for?private?gains? through?
the? conflict.? Therefore,? state? leaderships? as? elites? within? the? executive?
provide? the? analytical? surface?where?multiple? agencies? tie? together? and?
spin?off?into?the?dynamics?that?are?subject?of?the?study.??
?
External?influence?in?the?South?Ossetia?context?
Prior? to? 1991,?Georgia?had?been? embedded? into? the? Soviet?order?which?
entailed? a? rigid? dependence? of? domestic? policy? on?Moscow’s? patronage?
(see?Suny?1994,?De?Waal?2010).?After? independence,?rapid?diversification?
of? foreign?relations?of?post?Soviet?successor?states?set? in? (on? this?process?
see:?Stein?and?Lobell?1997,?Wallensteen?and?Axell?1993).?This?radical?shift?
to? an? internationalized? agenda? had? important? implications? for?Georgia’s?
domestic? context.? First,? the? external? context? of? Georgia? diversified? on?
various? levels.? The? highly? bureaucratized? Georgian? Soviet? Republic?
operating?on?family?relations?and?other?patrimonial?structures?turned?into?
a? privatizing? state? with? developing? foreign? relations? and? international?
activity?on?the?ground.?Hence,?the?field?in?which?Georgian?politics?unfolded?
heterogenized? to? an? enormous? extent,? offering? new? partnerships? and?
alliances?for?local?elites.?
Second,? after? the? shift? in? Georgia’s? external? context,? internal? and? to? a?
lesser?extent?external?patronage?persisted.?Whereas?the?external?and?the?
internal?patrons?had?changed,?the?patrimonial?structures?that?had?provided?
for?power? resources? continued? to?determine?domestic?politics? (on? these?
continuities? see? above? all:? Christophe? 2001? and? 2005,? Stefes? 2008,?
Zuercher?and?Koehler?2004).?Western?support?of?a?single?Western?leaning?
elite? pushed? Georgian? political? groups? to? unify? into? one? ruling? power?
52?
?
apparatus,?which?potentially?kept? intact? limited?patronage?circles?(see?the?
commentary?of?Muskhelishvili?2012).18??
Third,?Western?engagement? focused?on?strengthening?the?state.?Western?
organizations? demanded?measures? to? stabilize? the? rule? of? law? through?
cracking?down?on?corruption?and?smuggling.?International?funds?were?tied?
to?providing? incentives? for?domestic? state?actors? to? implement?Western?
style? reforms.? As? a? result,? the? state? was? massively? boosted? from? the?
outside? to?become?a? firm?authority?over?other?societal?groups?within? the?
designated?boundaries?of?the?state.19?
?
Altogether,?external?policies?appear?to?have?to?varying?degrees?sustained,?
directed? and? created? incentives? for? power? consolidation? of? local? state?
agency.?External?actors?enabled?local?elites?to?utilize?resources?provided?by?
them? such? as? funds,? political? support? and? outside? leverage.? As? the?
empirical?analysis?will?show,?these?intensifying?ties?created?a?complex?field?
of?interaction?in?the?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict.?In?this?respect,?it?
is? important? to? reiterate? that? the? argument? of? the? study? holds? Russian?
influence,? first,? not? to? be? fully? external? to? the? context? as? the? Russian?
Federation?and?Russian?actors?are? immediate?stakeholders? in? the?conflict?
and,? second,? to? be? a? key? component? of? the? escalation? process? in?
reinforcing?conflict?dynamics.?Particularly,?as?will?be?shown,?the?interaction?
of?Russian?and?Western? state?actors?at? the? international? level?of? conflict?
reinforces?local?escalation?dynamics.?However,?as?argued?earlier,?change?in?
local?behavior? is?held? to?be? induced?by?Western?policies.? Therefore,? the?
empirical?analysis?will?account?for?the?reinforcing?effect?of?Russian?policies?
                                                          
18?At? least?until?2004?Russia? remained? the? largest? trade?partner?and?economic? factor? in?
Georgia?after? the?break?down?of? the?Soviet?Union.?After? the?Georgian?Russian? fallout? in?
2004,? the? import? volume? shifted? to?Turkey,?also?as?a? result?of? the?Russian?blockade?of?
Georgian? import?goods.?Remittances?of? the?Georgian?diaspora? in?Russia? remain?a? large?
economic?factor?in?Georgia.?However,?although?strongly?influenced?by?state?politics,?trade?
relations?between? the? two? states?build?only?a?minor?part?of? the?economic?activity?after?
2004,?whereas?private?business?relations,?also?in?the?banking?sector,?build?the?major?part?
(EBRD?Transition?reports).?
19? Western? support? also? massively? targeted? democratizing? projects? of? the? non?
governmental?sector?in?Georgia?(see?for?example:?Angley?2010,?Wheatley?2005).?
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at? various? levels? in? the? context? of? determining? Western?domestic?
interaction.?
?
Against? these? considerations,? the? study? reads? external? influence? in? two?
ways:?On? the?one? hand,? external? engagement? relates? to? actors?who? are?
closely? involved? in? the? conflict’s? affairs,? but? are? not? immediate?
stakeholders? in?the?conflict?with?territorial?properties,?which?are?Western?
actors? such? as? the? EU,? US,? OSCE,? UN,? and? NATO.? On? the? other? hand,?
external?actors?are?those?outside?the?jurisdiction?of?the?Georgian?state,?but?
whose?policies?significantly?influence?on?the?local?power?context.?The?study?
therefore?employs?a?unified?definition?of?Western?external?actors.?Bader?
assists? this?approach? in?his? study?of?external?party?assistance? in?Georgia:?
"The? distinction? between? U.S.? and? European? [actors]? masks? striking?
similarities? in? approaches? and? conceptual?underpinnings.? (…)? [P]rograms,?
whether?by?U.S.?or?by?European?actors,?are?shaped?by?a?shared?underlying?
norm?about?the?type?of?organization?that?recipient[s]?(…)?transform? into."?
(Bader? 2010:? 20).? In? this? respect,? the? study? encompasses? boundaries? of?
individual? actors? and? addresses? the? agenda? of? “Western? policies”? as? a?
common?ground?regarding?state?building?and?conflict?management?issues.?
Therefore,? the? study? puts? forward? that? external? influence? of??
Western?actors?seems?to?have?played?a?decisive?role?in?the?re?escalation?of?
violence.?Whereas? local? stakeholders?have,?as?argued?above,?persistently?
pursued?assertive?policies,? this?does?not?offer?a? satisfying?explanation?of?
re?escalation.?The?analysis,?therefore,?lends?itself?to?examining?the?specific?
effects?of?Western?policies?in?contexts?of?re?escalation?in?South?Ossetia.??
?
The? dissertation? argues? that? repeated? escalation? is? brought? about? by?
specific?mechanisms?of?external?policies?working?through?domestic?agency?
to? the? effect? of? recurrently? shifting? the? context? towards? escalation.? This?
section? will? summarize? the? framing? of? the? argument? in? four? working?
hypotheses?that?inform?the?analytical?framework:?1)?Local?state?actors?seek?
to?consolidate?domestic?power,?2)?External?policies? in?the?conflict?context?
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affect?power?resources,?3)?Change?in?local?behavior?is?induced?by?Western?
policies,?and?4)?Recurring?patterns?of?external?policies?prior?to?escalations.??
WHY1:?Local?state?actors?seek?to?consolidate?domestic?power.?In?the?post?
Soviet?context?of?Georgia,?state?power?is?permanently?at?stake.?The?volatile?
setting? makes? state? resources? attractive,? vulnerable? and? significant? for?
local?elites?to?consolidate?power.? In?this?context,?the?success? in?territorial?
integration?of?South?Ossetia? is?a?big?power? resource? for? local?state?elites?
and? is? shaped? through? the? influence? of? external? policies? of? Western?
agency.?Therefore,?the?study?holds?that?external? influence?on? local?power?
consolidation? in? the? context? of? the? conflict? has? to? be? observed? at? the?
central? state? level,?directing? the?analytical? focus? to?external? influence?on?
capital?politics?in?Georgia.??
WHY2:? External? policies? in? the? conflict? context? affect? power? resources.?
The?analysis?holds? that? the? conflict? is? relevant? to?power? consolidation?at?
particular?points? in? time? that? seem? to? strongly? correlate?with?policies?of?
Western?agency,?mainly?at?the?national,?but?also?the?international?and?local?
level?of? the?conflict.?Hence,? the?study?contends? that? the?domestic?power?
claim? is?decisively?shaped?and?reinforced?through?state?formation?policies?
of?external?actors,?particularly?in?the?conflict?context.?
WHY3:?Change? in? local?behavior? induced?by?Western?policies.?The?study?
argues?that?prior?to?escalations,?local?behavior?changes?to?assertive?policies?
that?directly?or?indirectly?lead?to?escalation.?Change?in?local?behavior?takes?
place?when? specific?Western?policies?bring? into?effect? incentives?of? local?
power? consolidation.? In? this? context,? local? state? actors? react? to?Western?
policies?which?provides?for?shifts?to?assertive?policies?that?drive?the?context?
towards?escalation.?
WHY4:? Recurring? patterns? of? external? policies? prior? to? escalations.?
Dynamics? in? South?Ossetia? exhibit? a? consistent? pattern? of? re?escalations?
ruptured?by?periods?of?low?intensity?violence.?Shifts?in?dynamics?occur?due?
to?shifts? in?policies?and?behavior? induced?by?Western?policies.?Hence,?the?
analysis? attempts? to? single? out? which? external? policies? recur? prior? to?
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escalations?by? linking?Western? impact? to?domestic? assertive? shifts.?Thus,?
the?study?further?hypothesizes?that?if?Western?policies?take?effect?prior?to?
escalation?and?this?policy?is?observable?at?least?at?one?other?point?prior?to?
escalation,?the?study?may?plausibly?sustain?the?policy?to?be?part?of?at?least?
one? of? the? violence?generating? mechanisms? of?Western? impact? on? the?
conflict?dynamics.?
?
b) Analytical?framework?and?methods?
In? order? to? establish? the? analytical? framework? of? this? study,? working?
hypotheses? were? developed? with? the? following? methodological?
considerations.? The? section? starts? out? by? defining? the? here? employed?
understandings?of?agency?in?the?form?of?policies,?causality,?and?the?tools?of?
narrative?analysis?and?social?mechanisms?that?inform?the?empirical?analysis?
of? agency? prior? to? escalations.? Hereafter,? the? section? sums? up? these?
reflections?by?presenting?the?model?of?analysis.?The?section?concludes?with?
remarks? on? the? use? of? data.? In? the? subsequent? chapter,? the? discussion?
proceeds?to?the?empirical?analysis?of?agency?in?the?context?of?the?conflict.?
Change?in?local?behavior:?Tracing?shifts?
By?deploying?the?notion?of?policies,?the?study?seeks?to?avoid?interpretive?or?
normative?revaluations?such?as?categories?of?identity?or?interests?and?aims?
at?specifying?the?confluence?of?events?through?agency.?Policies?are?defined?
as?purposeful,?framed?and?agenda?based?actions?of?Western?actors? in?the?
context? of? the? conflict? during? periods? prior? to? escalation.? The? analysis?
envisages? policies? that? operate? as? part? of? an? informed? policy? agenda? of?
Western? agency? in? the? local,? national? and? international? arenas? of? the?
conflict.?As? is? generally? assumed,? disaggregating? policies?will? reveal? that?
repetitive? patterns? of? behavior? appear? throughout? the? process.20?
Therefore,?examining? the? influence?Western?policies?bare?on? local?power?
                                                          
20?The?study? refrains? from?employing?the?concept?of?practices? (Bourdieu?1998,?Reckwitz?
2002),?as?the?notion?of?policies?highlights?the?effect?of?state?agendas?at?specific?points?in?
time.?The?repetitive?element?of?agency? is?captured?by?mechanisms?and?chains?of?similar?
actions?that?recur?at?different?points?in?the?process.?
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consolidation? requires? an? analytical? lens? that? reveals? empirical? reality.?
Observable?action? in?the? form?of?policies?of?Western?agency? is?hence?the?
first?object?of?analysis?with?the?aim?of?disaggregating?repetitive?patterns?of?
agency?on?an?empirical?level.??
?
Therefore,? identifying? policies? is? the? first? analytical? step? to? unveil? causal?
links?that?go?beyond?situational?reasoning.?In?this?respect,?centering?on?re?
escalation? enables? the? study? to?make?more? valid? statements.? Individual?
motivations?and?decision?making?processes?that?may?have? led?to?violence?
are? always? covert? to? the? observer.? In? analyzing? agency? prior? to? a? single?
event,? social? research? can?never?plausibly? sustain?why?an? agent?acted? in?
the?observed?manner.?In?contrast,? if?the?same?mode?of?behavior?recurs?in?
similar? situations,? social? research? can? postulate? patterns? of? behavior? in?
relation? to? the? outcome? that? make? agency? plausible? (above? all? see:?
Capoccia?and?Keleman?2007,?Mahoney?and?Rueschemeyer?2003).?
With?this?in?mind,?the?next?step?of?the?study?is?to?enable?the?identification?
of?the?points?in?time?when?local?behavior?changes?and?provides?the?context?
for?a?shift?toward?escalation.?
?
Change? in? local? behavior?making? for? shifts? to? escalation? takes? place? at?
specific?points? in? time?and? signifies? the? temporal? frame? in?which?policies?
that?bring?about?shifts?take?place.?Hence,?the?study?identifies?those?points?
in?the?process?through,?1)? identifying?points? in?time?when?violence? in?the?
conflict? spiked? and,? 2)? seeking? out? shifts? in? assertive? policies? prior? to?
escalations.?For?this?purpose,?the?study?employs?two?sets?of?data:?analysis?
of?the?reports?of?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?and?interviews?conducted?in?
Georgia?during?2009?and?2010?(see?annex?4).?This?data?enables?the?study?to?
identify?phases?of?violence? that? signify?escalations?and,? in?accounting? for?
local?perceptions?through?interviews,?to?plausibly?signify?prior?shifts?in?local?
behavior?in?relation?to?Western?agency.?
Before? the? study? turns? to? the? analysis? of? the? data? in? chapter? 2,? it? is?
necessary?to?define?causality?of?external?agency? in? local?contexts,?present?
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the?method?of?narrative?analysis?that?enables?identifying?plausible?instants?
of?causal?agency?and?attribute? interpretative?meaning?to?them,?and?draw?
on?the?concept?of?social?mechanisms?to?aggregate?recurring?violence?in?the?
context?of?the?conflict.?
?
Causality:?Framing?the?causal?link?
The? study? employs? Stathis? Kalyvas’? useful? concept? of? causality? in?multi?
actor?and?multi?locality?settings?of?processes?of?violence?(2000,?2001,?2004,?
2006,? Kalyvas/? Balcell? 2010).? Kalyvas’? inquiry? deals? with? generating? a?
plausible? causal? link? through? explaining? contentious? outcomes? through?
spatially? and? temporally? complex? sets? of? episodes:? “The? direction? of?
causality? (…)?matters?when?deriving?empirical,? theoretical?and?normative?
implications? about? civil?wars”? (Kalyvas?2001:? 104).? This? approach? allows,?
firstly,? to? purport? policies? that? take? place? simultaneously? at? different?
localities?such?as?the? international,?national?or? local?arena?of?the?conflict,?
secondly,?to? locate?the?causal? link?at?the? level?of?domestic?power?politics,?
and?thirdly,?to?bridge?specifically?the?analytical?gap?between?external?and?
domestic?policies?and?private?and?political?interests.?Kalyvas?thus?develops?
a?convincing?framework?to?grasp?causalities?of?macro?political?outcomes.??
?
The? first? consideration? envisages? the? problem? of? timing? and? locality? if?
events? leading? to? the? same? outcome? are? to? happen? simultaneously? in?
different? localities.? Kalyvas’? concept? contends? that? policies? at? different?
localities?and?possibly?taking?place?simultaneously?can?be?part?of?the?same?
causal? structure? generating? the? same? observed? outcome? (Kalyvas? 2006:?
364ff.).? Importantly,? Kalyvas’? approach? sets? itself? apart? from? classical?
definitions? of? causality? that? assume? a? linear? sequence? of? events?
constituting? a? causal? chain? that? brings? about? the? observed? outcome?
(Mayntz? 2005:? 209,?Mahoney? 2000a:? 536).? In? contrast,? Kalyvas? assumes?
events?or,? in? this? case,?policies? in?different?places? at? the? same? time? can?
generate? a? unified? causal? structure? under?which? the? observed? outcome?
comes? about.? In? other? words,? events? or? policies? with? no? obvious?
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connection? can? bare? causal? effects.? This?means,? simultaneous? instances?
might?not?show?and? in?fact?might?not?have?an? inherent?causal?connection?
between? each? other,? but? all? of? the? instances? together? bring? about? the?
outcome.?
In? this? sense,? this? study? assumes? that? the? cause? of? escalation? is? power?
consolidating?behavior?of? local?elites,?whereas?Western?agency?decisively?
triggers?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?escalation.?This?means,?the?study?
perceives?Western? agency? in? different? arenas? and? possibly? at? the? same?
time?to?exhibit?the?causal?link,?the?chain?of?events?leading?to?escalation.??
?
The? second? consideration? locates? causality? at? the? level? of? policies? of?
domestic?power?consolidation?of?state? leaderships.? In?Kalyvas’? terms,? the?
explanatory?elements?generating?violence?tie?together?at?the?local?and?not?
the?global?level?of?the?conflict?(Kalyvas?2006:?383ff.).?Kalyvas?contends?that?
to? sustain? a? causal? link? happens? if? events? at? different? levels? invariably?
exhibit?a?repetitive?effect?on?local?events.?Therefore,?Kalyvas?suggests?that?
studying?violence?at?the?local?level?involves?analysis?of?relationships?among?
a?wide?range?of?actors?in?different?arenas,?while?locating?the?analysis?at?the?
domestic? level?of?power?politics.?At? the?heart?of?Kalyvas’? theory? lies? the?
proposition?that?escalations?result?from?local?attempts?to?bridge?cleavages?
arising? from? interests? at? different? levels?of? politics? and? through? external?
policies.?As? a? result,? Kalyvas’? concept? looks? at? factors? driving?multi?level?
conflicts?at?the?domestic?level?by?bridging?the?analytical?cleavage?between?
local?and?supranational?conflicts?of?interests.??
?
Kalyvas’?approach?strengthens? this?study,? first,? through?attributing?causal?
significance? to? events? happening? at? locations? other? than? those? where?
violence? takes? place.? Second,? the? approach? suggests? locating? causality?
where?and?when?factors?have?an?effect?on?the?local?power?context.?Hence,?
this?approach?links?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?escalations?to?external?
policies? and? supports? that? external?policies?do?not? cause,?but?determine?
the?point?in?time?and?the?manner?in?which?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?
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escalation?occurs.?In?this?respect,?this?study?centers?on?the?national?level?of?
capital?politics? in?Georgia? at? the? same? as? investigating? the? international,?
national? or? local? centers? of? agency.? In? the? next? step,? it? is? necessary? to?
discuss?the?method?of?narrative?analysis? in?order?to? identify?and? interpret?
the?causal?link?between?Western?agency?and?change?in?local?behavior.??
?
Narrative?analysis:?Locating?and?ascribing?meaning?to?causal?links?
The?study?employs?narrative?analysis?(for?this?approach?see:?Buethe?2002,?
Capoccia?and?Keleman?2007,?Mahoney?2000a,?Griffin?1992,?also?see?Sewell?
1996a)?as?a?helpful?approach?to?analyze?complex?sets?of?events.?Narrative?
analysis?is?a?“heuristic?device?that?can?make?us?more?conscious?of?what?we?
are? already? doing? implicitly? in? rhetorical? battles? between? rival? historical?
narratives”? (Capoccia? and? Keleman? 2007:? 362).? The? study? chooses?
narrative? analysis? to? help? to? plausibly? identify? where? the? causal? link?
between?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?escalation?is?located?and?how?it?
is?brought?into?being.?The?below?discussion?will?clarify?the?analytical?value?
of? several? features? of? narrative? analysis? such? as? critical? juncture,? path?
dependent?trajectory,?and?sequences.?
?
Narrative?analysis?originates? in?historical?sociology?and?embraces?any?kind?
of? structured,? theory?guided? narrative? that? traces? processes? through?
reconstructing? chains? of? social? properties? (Capoccia? and? Keleman? 2007:?
354;?King,?Keohane?and?Verba?1994:?77?80)?and?“can?offer?a?stylized?but?
compelling?reconstruction?of?the?key?decisions?and?choices”?(Capoccia?and?
Keleman? 2007:? 358)? as? it? aggregates? complex? settings? and? empirically?
demonstrates?the?hypothesized?causal?links?at?work?(for?this?approach?see?
the?the?seminal?studies?of?George?and?Bennett?2005,?Elster?2000).??
As? a? result,? Capoccia? and? Keleman? introduce? the? term? of? the? ‘critical?
juncture’? to? grasp? the? very? period? of? time? when? significant? change? is?
possible? and? alters? the? equilibrium? of? the? process? into? a? different? state?
(Capoccia?and?Keleman?2007:?346).?Mahoney?describes? ‘critical? junctures’?
as? “moments? of? relative? structural? indeterminism? when? willful? actors?
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shape?outcomes?in?a?more?voluntaristic?fashion?than?normal?circumstances?
permit”?(Mahoney?2002:?7).?Change?takes?place?when?the?probability?rises?
that?choices?exert?a?lasting?and?stable?impact?on?the?process.?The?scope?of?
choices? for? key? actors? during? those? junctures? narrows? down,? closes? off?
alternative? options,? and? subsequent? agency? generates? self?reinforcing?
path?dependent?processes?(ibid.:?348).??
?
Based?on?the?notion?of?critical?junctures,?once?the?point?in?time?of?change?
in? local?behavior? is? identified,?analyses?can?reconstruct?the?trajectory?of?a?
path?through?tracing?events?or?policies?back?to?the? initial?condition?of?the?
sequence.? In? this? respect,? several? scholars? propose? to? use? narrative?
analysis? through? the? ‘sequencing’? of? series? of? relevant? policies? into?
episodes? (Mahoney? 2000a:? 2,? Buethe? 2002:? 482,? Verba? 1971:? 308).?
Sequencing?introduces?a?step?by?step?approach?which?provides?"a?scene?by?
scene?description?of? the?particular?causal?paths"? (Reisch?1991:?17).?Three?
properties? are? proposed? to? describe? a? path?dependent? trajectory:? First,?
tracing?an?outcome?back?to?and?along?a?particular?set?of?historical?events?
(Goldstone?1998:?834).?Hence,? the? task? is? to? show?a?plausible? chain?of?a?
specific?set?of?events?leading?to?the?observed?outcome.?Here,?events?in?the?
early?stages?of?a?historical?sequence?matter?more?than?events?that?happen?
closer? in?time?to?the?outcome? (Mahoney?2000a:?510,?Pierson?2000:?263).?
This?means,?critical? junctures?are? the?moment? from?which? local?behavior?
changes,? but? not? the? moments? when? outcomes? occur.? Therefore,? this?
study?does?not? focus?on? the? segment?of? the?process?after? local?behavior?
has? changed,? but? focuses? on? the? path? leading? up? to? change? in? local?
behavior?triggered?through?Western?policies.??
Second,? a? path?dependent? trajectory? is? characterized? by?what?Mahoney?
calls?“inherent?sequentiality”? (Mahoney?2000a:?529).?A?series?or?string?of?
events? leading?from?the?shift?to?the?outcome?should?exhibit?deterministic?
characteristics:?Once?a?path?has?set?in,?the?outcome?is?likely?to?come?about?
(Abbott?1992:?445,?Mahoney?2000a:?511).?This?concept?puts?forward?that?
conditions? at? the? start? of? a? path?dependent? sequence? do? not? cause? the?
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outcome? as? the? causal? properties? leading? to? the? outcome? do? not? exist?
then.?Causality?evolves?only?during?the?process,?through?the?gradual,?small?
steps? constituted? through? agency? (on? the? view? of? agency? observable? in?
steps?of?a?process?see?for?example:?Goldstone?1998).?Hence,?these?smaller?
steps?are?the?central?objects?of?analysis?of?this?study.?
Third,? the? last? property? of? a? path?dependent? trajectory? is? assigned? to?
identify? a? meaningful? starting? point? in? a? sequence? of? events,? as? a?
contingent? event? marking? the? initial? condition? of? a? process.? Initial?
conditions? of? a? sequence? pose? a? “surprising? break”? with? theoretical? or?
intuitive?assumptions?about?the?course?of?the?process?(Sewell?1996b:?843).?
Those?expectations?are?in?conflict?with?empirical?reality?when?at?least?two?
separate? trajectories? temporally? intersect? (Mahoney? 2000a:? 527).?More?
precisely,?initial?conditions?are?indeed?held?to?trigger,?shape?and?constitute?
the? process,? but? they? change? during? the? process?when? they? react?with?
other?factors?that?occur?at?later?points?in?the?process.??
Specifically,?Western?agency?by?itself?is?not?sufficient?to?set?off?a?sequence?
of? events.? Western? policies? have? to? interact? with? local? agency? in? a?
significant? context? in?order? to? initiate? a?path,? for?example? in? a?historical?
contingent? instant? of? collision? between? competing? agendas? (Mahoney?
2000b,? Abbott? 1983:? 130).? As? a? result,?Western? agency? constitutes? an?
initial?condition?when?it?interacts?with?local?actors?in?a?contingent?moment?
resulting?in?1)?setting?off?an?escalation?cycle?and?2)?bringing?about?change?
in?local?behavior?prior?to?the?escalation.??
Lastly,? historical? narrative? analysis? particularly? supports? specifying? the?
causal? link? in? an? empirical? context? of? agency.? A? theory?guided? narrative?
“focuses?on? the? aspects? considered? salient?by? the? theory? itself;? (…)? such?
aspects? include? the?main? actors,? their? goals,? preferences,? decisions,? and?
the? events? that?directly? influenced? them.”? (Capoccia? and?Keleman? 2007:?
357,? also? see?Buethe? 2002:? 483).? In? this? respect,? Capoccia? and? Keleman?
explicitly? encourage? narrative? analysis? to? locate? shifts? in? properties? of?
agency?to?explain?outcomes.??
?
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In?this?regard,?historical?narrative?analysis?allows?for?the? interpretation?of?
meaning? of? narrated? events.? To? identify? meaningful? events,? interviews?
were?conducted?according? to? the?method?of?qualitative?content?analysis,?
allowing? for?narrative?elements? to?be?given?priority?while?conducting? the?
interviews?and? focusing?on? the? specific? issues?of?processes?of?escalation,?
Western? policies,? and? local? state? politics? (for? this? approach? see:?Meuser?
and?Nagel?1991;?Bogner,?Littig?and?Menz?2005;?Geddes?2004;?Ragin?1987?
and?1992;?Oevermann?et?al.?1979).?Specifically,?each?narrative?accounted?
for?within? one? interview? identified? the? initial? condition? of? an? escalation?
cycle?and? the?point?of?change? in? local?behavior? toward?assertive?policies.?
Therefore,? the? interviews? provide? plausible? causal? reasoning? for? the?
processes?of?escalation.?
In? addition,? the? interviews? account? for? local? perceptions? through?
evaluations? and? assessments? of? locally? based? actors.? Theoretical?
assumptions?or?a?chronology?of?events?cannot?unearth?the?individual?logic?
of? local? dynamics.? Without? social? reasoning,? change? in? local? behavior?
toward?assertive?policies?are?not?traceable.?The?interview?process?took?into?
account? local?perceptions? and? local? cultural? contexts? that? influenced? the?
reasoning?behind?the?course?and?causes?of?agency?and?escalation?(on?the?
approach?of? raising? local?perception? in? social? research? see:?Geertz?1991:?
chapter?1,?Salmon?2006:?13,?also?see:?MacPherson,?Brooker?and?Ainsworth?
2000).?This?enabled?an?analysis?of?sequences?of?action?in?order?to?identify?
plausible? instances? of? causality? and? generate? narratives? of?Western? and?
Georgian?policies?prior?to?escalations.?
?
Hence,?the?third?and?last?step?deals?with?how?to?aggregate?recurring?causal?
links? between? the? narrated? policies? and? escalations.? Therefore,? the? last?
section?frames?how?to?identify?specific?social?mechanisms?of?escalation?and?
presents?an?operational?concept?of?social?mechanisms?of?specific?instances?
of?agency?linked?to?repeated?escalation.?Hereafter,?the?chapter?will?present?
the?model?of?analysis.?
?
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Social?mechanisms:?Aggregating?recurring?causal?links?
This? study? seeks? not? only? to? explain? escalations,? but? also? to? explain? the?
recurring? instant? of? escalation.? Hence,? the? study? envisages? the?
chronologically?narrated?accounts?prior?to?several? instances?of?escalations?
in?order?to?detect?possible?patterns?that?might?plausibly?explain?conditions?
for?re?escalation.?The?aim?of?the?study?is?to?plausibly?present?mechanisms?
that?generally? lead? to?escalation? in? the?South?Ossetia?context?and? in? this?
context? the? study? expects? that? Western? policies? prior? to? each? of? the?
escalations? exhibit? similarities? that? allow? to? deduct? mechanisms.?
Therefore,? the?discussion? conceptualizes? social?mechanisms? to?1)?explain?
occurrences?at?the?meta?level?of?agency?prior?to?escalations,?in?order?to?2)?
explain?the?repeated?occurrence?of?those?meta? links?at?different?points? in?
time?prior?to?escalations.?
?
Hedstroem?and?Swedberg,?the?pioneers?of?consequent?research?on?social?
mechanisms,?along?with? Jon?Elster,?offer?a?compelling?definition?of?social?
mechanisms?at?work? (Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?1998,?Elster?1989).?Their?
concept?distinguishes?between?social?mechanisms?that?reveal?the?general?
logic?of?a?process?as?opposed?to?specific?social?mechanisms?that?reveal?the?
step?wise,?practical? functioning?of? a?process.? This? study?employs? specific?
mechanisms?of?analysis,?and?aims?at?concluding?with?general?mechanisms?
that?plausibly?explain?the?logic?of?re?escalation?in?South?Ossetia.?
?
Hedstroem? and? Swedberg? state? that? a? social? mechanism? ascribes? an?
instant?of?agency?within?a?causal?chain?of?social?events?connecting?an?initial?
condition? to? an? observed? outcome? (Hedstroem? and? Swedberg? 1998:? 6).?
Schelling’s? definition,? therefore,? captures? the? explanatory? importance? of?
mechanisms?by? stating? that? "[a]? social?mech? is?a?plausible?hypothesis,?or?
set?of?plausible?hypotheses,?that?could?be?the?explanation?of?some?social?
phenomena,? the? expalantion? being? in? terms? of? interactions? between?
individuals,?or?[between]?individuals?and?some?social?aggregate."?(Schelling?
64?
?
1978:? chapter?2? in?Hestroem? and? Swedberg?1998:?22?23).?The?definition?
puts?forward?three?central?ideas?of?the?theory?of?social?mechanisms:??
First,?the?causal?value?of?mechanisms?links?a?starting?point?to?an?outcome.?
Social? mechanisms? not? only? are? the? ‘social? glue’? that? holds? processes?
together,?but?they?also?explain?how?processes?work?specifically?and?step?by?
step:? Social? mechanisms? reveal? the? meaning? of? individual? instances? of?
events? because? they? establish? them? as? a? part? of? the? process? and? take?
account?of?them?in?practical?relation?to?the?outcome.?Further,?mechanisms?
go? beyond? signifying? a?mere? link,? but? they? also? reveal? how? causality? is?
expressed? in? empirical? reality? and? therefore? they? exhibit? practicality? in?
analytical?contexts.?Therefore,?plausibility?of?this?link?is?a?core?feature?of?its?
actual? validity:? If? the? informed?description?of? empirical? reality? through? a?
mechanism?is?not?reasonably?convincing,?the?account?is?not?plausible.?
Second,?the?definition?is?based?on?generative?properties?of?mechanisms.?A?
mechanism,?thus,?actually?brings?about?or?produces?the?outcome?step?by?
step.? These? steps? are? traceable? to? the? extent? in? which? the? narrative?
accounts? for? a? consistent? picture? of? the? sequence.? Schlichte? agrees? that?
mechanisms?can?be?seen?as?sequences?of?practices?leading?to?or?impeding?
escalations? of? violence? (Schlichte? 2009,? first? version? 2007:? 91).? In? this?
respect,? two? aspects? are? noteworthy:? On? the? one? hand,? mechanisms?
encompass? the?micro? level?of?motivations,? the?meta? level?of?agency?and?
the?macro? level?of?a?social?outcome?(Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?1998:?22).?
Especially?‘transformational’?mechanisms?linking?the?meta?and?macro?level,?
and? explaining? how? agency? translates? into? macro?social? outcomes:? “A?
number? of? individuals? interact? with? one? another,? and? the? specific?
mechanism? (which? differs? depending? on? the? nature? of? the? interaction)?
shows? how? these? individual? actions? are? transformed? into? some? kind? of?
outcome,?be?it?intended?or?unintended”?(ibid.:?23).?This?link?is?at?the?center?
of? this?study.?On? the?other?hand,?mechanisms?deal? in?a? flexible?way?with?
the? normative? instant? of? the? direction? of? causality.? Social? mechanisms?
allow? for?a?complex?understanding?of?present?tense? in?empirical?analysis:?
Prior?events?can?in?varying?manners?take?effect?on?later?events.?This?relates?
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to?reproducing?mechanisms?that?stress?path?dependent?features,?reactive?
mechanisms? that? focus? on? present? interaction,? and? reinforcing?
mechanisms? that? increase? in? intensity?compared? to?earlier?points? in? time?
(Mahoney?2000:?526?ff.).?The?study?will?make?use?of?this?operative,?multi?
facetted?understanding?and?employ?it?in?the?discussion?of?findings.?
In? this? respect,? the? first? two? properties? of?mechanisms? comply?with? the?
causal?understanding?of?historical?analysis?as?presented?earlier.? In?a? third?
and? for? explanatory? purposes? most? far?reaching? property? mechanisms?
enable? generalizing? behavior? in? given? social? contexts? (Hedstroem? and?
Swedberg?1998:?20).?More?precisely,?a?mechanism?may?recur?across?time?
and? cases,? but? the? functions? of? the? same?mechanism? differ? as? they? are?
specific?for?the?empirical?context.?In?this?regard,?Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?
support?Merton’s?early?call?for?mechanisms?to?constitute?a?middle?ground?
between? laws? and? descriptions? (Hedstroem? and? Swedberg? 1998:? 6).? By?
accounting?for?social?processes?in?a?descriptive?way,?mechanisms?lay?open?
components?of?processes?and?enable? their?generalization.?Therefore,? the?
analysis? of? mechanisms? is? an? intrinsic? part? of? tracing? path?dependent?
trajectories?of?social?processes.?
As?mechanisms?grasp?common?features?of?the?logic?of?agency?across?time?
and? cases,? the? general? assumptions? based? on? them? can? be? applied? to?
different?settings?of?analysis.?Therefore,?Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?chiefly?
conclude?that?“a?mechanism?is?a?function?of?a?general?behavior?in?different?
situations”? (ibid.).? In? this? vein,? the? study? establishes? policies? of?Western?
actors?as?specific? functions?of?mechanisms? leading?to?escalations?and?will?
discuss?those?in?the?model?at?the?end?of?the?empirical?chapter?as?well?as?in?
the?discussion?of?the?findings.?
?
Thus,? the? study?will? identify? specific?mechanisms?of?external? influence?at?
work?prior?to?escalations?and?will?draw?conclusions?and?extensively?discuss?
the? scope? of? generalizability? of? these? mechanisms? in? the? theoretical?
discussion?of?the?findings?and?the?empirical?cross?context?discussion.?
?
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Model?of?analysis?
The?above?methodological?considerations?are?summarized?in?the?following?
model?of?analysis:?
Graphic?1:?Model?of?analysis?
?
The?causal?argument?and?the?empirical?analysis?are?supported?by?a?model?
of?analysis? that? seeks? to?plausibly? frame?when?and?how?a? sequence?or?a?
cycle?of?escalation?is?triggered?by?a?historically?contingent?event,?the?initial?
condition? that? occurs? through?Western? agency? and? enables? local? power?
consolidation?at? the? international,?national?and? local? level,?which? informs?
the? causal? path? to? triggering? the? critical? juncture? of? change? in? local?
behavior?of?Georgian? state? elites? that,? lastly,?provides? for? the? context? to?
shift?and?bring?about?escalation.?
To? this? end,? the?model? frames? how?Western? agency? at? the? start? of? an?
escalation?cycle?intersects?with?specific?circumstances?on?the?international,?
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national? or? local? level? of? the? conflict? and? how? this? process? affects? local?
power?consolidation?options?at?the?national? level.?The? intersection?causes?
a?rupture? in?the?process?that?opens?a?path?for?Western?policies?to?trigger?
change? in? local?behavior?of?power?seeking? states?elites.?Western?policies?
can? exhibit? restricting?or? enabling?qualities? in? affecting? local?behavior? as?
they?effectively?limit?options?of?local?power?consolidation?in?the?context?of?
the? conflict? and? enable?power? consolidating? options? as?Western?policies?
provide? incentives? for?Georgian?elites? to? consolidate?power.?The?process?
starting?from?the? initial? instant?of?Western?policies?setting?off?a?sequence?
of?small?steps?leading?to?change?in?local?behavior?is?the?central?focus?of?the?
empirical?analysis.?Those?steps?which? tie?together?at?the?national? level?of?
state? policies? build? a? self?reinforcing,? deterministic? sequence? of? actions?
that?triggers?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?escalation.?
?
The?study?aims?at?identifying?specific?chains?of?actions?prior?to?escalations?
and?to?translate?those?when?then?links?into?a?general,?logical?pattern?of?the?
dynamics? of? the? conflict? by? establishing? plausible? if?then? connections?
between?agency?and?outcomes.?For? this?purpose,? the?study?will?generate?
sequences?of?policies?on?the?basis?of?phases?of?escalation?and?analyze?the?
sequences?in?chapter?3.?The?study?expects?to?find?significant?links?between?
Western?policies?and?escalations,?particularly?at?the?level?of?national?state?
politics? in? Georgia.? The? study? will? present? these? links? by? generating? at?
model?of? the?dynamics?of? re?escalations? in?South?Ossetia?on? the?basis?of?
mechanisms?of?external?policies.?These?findings?will?be?discussed?reflecting?
their? theoretical? and? empirical? scope? in? chapter? 4.? Therefore,? the? study?
proceeds?to?the?empirical?analysis?in?the?following?chapter.?
? ?
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3. Empirical?analysis?
The?empirical?analysis?starts?out?with?a?discussion?of?the?event?data?set?and?
identifies?three?phases?of?violence.?Second,?in?its?account?of?the?identified?
phases? of? violence? the? chapter? gives? a? background? account? of? the?
trajectory?of?politics?and?violence?in?the?South?Ossetia?context?after?1989.?
The? third?part?entails? the?empirical? analysis?of? the? sequences?of?policies?
determined? through? qualitative? interviews? and? presents? narratives? of?
Western? policies’? effect? on? Georgia? state? leaderships’? behavior? prior? to?
escalations.?The?chapter?concludes?with?presenting? the?empirical? findings?
of?the?study?and?proposes?a?model?of?re?escalation?in?South?Ossetia.?
?
3.1. Analysis?and?use?of?the?event?data?set?
The? explorative? outreach? of? the? study? and? the? utter? lack? of? data? on?
dynamics? of? violence? in? South? Ossetia? made? extensive? use? of? primary?
sources? indispensable.? For? this?purpose,? the? research?undertook? archival?
research? at? the? OSCE? archive? in? Prague? in? January? and? February? 2009.?
Research? at? the? OSCE? archive? provided? a? consistent? body? of? data? for?
identifying? phases? of? violence? in? the? South? Ossetia? context.? The? seven?
week?archival?research?achieved?to?establish?an?overview?of? increase?and?
the?decrease?of?violence?in?the?conflict?between?1989?and?2008?and?of?key?
political?events?in?the?political?context?of?the?conflict.??
The?material?entails?activity?reports?of?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?to?the?
Vienna?headquarter?as?the?OSCE?military?monitoring?mission?reported?on?
events? of? violence? in? the? conflict? area? and? gave? assessments? of? their?
context?since?1992.? In?addition,?the?Head?of?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?
reported?on?political?activities.?The?reports?account?the?OSCE’s?facilitation?
of?political?talks?between?Georgian,?Russian?and?Ossetian?representatives,?
meetings? with? political? leaders? and? general? overviews? of? the? political?
developments.?Therefore,?apart?from?accounts?of?violence?the?reports?also?
give?a?valuable?insight?into?the?course?of?negotiations?in?the?framework?of?
the?Russian?mandated?Joint?Control?Commission?(JCC),?a?political?body?that?
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functioned?under? the? auspices?of? the?OSCE? from?1994? to?2008? and? that?
was?served?to?monitor?and?facilitate?the?political?talks?and?the?activities?of?
the? Georgian?Ossetian?Russian? Joint? Peace?Keeping? Forces? (JPKF).? The?
reports?account? for? talks? in? the? fields?of?economic?rehabilitation,?political?
settlement?of?the?de?jure?status?of?South?Ossetia,?and?the?politically?most?
contentious? issue,? the?negotiations? on? return? and? compensations? of? the?
Georgian?IDPs?(Internally?Displaced?Persons).??
As?status? talks?permanently?put? this? format?at? risk? to?be?cancelled,?a?key?
task? of? the? negotiations?was? to? keep? a? platform? of? dialog? alive? and? to?
organize?every?day? life? in? the? conflict?area?under? the?absence?of?de? jure?
state? authorities.? Therefore,?many? reports? reveal? how? local? issues?were?
solved? through? the? cooperation? of? the? sides,? such? as? gas,? water? and?
electricity? supply? issues,? police? cooperation? in? criminal? incidents,? and?
exchange?of?prisoners.?
?
Moreover,? the? reports? give? an? account? of? violence? in? the? designated?
conflict? zone? from? 1992? with? bi?weekly? reports? from? 1994.? The? OSCE?
reports? therefore? provide? ample? raw?material? on? political? decisions.? For?
example,? the? assessment? repeatedly? shows? that? decisions? taken? in? the?
framework? of? the? JCC? were? as? much? informed? by? strong?hand?
interventions? by? the? Russian? representatives? as? by? internal? political?
developments?in?South?Ossetia?–?a?clear?hint?that?events?at?the?local?level?
determined?political?dynamics?at? least?as?much?as? international?decision?
making? at? the? level? of? Russia? or? the?West.? The? task? of? the? subsequent?
discussion?will?be?to?show?how?Western?policies?triggered?these?tendencies?
set?off?by?events?at?the?local?level?into?escalation.?
In?assessing?the?data?on?violence?in?the?conflict?area,?several?issues?have?to?
be? noted:? The? reports? classify? casualties? as? criminally?motivated,? ethnic?
strife,?police?or?military? action? (see? annex?2).21? The? reports? suggest? that?
criminally? motivated? casualties? had? high? potential? to? turn? into? ethnic?
tension,? and? also? that? the?members? of? criminal? groups?were? organized?
                                                          
21?The?OSCE?reports?quote?following?news?sources:?Black?Sea?Press,?Caucasus?Press,?Imedi?
TV,?Itar?Tass,?Regnum?Russia,?Rustavi?2.?
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along? ethnic? lines.? The? reports? do? not? openly? state,? but? give? hints? that?
violence?between?police?or?Peace?Keeping? Forces?often? took?place?along?
ethnic?lines?in?order?to?gain?access?to?infrastructure?and?territory.?
The? monitoring? mission? was? not? able? to? monitor? or? account? for? all?
instances? of? violence,? casualties,? movement? and? actions? of? agents? of?
violence?in?the?conflict?area.?Therefore,?the?figures?are?not?quantifiable,?for?
example?the?reports?do?not? indicate?any?deaths? in?1993?or?1994?and? less?
than? 5? dead? in? 2002,? and? only? from? 1997? do? the? reports? systematically?
report?on?casualties,?but?only? then?give?selective?accounts? (see?annex?1).?
However,? the? accounts? give? a? reliable? assessment? of? the? qualitative?
trajectory?of?violence?relating?to?the?decrease?and? increase?of?violence? in?
the?trajectory?of?the?conflict.?
?
The?analysis?of? the?data? succeeded? in? showing?an? increase?and?decrease?
violence?between?1989?and?2008.?On?this?basis,?an?extensive?chronology?of?
political? events? and? events? of? violence? at? the? local,? the? national? and?
international? level?of? the?conflict?between?1989?and?2008?was?generated?
(see?annex?1).?As?a?result,?the?material?generated?three?phases?of?violence?
in? the? conflict? by? pointing? out? escalations? throughout? the? period? of?
analysis.? Based? on? the? accounts? of? casualties,? the? analysis? identified?
escalations? in?2002,?2004? and?2008.?However,? it? is? important? to? keep? in?
mind? that?violence?never?ceased?at?any?point? in? time?between?1989?and?
2008.? ?
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Pre?Phase?
1989?–?2000?
Phase?1:?
2000?–?2002?
Phase?2:
2002?2004?
Phase?3:
2004???2008?
Post?phase:? from?
2008?
Ease?of?violence??
1992?–?1993,?
Low?intensity?
violence?
1994???2000?
Re?start? of?
violence?
2000?–?2002?
Re?
escalation?
2002?
Ongoing?
violence?
2002? ??
2004?
Re?
escalation?
2004?
Deteriorating? into?
war?
Ongoing?violence
??1992?–?1995:?
decreasing?
casualties,?1995?
2000?few?
casualties.?
??Civilian?actors,?
also?police?and?PKF?
??From?2000,?
increasing?
casualties?
??Police,?
internal?
troops,?PKFs?
and?militia?
??Police,?
internal?
troops?and?
militia?
? ongoing?
casualties?
??Police,?
internal?
troops,?
militia?
? Police,?
Internal?
troops?
? Increasing?
casualties?among?
police?and?PKFs?
??Increasing?
military?in?the?
conflict?zone,?
military?action?
??Very?few?
casualties22?
???Militias,?Russian?
and?Georgian?
military,?police,?
civilians?
?
Table?1:?Phases?of?violence?1989?–?2008?
?
The? graphic? depicts? violence? starting?with? civil? uprisings? from? 1989? and?
escalating? into? the? first?Georgian?Ossetian?war? between? 1991? and? 1992?
that?was?followed?by?a?stretch?of?low?level?violence?until?2000.?During?the?
first?phase?of?violence?after?2000,?violence?re?intensified?for?the?first?time?
after? the? war? with? increasing? levels? of? casualties,? also? among? military?
personnel,?but?especially? the?police? in? the?conflict?zone,?and?escalated? in?
2002? due? to? the? start? of? large?scale? anti?crime? operations.? During? the?
second? phase,? the? conflict? remains? at? a? tense? level? after? 2002? and? re?
escalates? again? in? 2004,? first? intensifying? through? the? closure? of? the?
Georgian?Ossetian?Ergneti?market?and? in?August?2004?with?the?shelling?of?
Tskhinvali.?During?the?third?phase,?violence?kept?increasing?after?2004,?with?
unprecedented?levels?of?military?actors?involved,?culminating?in?the?second?
war?in?August?2008?with?involvement?of?Russian?and?Georgian?military.?
?
To? support? the?account?of? these?phases?of? violence?based?on? casualties,?
the?study?additionally? linked?the?decrease?and? increase?of?violence?to?the?
additional?variable?of? the? involvement?of? typologies?of?actors?of?violence?
(see?annexes?1?and?2).?The?analysis?of?the?OSCE?material?showed?the?points?
in?time?when?actors? in?the?typologies?of?civilian,?police?and?military?were?
involved? in? violence.? This? served? two? purposes:? First,? the? numbers? of?
                                                          
22? The? reports? of? the? European? Union?Monitoring?Mission? (EUMM)? are? restricted? and?
cover?only?the?Georgian?controlled?territories.??
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deaths? are? highly? flawed? and? cannot? depict? trajectories? prior? to?
escalations.? In? contrast,? typologies? of? actors? can? reflect? the? level? of?
intensity?if?we?understand?that?the?state?related?status?of?actors?signifies?a?
higher? intensity? of? violence? than? perpetrated? by? civilian? actors.? Second,?
typologies?of?actors?support?the?explanatory?aim?of?the?study?as?they?point?
out?violence?carried?out?by?state?actors.??
The?overall? trajectory?of?violence?based?on? the?decrease?and? increase?of?
violence? are?measured? through? involvement? of? typologies? of? actors? and?
can?be?depicted?as?follows:?
?
Graphic? 2:? Trajectory? of? violence? based? on? the? involvement? of? typologies? of?
actors?of?violence.?
?
The?curve?shows?three?major?points?of?escalation?in?1991,?2004?and?2008.?
The?most?pronounced?increase?of?intensity?shows?that?prior?to?the?first?war?
in? 1991,? state? actors? were? significantly? less? involved? in? the? onset? of?
violence? from?1989.?After? the? intensity?had?decreased? in?1994,? the?curve?
persistently?remains?at?an? intense? level?as?a?result?of?which?the?following?
escalations? in?2004? and?2008?do? show? less? radical? increases.? Even?more?
significant,? after? each? escalation? the? curve? never? falls? back? to? the? level?
prior?to?the?escalation,?but?always?decreases?to?a?comparably?higher?level.?
Therefore,?the?curve?gathers?intensity?with?each?escalation.??
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Therefore,? the?major? differences? between? the? three? escalations? can? be?
summarized?as?a?gradual? shift? from? local? to? international?conflict23,? from?
civilian?actors?of?violence? in?1989? to?gradual? involvement?of?state?actors,?
and?an?overall? increasing?death? toll? from?1992.?Together?with? the?overall?
increasing? involvement?of?state?actors,?this?suggests?that?the?conflict?over?
time?progresses? into? a? conflict? less?between? the? communities?or?private?
agents?than?more?between?stakeholders?at?the?state?level.?In?other?words,?
even?though?violence?is?carried?out?on?the?local?level,?the?driving?issues?of?
the?conflict?seem?to?be?increasingly?located?at?the?national?or?international?
level.?
Altogether,?the?curve?supports?the?conclusion?that?points?of?escalation? in?
2004? and? 2008? identified? through? the? analysis? of? the? numbers? of?
casualties.? However,? the? curve? does? not? show? an? escalation? in? 2002,?
although?the?graph?accounts?for?an?increased?level?of?intensity?from?2000.?
Apparently,? the? involvement? of? actors? remains? at? fairly? the? same? level?
between?1994?and?2004,?with?permanent? involvement?of?police,?militias?
and? other? non?state? armed? groups.? Nevertheless,? for? 2002? the? graph?
shows? increased?casualties?and?which?points? the?study? to?account? for?an?
escalation?in?2002.?That?being?said,?we?should?keep?in?mind?that?the?study?
does?not?seek?to?explain?varying?levels?of?intensity,?but?looks?at?the?periods?
prior?to?escalations?of?violence.?To?conclude,?the?graph?altogether?supports?
the? argument? for? the? division? of? three? phases? of? violence? identifying?
escalations?in?2002,?2004?and?2008.?
?
The? following? section? will? use? these? findings? to? frame? the? background?
discussion?of? the?episodes?of?political?events?and?violence?with? the? three?
points?of?escalation? in?2002,?2004?and?2008.? In? this? respect,? the?account?
focuses?on?the?local?context?of?external?and?domestic?policies.?Thereafter,?
the?study?will?continue?with?an?empirical?analysis?of?the?interview?material?
                                                          
23? The? escalation? of? 1989? to? 1991? that? started? the? conflict? does? not? count? as? an?
international?conflict?as?Georgia?was? formally? still?part?of? the?Soviet?Union?and?Russian?
intervention?counted?as? internal?affair;?only?after?Georgia?had?declared? independence? in?
1991?involvement?of?Russian?actors?put?the?conflict?on?an?international?scale.?
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using? the? method? of? narrative? analysis? to? examine? the? influence? of?
Western?policies?on?Georgian?state?leaderships’?behavior?in?the?conflict.?
?
The?account?is?based?on?the?analysis?of?the?OSCE?material?(see?annex?1)?to?
add? to? the? scarce? reference? material? on? the? conflict.? In? addition,? the?
account? is?based?on?the? interviews?held? in?Georgia? in?2009?and?2010?(see?
the? discussion? in? 3.3.? and? annexes? 3? and? 4)? and? on? the? primary? and?
secondary? sources?on?Georgia’s?and? the? conflict’s?political? context?which?
has? been? discussed? in? the? literature? review.? Particularly? the? second?
sequence?of?events?draws?on? the?research?done? in? the? framework?of? the?
M.A.?thesis?(submitted?to?the?board?of?the?Otto?Suhr? Institute?at?the?Free?
University?of?Berlin? in?February?2006,?referenced?as?Sigwart?2006),?which?
centered? on? power? policies? of? the? Saakashvili? leadership? in? the? South?
Ossetia? conflict? between? January? and?August? 2004.? The? interviews?were?
conducted?in?the?framework?of?a?DAAD?funded?research?project?in?Georgia?
from?August?to?October?2005.?
?
3.2. Background?of?the?study:?Trajectory?of?politics?and?violence? in?the?
South?Ossetia?conflict?1989?2008??
Violence? in? South? Ossetia? took? its? start? when? national? movements?
throughout?the?Soviet?Union?claimed?self?determination?at?the?end?of?the?
1980s.?After?movements? in?Tskhinvali?and?Tbilisi?started?to? foment?public?
debate?and?violent?clashes?ensued,?violence?became?a?consistent?pattern?
of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?that?never?came?to?cease.?
The?task?of?the?background?account?is?to?provide?contextual?knowledge?of?
the? conflict?highlighting?major?politic?events?and? trajectories?of?violence.?
The?purpose?of?the?section?is?to?point?out?the?context?of?Western?and?local?
agency? in? light?of? the?argument?of? the? study.?Therefore,? the? section?will?
show?how?after?1989?Georgia?state?elites?attempted?to?consolidate?power?
in?the?context?of?the?conflict?and?at?how?the?Western?agenda?in?the?conflict?
reacted? to? local? power? claims.? The? background? account? of? key? political?
events? covers? four?major? episodes,? comprising? the? periods? of? increasing?
75?
?
and?decreasing?violence?before?and?after?the?escalations?in?2002,?2004?and?
2008.?
?
The?key?events?within?the?four?episodes?can?be?summarized?as?follows:??
Episode? 1:? 1989? to? 1994? –? Independence? of?Georgia,? start? of? conflict? in?
South? Ossetia,? and? first? Georgian?Ossetian? war? (Independence?
demonstrations,? March? to? Tskhinvali,? Gamsakhurdia? becomes? first?
president? of?Georgia,?Gorbachev? referendum,?Ousting? of?Gamsakhurdia,?
Shevardnadze? becomes? second? president? of? Georgia,? Sochi? agreement?
ending?the?first?South?Ossetia?war,?Start?of?war?in?Abkhazia,?Start?of?JCC).?
Episode?2:?1994?2002?–? Shevardnadze?Chibirov?agreement,?Kokoity? takes?
power,?and?re?escalation? in?2002?(Chibirov?becomes?de?facto?president?of?
South? Ossetia,? Shevardnadze?Chibirov? agreement,? Second? war? with?
Chechnya,?Putin?becomes? (acting)?president?of? the?RF,?Baden?Document,?
Re?election? of? Shevardnadze,? Kokoity? replaces? Chibirov? as? de?facto?
president?of?South?Ossetia).?
Episode? 3:? 2002?2006? –? Ousting? of? Shevardnadze,? closure? of? Ergneti,?
Ljubljana?Document,? Sanakoev? administration? (Ousting? of? Shevardnadze,?
Saakashvili?becomes?third?president?of?Georgia,?Closure?of?Ergneti?market,?
Shelling? of? Tskhinvali,? Mamsurov? becomes? president? of? North? Ossetia,?
Ljubljana?Document,?Sanakoev?becomes?head?of?alternative?South?Ossetia?
administration).?
Episode?4:?2006?2008? –?Kosovo,?NATO? summit? in?Bucharest,?August?war?
and?aftermath?of?the?war?(November?demonstrations?in?Tbilisi,?Okruashvili?
goes?into?exile,?Recognition?of?Kosovo,?NATO?summit?in?Bucharest,?Second?
war?in?South?Ossetia,?Russia?recognizes?Abkhazia?and?South?Ossetia,?End?of?
OSCE? Mission,? mandate? of? the? European? Union? Monitoring? Mission?
(EUMM)).?
?
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Episode? 1:? 1989? to? 1994? –? Independence? of?Georgia,? start? of? conflict? in?
South?Ossetia?and?first?Georgian?Ossetian?war?
Summary.? Between? 1989? and? 1994,? claims? of? self?determination?
intensified? the? Georgian?Ossetian? conflict.? While? Georgia? declared?
independence? from? the? Soviet? Union,? Russian? leaders? supported? South?
Ossetian? attempts? to? cede? from? Georgia.? The? first? Georgian? president?
Gamsakhurdia?started?the?conflict?and?the?second?president?Shevardnadze?
ended? the? first? war? in? 1992,? both? attempting? to? legitimize? their? rule?
through? gaining? control? over? South? Ossetia.? The? peace? agreement?
mandated?Russia’s?presence?on?the?ground?and?upheld?the?political?status?
quo? of? South? Ossetia.? When? Western? actors? entered? the? conflict? as?
facilitators,? the? Russian,? Georgian? and? South? Ossetian? leaderships? had?
already? secured? their? interests? of? opportunities? for? illicit? gains,? shared?
control? of? territory? and? de?facto? independence,? particularly? with?
Shevardnadze? proving? to? be? a? strong? leader? and? being? able? to? provide?
payoffs?to?his?civil?servants?through?the?profits?from?smuggling.?
?
In?early?1989,?tensions?rose?in?the?Soviet?Republic?of?Georgia?when?people?
in? the? capital? of? Tbilisi? demonstrated? for? independence? from? the? Soviet?
Union? (see? Suny? 1994,? Beissinger? 2002,? Nodia? 1996).? In? March,? the?
demonstrations? in?front?of?the?Georgian?parliament?reached? its?peak.24? In?
the?beginning,?claims?were?brought?against?Abkhazian? self?determination?
as?fears?grew?that?the?region?might?drift?away?from?Georgian?central?rule.?
However,?Soviet? troops?cracked?down?on?demonstrations?causing?civilian?
casualties?on?April?9,?1989.?As?a?consequence,?the?public?tide?turned? into?
demands? of? independence? from? Moscow? rule? (I? 25).? As? the? Georgian?
national?movement?gathered?strength,?claims?of? independence?coincided?
with? demands? of? Russian? withdrawal? from? Georgia’s? regions? under? the?
titular? ethnoterritorial? rule? granted? by? the? Soviet? system.25? Effective?
                                                          
24? Three? interview?partners?who?were? active? in?politics?during? and? after? the? fall?of? the?
Soviet?Union?described?the?events?at?the?time?(I?25,?I?29).?
25?Under? the? Soviet? system,? administration? of? territorial? entities?was? divided? by? ethnic?
groups.? Adjara? and? Abkhazia? held? the? status? of? autonomous? republic,? with? more?
77?
?
central?control?over?these?territories?was?held?to?be?necessary?to?achieve?
of?Georgian?independence.?
?
The? situation? intensified? when? Zviad? Gamsakhurdia? became? Georgia’s?
national? figurehead? on? the? way? to? the? presidency? of? an? independent?
Georgia.? A? popular? writer,? his? ideas? of? independence? of? the? Georgian?
nation?attracted?his?followers?and?made?him?a?powerful?figure?and?activist?
well?before?he?was?elected?president? in?October?1990.?He?fiercely?pushed?
an? anti?Soviet? agenda?with? a?nationalist? rhetoric? (see?Nodia? 1996,? Jones?
2005,? Zhorzholiani? et? al.? 1992,? Beissinger? 2002,? English? 2008).?After? the?
spring?demonstrations?of?1989,?Gamsakhurdia?made?South?Ossetia?the?test?
case?for?his?anti?Russian?policy.?After?Gamsakhurdia,?South?Ossetia?was?the?
cradle?of?Georgian? identity?that?was?now? in?the?grip?of?Russia´s?ethnically?
divisive?politics?(see?for?example:?Jones?1997,?Aves?1992).?On?10?November?
1989,? the? South? Ossetian? leadership? for? the? first? time? called? on? the?
Georgian?Supreme?Soviet?to?grant?South?Ossetia?the?status?of?autonomous?
republic?(on?this?process?above?all?see:? ICG?2004).?The?Georgian?Supreme?
Soviet?refused?the?request.??
After? a? public? appeal? on? television? by? Gamsakhurdia? on? 23? November?
1989,?15,000?Georgians?gathered?and?marched?to?Tskhinvali,?in?what?came?
to?be?known?as?the?‘March?to?Tskhinvali’?(Birch?1996:?44,?Wheatley?2005:?
46).?Georgian?protesters?clashed?with?Ossetian?residents?and? followers?of?
the?South?Ossetian?National?Front?Ademon?Nykhaz? (HRW?1992:?6,?Fuller?
1991:? 21).? The?march? caused? the? first? casualties? in? the? conflict? through?
clashes?of?Georgians,?Ossetians,?Soviet?troops?and?militias?and?the?conflict?
started?to?gradually?escalate?into?war.?
?
Almost? one? year? later? on? 20? September? 1990,? South? Ossetia? declared?
independence? from?Georgia?and? full? sovereignty?within? the?Soviet?Union?
amid? ongoing? clashes.? Yet,? once?more,? both? the? Georgian? and? Russian?
leaderships? formally? rejected? recognition.?Ossetians?were?not?part?of? the?
                                                                                                                                                                                     
independence? from? the?center? in?Tbilisi? than?South?Ossetia?which?held? the? status?of?an?
autonomous?region.??
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Georgian? elections? that?on?30?October? 1990? brought?Gamsakhurdia? into?
power,?and?later?made?him?the?first?president?of?Georgia?on?26?May?1991?
(Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication? No.? 186).26? On? 11? December? 1990,? six?weeks? after? the?
parliamentary?elections?and? in?reaction?to?the?South?Ossetian?declaration?
of? independence,? the? Georgian? parliament? abolished? the? status? of? the?
autonomous?region?of?South?Ossetia,?declaring?the?state?of?emergency?for?
the?region?and?putting? it?under?central?rule? (Times?28.01.1991).?Georgian?
central?authorities?dispatched?police?forces?to?Tskhinvali.? In?the?course?of?
December,? the? first? casualties? among?Georgian?police?occurred,? and? just?
before? January? 1991? armed? hostilities? among?Georgian? guards,?Ossetian?
militias? and? Russian? troops? broke? out? in? Tskhinvali.? When? Georgian?
independence?from?the?Soviet?Union?was?finalized?on?25?December?1991,?
Georgia?was?already?engaged?in?its?first?internal?war.?
?
In?what?aggravated?the?general?situation,?Mikhail?Gorbachev,?head?of?the?
Supreme?Soviet?in?Moscow,?offered?a?higher?degree?of?self?rule?to?national?
entities.?All?autonomous? republics? could?hold? referendums?over?national?
independence.?In?March?1991,?Gorbachev?offered?Abkhazia?to?receive?the?
same?sovereign?status?as?Georgia?within?the?Soviet?Union? (Lane?and?Ross?
1994,?I?13,?I?2427).?When?Gorbachev´s?offer?came,?violence?in?South?Ossetia?
had?already?been?waging?for?months?and?the?offer?embittered?Tbilisi?even?
more? as? it? undermined? the? claim? of? Georgia’s? territorial? unity? (NYT?
10.04.1991).?Until?March?1991,?sources?estimate?50?casualties;?by?the?end?
of?Gamsakhurdia’s?rule?in?December?1991?some?sources?put?the?death?toll?
at?one?thousand?deaths.28?
                                                          
26?The?references?abbreviate?CSCE,? later?OSCE?reports?with?AR? for?the?bi?weekly?Activity?
Reports?of?the?Head?of?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?to?the?Vienna?headquarter,?and?SR?
for?Spot?Reports?that?were?issued?by?the?mission?on?occasion?of?incidents?of?violence?that?
affected?the?situation?in?the?conflict?area.??
27?Both,?a? former?member?of? the?Gamsakhurdia?government?and?a?co?worker?of? the?EU?
Representative? to? the? South?Caucasus,? emphasized?Gorbachev’s?offer? as? an? event? that?
alienated? the?Georgian?national?movement? from?Russian?politics? and? the?minorities.? In?
addition,?the?offer?alienated?the?South?Ossetian?independence?movement.?
28?Data?on?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?is?not?reliable.?Here?widely?quoted?data?on?the?first?
Georgian?Ossetian?war? 1990? to? 1992:?Casualties?of? "at? least?700“? (International?Herald?
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Western?Georgian?relations?did?not?experience?a?good?start?under?this?first?
presidency.? Gamsakhurdia’s? policies? were? met? with? stark? Western?
contempt? (on? European? and?U.S.? reaction? see:?HRW?1992,? English?2008,?
Nodia?1995).?Gamsakhurdia?intended?to?establish?order?with?a?strong?hand?
before? introducing?democracy.?The?West? reacted?by?adamantly? rejecting?
Gamsakhurdia’s?crackdown?on?demonstrations,?media?and?his?nationalist?
rhetoric? against? ethnic? minorities.? As? well,? Gamsakhurdia’s? refusal? to?
introduce?market? oriented? reforms? and? his? intention? to? keep? a? planned?
economy?system?did?not?gain?him?support.?When?violence?in?South?Ossetia?
escalated,?the?West?mainly?blamed?it?on?Gamsakhurdia’s?ethnically?divisive?
rhetoric?and?welcomed?the?regime?change?to?Shevardnadze?with?relief.?
?
The? end? of? Gamsakhurdia’s? rule? came? at? the? hands? of? his? internal?
opponent? when? political? groups? that? were? part? of? Gamsakhurdia’s?
umbrella?coalition?usurped?his?power?(see?Shatirishvili?2003,?Nodia?1996).?
When? Gamsakhurdia? was? ousted,? violence? in? South? Ossetia? continued?
unmitigated.? Shevardnadze? arrived? in? Georgia? to? become? the? second?
president? of? Georgia? in? January? 1992.? He? enjoyed? the? backing? of? the?
Mkhedrioni?militias?who?had?defied?Gamsakhurdia.?As?the?former?Minister?
of?Foreign?Affairs?of? the?Soviet?Union?Shevardnadze?enjoyed?an?excellent?
standing?with?Russia?as?well?(Suny?1994:?328?330).?One?of?Shevardnadze’s?
first?actions?was? to? send? the?Georgian?military? to? fight? the?war? in? South?
Ossetia.?Until?then,?militias?and?the?Georgian?National?Guard?had?engaged?
in?skirmishes?since?the?winter?of?1990.??
?
Shevardnadze,? as? the? second? president? of? Georgia,? seemed? to? follow? a?
more? moderate? course? than? his? predecessor.? However,? Shevardnadze?
attempted? to?prove?being?a?capable? leader?by?subduing?separatist? forces?
and?regaining?South?Ossetia.?As?a?result?from?January?1992,?Georgian?and?
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Tribune? 1992),? 1,000? (ICG? 2004),?or? "up? to? 2000“? (Le?Monde? 1992),? 3,000? (Svetkovsky?
1993);? estimates? of?wounded? quote? 1500? (Le?Monde? 1992),?missed? persons? 100? (ICG?
2004).?The?UNHCR?estimates?Ossetian?refugees?in?North?Ossetia?at?40,000,?ICG?and?Birch?
at?100,000?(ICG?2004;?Birch?1996);?Georgian?and?ethnically?mixed?IDPs?inside?of?Georgia?at?
10,000?and?5,000?(UNHCR?2004).?
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Russian?military?engaged?in?a?six?month?war?in?South?Ossetia?until?a?peace?
agreement?was? negotiated? in? June? 1992? that? left? South? Ossetia? lost? to?
central?Georgian?rule?(see?for?example:? ICG?2004,?Cornell?2001?and?2002,?
Milcher?and?Slay?2005,?Barbe?and?Johansson?Nogue?2008).??
In? June? 1992,? President? of? the? Russian? Federation,? Boris? Yeltsin,? and?
Shevardnadze? built? on? their? good? personal? relations? and? negotiated? the?
Sochi?Agreement?which?ended? the?war? (Annex? II?of?CSCE?Communication?
No.?228,?05.08.1992,?Report?of?the?CSCE?Fact?Findinq?Mission?to?the?region?
of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict,?25.?30.07.1992).?The?agreement?set?up?a?
joint?Peace?Keeping? Force?under? the? auspices?of?CSCE,? from?1995?OSCE,?
and? later? included? the? EU? as? a? participating? member;? however? only?
Georgian,?Russian?and?South?Ossetian?representatives?held?veto?power?(on?
the?CSCE/?OSCE?process?see:?Koenig?2005,?Mayorov?2002,?Olcott?Brill?et?al.?
1999,? Cummings? 2001).? South? Ossetian,? Russian? (constituted?mainly? by?
North? Ossetians)? and? Georgian? troops? were? to? control? the? buffer? zone?
under?Russian?command.?The?Peace?Keeping?Forces?were?the?only?security?
personnel?the?Sochi?Agreement?entitled?to?carry?arms?in?the?conflict?zone.?
Joint? checkpoints? with? members? of? each? battalion? were? established?
throughout? the? area.? Later? from? 2000,? the? peace?keeping? forces? were?
supplemented?by?joint?operations?of?Georgian?and?Ossetian?local?police.??
?
This? arrangement? marked? the? start? of? Western? engagement? in? South?
Ossetia? from? the? end? of? the? first?war? in?mid?1992.? However,?within? six?
weeks? after? the? Sochi? agreement? the?war? in?Abkhazia? started? in?August?
1992? which? proved? to? be? an? ongoing? volatile? situation? also? under?
Shevardnadze’s? rule.?By? settling? the?war? in? South?Ossetia,? Shevardnadze?
cemented?his?claim?to?power?by?settling?the?conflict?and?maintaining?close?
ties?with?Moscow?and?with?the?new?South?Ossetian?leader,?Ludvig?Chibirov,?
being?installed?in?1993.?
?
Episode? 2:? 1994?2002? –? Shevardnadze?Chibirov?agreement,?Kokoity? takes?
power,?and?re?escalation?in?2002?
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Summary.? Between? 1994? and? 2002,? low?intensity? violence? persisted? in?
South?Ossetia,?due?to?the?good?relations?between?the?Georgian?and?South?
Ossetian?leaderships?and?intense?support?of?Western?actors.?From?the?very?
start? of? the? 1990s,?Western? support? of? the?Georgian? elites? centered? on?
territorial? integration,? with? a? special? focus? on? anti?corruption? and? anti?
smuggling?measures? in?the?conflict?area?of?South?Ossetia.?Simultaneously,?
Georgian? and? Ossetian? leaders? made? enormous? private? gains? from?
cooperatively? organizing? smuggling? through? South?Ossetia? and? therefore?
kept?the?conflict?from?escalating.?However?from?2000?on,?the?situation?was?
aggravated? due? to? a? hardening? stance? of? Moscow,? cancelling? the?
settlement? negotiations? in? Baden? and? replacing? Chibirov? with? hardline?
leader? Kokoity.? As? Georgian? elites? turned? away? from? Russia,? Russian?
politics?in?South?Ossetia?continued?to?reinforce?the?situation?in?the?conflict.?
The?conflict?re?escalated? in?2002?with?Shevardnadze?clinging?to?power?by?
trying?to?re?organize?smuggling?to?satisfy?the?clients?of?his?regime?as?well?as?
staging? anti?corruption?measures? to? the?West? and? the? harshly? criticizing?
civil?society.?
?
From? 1994,?Western? engagement? increasingly? stepped? up? its? activity? in?
Georgia?and?in?the?Georgian?Ossetian?conflict?amid?the?reality?of?the?shaky?
power?sharing? deal? monitored? through? the? Joint? Control? Commission?
(Koenig?2005,?Jawad?2005,?Mayorov?2002).?While?the?deal?was?in?place?and?
Western?actors? sustained? the?process,? the? conflict? remained? in?a?volatile?
state.?Frequent?outbreaks?of?violence?persisted,?but?were?downplayed?as?
local? disputes.? After? Gamsakhurdia? had? been? ousted,? Georgia? went?
through?both,?a?civil?war?between?non?state?groups?and?a?war?with?break?
away?Abkhazia? (on? the? first?Abkhazia?war? see:?Slider?1997,?Hensell?2009,?
Coppieters? 2004,? Coppieters? et? al.? 1998).? Once? those? struggles? of?
competing? elites?were?overcome,?Georgian? capital? politics? settled? into? a?
routine? from? 1996? and? Shevardnadze? established? uncontested? rule?with?
Western?support.?
?
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After?the?peace?agreement?had?been?put?in?place?in?1992,?it?took?two?years?
for?a?drop? in?violence.? In?1993,?at? least?48?casualties? in?sixteen? incidents?
were? reported? and? in? 1994,? the? death? toll? went? down? to? thirteen.?
Casualties?during?this?time?mainly?occurred?because?of?shoot?outs?between?
Ossetian?or?Georgian?local?gangs?or?between?gangs?and?local?authorities?or?
PKFs,? reported? to? be? mostly? related? to? smuggling? activities.? Casualties?
frequently? occurred? during? controls? at? road? posts? and? were? then?
considered? to? be? related? to? criminal? activities.? However,? as?mentioned?
earlier,? the?OSCE?reports?gave?a?detailed?account?on?casualties?only? from?
1997.29?Before?this,?the?casualties?rates?and?indications?of?causes?were?very?
vague.? While? casualties? stayed? at? a? low? level? throughout? the? 1990s,?
violence? however? simmered? beneath? the? surface? throughout? the? entire?
period.?Altogether,?at?least?59?casualties?were?reported?in?the?‘calm’?period?
between?1994?and?1999.?
?
In? the? 1990s,? the? balance? in? South? Ossetia? worked? through? active?
cooperation? between? Shevardnadze’s? leadership? and? South? Ossetia’s?
moderate?leader?Chibirov.?Relations?were?supported?by?the?JCC?in?settling?
organizational?and?security? issues? for?the?populations? in?the?conflict?area.?
Amid? the?ongoing?war? in?early?1992,?Torez?Kulumbegov?became? the?de?
facto? president? of? South? Ossetia.? Already? then?Western? actors’? intense?
interest? in?engaging? in? the?conflict?showed.? JCC?negotiations?started?and,?
on? 23? January? 1993,? Kulumbegov? signed? the? memorandum? on? the?
cooperation?between?CSCE? and? the? South?Ossetian? leadership? (OSCE?AR?
12/92).?The?CSCE?presented?a?“CSCE?Plan? for?Georgia”?envisaging?gradual?
reintegration?of?South?Ossetia?into?Georgia?in?July?1993.30??
                                                          
29? The?major? incidents? during? this? period?were? an?Ossetian? being? killed? by? a?Georgian?
policeman?during?the?first?half?of?August?1997.?In?the?first?half?of?April?1998,?a?Russian?PKF?
soldier?killed?a?Georgian?resident?in?the?Georgian?village?of?Tamarasheni.?In?the?first?half?of?
December?1998,?two?Georgian?residents?were?killed?by?other?local?residents.?The?suspects?
were? subsequently? arrested? in? a? joint? Georgian?South? Ossetian? operation? of? law?
enforcement?bodies.?Finally,?on?October?13,?1999,?a?North?Ossetian?was? killed?by? local?
Ossetians?at?the?Ergneti?market.?
30?The? five?page?document? includes?the?“CSCE?concept?of?a?Settlement?of?the?Georgian?
Ossetian? and? Georgian?Abkhazian? Conflicts”? and? was? viewed? in? the? OSCE? archive? in?
Prague.?
83?
?
However,?only?two?months?later,?Chibirov?was?elected?the?new?head?of?the?
South?Ossetian?Supreme?Soviet.?Chibirov?announced?that?Kulumbegov?had?
been? too? much? in? favor? of? the? CSCE? plan? (CSCE? ARs? 24.08.,? 28.11.,?
11.10.1993,? CSCE? Supplemental? Report,? 30.09.1993).? After? two? years? of?
half?hearted? negotiations,? from? early? 1996,? Shevardnadze? announced?
“perspectives? for? the? relative? quick? settlement? of? the?Georgian?Ossetian?
conflict”? and? signed? the? “Initiative? for? a? Peaceful? Caucasus”? (OSCE? ARs?
13.02.?and?03.04.1996).?On?May?16,?Shevardnadze?and?Chibirov?signed?a?
Memorandum?on? confidence?building?and? security?measures? in?Moscow.?
This?was?considered?as?a?major?step?toward?the?settlement?of?the?conflict,?
but?most?of?all? it?was?an?expression?of?close?ties?between?the? leaderships?
and?was?regarded?favorably?by?Western?partners.?
?
Good?relations?between?the?South?Ossetian?and?the?Georgian? leaderships?
also? enabled? significant? incomes? for? both? sides? through? organized?
smuggling?through?the?region?of?South?Ossetia?to?Georgia.?The?power?basis?
of? the? Shevardnadze? regime? was? rooted? in? a? ‘pyramid? system’? of? re?
distribution?of?revenues?into?the?hands?of?regime?loyal?clients?(Christophe?
2005:?78,?also?see:?Easter?1996,?George?2009,?Holmes?1997).?There?were?
very? few? people? at? the? top? of? the? pyramid? in? the? state? apparatus? that?
entertained? a? large? network? of? corruption? via? police? and? regional? state?
actors.?At?the?bottom?of?this?pyramid,?most?of?the?population?had?to?bribe?
state? employees? for? access? to? virtually? anything,? including? roads,? gas? or?
jobs.?This?system?ensured? the?power?basis?of? the? state?elite?and?granted?
large? incomes? (on?the?role?of?corruption? for?governments?see?the?studies?
of?Banfield?1975,?Charap?and?Harm?1991,?Lapalombara?1994).?
Smuggling?played?a?significant? role? in?allocating? revenues? in? the?hands?of?
capital?loyal? state?actors? in? the? regions,?and?granted?gains? for?everybody?
involved.? Therefore,? Georgian,? North? and? South? Ossetian? and? Russian?
militia,? police? and? civilian? actors,? and? parts? of? the? Peace?Keeping? Forces?
engaged?in?smuggling,?with?smuggling?activities?peaking?between?1995?and?
2004?(ICG?2004:?9?10,?also?see:?Vilanishvili?2005,?Chkhartishvili?et?al.?2004).?
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Above?all,?Ergneti?market? flourished? from?the?mid?1990s?and?became?the?
most? active? trans?shipment? center? in? Georgia,? the? hub? of? Georgian?
Ossetian? illegal? and? legal? trade? relations? (on? the? role? and? functioning?of?
Ergneti?market? see:? George? 2009,? Kukhianidze? et? al.? 2006,? Kukhianidze?
2003,?2004?and?2007).?The?market?was? the?biggest? source?of? income? for?
the? leadership? in? Tskhinvali,?many? of? Shevardnadze’s? civil? servants? and?
businessmen?in?North?Ossetia?(ibid.,?Wennmann?2004).?Therefore,?all?sides?
across?the?conflict?boundaries?had?a?vested?interested?in?keeping?the?illicit?
trade? system? alive.? In? order? to? organize? smuggling? activities? along? the?
routes? between? North? Ossetia? and? Georgia,? the? main? concern? was? to?
maintain?order?in?the?conflict?area?and?keep?violence?at?a?low?level?(on?this?
view?see?above?all:?George?2009).??
?
At? the?same? time,?however,?Chibirov?signed?a? treaty?of?cooperation?with?
North?Ossetia.?The?Chibirov?leadership?openly?stated?the?intention?to?unite?
with?North?Ossetia?and?become?a?member?of?the?Russian?Federation.?From?
the? end? of? the? 1990s,? the? Russian? political? elite? had? undergone? a?
transformation? that,?at? least? for?Georgian?politics,?proved? to?be? fatal? (on?
this? period? see? for? example:? Gower? and? Timmins? 2009,? Haukkala? 2008,?
Sikorski?2009,?Loewenhardt?2005,?Cooley?and?Mitchell?2010a?and?2010b,?
Allison?2008,?Blank?1995).?The?change?from?Yeltsin?to?the?Putin?presidency?
radicalized? Russian? policy? towards? Georgia? very? quickly? (see? Cummings?
2001,?Allison?2008,?Filippov?2009).??
With?almost?immediate?effect,?the?tightening?Russian?stance?was?revealed?
in? the? South?Ossetia? context:? the? so? called? Baden? process? of? the? JCC,? a?
negotiation? format? envisaging? the? settlement? of? the? region’s? political?
status?and?at? least? to?most? international?observers?highly?promising,?was?
halted?(on? international?view?to?the?Baden?process?see:?Koenig?2005;?also?
see:?I?8,?I?14,?I?1?1631).?In?addition,?Chibirov?was?replaced?with?his?politically?
                                                          
31?The?two? local? interview?partners,?though?with?diverse?backgrounds?of?a?current?and?a?
former?government?official,?as?well?as?a?member?of?the?EU?Delegation?had?a?more?critical?
view?stressing?the?disblanace?in?voting?distribution?leaving?the?Georgian?side?as?a?rule?in?a?
weaker?position?against?the?Russian,?the?South?and?the?North?Ossetian?votes.?This?along?
with? the? hawkish? turn? in? the? Georgian? governmental? line,? the? interview? partners?
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radical?successor?Eduard?Kokoity?who? took?power? in?December?2001? (on?
this? turn? in? the?process? see:? I?8,? I?9,? I?28,? I?29).?The? failure?of? the?Baden?
process? was? the? first? sign? announcing? the? end? of? Chibirov’s? era? under?
whom? the? process? toward? a? peace? settlement? had? been? striving.? The?
replacement? of? Chibirov? proved? to? be? a?major? setback? in? the? otherwise?
successful? Georgian?Ossetian? process? that? had? taken? place? through? the?
1990s.? By? 1997,? the? institutions? managing? conflict? affairs? had? been?
consolidated?and? internationalized;?The?OSCE?branch?office?had? taken?up?
work? in?Tskhinvali,?the?three?Peace?Keeping?Forces?had?held?the?first?joint?
training,?the?first?meeting?on?the?political?status?of?South?Ossetia?had?been?
held? in?Moscow,?and?Georgian?and?Ossetian? intellectuals?met? for?yet? the?
second?time.??
After? the?South?Ossetian?elections? in?December?2001,? in?one?of?his? very?
first?public? statements?Kokoity? announced?Georgia´s? acknowledgment?of?
the? ‘genocide’? against? the? South?Ossetian? people? during? the? 1990?1992?
war? as? conditional? for? dialog? (OSCE? AR? 18.12.2001).? The? new? South?
Ossetian? course? reiterated? reunification? with? North? Ossetia? and? would?
never? again? come? as? close? to? negotiating? South? Ossetia’s? autonomous?
status? within? Georgia? as? under? Chibirov.? As? relations? deteriorate,?
Shevardnadze? for? the? first? time? openly? criticized? Russia? in? June? 2002,?
saying? that? Russia? “secretly? annexes”? South? Ossetia? and? thus?made? its?
mediating?role?less?credible?(ibid.).?
?
Seconded? by? Georgia’s? mutual? interest? of? integration? into? the? West,?
Western? engagement? gradually? intensified? over? the? 1990s.? Formation?of?
the?Georgian?state?was?a?core?priority,?and?here,?intense?activity?showed?in?
solving? Georgia’s? rule?of?law? problems? by? enhancing? capacities? of? the?
central?state?through?fighting?crime?and?corruption?in?South?Ossetia?where?
statehood?was? contested? through? territorial? conflict.? The?Georgian? state?
elite? responded?with? a? vivid? interest? in? cooperation.? During? the? 1990s,?
Shevardnadze?had?pursued?a?mild?course?toward?Russia?(see?for?example:?
                                                                                                                                                                                     
suggested,?led?over?time?and?regardless?of?change?in?personnel?represented?in?the?JCC?to?
the?Georgians’?refusal?to?carry?on?with?the?format.?
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Mark? 1996,? Timmermann? 1992,? English? 2000,? Allison? 2008),? keeping? a?
balance? between? Russian? influence? in? Georgia,? revenues? for? selected?
echelons? of? the? elite? and? political? stability? in? the? territorial? conflicts.?
However,?when?Russia’s?political?system?transferred? from?Yeltsin?to?Putin?
in?2000,?the?ground?of?politically?stable?relations?gradually?eroded.??
As? the? Georgian? elites’? relations?with? Russia? started? to? fall? apart? under?
Shevardnadze,? Georgia’s? turn? to? the? West? was? accomplished? through?
promoting? an? anti?Russian? discourse? and? altogether? opening? a? new,?
modernized? perspective? that? was? boosted? through?Western? pledges? of?
support? for? independence? and? progress? (Christophe? 2001,? Jones? 1993,?
Zuercher?and?Koehler?2004).?Moscow’s?politics,?in?contrast,?weakened?local?
independence? politics? as? they? supported? competing? groups? in? the?
secessionist?regions?as?well?as?opposition?groups?in?the?capital,?cutting?links?
of?Georgia?with?its?North?Caucasus?neighbors?and?altogether?attempting?to?
diffuse?social?and?infrastructural?capital?necessary?to?sustain?independence?
(Proladze? 2001,? Sikharulidze? 2001,?Hanf? and?Nodia? 2000).?As? local? elites?
gradually? experienced? new? power? consolidating? opportunities? through?
relations? with? Western? partners,? their? policies? adopted? a? stern? pro?
Western? course? that,? particularly? from? 2000,? included? meticulous?
fulfilment? of?Western? conditionalities? in? the? reform? process? that?was? to?
lead?to?Western?integration?into?NATO?and?EU.?
?
With?the?background?of?Western?integration,?from?2000,?Georgia?boosted?
anti?crime? activities? and? therefore? intensified? efforts? to? control? the?
situation? in?the?Georgian?South?Ossetian?conflict?zone?and? its?vicinity.?The?
campaign?was? endorsed? by? then? Georgian?Minister? of? Justice? and? later?
president?Mikheil? Saakashvili? and? took? place? in? the? context? of?Western?
demands?to?restore?rule?of?law?in?Georgia’s?peripheral?regions.?Therefore,?
from? 2002,? the? Georgian? leadership? announced? a? large?scale? anti?
corruption? and? anti?smuggling? campaign? as? a? senior?member? of? a? local?
research?NGO?pointed?out? (I?7),?of?which?the?operations? in?South?Ossetia?
were?one?result.?
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As? the? result?of? tense?Georgian,?Ossetian?and?Russian? relations?and?anti?
crime?operations?after? the?end?of?Baden,?re?intensification?of?the?conflict?
occurred?from?2000.?As?discussed?earlier,?the?reports?give?only?but?a?weak?
hint?to?the? intensification?through?casualties:?While?OSCE?reports? indicate?
at? least? 59? casualties? between? 1994? and? 1999,? the? death? toll? rises? to? a?
minimum?of?29?casualties?only?between?2000?and?2003.?Throughout?2000,?
very?few?casualties?were?reported,?but?on?May?20?a?highly?symbolic?killing?
took?place? in? the?Georgian?village?of?Kheiti?when? five?Georgian? residents?
were?killed? in?a?car?ambush.? It?was? the?commemoration?day?of? the?1992?
killings? of? 36? Ossetian? residents.? The? killings? were? widely? held? to? have?
happened?in?retaliation?(OSCE?AR?10/00,?OSCE?SR?21.05.2000).?In?2001,?the?
reported?death? toll? in? the? conflict? zone? rose? remarkably?up? to?13,?more?
than?doubling?the?2000?rate.32??
?
Particularly,? the? intensification?showed?an? increase? in? the?engagement?of?
police? and? internal? forces? in? the? conflict? area.? In? September?2002,?OSCE?
observers? located? for? the? first? time?heavy?armament? in? the?conflict? zone?
and?Georgian?troops?of? interior?(troops?of?the?Ministry?of? Internal?Affairs)?
increased.?South?Ossetia?leader?Kokoity?announced?a?“partial?mobilization”?
of?Ossetian? forces,?allegedly? to? secure? the? territory?against? fighters? from?
the?North?Caucasus?(OSCE?AR?08.10.2002).?In?mid?October?Georgian?forces?
started?to?carry?out?large?scale?anti?crime?operations?in?the?region?of?Shida?
Kartli.?From?that?point,?Ossetian?and?Georgian?forces?both?engaged?in?anti?
crime?operations?and?struggled?over?access?and? infrastructure?across? the?
area.? As? a? result,? by?March? 10,? 2003? the? Georgian?Ministry? of? Defense?
(MoD)?unilaterally? subordinated? the?Georgian?battalion?of? the?PKF?under?
its? authority? (OSCE?AR? 06.03.2003),? a?breach?of? the? JCC? agreement? that?
                                                          
32? On? April? 3,? a? gangland? shoot?out? in? Tskhinvali? left? three? Ossetians? dead? (OSCE? AR?
07/01).?On?May?13,?a?gunbattle?between?the?South?Ossetian?police?and?Chechens?caused?
four?casualties?(OSCE?AR?09/01).?It?was?the?first?time?since?1997?that?a? law?enforcement?
member? was? killed.? In? July,? two? were? found? dead? in? Tskhinvali? and? in? the? end? of?
November? two?Ossetians?and? two?Georgians?were?killed? in? two?gunfights?with? the? local?
police?(OSCE?AR?13/01?and?10/01).?
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initially? envisaged? the? PKF? troops? under? the? bi?annually? rotating?Russian?
JPKF?command.??
?
The? trend? did? not? reverse? and? violence? annually? increased,? significantly?
involving?increasing?death?tolls?among?Georgian?and?Ossetian?police?forces,?
with?Shevardnadze’s?claim?to?power? left? in? limbo?amid?Western?demands?
for? reform,?harsh? criticism?of?Georgian? civil? society?organizations? and?an?
exacerbating?situation?in?the?conflict?zone?and?with?Russia.?As?the?situation?
in?South?Ossetia?became?exacerbated,?Shevardnadze?gradually?lost?his?grip?
on?power.?Failing? to?achieve? territorial?reintegration,?Shevardnadze?could?
not?prove?being?a?capable? leader?to?the?population?and?the? international?
community.?Ongoing? corruption?of?his?government?and?high?crime? levels?
related?to?smuggling?around?South?Ossetia?turned?support?of?civil?society?
organizations?and?Western?organizations?sour.?
?
Episode? 3:? 2002?2006? –? Ousting? of? Shevardnadze,? closure? of? Ergneti,?
Ljubljana?Document,?Sanakoev?administration?
Summary.? With? Shevardndaze? ousted? in? 2003,? the? new? Saakashvili?
government? tried? to? consolidate? rule?by? fulfilling?Western?demands?of? a?
strengthened,?democratic?statehood.?Introducing?a?sweeping?change?in?the?
stance? on? South?Ossetia,? Saakashvili? closed? down? the? smuggling? hub? of?
Ergneti?market? in?May?2004.?Re?escalation?ensued? in?August? through? the?
shelling? of? Tskhinvali.? Subsequently,? the? government? sought? to? draw?
Western?support?to?further?consolidate?rule?through?promoting?peace?road?
maps?to?reintegrate?South?Ossetia.?The?government?successfully?played?on?
a? two?sided?agenda,? assuring?Western?partners?of?a?democratic? strategy?
while?keeping?open?options?for?a?military?option?on?the?ground.?By?2006,?
all? players? in? the? conflict? had? radicalized,? including? the? Georgian?led?
alternative? South? Ossetian? Sanakoev? administration,? with? new? North?
Ossetian?leader?Mamsurov,?and?due?to?an?erosion?of?the?buffer?institution?
of? the? JCC.? The? Georgian? government? enjoyed? Western? support? in? its?
stance.?
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In?2003,? Shevardnadze’s?power?base? finally?broke?away? (Wheatley?2005:?
chapter?7,?also?see:?Mitchell?2004,?Coppieters?and?Legvold?2005).?The?2000?
presidential? elections? already? had? raised? doubts? of? Western? observer?
organizations? and? partners? about? Shevardnadze’s? commitment? to?
democratization? and? the? November? 2003? parliamentary? elections? were?
openly? branded? as? falsified? (OSCE/? ODHIR? reports,? 10.04.2000? and?
23.11.2003).? After? the? elections,? Mikheil? Saakashvili,? Shevardnadze’s?
former?Minister?of?Justice,? led?the?ensuing?protests.?Amid?strong?Western?
support? of? the? protesters,? the? ‘Rose? Revolution’? leaders? ousted?
Shevardnadze?and?Saakashvili?took?office?as?the?third?president?of?Georgia?
in? January? 2004.? Mitchell? observed? in? 2004:? “The? Rose? Revolution?
represented?a?victory?not?only?for?the?Georgian?people?but?for?democracy?
globally.? [It]? ...? demonstrated? that,? by? aggressively? contesting? elections,?
exercising? basic? freedoms? of? speech? and? assembly,? and? applying? smart?
strategic? thinking,? a? democratic? opposition? can? defeat? a? weak,? semi?
democratic?kleptocracy”?(Mitchell?2004:?342).?
?
In? Saakashvili’s? generally? ambitious? reform? agenda? of? rule? of? law? and?
democratization,?territorial? integration?ranked?at?the?top?(Wheatley?2005:?
195ff.,? also? see:? Huber? 2004,? Jawad? 2005).? Saakashvili? continued? the?
course? initiated? under? him? as? Shevardnadze’s? Minister? of? Justice? in?
establishing?rule?of?law?through?addressing?the?conflicts?and?generally,?just?
like?Gamsakhurdia?and?Shevardnadze?before?him,?banked?on?fortifying?his?
rule? through? reintegrating? the? territories.?The?new? impetus? introduced?a?
sweeping?change? in?Georgian?policy?on? the?secessionist?entities? to?a?pro?
active?course? (I?9,? I?1333).?Western?partners?promised? full? support? to? the?
new?government.?Saakashvili’s?first?success?is?the?peaceful?reintegration?of?
the?secessionist?region?of?Adjara? in?Georgia’s?southwest?and?on?the?wave?
of? triumph? the?Saakashvili? leadership? turned? its?attention? to?Tskhinvali? in?
May?2004.?
                                                          
33?The?critical?views?of?two? interview?partners,?both?members?of?the?opposition,? framed?
this?account.?
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The?implications?of?the?new?policy?showed?for?the?first?time?when?in?May?
2004?Georgian?troops?of?interior?closed?down?the?market?in?Ergneti?on?the?
border?of? South?Ossetia? and?Georgia? (several? interviews? gave? insight? on?
this?event:?I?1,?I?6,?I?8,?I?9).?While?the?Georgian?state?servants?who?gained?
from? the? system? had? been? replaced? due? to? the? regime? change? (for? this?
view? see:? Papava? 2006),? the? crackdown?mainly? cut? off? incomes? of? the?
South?Ossetian? side.?South?Ossetians?already?had?eyed?Saakashvili’s?new?
agenda?suspiciously?from?earlier?that?year?(Peuch?2004,?Fuller?2005).?After?
Ergneti?was?closed,?these? fears?seemed?to?be?confirmed.? In?August?2004,?
six? days? after? South? Ossetian? leader? Kokoity? and? new? Georgian? Prime?
Minister? Zurab? Zhvania? had? signed? a? cease?fire? agreement,? Georgian?
Minister?of?Internal?Affairs?Irakli?Okruashvili?led?an?operation?during?which?
Georgian?troops?shelled?Tskhinvali?for?hours?(RFE/RL?20.?and?27.08.2004,?I?
18).?The?next?day?on?television,?Saakashvili?declares?the?incident?a?“brilliant?
operation”?(RFE/?RL?Newswire,?20.08.2004).?With?this,?the?conflict?in?South?
Ossetia?escalated? for? the? first? time?since?1992?due? to? the? involvement?of?
the?assertive?armed?action?of?state?actors.34?
?
Already? at? the? end? of? 2003,? the? new?Georgian? government? had? sought?
Western? support? for? their? stance? toward? South?Ossetia? (Wheatley?2005:?
218?219,? also? see:?Milcher? and? Slay? 2005,? Barbe? and? Johansson?Nogue?
2008,?Popescu?2007,? Zuercher?2007,? Sigwart?2006).? Saakashvili? launched?
an?all?encompassing?international?campaign?to?promote?a?peace?road?map?
for? the? settlement? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? as? a? Georgian?
representative? at? the?OSCE?meeting? in? Ljubljana? observed? (Socor? 2005).?
The?peace?road?map?included?the?new?government’s?agenda?in?the?conflict?
and? envisaged? confidence?building? measures,? negotiations,? economic?
rehabilitation,?legalized?trade?relations?and?broad?autonomy.?In?the?course?
                                                          
34?The?more?the?conflict? intensifie,?the?more?OSCE?reports?refrained?from?accounting?for?
casualties.?For?the?period?of?2004,?the?reports?account?for?five?casualties?(two?civilians?and?
the?deputy?commander?of?the?South?Ossetian?special?forces?are?killed?by?Georgian?police?
in?separate?incidents,?two?Ossetian?peace?keepers?are?killed?in?an?ambush).?The?shelling?of?
Tskhinvali?is?accounted?with?unspecified?numbers?of?both?“military?and?civilian”?casualties.?
However,?intensification?of?the?conflict?shows?in?increased?involvement?of?state?actors?in?
violence.?
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of?2004?and?2005,?the?road?maps?were?widely?presented?to? international?
audiences? such? as? the?UN?General? Assembly? (UNGA),? the? Parliamentary?
Assembly? of? the? Council? of? Europe? (PACE),? and? the? OSCE? Permanent?
Council.? The?2005?peace? campaign?managed? to?ensure?Western? support?
for?the?new?government.?
?
While? Saakashvili´s? peace? campaign? resounded? in? the? international?
community,? the? signs? of? deterioration? continued.? Moscow? took? away?
influence? from? the?Georgian?official? side? in? South?Ossetia?affairs? step?by?
step.? Georgian? Prime? Minister? Zurab? Zhvania? and? Kokoity? signed? a?
demilitarization? agreement? in? November? 2004? (OSCE? AR? 15/04,? Civil.ge?
06.11.2004).?The?agreement?dictated?that?all?military?personnel?apart?from?
the?Peace?Keeping?deployments?must? leave?the?conflict?zone.?As?a?part?of?
the? deal,? Georgian? troops? withdrew? from? the? Sarabuki? post? in? South?
Ossetia? and? left? it? to? South? Ossetian? Peace?Keepers? (I? 9,? I? 1835).? The?
arrangement?was?lobbied?by?the?Russian?side?and?as?a?result?supported?by?
the?Western?side?as?a?concession?after?the?August?2004?escalation.?While?
demilitarization?was? in? fact?never? concluded?on?neither? side,? this?gave?a?
severe?blow?to?Georgian?military?control? in?the?area.?Moreover,? in?August?
2006?the?Georgian?military?carried?out?a?massive?campaign?in?Abkhazia?and?
gained?back?Upper?Kodori?Valley,?a?region? inhabited?by?ethnic?Georgians,?
but? located? in? the? Abkhazian?controlled? area? of? the? UN?monitored?
boundary?line?(I?14,?I?1?13,?I?2336;?also?see?OSCE?AR?26.04.1994).??
Furthermore,?Moscow? enhanced? its? influence? in? South? Ossetia? and? the?
North?Caucasus,?through?installing?a?new?leader?in?North?Ossetia,?the?most?
Moscow?loyal?North?Caucasus?entity.?After?over?seven?years,?the?moderate?
Alexander?Dzasokhov?was?replaced?by?hardliner?Teimuraz?Mamsurov?May?
31,?2005? (OSCE?AR?11/05,?Civil.Ge?11.06.2005,?Kommersant?17.06.2005).?
Just?as?South?Ossetia´s?de?facto?president?Kokoity?before?him,?Mamsurov?
                                                          
35? Two? interview? partners? emphasized? the? importance? of? the? Sarabuki? post? for? the?
Georgian?government’s?policy?toward?South?Ossetia.?
36? Several? interview? partners,? among? them? members? of? an? international? NGO? and?
organization? as?well? as? amember? of? the? opposition? framed? their? account? of? events? in?
South?Ossetia?with?events?in?Kodori?Valley.?
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insisted? in?one?of?his?first?public?statements?on?the?reunification?of?North?
and?South?Ossetia?(RFE/RL?14.06.2005).?
?
On? the? international? level?as?well,? relations?between?Russia?and?Georgia?
also? very? clearly? deteriorated? from? 2006.? In? February? 2006,? Georgia?
underlined?its?determination?in?the?conflict?context?and?vetoed?the?Russian?
mandate? of? the? Peace?Keeping? Force? in? South?Ossetia? (OSCE?AR? 02/06).?
After? the? vote,? the? Georgian? parliament? instructed? the? government? to?
revise? the? 1992? Sochi? Agreement? and? replace? the? Russian?led? Peace?
Keeping?Force?(Civil.ge?07.?and?15.02.2006).??
In? addition,? the? Georgian? side? started? to? question? the? JCC? format? from?
October? 2006.? In? November? 2006,? the? Georgian? government? held?
alternative?elections?in?the?Georgian?controlled?parts?of?South?Ossetia?and?
established? an? alternative? South? Ossetia? government? under? Dimitry?
Sanakoev? (OSCE?AR?19/06,?20/06,?22/06).?The?Georgian?government,? in?a?
provocative?move? for? the? JCC? counterparts,? introduced? Sanakoev? as? the?
Ossetian? representative? to? the? JCC.? However,? neither? Russia? nor? the?
Western? representatives?of? the? JCC? reacted? to? the?decision.?As? a? result,?
Russia?did?not?pull?out?its?peace?keepers?until?after?the?war?in?2008.37??
Altogether,?after?the?escalation?in?2004?the?conflict?remained?at?an?intense?
level?due? to?ongoing?militarization?and?operations?of? security? forces.?The?
establishment? of? the? Sanakoev? administration,? the? eroding? of? the? CC?
format?and? increased?unilateralism?of?Russia? through?a? tightening?grip? in?
the? North? Caucasus? and? Georgia’s? Kodori? campaign? in? Abkhazia? also?
aggravated? the? situation? after? the? 2004? escalation.?Western? support? for?
Georgia’s? strategy? further? progressed? at? the? international? level? and?
remained?reluctant,?but?supportive?on?the?ground.??
?
                                                          
37? In? September? 2006,? in? an? unparalleled? move,? Georgian? intelligence? arrested? four?
Russian? officers? on? spying? charges,? initiated? a? big?media? campaign? and? expelled? them?
from?Georgia?to?Russia?(Civil.ge?27.09.2006,?BBC?News?02.10.2006).?In?April?2007,?Georgia?
further? irked? Russia? and? vetoed?Russia´s?membership? in? the?World? Trade?Organization?
(WTO)?(RFE/RL?30.04.2007).?
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Episode? 4:? 2006?2008? –? Kosovo? recognition,?NATO? summit? in? Bucharest,?
August?war?and?aftermath?of?the?war?
Summary.?From?2006,?the?situation?continued?to?become?more?and?more?
tense?at?a?fast?pace.?Harsh?international?criticism?and?domestic?opposition?
challenged?Saakasvhili’s?power?base.?The?situation?created?the?pressure?for?
Saakashvili?to?act?in?his?favor?and?he?continued,?just?as?his?predecessors,?to?
direct? special? efforts? to? territorial? integration.? At? the? same? time,? the?
recognition?of?Kosovo?and?the?Bucharest?NATO?summit?put?Western?policy?
under?pressure?vis?a?vis?Russia’s?stance?of?maintaining?secessionism?in?the?
Caucasus.?The?aftermath?of? the?August?war? left?Western? influence? in? the?
conflict? diminished,? however,?Western?Georgian? ties? continued? to? exert?
considerable?influence?on?Georgian?elites’?power?base.??
?
Throughout? 2007,? tensions? continued? to? steadily? increase,? with? the?
Georgia?parliament? giving? legal? status? to? the? Sanakoev? administration? in?
May?2007.?Also,?in?July,?a?Russian?missile?hit?close?to?the?convoy?of?an?EU?
delegation? returning? from?a? visit? to?Tskhinvali? (I?14,? I?2038).?At? the? same?
time? tensions? in? Tbilisi? rose? as? the? Saakashvili? regime? grappled?with? its?
opposition? (for? this? period? see:? Lazarus? 2010,?Mitchell? 2009,? Areshidze?
2007,? Tatum? 2009,? Welt? 2009,? Kalanadze? and? Orenstein? 2009).? In?
September,?the?launching?of?the?new?oppositional?party?of?former?Minister?
of?Defense?Okruashvili?was?stalled? through?charges?of?corruption,?money?
laundering? and? abuse? of? office? against? him? (Civil.ge? 27.09.2007).? In?
November,? opposition?led? street? protests? ensued? and?were? subdued? by?
military? police? with? what? international? actors,? including? the? US? and? EU?
fiercely?condemned?as?disproportional?use?of?force?(see?Bigg?and?Sindelar?
2007).? Therefore? prior? to? the? August? war,? the? political? situation? put?
Saakahvili’s?power?base? strongly?at? risk? (Jones?2008:?3,?also? see:?Lanskoy?
2008).? Just?as? the? two? leaderships?before?him,?Saakashvili? resorted? to?an?
                                                          
38?Especially?members?of? international?organizations,?here? the?EU?Delegation?and?OSCE,?
recalled? this? incident? as? a?marker? of? increasing? tensions? in? South?Ossetia? at? the? time,?
stressing?the?potential?for?violence?from?the?South?Ossetian?side.?
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ever?more?hardening?stance?in?South?Ossetia,?including?fierce?demands?for?
the?support?of?the?international?community.?
?
In? February? 2008,? the? recognition? of? the? international? protectorate? of?
Kosovo?shook?the?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?and?Abkhazia?conflicts?(on?
the? effect? of? Kosovo’s? independence? see:? Averre? 2009,? Cerone? 2009).?
Russia? opposed? Kosovo’s? recognition,? but? then? turned? the? situation? by?
claiming? the? same? rights? for? the?South?Caucasus? separatist?entities.?As?a?
result,?Moscow? took? up? official? diplomatic? relations?with? Tskhinvali? and?
Sokhumi?in?April?2008.?Two?months?on?in?April?2008,?the?NATO?summit?in?
Bucharest?denied?membership?to?Georgia?in?the?near?future?(I?6,?I?739;?also?
see:?Asmus?2010,?Nichol?2009,?Bounds?and?Hendrickson?2009).?Ahead?of?
the?summit,?expectations?in?Georgia?were?high?as?NATO?Secretary?General?
Scheffer´s? earlier? remarks? had? boosted? hopes? for? sooner? membership,?
even?without?achieving?territorial? integrity? (Civil.ge?12.02.2007).?Ahead?of?
the? summit,? Russia? fiercely? campaigned? against? a? possible?membership.?
Georgia?saw?this?failure?largely?at?the?hands?of?Russia´s?pressure?on?NATO?
member? states,? particularly? Germany,? with? threatening? to? cut? energy?
supplies.?Although? the?summit?stressed? the?member?states’?will? to?admit?
Georgia? at? a? later? point,? the? rebuff? to? Georgia? testified? Russia´s? strong?
ambitions? and? put? a? preliminary? end? to? Georgia´s? way? into? Western?
structures.? The? same? month,? Russia? started? legal? relations? with? South?
Ossetia?and?Abkhazia?(I?540).?
?
In?early?August?2008,? the? second?war? in?South?Ossetia? took?place?during?
five?days? (on? this?period? see? for?example:?King?2008,?Asmus?2010,? Jones?
2008,? Garthon? 2010,? Allison? 2008,? Cornell? and? Starr? 2009,? Cooley? and?
Mitchell? 2010b,? International? Fact?Finding?Mission? 2009).? Armed? action?
involved? Ossetian?militias,? Georgian? and? Russian? air? forces? and? ground?
                                                          
39?A?member?of?a?local?NGO?and?of?the?opposition?accounted?for?the?Bucharest?summit?as?
a?chronological?milestone?in?the?cycle?of?escalation?leading?to?the?2008?war.?
40?A? senior?member?of? the?Ministry?of? Internal?Affairs?of?Georgia?described?Russia’s?de?
facto?recognition?of?the?two?entities?as?a?consequence?from?the?reality?that,?according?to?
the?interview,?Russia?created?in?Bucharest.??
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troops.? Georgian? military? temporarily? invaded? Tskhinvali? engaging? in?
skirmishes?with?South?Ossetian?militias,?but?was?pushed?back?by?Russian?
military.? Russian? troops? subsequently? moved? into? central? Georgian?
territory? and? occupied? strategic? locations? beyond? Abkhazia? and? South?
Ossetia.?The?war? leaves? several?hundred?dead? (HRW?2009:?5).41?The?war?
was? ended?with? an? initiative? of? the? head? of? the? EU? presidency,? French?
president?Nicolas? Sarkozy,?when? a? ceasefire?agreement?was?put? in?place?
between?Georgia?and?Russia?on?12?August?and,?after?inconsistencies?with?a?
new? version,? on? 8? September.? Despite? the? condition? for? troops? to?
withdraw? to? their?pre?war?positions,?Russian? forced? only?withdrew? from?
central?Georgia?by?mid?October,?but?remained?present? in?Abkhazia,?South?
Ossetia?and?formerly?Georgian?controlled?areas?in?South?Ossetia.?
? ?
As?early?as?26?August?2008,?barely?two?weeks?after?the?end?of?fighting,?the?
Russian? Federation? recognized? the? independence? of? South? Ossetia? and?
Abkhazia.?In?October,?the?EU?and?US?initiated?a?new?format?of?international?
talks? on? the? future? of? the? Abkhazia? and? South? Ossetia? conflicts? to?
periodically?take?place?in?Geneva.?
In?May? 2009,? parliamentary? elections? in? South?Ossetia? and? the? formerly?
Georgian?controlled? region?of?Akhalgori? fortified? the?new?de?facto? status?
(Barry?2009).?The?same?month,?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?closed?down?
as? Russia? vetoed? the? semi?annual? prolongation? the? mandate? had? been?
living?on?since?1993.?The?UN?Mission?to?Abkhazia?was?also?vetoed?by?Russia?
and? ended? in? June? 2009.? In? October? 2009,? as? a? follow?up? international?
monitoring? tool? to? the? OSCE? Mission,? the? European? Union? Monitoring?
Mission? (EUMM)? was? implemented? (Parmentier? 2009,? Simons? 2012).?
However,?the?EUMM?mandate?is?limited?to?monitoring?Georgian?controlled?
territory,?whereas?the?former?OSCE?mission?had?had?access?to?parts?of?the?
South?Ossetian? and?Abkhazian? regions,? and? the? EUMM?does?not? carry? a?
                                                          
41?Accounts?of?the?war?extensively?diverge?with?respect?to?numbers?of?casualties?and?the?
three?sequences?of?events,?particularly?contested?on?the?point?whether?Georgian?troops?
moved? into?South?Ossetia?before?or?after?Russian?troops?moved? into?South?Ossetia? (see?
Jones?2008,?IIFFMCG?2009,?Asmus?2010,?Cornell?and?Starr?2009).?
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local? negotiation?mechanism? as? the? JCC.? After? the? 2008?war,? control? of?
these?areas? is? left?to?the?Russian?military?and? local? leaders?with?close?ties?
with?Moscow?(Garthon?2010,?Makarychev?2009).??
?
To?conclude,?the?second?war?in?South?Ossetia?came?about?amid?increasing?
external?and?internal?pressure?on?Saakashvili’s?power?base.?From?2006,?the?
conflict? intensified?enormously?due? to?Russia’s?opposition? to? the?Kosovo?
recognition?and?consolidation?of?the?Sanakoev?administration.?Both? in?the?
Kosovo? precedence? and? later? at? the? NATO? summit? in? Bucharest,? the?
contentious?politics?between?Russia?and?Western?actors?appeared?and?had?
a? reinforcing? effect? on? the? local? situation,?with? the? result? of? the?war? in?
August?2008?that?has?left?the?situation?in?the?conflict?unsettled?up?to?date.?
?
3.3. Analysis?of?sequences?of?policies?
As? the? background? account? has? attempted? to? show,? assertive? agency?
frames? the? intensifying? situation? before? each? escalation.? However,? the?
sum,?intensity,?or?sheer?number?of?these?actions?does?not?explain?why?the?
conflict?escalated?at?the?points? in?time?observed.?Therefore,?the?empirical?
analysis? explores? sequences? that? circumscribe? a? chain? or? closed? unit? of?
events?prior?to?escalations.?For? this?purpose,?the?analysis? identified?three?
points? of? escalation? in? 2002,? 2004? and? 2008? prior? to? which? a? specific?
sequence?of?events?takes?effect.?The?analysis? is?aimed?to? identify?specific?
policies?of?Western?actors? that? repeatedly?occur?prior? to?escalations?and?
can?be?plausibly? linked?to?triggering?change? in? local?behavior.?This?section?
will?start?by?introducing?the?interview?method?and?analysis?of?the?interview?
material? with? the? result? of? identifying? the? three? specific? sequences.?
Thereafter,?the?section?will?present?the?reconstructed?sequences?based?on?
narratives?provided?by?interviews.?
?
Interviews?and?sequences?of?policies?
Apart? from? the?analysis?of? the?OSCE? reports,?a? second?body?of?data?was?
generated?through?conducting? interviews? in?2009?and?2010? in?Tbilisi,?Gori?
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and? in? villages? along? the? Administrative? Boundary? Line? (ABL)? in? the?
Georgian?Ossetian? conflict? area.? In? total,? 76? qualitative? interviews?were?
conducted,?of?which?39?were?used?for?the?study?(see?annex?4).?The?purpose?
of? the? interviews? was? to? explore? local? perceptions? of? escalations? and?
related?policies?in?order?to?enable?the?analysis?to?establish?plausible?causal?
links?to?reveal?chains?of?actions?leading?to?escalations.?
?
Interviewees?were?selected?according?to?whether?they?were?active? in?the?
context? of? the? conflict? prior? to? at? least? one? of? the? escalations.? The?
interviews?were?conducted?with:??
? residents?of?the?area?along?the?internal?border?with?South?Ossetia?
about? their?experiences?of?violence? in? the?aftermath?of? the?2008?
war,?
? Georgian?IDPs?of?the?first?and?the?second?war?about?their?accounts?
of?violence,?
? journalists?present?during?escalations?who?have?analytical? insights?
into?Georgian?internal?politics,??
? opposition?leaders?about?their?assessments?of?state?leaders’?power?
policies,??
? current? and? former? members? of? all? three? governments? since?
independence? about? governmental? policies,? including?
representatives?of?the?Ministry?of?Internal?Affairs,??
? current? and? former?members? of? the?Ministry? of? Foreign? Affairs?
who?had?been?representatives?to?the?JCC,??
? members?of?parliamentary?commissions,??
? representatives? of? the?Ministry? for? Refugees? on? the? conflict? and?
Western?relations,??
? current? and? former? representatives? of? the? local? district?
administration? next? to? South? Ossetia? on? cooperation? with? the?
South?Ossetian?side,?
? local?police?in?the?conflict?zone,??
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? local?and? international?non?governmental?actors? such?as?analysts?
at? local? think? tanks? on? Western? and? Georgian? policies? or?
academics,?
? lawyers?and?human?rights?activists?on?ethnic?cleansing?cases?during?
the?second?war,?
? members? of? international? state? organizations? such? as? the?OSCE,?
the? EUMM? (the? EU? Monitoring? Mission? which? is? the? OSCE?
successor?organization?in?the?conflict)?and?the?UN,?
? the? EU? Delegation? to? Georgia? on? Western? and? governmental?
policies,??
? soldiers?who?had?been?in?action?during?the?second?war,??
? and?former?international?and?local?advisors.?
Based? on? the? prior? experience? of? research? for? the?Master’s? thesis,? the?
respondents?were?expected?to?give?more?information? if?the?conversations?
were?not? taped?and?held?with?prior?agreement? to?being? ‘off? the? record’,?
the? agreement? to?use? the?materials?without?quotations? and?under? strict?
anonymity.?Therefore,? this? study? refrained? from? recording? the? interviews?
electronically? and? instead? recorded? through? handwritten? notes? and?
memory?protocols.?The?electronic?transcript?of?the?handwritten?notes?and?
protocols?comprises?a?document?of?35?pages.?
?
At? the? start? of? the? interview,? the? main? research? interest? was? briefly?
introduced?after?which? the? respondents?were?asked? to?generally? recount?
the?events?that?in?their?opinion?led?to?the?respective?points?of?escalation?in?
2002,? 2004? or? 2008.? The? rest? of? the? interviews? alternately? drew? on?
deepening?issues?the?respondents?brought?up?themselves,?by?pointing?the?
conversation? to? specific? issues? of? Western? or? local? policies,? and? by?
encouragements?to?continue?speaking.?The?study?chose?a?question?scheme?
establishing?a?chronological?reconstruction?of?events?to?enable?an?account?
of?events?omitting?political?bias?of?the?interviewees?and?centering?on?their?
local?knowledge.??
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For? example,? if? asked? what? are? considered? the?most? important? factors?
related? to?escalation,? the?vast?majority?of? respondents?–? international?or?
local?–?stated?the?contention?of?US?and?Russia?over? influence? in?the?post?
Soviet? space,?with? some? pointing? to? either? Putin’s? or? Saakashvili’s? (from?
2004)? aggressive? politics.? However,? if? asked? to? depict? the?major? events?
prior?to?escalation,?interview?partners?would?account?almost?exclusively?for?
local? events.? This? substantially? supports? the? key? feature? of? the? causal?
argument:?whereas?Western?activity?in?the?conflict?skyrocketed?from?2004?
and? exerted? considerable? influence? on? Georgian? actors’? power? choices,?
Western? agency? showed? little? presence?or? activity? at? the? local? level? and?
therefore?was?hardly?visible?to?take?effect.?Therefore,?the?study?reiterates?
once?again,?the?following?analysis?focuses?on?the?triggering?role?of?Western?
policies?within?events?at? the? local,?national?and? international? level?of? the?
conflict.?
?
The?analysis?of?the?interview?material?focused?on?recurring?narratives?(for?
a? discussion? of? this? methodology? see? chapter? 2).? As? each? interview?
accounts? for? an? individual? narrative,? the? interviews? do? not? necessarily?
narrate? a? detailed,? stepwise? or? chronological? sequence? of? events,? but?
highlight? specific? events? as? crucial? and? present? a? reasoning? why? these?
events? led? to?escalation.?Specific?key?elements?of?narratives? recur?across?
interviews?and?hence?enable?the?analysis?to?identify?a?plausible?and?unified?
reading? of? the? policies? which? trigger? the? same? cycle? of? escalation.?
Therefore,?these?narratives?enable?the?below?empirical?account?to?reflect?
this?process? in? light?of? the? influence?of? specific?Western?policies?on? local?
behavior.? In? this? respect,? respondents? provided? similar? assessments? of?
those?events?that?through?the?analysis?of?the?material?occurred?to?be?key?
causal?events?prior?to?change?in?local?behavior,?based?on?accounts?by?local?
and? international? respondents? across? political? boundaries? alike.? This?
means,? respondents?did?not?only?account? for? the? same?events,?but? they?
also?gave?a?similar?reasoning?of?their?impact.?This?is?an?important?outcome?
as? the? value? and? interpretation? attributed? to? individual? events? did? not?
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strongly?differ,?but?respondents?largely?overlapped?on?the?importance?and?
quality? of? those? events? that? the? analysis? later? identified? as? the? initial?
conditions?and?points?in?change?of?local?behavior?of?the?escalation?cycles.?
?
The? analysis? of? the? OSCE? material? had? identified? intensifying? and?
decreasing? intensity?around?points?of?escalation?of? violence.? In?a? further?
step,?the?interviews?identified?narratives?of?causal?chains?of?events.?In?this?
manner,? the? interviews? both? pointed? out? the? specific? role? of?Western?
impact?on?local?policies?in?key?turning?points?of?the?process.?The?interviews?
provide?and?frame?the?following?starting,?shifting?and?end?points?of?three?
sequences?of?events?leading?to?escalation?in?2002,?2004?and?2008:?
Time/?
Sequence?
Initial?condition/?
Western?policy,?Start?
of?escalation?cycle? ?
?
Juncture/?Change?of?
local?behavior? ?
Event/?Escalation,?
End?of?escalation?
cycle?
Sequence?1?
2000?2002??
Failure?of?Baden?
process??
Shevardnadze’s?anti?
corruption?agenda??
Anti?crime?operations?
Sequence?2?
2003?2005?
Regime?change
?
Closure?of?Ergneti?
market?
Shelling?of?Tskhinvali??
Sequence?3?
2006?2008?
Peace?road?maps?of?
the?Saakashvili?
leadership?
Sanakoev?
administration?
Armed?action?of?
Georgian,?Ossetian?
and?Russian?forces?
?
Table?2:?Sequences? leading?to?assertive?policies:? Initial?condition,? juncture?and?
event?with?interview?sources?(I?n).?
?
On? this?basis,? the?empirical?analysis?explores? these? three? sequences? that?
circumscribe? specific? trajectories? prior? to? the? 2002,? 2004? and? 2008?
escalations,?with? the? interviews? that? account? for? these? narratives? being?
indicated?in?the?table.?The?sequences?span?cycles?of?escalation?that?1)?are?
set?off?by?an? initial?condition?or?contingent?event?when?a?Western?policy?
interacts?with?its?context,?which?2)?subsequently?forms?a?path,?a?sequence?
events?when?Western? policies? significantly? and? gradually? influence? local?
power?policies?on?the?local,?national?and?international?level?of?the?conflict?
context,?which?3)? subsequently? triggers? the? critical? juncture?of? change? in?
local?behavior?that?creates?a?shift?to?assertive?policies?that?4)?lastly,?with?a?
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certain?delay? after? the? change? in?behavior?brings? about? an? escalation?of?
violence.?
?
Here,? the? study? presents? the? trajectory? of? the? sequences? of? escalation?
cycles? in?brief?and?then? in?depth? in?the?below?analysis.?The?first?sequence?
took? its? start?with? the? failure?of? the?OSCE?facilitated?Baden?process? that?
was? to? conclude? in? the? reintegration? agreement? between? South?Ossetia?
and?Georgia?in?2000.?The?prospects?seemed?promising?until?Georgia?denied?
Russia? support? for? the? war? in? Chechnya.? As? a? result,?Moscow? initiated?
South?Ossetia? to?pull?out?of? the?deal?and? the?agreement?was?not?signed.?
The?core?element?of?the?Baden?process?had?been?the?introduction?of?a?tax?
system? for? shipments? from? Russia? through? South? Ossetia? to? Georgia? in?
order?to?diminish?smuggling?activities.?After?Baden?failed,?the?OSCE?and?EU?
continued? to?negotiate?an?agreement? if?not?on? reintegration? then?at? the?
very? least?on? custom? controls.?This?deal?was?not?popular,?neither?within?
the? South? Ossetian? nor? the? Georgian? side? as? it? would? have? cut? illicit?
revenues.? Negotiations,? however,? proceeded? until? 2002,? when? then?
Minister?of?Justice?and?later?president?Mikheil?Saakashvili?spearheaded?the?
anti?corruption?campaign?of?the?Shevardnadze?government,?and?as?a?part?
of? this? conducted? large?scale? anti?crime? operations? in? the? Georgian?
Ossetian?conflict?zone.?Subsequently,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?forces?started?
to?struggle?over?on?the?ground?control?on?an?intense?level.?
The? second? sequence? set? off? with? the? regime? change? in? Georgia? from?
President? Shevardnadze? to? Saakashvili? after? the? Rose? Revolution? of?
November?2003.?The?new?ruling?elite?under?reformer?Saakashvili?came?into?
power?on?a?wave?of?massive?Western?support? from? the?U.S.?and?Europe.?
Western? demands? settled? on? implementing? rule? of? law? by? establishing?
central?rule?through?territorial?integration?and?a?crackdown?on?corruption.?
Both?these?goals?ranked?at?the?top?of?Saakashvili’s?inauguration?agenda.?In?
May?2004,?three?months? into?Saakashvili’s? term,?Georgian? interior?troops?
closed?down? the?major? smuggling?hub? the?Ergneti?market?on? the?border?
with?South?Ossetia.?Although?this?action?established?control?to?a?significant?
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extent,? the? conflict? however? escalated? with? permanent? skirmishes?
between? the? Ossetian?militia? and? the? Georgian? police.?When? Georgian?
Minister? of? Internal? Affairs? Okruashvili? shelled? Tskhinvali? in? a? brief? and?
unanticipated?operation,?the?conflict?permanently?reached?a?higher?level?of?
violence?than?since?the?first?war?ended?in?1992.??
The? third? sequence? started? in? the? wake? of? intensifying? relations? with?
Western?actors?while?the?Saakashvili?regime?slowly?settled?into?power.?The?
Georgian? government? launched? foreign? policy? efforts? promoting? peace?
road? maps? for? settlement? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict,? successfully?
gathering?support? in? the? international?arena? through? frameworks?such?as?
NATO,? EU,? OSCE? and? UN.? Additionally,? in? the? course? of? 2005?Western?
engagement? intensified? in? the? conflict? zone,? through? implementing? joint?
Georgian?Ossetian? economic? rehabilitation? projects.? However,? the?
Georgian? government? deemed?Western? support? in? territorial? integration?
issues? to?be? too?hesitant.? In? the?end?of?2005,?Tbilisi?hardened? its? stance?
and?installed?the?alternative?Sanakoev?administration?with?authority?in?the?
Georgian?controlled? areas? in? the? conflict? zone,? outraging? Ossetian? JCC?
representatives? and? shifting? the? situation? toward?assertive?policies.?Until?
the? 2008? war,? international? activity? in? all? arenas? thrived? whereas? the?
situation? in? the?conflict?area?deteriorated.?The?recognition?of?Kosovo?and?
Russia’s? commencement?of? legal? relations?with? the? secessionist? Sokhumi?
and? Tskhinvali? leaderships? provided? contentious? terrain? for? the? NATO?
summit?in?Bucharest?in?April?2007?that?finally?denied?accession?to?Georgia?
in?the?mid?term.?Four?months?after?the?summit,?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?
escalated?into?war?in?August?2008.?
?
The? previous? section? has? given? a? background? discussion? of? episodes? of?
political?events? and? violence? framing?on? the?basis?of? the? three?points?of?
escalation?in?2002,?2004?and?2008.?It?should?be?reiterated?that?the?purpose?
of? the? subsequent? account? is? not? to? explain? actions? or? motivations? of?
actors,?but? to?plausibly? frame?why? agency? came? to?exhibit? the?observed?
effects.?Therefore,? the? study?proceeds?with? the?empirical?analysis?of? the?
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interview?material? by? presenting? the? study? with? a? narrative? analysis? of?
sequences?of?the?Western?and?local?policies?in?the?conflict.??
It?should?also?be?reiterated?that?the?interviews?point?out?contingent?events?
as?well?as? their?causal? significance,?but? the? interpretation? follows?on? the?
basis?of?the?previously?discussed?argument?and?related?working?hypothesis?
of? the? study.? Therefore,? in? contrast? to? the? background? account? that?
elaborated? on? the? local? context? of? events,? the? analysis? of? sequences?
emphasizes?Western? effects? on? those? events.? As? discussed? above,? the?
account?will?depict?the?interaction?of?Western?and?local?leadership?policies?
at?specific?points? in? time?and?points?out?which?Western?policies?at?which?
levels? of? the? conflict? start? and? sustain? cycles? of? escalation? through?
triggering?a?change?in?behavior?of?local?state?leaderships.?
?
The?three?sequences?are?based?on?the?analysis?of?the? interview?materials?
(see? annex? 4).? Each? sequence? is? based? on? interviews? and? the?materials?
from?the?OSCE?archive? (see?annexes?1?and?3).?The?secondary? literature? is?
selectively? quoted? and? draws? on? the? sources? used? in? the? background?
chapter.? It? serves? to? frame? the? account? of? the? interviews.? The? table? of?
events? which? the? interviews? account? for? is? included? in? the? annex? (see?
annex?1).??
?
Sequence?1?–?2002??
Initial?condition:?Failure?of?the?Baden?process? ?Change? in? local?behavior:?
Shevardnadze's? anti?corruption? agenda? ?? Escalation:? anti?crime?
operations?
Summary.?The?first?sequence?began?with?the?failure?of?the?OSCE?facilitated?
Baden? process? that? was? to? conclude? in? the? reintegration? agreement?
between?South?Ossetia?and?Georgia?in?2000?through?introducing?extensive?
measures? to? curb? smuggling.? After? Baden? failed,? the? OSCE? and? EU?
continued? to? negotiate? an? agreement? on? custom? controls.? Negotiations?
proceeded? until,? in? 2002,? then?Minister? of? Justice? and? later? president?
Mikheil? Saakashvili? spearheaded? the? anti?corruption? campaign? of? the?
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Shevardnadze? government,? and? as? a? part? of? this? operation? conducted?
large?scale? anti?crime? operations? in? the?Georgian?Ossetian? conflict? zone.?
After? the?subsequent?escalation,?Georgian?and?Ossetian? forces?started? to?
struggle?over?on?the?ground?control?on?an?intense?level.?
?
Western?integration?of?Georgia?took?shape?on?a?small?scale?at?the?start?of?
the?1990s,?as?CSCE?and?later?OSCE?became?active?in?Georgia?as?one?of?the?
first?Western?state?organizations?on?the?ground?(I?8,?I?14,?I?1?16,?I?5,?I?20).42?
The?OSCE?served?as?a?gate?keeper?for?the?Western?actors?to?follow?and?as?
an?introductory?instrument?to?implement?the?conditionalities?envisaged?by?
the?Western? agenda,? to? promote? democracy? by? establishing? rule? of? law?
and?assisting? in?solving?territorial?conflicts?in?Georgia?(Jawad?2008,?Koenig?
2005).? While? expectations? ran? high? from? the? very? beginning? of? their?
cooperation? and? rhetoric? from? the? Western? and? the? Georgian? sides?
adopted?a?grand?style,? the?OSCE?adopted?a?subdued?manner?and?did?not?
externalize? funds?but?worked?merely?as?a?political? tool?of? facilitation?and?
observation.? On? the? whole,? OSCE’s? ‘soft’? entry? to? Georgia’s? political?
context?at? the?beginning?of?Western? integration? tried? to?ease?post?Soviet?
structures? in?conflicts,?relations?and?politics? into?the?Western? framework,?
and?eventually?tried?to?make?the?country?fit?to?adapt?to?Western?structures?
in?formal?terms.?
?
The?most?ambitious?project? in? this?plan?was?paving? the?way? to?Georgia’s?
territorial? integrity.?Functional? state? structures,? it?was?agreed,? required?a?
predictable? security? setting? for? livelihood? and? prosperity,? and?would? be?
provided? if?Georgia? came? to? guard? its? internationally? recognized?borders?
with?Russia,?in?both?Abkhazia?and?South?Ossetia.?Functional?statehood,?the?
OSCE? agenda?held,?was? to?be?maintained? through? acquiring? revenues? at?
the?hands?of?the?state?to?sustain?a?functional?economy?(Socor?2005).?In?the?
                                                          
42?The?UN?was?active? in? safe?guarding? the?post?conflict? setup? in?Abkhazia,?whereas? the?
OSCE?was?mandated? in? South? Ossetia,? however,? both? operations?were? under? Russian?
command.?Interviews?on?the?activities?of?European?international?organizations?at?the?start?
of? the? 1990s? in? Georgia? were? held? with? current? and? former? senior? members? of? the?
Saakashvili?government,?the?EU?Delegation,?and?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia.?
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case? of? Georgia? this? was? a? far?away? reality? at? the? start? of? the? 2000s:?
Smuggling? through?Abkhazia,?but?mainly? through?South?Ossetia?occupied?
up? to?70?per?cent?of? incoming?goods? to?Georgia? that?were?cheaper? than?
locally?produced?ones?and?that?evaded?taxation?(Kukhianidze?2006).??
As?a? result,?Western?partners? in? the?OSCE? framework? recognized?settling?
illicit?trade?in?South?Ossetia?as?the?most?sensitive?and?urgent?issue?in?terms?
of? building? the? Georgian? state.? Therefore,? the? OSCE? attempted? to?
encompass?the?volatile?aspects?of?the?post?war?situation?in?South?Ossetia,?
including? status,? violence,? illicit? trade? and? territorial? issues? as? a? former?
member?of?the?Shevardnadze?government?recalled? in?the? interview?(I?29).?
OSCE? engagement,? thus,? was? an? integral? part? of? Georgia’s? post?Soviet?
politics?since?the?CSCE?had?taken?over? facilitation?of?political?negotiations?
and?military? issues? in?South?Ossetia?as?early?as?1992?and? later? in? the? JCC?
framework.??
?
Former?senior?officials?of?the?Shevardnadze?government?and?a?member?of?
international?organization?confirmed?that?the?OSCE’s?focus?on?settling?the?
South? Ossetia? conflict? fed? on? close? relations? between? Chibirov? and? the?
Georgian?administration?(I?8,?I?14,?I?1?8).?In?1996,?Shevardnadze?and?South?
Ossetian?president?Chibirov?had?fallen?very?short?of?reaching?an?agreement?
to?reintegrate?South?Ossetia?into?Georgia?within?a?broad?autonomy?setting?
(I?943,?Koenig?2005).?The?close?cooperation?between?Tbilisi?and?Tskhinvali?
over? smuggling? revenues? and? financial? perks? for? Chibirov? from? Tbilisi?
resulted? in? the?mutual?Georgian?Ossetian? interest?of? low? intensity?of? the?
conflict? throughout? the? 1990s:? The? internal? border? was? kept? open? and?
formal? or? informal? organizational? issues? came? to? be? settled? between?
Georgians?and?Ossetian?either?directly?or?within? the? JCC? framework? (also?
see? Episode? 2).? Additionally? by? 1999,? the? settlement? talks? had? been?
enhanced? into?a?broader? international?setting,?with?OSCE?and?EC?member?
states?attending?the?negotiations?and?backing?them?up?with? lobbying?and?
facilitation?activities.?
                                                          
43?Interview?with?a?member?of?the?opposition?and?political?analyst?in?July?2009?in?Tbilisi.?
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End?of?Baden?process?
Against?this?background,?the?end?of?the?OSCE?led?‘Baden?process’? in?2000?
created? a? juncture? in? Western? efforts? in? implementing? territorial?
reintegration? of? South? Ossetia? and? setting? off? a? series? of? events? that?
intensified?the?conflict?until?2002.?The?process?of?the?Baden?talks?envisaged?
framing? the? settlement? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? through? gradual?
integration? into?Georgia? (I?8,? I?9,? I?14,?Koenig?2005).?At? the?center?of? the?
agenda,? the? negotiations? envisaged? strengthening? the? capacities? of? the?
central? state?by?ending? illegal? shipments? from?Russia? to?Georgia? through?
introducing?a?free?trade?zone? in?South?Ossetia?(Socor?2005).?This?practical?
approach,? that? initially? did? not? address? South? Ossetia’s? political? status,?
included? introducing? freight? controls? of? shipments? from? the? North?
Caucasus? by? Georgian? personnel? at? the? international? border? between?
Georgian?and?Russia.?This?scheme?was? to?guarantee?a?minimal?degree?of?
Georgian?involvement?in?border?control?at?the?Russian?border?and?revenue?
from? taxing? the? shipments.? However,? the? Georgian? and? Ossetian? sides?
maintained? a? cautious? attitude? toward? finalization? as? the? arrangement?
would?have?deprived? the? leaderships?of? their?smuggling? revenues.?At? the?
same? time,? particularly? the? Georgian? side? had? the? vested? interest? to?
comply? with? Western? demands? at? least? on? the? surface? and? show? the?
commitment? to? fight? smuggling? (I?8,? I?9,? I? 14,?George?2009,?Kukhianidze?
2006).?Therefore,?negotiations?dragged?on.?However,?the?OSCE?pushed?for?
implementation,? and? prepared? for? signing? the? result? of? three? years? of?
negotiations?at?the?big?meeting?in?Baden,?South?Germany?in?July?2000,?with?
Russian,?Georgian,?South?Ossetian,?and?North?Ossetian?representatives.??
However,?Russia’s? second?war? in?Chechnya? in?1999?provided? the?context?
for? Moscow? to? put? an? end? to? the? Baden? process? and? reinforce? the?
strengthening? Georgian?Ossetian? relations.? When? Putin? became? acting?
president? in?December?1999,?he?offered?but?one?chance?to?Shevardnadze?
by?demanding? from?him?to?support?Russia´s?second?war? in?Chechnya?and?
grant?overflight?and?deployment? rights? to?Russian? forces?south?of?Pankisi?
valley? on? Georgian? territory? (Kuzio? 1995,? Proladze? 2001,? Sikharulidze?
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2001).?Only?one?month?before?Putin´s? rise? to?power? in?November?1999,?
Shevardnadze? reiterated? his? commitment? to?Western? structures? at? the?
1999?OSCE?summit? in? Istanbul?(OSCE?AR?20/99,?Van?Santen?2000).?Just?as?
Gamsakhurdia? before? him,? Shevardnadze? refused? to? support? Putin,?with?
one? eye? on? the? Georgian? population? which? would? have? condemned?
bonding?with?Russia?over?waging?war?with? the?Chechen? ‘brother?nation’?
and?with?the?other?eye?even?more?focused?on?the?Western?condemnation?
of?Russia’s?Chechnya?atrocities?as?a?current?and?a?former?senior?member?of?
the? Georgian? governments? indicated? in? interviews? (I? 8,? I? 29).? Thus,?
Shevardnadze?refused?and?ultimately?disgruntled?Putin.?In?a?direct?reaction?
to?Georgia’s?refusal?to?cooperate?with?Russia?on?the?Chechnya?war,?Russian?
representatives? pulled? out? from? the? Baden? deal? and? urged? their? South?
Ossetian? counterparts? to? follow? suit.? The? document? that? had? been?
regarded?as?the?greatest?success?in?negotiations?after?the?end?of?the?1992?
war?was?not?signed.?
?
As? a? result,? the?Western? side? cancelled? the? format.?However,? the?OSCE?
stuck?to?its?approach?of?focusing?on?the?issue?of?freight?control?in?order?to?
curb? smuggling? and? strengthen? central? state? authority.? However,? the?
following? steps? revealed? a? change? in? strategy? as? they? detached? from?
political? issues? such? as? the? status? of? South?Ossetia? even?more? than? the?
Baden? approach? had? envisaged.? Keeping? close?with? practical?more? than?
political? issues,? the? OSCE? recovered? from? the? Baden? failure? and? soon?
organized?a?working?meeting?of?the?JCC?Political?Expert?Group?in?Bucharest?
as? in?September?2001?and?a?second?meeting? in?Castelo?Branco?in?October?
2002?a?senior?member?of?the?EU?Delegation?to?Georgia?emphasized?as?an?
important?milestone?in?the?process?(I?14).?The?meetings?were?attended?by?
EU? representatives? giving? credibility? to? the? talks.?Particularly? the?Castelo?
Branco? meeting? celebrated? the? results? on? establishing? joint? Georgian?
Ossetian?customs’?post.?
Meanwhile,?Moscow? followed?up?on? its?blow?to?the?negotiations.?Though?
Russia? had? veto? power? in? the? JCC,? the? Castelo? Branco? and? Bucharest?
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meetings? envisaged? the? joint?Georgian?Ossetian? freight? controls?without?
participation? of?Russia?on? the? territory? of? the? South?Ossetia? region.? The?
implementation? of? this? border? regime? would? have? greatly? diminished?
Russian? influence? on? Georgian? territory.? To? keep? control,? at? the? end? of?
2001,?Moscow?sacked?the?moderate?Chibirov?and?replaced?him?with?hard?
line? leader? Eduard? Kokoity? as? the? de?facto? president? of? South? Ossetia,?
among? others? a? former? senior? member? of? the? Kokoity? administration?
accounts?in?the?interview?(I?8,?I?9,?I?28,?I?29).?
?
Therefore,? in? the? aftermath? of? the? Baden? process? until? 2002,?Western?
policies?aimed?at?building?a?functional?state?in?Georgia?were,?on?a?political?
level,? almost? exclusively? directed? to? recovering? relationships? among? the?
conflicting?parties?and?restoring?border?authority?of?the?Georgian?state.?
In?this?respect,?the?Western?agenda?put?strengthening?the?central?state?in?
Georgia? through? fighting?crime?on? top?of? its?agenda,?over?multiple?other?
measures? of? external? state? building? such? as? enhancing?military? capacity,?
launching? large?scale? investment,? or? integrating? the? state? into? existing?
treaties.?A? local? journalist?suggests? in?the? interview?that?before?2002,?the?
brunt?of?Western?engagement?in?state?building?through?territorial?integrity?
took? place? at? the? local? level? in? the? conflict? zone? (I? 2).?Western? actors?
continued? to? address? stakeholders? in? the? capital,? but? the? very? active,?
intense? part? of?Western? engagement? concentrated? on? bringing? together?
the? conflict? parties,? mostly? in? Tskhinvali? or? Gori,? but? also? in? Tbilisi? or?
Moscow.?Therefore,?the?OSCE?was?locally?involved?in?setting?up?talks,?joint?
projects? such?as? joint?checkpoints?of? the?Russian,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?
peace?keeping? forces,? joint? police? patrols,? talks? on? water? and? power?
supplies?for?villages?or?solving?crime?issues,?the?local?journalist?accounts?for?
in?detail,?backed?by?the?account?of?a?senior?member?of?the?EU?Delegation?
to?Georgia?who?had?been?in?charge?of?those?international?efforts?(I?2,?I?14).?
Engagement?on? the? international? level?of?Western?agency?or? the? level?of?
the?capital?in?Tbilisi?was?comparably?low?or?non?existent.?
?
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After?the?European?initiated?projects?of?the?1990s?had?failed?in?their?initial?
scope,?Western?engagement?gathered?pace?at?the?beginning?of?the?2000s.?
While? the?OSCE?was?still?pushing? forward?border?controls?between?South?
Ossetia?and?Georgia,?the?US,?EU?and?large?international?state?organizations?
such? as? the? IMF,? World? Bank? and? NATO? started? to? show? presence? in?
Georgia.?This? trend?was? genuinely? supported?by? the?Georgian? state?elite?
whose?efforts? to? integrate? into?Western? structures?were?unbridled.?With?
this? new? and?wide? range? of? actors? entering,? the?West’s? focus? on? state?
building?measures?in?Georgia?shifted?from?the?local,?issue?oriented?focus?of?
the?1990s?to?focusing?on?a?capital?centered?approach?of?strengthening?the?
central?state?in?Tbilisi.?
?
Shevardnadze’s?anti?corruption?campaign?
The?shift?to?capital?politics?became?most?evident?as?Western?actors?more?
frequently?and?more? stridently?addressed? the?main? state?actors,?uttering?
expectations,?demands?and?conditionalities?more?fiercely?than?in?the?prior?
decade.?Even?before?cooperation?in?defined?frameworks?took?its?start,?this?
stance? had? an? altering? effect? on? central? state? politics.? Envisaging? a?
Western?style? government? in? Georgia,? the? West? took? to? vehemently?
criticizing? corruption? levels? in?Georgia? from? 2000? as? several? then? active?
members?of?advocacy?and? international?organizations? recall? (I?1?7,? I?14,? I?
11).? This? stance? was? accompanied? by? large? amounts? of? funding? for?
Georgian? civil? society? organizations? engaging? in? democratization? and?
opposing? the? Shevardnadze? regime? for? embezzling? the? state?budget? and?
upholding?a?system?of?corruption?that?resulted? in?broad?injustice?(I?14).?In?
2002,? IMF?and?Western?governments?mounted?harsh?criticism?of?the? lack?
of? rule? of? law,? particularly? in? regards? to? corruption? and? crime? levels.?
Georgian? civil? society? groups? at? the? same? time? raised? pressure? on? the?
Georgian?government.?As?a?result,?the?IMF?stalled?loans?to?Georgia?in?2001?
and? Western? donors? threatened? to? permanently? withdraw? financial?
support?(also?see?footnote?14).?
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In? order? to? secure?Western? support,? Shevardnadze? announced? a? large?
scale?anti?corruption?campaign?in?2002?(I?7,?I?1?7).?The?campaign?aimed?at?
internally?re?organizing?smuggling?with?even?better?revenues?for?the?state?
elite,?mainly? through?dividing? control? of? smuggling?of? gas? and? cigarettes?
between? the? Ministry? of? Internal? Affairs? and? the? Ministry? of? Justice.?
However,? toward?Western? partners? the? campaign? aimed? at? staging? an?
ambitious? and? successful? rule?of?law? reform? to? restore? trust? in? the?
Shevardnadze?government.?
?
Anti?smuggling?operations?
The? tide? in? the? conflict? turned? toward? escalation?when? then?Minister?of?
Justice? and? later? president?Mikheil? Saakshvili? implemented? a? large?scale?
anti?crime? campaign? in? the?area?bordering?South?Ossetia? (I?7,? I?1?7).?The?
campaign? implemented? part? of? the? anti?corruption? agenda? of? the?
Shevardnadze?regime.?In?February?2002,?the?Georgian?Ministry?of?Defense?
took?command?of?the?Georgian?PKF?battalions?who?were?under?the?peace?
agreement? subordinate? to? the? JPKF? command? and? from? mid?October,?
Georgian?forces?carried?out?a?large?scale?anti?crime?operation?in?the?region?
of? Shida? Kartli? with? subsequent? raids? (OSCE? AR? 16/02,? 17/02,? 18/02,?
21/02).?At? the? same? time? in? February?2002,? representatives?of?Georgian?
and? Ossetian? Law? Enforcement? Bodies? were? named? to? jointly? head? a?
Special? Coordination? Center? for? anti?crime? activities? in? the? conflict? zone?
(OSCE?AR?03/02).?
From?then,?Ossetian?and?Georgian?forces?engaged?in?anti?crime?operations?
struggling? over? access? and? infrastructure? across? the? area.? The? new?
Georgian?policy?overturned?the?local?situation:?A?mutual?spiral?of?assertive?
actions? on? the? Ossetian? and? Georgian? sides? kicked?off? as? actions? were?
reciprocated?by?Ossetian?militias?and?non?regular?actions?by?Peace?keeping?
Forces.?Ossetian?as?well?as?Georgian?forces?acted?under?the?same?banner?
of? anti?smuggling? or? anti?crime? campaigns.? The? situation? amounted? to?
increased?numbers?of?security?personnel,?continuous?road?blocks,?arbitrary?
raids?and?increased?shoot?outs.?
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Assessment?of?Western?policies?
Georgian?state?elites?were?highly?responsive?to?Western?demands?as?they?
saw?Western?policies?decisively?influencing?their?domestic?power?base.?The?
crucial? influence? of? Western? policies,? therefore,? concentrated? in? the?
concerted? Baden? process? involving? the? Russian,? Georgian? and? Ossetian?
sides?to?curb?smuggling?in?South?Ossetia?and?likewise?introduced?a?rupture?
when? the? process? failed.? Thus,? the? state? politics? of? Tbilisi’s? elites?
underwent?an?alteration?at?the?start?of?the?2000s.?Analysts?from?local?civil?
society? organizations? suggested? in? interviews? that,? adapting? to? the? new?
Western?conditionalities,?state?policies?adopted?an?assertive?stance?and,?as?
a? result,?brought?about?an? intensification?of?violence? in?2002? (I?31,? I?32).?
Sustaining? the? argument? of? the? study,?Western? policies? did? not? cause?
escalation,? however,? dynamics? changed? at? the? very? point? in? time?when?
Western?policies?introduced?a?new?stance?to?the?situation.?
?
In? the?aftermath?of? the?Baden? failure,?the? interaction?of?Western?policies?
with? Georgian? state? agency? reinforced? the? escalation? process,? including?
mounting?Western?criticism?of?corruption?levels?in?Georgia?up?to?the?point?
when?the?Georgian?government?introduced?an?anti?corruption?campaign?to?
comply?with?Western?demands.44?The?double?strategy?of?the?Georgian?side?
also?shows? in? increasing?escalative,?unilateral?activities?of? the?PKF?on? the?
one?hand,?while?on?the?other?implementing?a?joint?Coordination?Center.?
Western?partners?proved?satisfied?with?the?Georgian?government’s?efforts,?
among? them?Minister? Saakashvili’s? high?profile? initiative? in? the? conflict?
zone.? Funding? to? the?Georgian? state?was,? as? a? result,? not? stalled? at? any?
point?in?time?(I?7,?I?1?7).?However,?interviews?make?it?seem?this?happened?
when?multilateral?efforts?of?Western?policies?proved?not? to?be?successful?
and?Western? policies?went? on? to? address? responsibility? for?meeting? the?
goals?at?the?level?of?central?state?actors?in?Georgia?–?practically?setting?off?a?
unilateral?development?(I?7,?I?14).?After?the?end?of?the?Baden?process,?the?
                                                          
44?This?was?held?to?significantly?weigh?in?on?the?process?during?interviews?with?both?a?local?
analyst?and?a?former?senior?member?of?the?Shevardnadze?government?(I?7,?I?26).?
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Western? agenda?maintained? the? same? focus? of? state?strengthening? anti?
corruption? measures? (Socor? 2005,? Jawad? 2008),? but? at? the? same? time?
mounted? the? pressure? at? the? national? level? and? hence? reinforced? local?
dynamics?toward?escalation.??
More?specifically,?Western?policies?after?the?Baden?failure?shifted?from?the?
local?to?the?national? level?by?changing?the?arena?of?Western?agency?from?
on?the?ground? negotiations? to? cooperation? with? central? state? actors.?
Western?Russian? relations?at? the? international? level?of? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict?were?not?developed?as?an?arena?of?agency?of? the?conflict?as?yet.?
Following? the? shift? to? the? national? level,? Western? actors? increasingly?
addressed? demands? of? anti?smuggling? and? anti?corruption? measures? to?
Georgian? state? actors,? in? contrast? to? the? prior?multi?lateral? approach? of?
including?the?other?parties.??
?
In?this?context,?the?outline?of?an?ambiguous? influence?of?Western?policies?
on?domestic?power?consolidation?showed?for?the?first?time?within?the?post?
Soviet?political?context.?Prior? to? the?2002?escalation,?Western?policies?on?
the? one? hand? stressed? democracy?building? policies? through? seeking?
settlement?through?extensive?negotiation?schemes?and?through?enhancing?
the? rule? of? law? by? cutting? down? on? crime? and? corruption.?On? the? other?
hand,?Western? policies? focused? on? state?strengthening? policies? through?
support?of?central? rule?by?stressing? territorial? integrity?as? interviews?with?
former?members?of? the?OSCE?Mission? to?Georgia?and? the?EU?Delegation?
suggested?(I?14,?I?20,?I?4).?
?
Altogether,? the? analysis? of? the? first? sequence? of? actions? finds? three?
characteristics?shaping?dynamics?in?this?period:?1)?Western?agency?sets?off?
and? maintains? the? cycle? of? escalation? by? first,? creating? the? salience? of?
territorial?integration?policies,?second,?cancelling?the?policy?in?reaction?with?
other? stakeholders? and? third,? reinforcing? the? cycle? by? interacting? to? a?
significant? extent?with? local? state? elites,? 2)? Prior? to? escalation,?Western?
agency?changes?the?arena?of?agency?to?a?higher?level,?from?the?local?to?the?
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national?arena?of?the?conflict,?and?3)?A?focus?on?state?centered?policies?of?
Western?actors?prior?to?the?escalation.?
??
The? discussion,? hence,? is? set? to? further? look? into? whether? these? three?
characteristics? of? Western? policies? might? turn? out? to? be? generalizable?
mechanisms? of? the? dynamics? of? the? conflict.? The? study? seeks? to? further?
sustain? the? argument? of?Western? policies? triggering? dynamics,? although?
domestic?power?policies?or?Russian?influence?hold?a?significant?sway?in?the?
conflict.? As? for? Russia’s? impact,? it? is? crucial? for? the? dynamics? that? the?
Russian?intervention?ended?the?Baden?process,?but?did?not?determine?the?
policies?that?shaped?the?subsequent?path?to?escalation.? Instead,?Georgian?
elites? responded? to? and? complied? with? the? Western? policies? of? state?
centered? anti?smuggling? measures? that? had? laid? the? foundation? of? the?
Baden? process? and? continued? to? head? the? Western? agenda? in? the?
aftermath.? Therefore,? Russian? policies? reinforced? the? trajectory,? but? are?
not?seen?as?a?cause?in?the?cycle?as?defined?above.?
Further,?Georgian?state?elites?coped?with?the?demands?of?Western?actors?
to?their?own?advantage?of?power?consolidation?as?former?senior?members?
of?Georgian?governments?suggest?(I?12,?I?25,?I?26):?Shevardnadze?reshuffled?
portfolios?within?his? cabinet? so? that? smuggling? revenues? appeared? to?be?
retracted? even? more? effectively;? Shevardnadze’s? successful? protégé,?
Saakashvili,?gained?internal?and?international?recognition?through?his?anti?
crime?agenda;?the?Georgian?leadership?implemented?a?unilateral?stance?in?
the?conflict?zone?at?the?same?time?as,?in?the?formal?framework,?upholding?
joint? Georgian?Ossetian? activities? in? the? JCC? framework;?with? the? result?
that? the? government? –? though? not? supported? by? the? international?
community? into?a?next? term?–? temporarily?succeeded? in?muting?Western?
criticism?and?gained?support.?
?
However,? while? Western? policies? offered? opportunities? for? power?
consolidation,?they?at?the?same?time?put?restraints?on?options?for?agency?
in? the? conflict.? Georgian? power? politics? depended? to? such? a? significant?
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extent?on?Western?support?that?the?dynamics?after?the?2002?Baden?failure?
suggest? that?Western?policies? triggered? the?escalation? cycle?by?decisively?
curbing? local?power?consolidation?opportunities.? In? this?manner,?Western?
policies? worked? through? the? power? consolidation? policies? of? local? state?
actors?whose?change?in?behavior,?then,?led?to?escalation.?
?
Sequence?2?–?2004?
Initial?condition:?Regime?change? ?Change?of?behavior:?Ergneti?closure? ?
Escalation:?Shelling?of?Tskhinvali??
Summary.?The?second?sequence?was?set?off?by?the?2003?regime?change?in?
Georgia?from?President?Shevardnadze?to?Saakashvili,?which?occurred?with?
a?wave?of?Western?support? from? the?U.S.?and?Europe.?Western?demands?
settled?on? implementing? rule?of? law?by?establishing? central? rule? through?
territorial?integration?and?crackdown?on?corruption.?In?May?2004,?Georgian?
troops?of? the?Ministry?of? Interior? closed?down? the?major? smuggling?hub?
Ergneti?market?on? the?border?with?South?Ossetia.?When?Georgian? troops?
shelled? Tskhinvali? in? an?overnight?operation? in?August? 2004,? the? conflict?
permanently?escalated?for?the?first?time?since?the?war?ended?in?1992.?
?
From? the?early?2000s,?Georgia’s?Western?partners? started? to?bolster? the?
Georgian?state?as?part?of?a?more?developed?agenda?and?thus?cast?relations?
in? terms?of?more? formalized? integration?processes.?Those?efforts?granted?
Georgia?enhanced?relations?with?Europe?and?made?an?active?foreign?policy?
regarding?Georgia?a?more? important?element?of?European?and?American?
foreign?policy.?
?
Regime?change?
Intensified?and?more?focused?Western?engagement?took?a?key?role? in?the?
sea? change? in? Georgia’s? domestic? politics? with? the? turn? from? the?
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Shevardnadze? to? the? Saakashvili?presidency? (I?1,? I?6,? I?8,? I?9,? I?13,? I?1445,?
Wheatley?2005,?Milcher?and?Slay?2005,?Barbe?and?Johansson?Nogue?2008,?
Mitchell? 2012).? Whereas? the? new? government? came? into? power? on? a?
promise? of? stability,? the? South?Ossetia? conflict? escalated?within?months?
after? the? change? in?power?presidency? (I? 1,? I? 6,? I? 8,? I? 9,? ICG?2004,? Peuch?
2004,? Fuller? 2005,?Mayorov? 2002,? Kolst? and? Blakkisrud? 2008).?Western?
policies?engaging? in? the?regime?change?seem? to?have?crucially?set?off? the?
cycle?that,?starting? from?the?Rose?Revolution?protests? in?November?2003,?
triggered?the?change?in?local?policies?that?resulted?in?the?closure?of?Ergneti?
market?which?marked?the?change?of?local?policies?to?an?assertive?stance?in?
the?conflict.?
?
Whereas? the? Shevardnadze? era? had? introduced? close? relations?with? the?
West,?the?regime?turned?out?to?be?superseded?by?the?very?consequences?
of? the? intensified? relations? it? had? initiated? in? the? first? place.? In? the?
parliamentary? elections? of? 2003,?Western? actors,? particularly? European?
states? but? also? the? US,? did? not? support? the? Shevardnadze? model? into?
another? term? (I?1,? I?6,? I?29,?Mitchell?2004,?Coppieters?and?Legvold?2005,?
Wheatley? 2005).? Instead,? Georgia’s?Western? allies? turned? to? newcomer?
and? ardent? democrat? Saakashvili? who? already? under? Shevardnadze? had?
proven?capable?of?implementing?the?Western?agenda.??
From?2000,?Western?organizations?such?as?IMF,?Transparency?International?
and? governments? to? Soros’? Open? Society? Foundation? or? the? National?
Democratic? Institute? had? harshly? criticized? the? Shevardnadze? regime? for?
lack? of? democratic? rule? and? had? supported? civil? society? organizations?
working?for?a?change?in?Georgia.?After?the?post?election?protests?had?taken?
off? in?November?2003,?Western? support?played? a? key? role? in? supporting?
                                                          
45?The?following?section?draws?on?interviews?taken?mainly?with?persons?with?oppositional?
views?to?the?increasingly?unpopular?Saakashvili?government?after?the?2008?South?Ossetia?
war.?Among?those?were?members?of?the?opposition,?but?also?co?workers?of?international?
organizations? and? two?members? of? former? governments? now? in? the? opposition.? All? of?
these?persons?had?been? fierce? supporters?of? the?movement? that? Saakashvili?headed? to?
oust? Shevardnadze? and,? in? the? aftermath,? got? disappointed? by? what? they? felt? as?
undemocratic?politics?of?the?Saakashvili?government.?Therefore?the?interviews?gave?vivid?
testimony?of?the?rise?of?Saakashvili’s?rule.?
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Saakashvili’s? ousting? of? Shevardnadze? (I? 1,? I? 29,? Karumidze? and?Wertsch?
2005,?Mitchell?2004?and?2012).?As?Western?criticism?gathered?pace?in?the?
years? before? the? 2003? parliamentary? elections,? Western? players?
consistently? addressed? the? lack? of? rule? of? law? and? high? levels? of?
embezzlement?and?corruption,?with?a?very?small?proportion?of?funds?spent?
on?the?actual?target?projects?(Timm?2012,?also?see?Stewart?et?al.?2012).??
?
As? after? 2002,? Western? allies? had? lost? trust? in? the? Shevardnadze?
government? to?be? a? reliable?partner? in? strengthening? state? structures? in?
Georgia,?Western?actors?wished?for?a?new?elite?to?spearhead?the?country’s?
reform? process.? Funding,? loans? and? political? support? for?Georgia? soared?
after? Saakashvili? took? power? in? January? 2004.46? Western? agendas? of?
integration? into? NATO? and? European? structures? carved? out? specific?
conditionalities? linked? to? this?support,?specifically?aimed?at?strengthening?
state? structures.? These? structural? changes? included:? military? reform?
through?professional?training,?reliable?chain?of?command?and?equipment;?
economic? reform? generating? sustainable? revenues? for? the? state? through?
privatization,? regulated? import? and? export? flows,? and? raising? the? budget?
through? tax? collection;? investments? into? infrastructure? and? construction?
through?transparent?procurement?and?the? like? (European?Neighbourhood?
Policy? ??Reference?documents?2003?and?2004,?NATO?Press?Releases?2005?
and?2006).??
?
In? response? to? Western? incentives,? when? taking? power? Saakashvili?
introduced? not? only? a? new? elite,? but? also? a? new? code? of? conduct? for?
                                                          
46?In?January?2004?during?his?visit?in?Tbilisi,?Powell?reconfirmed?a?payment?of?164?m?USD?
to?Georgia?during?the?2004?fiscal?year,?and?allocating?64?m? in?training?and?equipment?of?
Georgian? troops? (Civil.ge? 26.01.2004).? In? August? 2005,? the? US? State? Department?
announced? the? allocation? of? the? ‘Millenium? Aid? Fund’? of? 130? m? USD? economic?
rehabilitation,?in?addition?to?the?regular?annual?fund?(US?State?Dep?16.08.2005).?EU?funds?
to?Georgia? started? in? 1991.? The? EU? assistance? programme? TACIS? allocated? 131?million?
Euro? to?Georgia? until? the? start?of? the? European?Neighborhood? Policy? Initiative? in? 2006?
which?includes?annual?payments?of?30?40?m?Euro.?Implementing?the?Ljubljana?document?
of?November?2005,? in? June?2006?a?donor?conference? in?Brussels?pledged?10?m?Euro? for?
the? OSCE?led? joint? Georgian?South? Ossetian? economic? rehabilitation? programme.? On?
average?throughout?the?post?independence?period,?the?payments?amount?to?70?per?cent?
of?the?gross?annual?state?budget.?
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political? life? in? Georgia.? These? new?ways? of? power? fed? considerably? on?
previously?existent?resources:?Fierce?anti?Russian?rhetoric?and?a?stern?pro?
Western? stance,? even? more? radical? than? under? Shevardnadze,? set? the?
agenda? of? the? new? elite? (Lazarus? 2010,? Wheatley? 2005).? The? new?
government?proved? keen? to? implement?Western? conditionalities? to? their?
full?extent.?Centralized?presidential?power?directed?the?implementation?of?
policies? in? the? capital? and? in? the? regions? and? reshuffled? personnel? and?
posts?in?a?managerial?manner?as?a?senior?member?of?an?oppositional?party?
who?had?been?close?to?Saakashvili’s?allies?at?the?start?of?his?rule?recounts?(I?
6).?The?Saakashvili?elite,? from?December?2003,?almost?built?a? state? from?
scraps.?As? state? structures?were?weak?or?non?existent,? Saakashvili? and? a?
small? group? of? people? concentrated? power? in? their? hands? and?managed?
state?forming? tasks?almost?on? their?own?accord.?Reform?–?democratic?or?
functional?–?thus?turned?into?a?matter?of?strong?state?structures?first.??
?
On? these? propositions,? Saakashvili? both? floated? into? power? as? well? as?
brought?those?expectations?into?office.?However,?the?implementation?of?a?
strong,? centralized? state? was? crucially? realized? through? the? support? of?
Western?actors.?The?new?style?politics?concentrated?power?in?the?hands?of?
even? fewer?actors?as?opposed?to?Shevardnadze’s? ‘pyramid?model’? (Stefes?
2008,?Timm?2012,?also?see?Stewart?et?al.?2012,?Sigwart?2006).?This? left?a?
smaller? number? of? people? in? de?facto? decision?making? positions? and?
resulted?in?a?nominal?decrease?of?embezzlement?and?abuse?of?public?office?
which? was? noted? and? well?received? by?Western? partners.? In? the? same?
manner,? more? money? was? spent? on? state?related? issues? such? as?
infrastructure,?military? expenditures? and? institutional? capacities? such? as?
police? than? under? Shevardnadze? (Liklikadze? 2007,? Fuller? and? Giragosian?
2007).? The? Saakashvili? leadership? justified? expenses? with? institution?
building?measures?and?the?national?right?to?self?defense.?Likewise,?policies,?
and?also?Western?oriented?reform,?came?to?be?implemented?more?quickly?
and?somewhat?more?effectively?which?sustained?Western?support? for?the?
new?government?in?spite?of?democratic?caveats.?
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Whereas? the? Western? agenda? prior? to? the? 2003? regime? change? had?
focused?on?state?strengthening?measures,?Western?support?of?the?regime?
transition? from? Shevardnadze? to? Saakashvili? strongly? emphasized?
democratic?reform:?Protests?were? internationally?supported?because?they?
abstained?from?violence?and?because?they?followed?what?were?recognized?
as?falsified?elections.?The?new?leader?Saakashvili?was?held?to?put?an?end?to?
corruption? and? respect? the? choice? of? the? people.? In? this? scheme,? state?
building?still?was? top?of? the? list?of?Western?demands,?but? this?desire?was?
bolstered?by?strong?pro?democracy?rhetoric.??
?
In?this?respect,?as?much?as?Western?actors’?support?of?the?Rose?Revolution?
was? based? on? the? call? for? democracy,? just? as? in? the? years? prior? to? the?
revolution? the? West’s? support? aimed? at? integration? into? Western?
organizational? structures.? The? Western? agenda? was? set? not? only? to?
democratize,?but?essentially? to?gradually?adapt? to?Western? structures?by?
first?establishing?functional?and?capable?state?structures?at?the?hands?of?a?
committed?elite.?Therefore,?Western? support? first?of?all? centered?on? the?
central? tasks? of? the? state,? such? as? collecting? revenues,? guarding?
international? borders,? enhancing? predictability? through? preventing? war,?
unfair?elections?or?other?instability?raising?instances.??
?
Closure?of?Ergneti?market?
Against? this? background,? the? Western? support? of? the? regime? change?
introduced?a?shift? in? the?behavior?of? the? local?elites.?Whereas?Saakashvili?
had? already? started? anti?corruption? policies? under? Shevardnadze,? the?
strong?Western?demands?of? rule?of? law?which?had? carried?him? to?power?
reinforced? the? necessity? to? act? appropriately? and? quickly? in? order? to?
maintain? the? support?of?Western?partners.?Accordingly,?when?Saakashvili?
introduced? his? agenda? upon? taking? office? in? January? 2004,? territorial?
integration? of? the? secessionist? regions? of? Georgia? ranked? on? top? of? the?
leadership’s? list? of? reforms? (Peuch? 2004,? Fuller? 2005).? The? day? after? his?
inauguration?in?a?joint?press?conference?with?U.S.?Secretary?of?State?Powell?
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in?Tbilisi,?Saakashvili?announced?a?plan?to? integrate?Georgia? into?Western?
structures?as?well?as?to?restore?Georgia’s?territorial?integrity?as?part?of?the?
same?process?(Civil.ge?26.01.2004,?Mitchell?2012).?The?leadership?targeted?
not?only?Western,?but?also?domestic?support?based?on?nationalist?claims?of?
territorial? reintegration,? just?as? the?previous? two?post?Soviet? leaderships,?
with?Western?support?reinforcing?the?claim.?
??
With? respect? to?Western? engagement? in?Georgia,? the? smuggling? hub? of?
Ergneti?market? interfered?with?efforts?to?establish?central?authority? in?the?
region? (I? 1,? I? 2,? I? 6,? I? 8,? I? 9,? I? 10,? I? 18,? I? 2947,? Kukhianidze? et? al.? 2006,?
Kukhianidze?2004,?Christophe?2005,?Wennmann?2004,?also?see?Episode?2).?
Ergneti? market? continued? to? flourish? also? after? anti?crime? campaigns?
started?in?2002.?The?Georgian?and?Ossetian?sides?had?an?interest?in?gaining?
control?over? the? flow?of?goods,?or,? respectively,? to? stage?commitment? to?
rule? of? law? to? Western? partners,? but? the? mutual? interest? of? keeping?
smuggling? through? Ergneti? alive? persisted? also? after? 2002? (George? 2009,?
Kukhianidze?et?al.?2006).? It?had?become?a?trans?shipment?center?of?goods?
from?the?North?Caucasus,? including?smuggling?of?gas,?cigarettes,?flour?and?
sunflower?seed?oil.?At?the?same?time,?Ergneti?provided?the?basis?for?small?
trade?between?Georgians?and?Ossetians.??
?
Thus,?Ergneti?adopted?a?dual?meaning:?On?the?one?hand,?it?ensured?contact?
and? relations? between? the? ethnic? communities? on? the? ground? and?
maintained?movement? of? people? across? the? border.?On? the? other? hand,?
Ergneti?supplied?Georgia’s?economy?with?large?flows?of?untaxed?goods,?and?
thus? supported? corruption,? incentives? for? state? leaders? to? uphold? the?
                                                          
47?Many?of?the? interview?partners?mentioned?the?role?of?Ergneti?market?as?crucial? in?the?
development?of?conflict.?They?ranked?from?senior?police?officers,?regarded?as?among?the?
most? rigid?allies?of? the?government,? to?opposition?members? fiercely?pitched?against? the?
government,?to?political?analysts?who?have?conducted?research?on?the?ground?before?the?
market?was?closed?down.?Everybody?unanimously?agreed? that?closing?down? the?market?
escalated?the?conflict?after?a?decade?of?relative?calm,?that?alternative?measures?had?not?
been? fully? taken? into?account?and? that? the?conflict?had? taken?a?point?of?no? return?after?
which?it?could?not?have?been?expected?to?de?escalate?back?to?the?previous?level.?
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status?quo?and?averted? state? revenues?and? integration? into? international?
trade?(I?7,?Kukhianidze?2002?and?2004).??
Both?during?Shevardnadze’s?and?Saakashvili’s?rule,?central?actors? in?Tbilisi?
did? not? meddle? in? local? affairs,? ensuring? the? loyalty? of? the? district?
administration? in?Gori? by? providing? opportunities? for? them? to? gain? from?
smuggling,? and? in? turn? enjoying?money? transfers? and? the? assurance? of?
general? order? (Christophe? 2005,? George? 2009,? Stewart? et? al.? 2012,?
Vilanishvili?2004).? It?was?held? that?unregulated? trade?via? the?market?was?
one?of? the?major? instruments?Russia?used? to?wield? influence? in?Georgia’s?
affairs.?The?Ergneti?system?was? the?one?practical?obstacle? that?prevented?
building?a?functioning?economy?in?Georgia.?
?
Therefore,? the?Ergneti? scheme? came?down? to? linking? smuggling? to? lower?
levels?of?violence?in?the?conflict?area,?but?simultaneously?keeping?violence?
confined.?As?a?result,?when?the?Saakashvili?elite?took?power?and?closed?the?
market,? the? trajectory? toward? escalation? leapt? forward.? Envisaging? an?
ambitious? process? of? reform? particularly? in? integrating? South?Ossetia,? in?
May? 2004? the?new? elite?decided? to? circumvent? the?dragging? JCC? format?
and?adopt?a?swifter?strategy.?The? internal?debate?was? led?by?Okruashvili’s?
Ministry? of? Internal? Affairs? and? the? National? Security? Council? under?
Secretary?Bezhuashvili?(I?6,?I?7).??
Okruashvili,?an?ethnic?Georgian?originating?from?Tskhinvali?and?close?ally?of?
president?Saakashvili,?was?said?to?privately?gain?from?smuggling?networks?
together?with?new?Gori?governor?Mikheil?Kareli?and,?officially?as?a?part?of?
anti?corruption? reforms? (Vilanishvili? 2005,? Papava? 2006),? Tbilisi? installed?
the? so? called? Financial? Police? in? the? Gori? region? to? target? smuggling?
activities?(for?an?account?of?these?activities?see?Sigwart?2006).?Four?months?
after? Saakashvili? had? taken? office,? Georgian? troops? of? the? Ministry? of?
Interior,? supported? by? Gori? police,? moved? into? Ergneti? in? a? large?scale?
operation?on?May?31,?2004?(OSCE?AR?10/04).?Troops?raided?the?market?in?a?
matter?of?hours.?No? casualties?or?major? shoot?outs?occurred?and?Ergneti?
market?closed?down?for?good.?
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With?the?Ergneti?action,?the?Saakashvili?regime?for?the?first?time?showed?a?
shift? to?assertive?policies? in? the?conflict.?The?previous?discussion?suggests?
that? the? operation? was? the? attempt? to? consolidate? power? in? satisfying?
domestic,? nationalist? claims? and? self?enrichment? prospects? by? way? of?
complying? with? very? specific?Western? demands? with? respect? to? central?
rule.?More? specifically,? the? concrete? focus? of?Western? actors? on? central?
authority?through?anti?corruption?policies?in?South?Ossetia?and?subsequent?
Georgian?compliance?suggests?a?key?role?of?Western?policies? in?triggering?
this?shift.?
?
Shelling?of?Tskhinvali?
In? the? immediate? aftermath? of? the? Ergneti? closure,? the? imminent?
intensification? of? the? South?Ossetia? conflict? turned? into? escalation?when?
Minister?of?Internal?Affairs?Okruashvili?launched?an?operation?on?Tskhinvali?
in?August?2004?(OSCE?AR?15/04,?OSCE?SRs?4,?5,?12,?16).?In?an?unparalleled?
move?since?the?end?of?the?1991/1992?war,?Georgian?troops?of?the?Ministry?
of? Interior? shelled? Tskhinvali? from? the? surrounding? heights.? The? Russian?
command?of?the?JPKF?threatened?to?call? in?battalions?of?the?Russian?army?
deployed?130?km?north?near?Vladikavkaz?should?Georgian?troops?advance?
any? further.? Okruashvili? ended? the? campaign,? but? the? following? day?
Saakashvili?praised?Okruashvili’s? stealth? campaign?on?TV? (RFE/RL?20.?and?
27.08.2004).?
?
Assessment?of?Western?policies?
With? the? regime? change? from? the? Shevardnadze? to? the? Saakashvili?
government?after?November?2003,?Georgian?policies?in?reintegrating?South?
Ossetia? changed? to? a? fiercer? stance.? This? change? was? set? off? through?
Western? support? of? the? regime? change? that? linked? political? backing? of?
Saakashvili’s? power? to? the? implementation? of? large?scale? state?
strengthening?reforms.?Western?demands,?therefore,?decisively?framed?the?
change? in? local? behavior? that? showed? itself? in? the? closure? of? Ergneti?
market,? an? anti?smuggling? campaign? with? the? aim? of? restoring? central?
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authority?in?the?region?of?South?Ossetia.?The?conflict?intensified?and?in?the?
aftermath? escalated? when? Georgian? troops? shelled? Tskhinvali? in? August?
2004.?
?
In? light?of? the?discussion? that?concluded? the?previous? first? sequence,? the?
analysis? of? the? second? sequence? finds? once?more? a? significant? reactive?
instant?of?Western?policy?with? local?dynamics? in? the?context?of? the?2003?
regime? change?which? set? off? a? reinforcing,? interactive? cycle? of?Western?
policies?promoting?strong? leadership?and?assertive?Georgian?state?policies?
of?territorial?reintegration.?
Secondly,?also?similar?to?the?2002?escalation,?the?focus?of?Western?agency?
in? the? conflict? prior? to? the? escalation? shifts? from? the? national? to? the?
international? level.? The? Georgian? government? and? Western? partners?
already?had?taken?to?prepare?for?settlement?plans?of?the?conflict,?so?called?
peace? road?maps? that?were? to? be? presented? in? important? international?
frameworks? in? 2004? and? 2005? (in? detail? see? Sequence? 3).? The? focus? of?
Western? actors,? therefore,?was? already? shifting? from? the?national? to? the?
international?level?of?the?conflict,?with?the?West?granting?confidence?to?the?
Saakashvili?leadership?in?resolving?the?conflict?without?use?of?force?(see?the?
interview? references? above,? among? these? I? 1,? I? 8,? I? 14,? I? 24,? I? 32,? I? 33).?
Hence,? after? concentration? of? support? at? the? national? level? during? the?
protest?and?Saakashvili’s?inauguration,?the?US?and?OSCE?support?Georgian?
conflict?politics? at? the? international? level.? Therefore,? this?Western? policy?
performs?stronger?in?2004?than?in?2002?as?it?changes?from?the?national?to?
the? international? level?as?opposed?to? from?the? local?to?the?national? level,?
displaying? the? increasing? internationalization? of? Georgian? politics? with?
Saakashvili?and?showing?a?more?clear?cut?shift?in?spanning?localities.?
Third,? in? 2004? it? for? the? first? time? showed?how? the?paradox?of?Western?
policies?oscillating?between?state?and?democracy?centered?policies?created?
an? instable? context? for? local? agency? in? the? conflict.? The? link? was? also?
evident?prior?to?the?2002?escalation?through?the?fostering?of?negotiations?
at? the? same? time?as?putting?unilateral?pressure?on? state?actors? in?Tbilisi.?
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However?back?then,?the? link?had?been?weaker?as? it?envisaged?multilateral?
versus?unilateral?policy?formats.?In?the?context?of?2004,?the?paradox?of?this?
Western? policy? intensifies? as? it? emphasizes? on? the? one? hand? formats?
promoting?democracy?centered?non?use?of? force? and?on? the?other?hand?
directly?targets?bolstering?the?state?elite?(see?interview?references?above:?I?
6,?I?9,?I?12,?I?14).??
?
Therefore,?the?analysis?of?the?second?sequence?suggests?that?two?instances?
of? Western? policies? trigger? instability? in? the? conflict:? First,? through? a?
paradoxical?focus?on?hard?and?soft?measures?at?the?same?time?and?second,?
through?a? superseding,?persistent? focus?on? strengthening? the? state?elite.?
Significantly? from?2005,? influential?Western? funding?organizations?such?as?
the? Open? Society? Foundation? cut? back? their? fundings? to? civil? society?
organizations,?which? had? been? a?major? pillar? in? strengthening? agents? of?
change.?This?left?outside?support?concentrated?on?the?state?level?to?a?much?
larger?extent?than?before.?
?
However,? the?discussion?pointed?out? that? the?Ergneti? raid?was?motivated?
by? the? re?structuring? of? smuggling? revenues? into? the? hands? of? certain?
members?of?the?new?elite.?Therefore,?a?possible?explanation?could?contend?
that? the? new? leadership? used? the? time?window? of? strong? support? right?
after?the?regime?change?to?as?tacitly?as?possible?re?organize?flows?of?assets?
with? assertive?measures,?with? the? convenient? by?product? of? establishing?
central?authority.48?The?shift? to?assertive?policies,? thus,?would?have?been?
generated?through?local?factors?and?not?through?external?Western?impact.?
??
Nonetheless,? the? re?organization?of? smuggling? for?private?gains?does?not?
sufficiently? explain? the? shift? in? local? behavior.? First,? the? closure? of? the?
Ergneti? market? would? have? fulfilled? this? purpose? without? the? ensuing?
escalation?of?violence.?The?subsequent?engagement?of?the?Georgian?state?
is? a? strong? indicator? that? the? leadership? aimed? at? restoring? territorial?
                                                          
48?Several? interviews?partners?who?gave?their?account?of?the?early?phase?of?Saakashvili’s?
government?suggest?this,?see?I?1,?I?6,?I?26.?
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integrity,? not? only? acquiring? financial? assets.? However,? another? locally?
based?explanation?could?attribute?the?escalation?to?nationalist,?emotionally?
triggered?motives?of?Minister?Okruashvili?who?was?born? in?Tskhinvali?as?a?
close?ally?of?the?early?phase?of?the?Saakashvili?government?suggests? (I?6).?
Strong?hints?that?this?is?not?a?sufficient?basis?to?exclude?the?triggering?role?
of?Western?impact?is?provided?by?two?further?arguments.??
Therefore,? second,? the? preparation? of? the? Western?Georgian? jointly?
prepared? peace? road? maps? over? the? summer? of? 2004? hinted? to? the?
necessity?to?secure?Western?support? in?the?conflict?and?that?reintegration?
of? South?Ossetia,? therefore,?was? at? least? in? part? a? reaction? to?Western?
demands?(I?4,?I?14).?Western?policies?in?the?conflict,?this?suggests,?were?as?a?
strong?a? factor? for? local?policies? to?move? in? the? conflict? as? locally?based?
demands.?
Third,? in? targeting?smuggling?activities,? the? leadership’s?choice?of?policies?
specifically?complied?with?the?Western?agenda?already?enumerated? in?the?
Baden?document.?Therefore,? the? concrete? choice?of?policies,?as?opposed?
to,?for?example,?closing?the?border?or?striking?an?informal?deal,?also?might?
allow? the?study? to?deduct? the? triggering? role?of?Western?policies?prior? to?
the?escalation? in?2004?(I?14,?I?26,?I?31).?Western?expectations?at?the?point?
of?the?regime?change,?therefore,?played?a?decisive?role? in?augmenting?the?
pressure?on?the?regime?to?act.??
?
Altogether,? the? discussion? seems? to?maintain? that?Western? policies? not?
only?significantly?frame?the?point? in?time?when?the?conflict?escalated,?but?
also?shape? local?state?policies? that?shift? the?context? toward?escalation.? In?
this? respect,? the? three? characteristics? of?Western? policies? of? the? 2002?
escalation?performed? in?an?even?more?clearly?shaped?manner,?namely?of?
interaction,?shift?to?a?broader? locality?of?agency?at?the? international? level,?
and? the? paradox? of? at? the? same? time? democracy? and? state?centered?
policies?of?Western?agency?in?the?conflict.?The?conflict,?therefore,?escalated?
when?these?characteristics?took?effect.?
?
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Sequence?3?–?2008??
Initial?condition:?Western?support?for?peace?road?maps? ?Change?of?local?
behavior:?Sanakoev?administration? ?Escalation:?August?war?
Between? 2004? and? 2006,? Georgia? implemented? an? ambitious? reform?
agenda,?taking?on?strengthening?and?restructuring?institutions?to?eliminate?
corruption?and?build?efficient?state?capacities,?strengthening?the?police?and?
military?capacities,?launching?a?second?privatization?reform,?reconstructing?
infrastructure?on?a? large?scale,?attracting?tourism?and?bolstering?Western?
relations.??
While? the?Saakashvili?government?consolidated?power?over?the?course?of?
2004,?Western?engagement?stepped?up?activity.?Both?negotiations?at? the?
international? level? on? NATO? and? European? integration? as? well? as?
cooperation? with? the? new? government? on? internal? Georgian? affairs?
acquired? a? foothold.? With? regard? to? territorial? integration,? Western?
support?continued?to?be?the?focal?point?in?the?Georgian?agenda?it?had?been?
since?the?2004?regime?change.? In?addition,?Western?and?Russian?relations?
intensified? in? the? 2000s,? including? in? the? context? of? the? South? Ossetia?
conflict.? Georgia’s? NATO? process? came? to? be? one? particular? arena? of?
Western?Russian? contention? taking? effect? on? Georgia’s? South? Ossetia?
policies.??
?
Western?support?for?the?peace?road?map?
One?month? after? the? shelling?of? Tskhinvali,? Saakashvili?presented? a? road?
map? for? conflict? settlement? at? the? UN? General? Assembly? in? New? York,?
envisaging? confidence?building,? demilitarization? and? intensified? OSCE?
monitoring,?and? the?autonomous?status?of?South?Ossetia? in? the?Georgian?
constitution? (UNGA? 21.09.2004,? Sigwart? 2006).? The? so?called? Peace? Plan?
was? part? of? an? encompassing? campaign? launched? by? the? Georgian?
government?to?promote?its?new?course?in?South?Ossetia.??
?
In?January?2005,?Saakashvili?presented?the?‘Peace?Initiative?South?Ossetia’?
at? the? Parliamentary?Assembly? of? the? Council? of? Europe?with? deepened?
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aspects? of? institutional? cooperation? with? South? Ossetia? on? economic?
rehabilitation? and? restitution? (PACE? 24.01.2005).? In? July,? Saakashvili?
launched? an? international? conference? in? Batumi,? receiving? international?
support? for? the? plan,? amongst? others? from? OSCE? Chairman? Rupel.? In?
October? 2005,?Georgian? Prime?Minister? Zurab?Noghaideli? presented? the?
Peace? Plan? at? the?OSCE? Permanent? Council? in? Vienna? (OSCE? Permanent?
Council?2005a?and?2005b).??
The?2005?efforts?in?gathering?international?political?support? in?the?conflict?
peaked?at?the?OSCE?launched?Ministerial?meeting?in?Ljubljana?in?November?
as?a?member?of?the?Georgian?delegation?remembered?in?the?interview?(I?9,?
also? see:? Socor? 2005,).? The? Ljubljana? document? envisaged? an? ambitious?
role? of? the? EU,?US? and?OSCE? in? establishing? a? free? trade? zone? in? South?
Ossetia?and?thereby?helping?to?reintegrate?the?region?gradually.?
?
The?peace?road?maps?were?a?key? instrument? in?the?Georgian? leadership’s?
attempt? to?attract?Western? support?by?presenting?an?agenda?devoted? to?
democratic?standards?of?multilateral?cooperation?and?non?use?of? force? in?
territorial? integration.? Meanwhile,? assertive? actions? continued? on? the?
ground,?as?an?attempt?of?Georgian?forces?to?hold?their?current?positions?as?
well? as? to? keep? open? the? option? of? a? military? solution? to? territorial?
integration.? The? Western? partners? continued? to? support? the? Georgian?
strategy? unanimously,? as? reaffirmed? at? a? high?level? international?
conference?on?South?Ossetia? in?Batumi? in? July?2005? (Civil.ge?10.07.2005,?
Fuller?2005,?Sigwart?2006).? In?response?to?the?peace?plan,?the?US?Mission?
to? the? OSCE? criticized? Russia’s? destabilizing? role,? praised? Georgian?
democratic? reforms? and? commitments? and? gave? its? “full? and? sincere?
support”?(OSCE?PC?31.10.2005).?In?November?2005?the?Ljubljana?document?
formalized?support?of?the?US,?EU,?and?OSCE?for?Saakashvili’s?government?in?
the?framework?of?territorial?integration.?
?
As? part? of? the? agenda? set? in? the? Ljubljana? document,?Western? policies?
increased?measures? to? settle? the? situation? locally? at? the? same? time? as?
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launching? efforts? at? the? international? level.? Specifically,? the? document?
envisaged? establishing? confidence?building? measures? between? the?
Georgian?and?South?Ossetian?leaderships?through?launching?an?“Economic?
Rehabilitation?Program”?(ERP)?in?the?Georgian?South?Ossetian?conflict?zone?
(I?1,?I?3,?I?4,?I?8,?I?14,?I?17,?I?2049).?As?early?as?2004,?OSCE?officials?started?to?
carve?out?the?plan?to? introduce?economic?rehabilitation? in?order?to?foster?
cooperation?and?economic?prosperity? in? the? region?of?South?Ossetia?and?
the? bordering? Georgian?controlled? territories? and? provide? for? gradual?
integration?of?the?region?into?Georgia?(I?4,?ERP?Final?Assessment?2009).?The?
plan? had? significance? as? it?made? Georgian? and? South? Ossetian? political?
actors? share? responsibility? for? the? first? time? since? the? end? of? the? Soviet?
Union.?Economic? rehabilitation?payments?had?been?planned?all? the?while?
since?the?war?in?1992,?but?were?recurrently?held?back?in?a?dragging?process?
by?either?the?Russian?or?the?Georgian?side?–?due?to?opaque?procurement?
processes,? distribution? policies? and? general? lack? of? supervision? which?
members?of? international?organizations? in?charge?with?closely?monitoring?
the?process?reported?during?the?interviews?(I?1,?I?14,?CSCE?Communication?
No.?REF.SEC/183/95,?OSCE?AR?05/98).??
?
The?Ljubljana?document?of?2005? finally?agreed?on? the? implementation?of?
the? ERP? facilitated? by? the? OSCE? with? funding? not? from? the? local?
stakeholders,?but?from?outside?donors?to?go?through?an?elected?board?with?
representatives? from? all? sides.? The? main? condition? of? the? ERP? was?
cooperation?between?Georgia?and?South?Ossetia?on?the?implementation?of?
these? rehabilitation? projects? in? the? framework? of? the? JCC.? In?November?
2005,?the?Needs?Assessment?Study?for?the?ERP?projects?was?conducted,?in?
May? 2006? the? Ossetian,? Georgian? and? Russian? JCC? representatives?
                                                          
49?The?following?section?is?based?on?interviews?mainly?with?former?members?of?the?OSCE?
Mission? to?Georgia,? but? also? other? international? organizations.? These?OSCE? co?workers?
had?been?based?both?in?Tbilisi?and?Tskhinvali?and?had?been?part?of?the? intensive?process?
of?negotiations?between?the?Georgian,?Ossetian,?Russian,?European?and?U.S.?counterparts?
before?and?during?the?set?up?of?the?ERP.?They?had?also?been?part?of?ongoing?talks?during?
the? implementation?of?the?ERP?which?namely?took?place? in?Tskhinvali?and?dealt?with?ad?
hoc? issues? concerning? specific? projects? in? the? Georgian?Ossetian? conflict? zone? and,?
therefore,?could?give?insight?into?the?political?aspects?of?the?conflict?at?the?micro?level?of?
decision?making?processes.?
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approved? of? the? portfolio? and? one? month? later? the? European? donor?
countries?were? informed?of? the? JCC?decision? at? a? conference? in?Brussels?
(OSCE? AR? 10/06,? ERP? Final? Assessment? 2009).? In? December? 2006,? the?
program?started.?The?projects?embraced?a?wide?range?of?sectors,?including?
agriculture,? infrastructure? (such? as? hospitals? and? roads),?micro?economy?
projects? targeted? at? improving? the? livelihood? of? individual? citizens,? and?
restoring?water,?gas?and?power?supply?lines.?
?
However,?these?efforts?took?place?alongside?a?deteriorating?local?situation?
after?2006.?Relations?soured?over?spying?accusations,?overflight?and?drone?
incidents? on? the? territory? of? South? Ossetia,? shoot?outs? in? the? volatile?
border?regions,?import?blockades?for?small?trade?and?sharp?rhetoric?(OSCE?
AR?10/06,?SR?257/06,?SR?297/06).?The?Ossetian? leadership?participated? in?
the? ERP?because? they? could? siphon?off? funds,?while? they? simultaneously?
received?trainings?from?the?Russian?military?to?prepare?for?escalation?(BBC?
10.08.2012).?Disruption?of?gas,?water?and?power?supplies?along?the?lines?of?
ethnically? divided? villages? created? a? continuous? bone? of? contention? and?
displayed? the? arbitrary? attitude? of? all? sides? to? the? process,?most? of? all?
leaving? farmers?without? irrigation? as? several? co?workers? of? international?
donors?and?organizations?observed?at?the?time?(I?14,?I?3,?I?4).?
?
Simultaneously? illustrating? the? tendency? of? Georgian? policies? to? use?
assertive?measures? in? territorial? integration? and?Western? willingness? to?
comply?with? it,?Georgian? police? forces? restored? control? in? the?Georgian?
inhabited?Kodori?Valley? in?Abkhazia? in?July?2006?(I?5,?I?7,?I?9,?I?14,?I?1?13,? I?
23,? I?2950;?also?OSCE?AR?26.04.1994).?The?operation?brought?the?situation?
to?the?verge?of?war?as?Georgian? forces?moved,? in?breach?of?the?UNOMIG?
agreement,? into? Abkhaz?controlled? territory? on? the? other? side? of? the?
                                                          
50?Interview?partners?with?a?very?different?background?raised?the?events?of?the?territorial?
conflict? over? Kodori? Valley? as? an? indicator? for? the? state? of? conflict? policies? in?Georgia.?
Particularly?the?July?2006?incident?was?accounted?for?by?a?Georgian?opposition?member,?a?
co?worker?of?international?NGO?and?one?of?the?EU?Delegation?(I?9,?I?14,?I?23).??
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Administrative? Border? Line.? Georgian? police? permanently? remained?
deployed?in?the?area.??
The?Georgian?government?declared?the?defeat?of?local?warlord?Kitsovani?as?
the?main?reason?for?the?campaign?and?on?these?grounds?received?full?U.S.?
support.?U.S.?Deputy?Assistant?Secretary?for?European?and?Eurasian?Affairs?
Matthew?Bryza?announced:?“So?there?is?a?lack?of?a?capability?to?create?the?
conditions,? the? secure? conditions,? free? from? crime,? that? allow? IDPs? to?
return?[to?Gali?region,?Abkhazia].?And?what? I'm?saying?now? is?there?was?a?
similar?situation? in?Kodori,?where? there?was? lawlessness.? In? this?case,? the?
Georgian?government?is?eliminating?the?lawlessness?and?restoring?the?rule?
of?law.”?(Civil.ge?02.08.2006)?
?
Whereas?Western?actors?showed?a?reluctant?stance?at?the?local?level,?these?
dynamics?were?significantly?superseded?by?events?on?the?international?and?
national? level.? Western? actors? relied? on? brittle? on?the?ground?
arrangements? while? hailing? steps? undertaken? by? Saakashvili? in? the?
international? framework,? for? instance? of? UNGA,? two? months? earlier.?
Instead,? Western? actors? pursued? multi?level? engagement? with? their?
attention?and?efforts?mainly?to?the?international?level?as?the?local?situation?
intensified.?Western?engagement?after?2004?in?the?first?place?continued?to?
buffer? deteriorating? effects? in? the? conflict? zone? by? on?the?ground?
facilitation?and?stressing?non?force?measures.?
?
Sanakoev?administration?
After?the?launch?of?the?new?Georgian?agenda?from?2004,?the?reluctance?of?
Western?policies?translated?into?passive?support?of?the?unilateral?stance?of?
the?Georgian?government?and?gradually?led?to?a?significant?change?in?local?
behavior? in? the? conflict? in? the? second? half? of? 2006.? Amid? the? volatile?
situation?on?the?ground,?Georgian?policies?had?also?been?assertive?prior?to?
2006,?but?had?remained?restrained?after?the?August?shelling? in?2004.?This?
however? changed? when,? subsequently,? the? Georgian? government?
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intensified? its? initiative? to?gain?control? in? the?conflict?both? in? the?conflict?
area?as?well?as?within?the?JCC.??
?
In? October? 2006,? the? newly? established? ‘Salvation? Union? of? Ossetians’,?
organized? by? ethnic? Ossetians? living? in? Georgia,? announced? alternative?
polls?in?South?Ossetia?(I?1,?I?2,?I?3,?I?4,?I?8,?I?14,?I?2851,?OSCE?AR?19/06,?20/06,?
22/06).? On? 12? November,? in? a? parallel? move? to? the? elections? of? the?
Tskhinvali? leadership,? the?Union? held? presidential? polls? in? the?Georgian?
controlled? regions? of? South? Ossetia? (Civil.ge? 12.11.2004).? In? December,?
Dmitri? Sanakoev?was? announced? alternative? president? of? South?Ossetia,?
whereas?Kokoity?was?re?elected?in?South?Ossetia.?Dmitri?Sanakoev,?former?
South? Ossetian? defense?minister? and? a?military? commander? in? the? first?
Georgian?Ossetian? war,? had? defected? to? the? Georgian? side.? The? Tbilisi?
government? declared? its? willingness? to? formalize? the? self?declared?
alternative? government? (Civil.ge? 01.12.2006).? Sanakoev’s? administration?
was? inaugurated? in? December? 2006,? the? same? month? when? the? ERP?
projects? started.? On? May? 8,? 2007,? the? Georgian? parliament? passed? a?
resolution? formally? setting? up? the? administration? (I? 28).? The? ‘Sanakoev?
administration’?took?office? in?the?ethnic?Georgian?village?of?Kurta,? located?
in?South?Ossetia,?seen?as?a?provocative?move?by?the?South?Ossetian?side.??
?
The?Georgian?side?presented?Sanakoev?as?the?official?representative?of?the?
South? Ossetian? side? to? the? EU? and? OSCE? representatives? of? the? JCC.?
Sanakoev? announced? the? non?violent? resolution? of? the? conflict? and? a?
peaceful? unity? of? Ossetians? and? Georgians? inside? of? Georgia? as? his? top?
priority.? The?Georgian? government? announced? to? leave? the? format? if? he?
was?not?accepted?(I?4,?I?5,?I?8,?I?9,?I?14,?I?34).?Not?only?did?Russian?and?South?
Ossetian?counterparts?boycott?the?new?administration?(Civil.ge?13.11.?and?
05.12.2006),? but? the? introduction? of? Sanakoev? into? the? JCC? format?
                                                          
51?The? alternative? elections?on? the? administration? in?Tskhinvali?was?held? to?be? a?major?
turning? point? in? the? conflict? by? several? interview? partners,? both? with? a? local? and? an?
international?background.? They? all? suggested? that? this? step?by? the?Georgian? leadership?
was?strategic,?but?also?willfully?provocative.?
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outraged? the?Ossetian?counterparts.?Western? representatives? feared? that?
the? format?would? lose?Tbilisi? if? they?did?not?comply.?Ultimately,?Western?
partners?accepted? the? institution?of? the?Sanakoev?administration,?on? the?
grounds? of? not? denying? the?Georgians? to? establish? a? body? of? control? of?
their?own?on?their?territory.??
?
In?the?course?of?2007,?the?situation? in?the?JCC?further?deteriorated?to?the?
point? of? the? JCC? format? being? de?facto? cancelled.? In? January? 2008,? the?
Georgian?leadership?fortified?its?assertive?stance?and?replaced?dovish?State?
Minister? for? Reintegration? Giorgi? Khaindrava,? the? Georgian? JCC?
representative,?with?the?more?rigorous?Temur?Yakobashvili?(I?8,?I?1?8,?also?
see?Sigwart?2006).?Georgian?representatives?under?the?new?State?Minister?
insisted?that?Western?partners,?particularly?the?Delegation?of?the?European?
Commission?and?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia,?did?not?sufficiently?support?
Georgian?demands.?Thus,?Georgia?bailed?out?of?political?talks?and?only?the?
administrative?meetings? on? practical? issues? continued,? including? the? ERP?
programme.?
?
As?a?result,?by? installing?the?Sanakoev?administration,?Tbilisi?attempted?to?
swerve? a? stagnating? situation? into? one?with? a? perspective? toward? both?
Western? and? territorial? integration:? First,? in? introducing? an? alternative?
administration?in?South?Ossetia,?central?control?in?the?area?was?to?ensue?as?
a?post?factum?reality,?gradually?to?be?transferred? into?formalized?terms?as?
an? oppositional? political? analyst? observed? (I? 9).? Second,? several?
international? and? local? decision?makers? suggested? that? the? formal? JCC?
recognition? of? Georgian?backed? Sanakoev? as? the? South? Ossetian?
representative? practically? coerced?Western? partners? into? support? of? the?
leadership’s?policy?(I?4,?I?5,?I?8,?I?1452).??
?
As?much? as? the?Georgian? side?portrayed?Western? engagement? as? falling?
short? in? supporting? Georgian? interests,? Western? policies? however?
                                                          
52?Also,?a?background?talk?with?a?senior?analyst?of?an?EC?funded?think?tank?was?held?on?the?
topic.?
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supported? the? shift? to? the? increasingly?assertive?policies?of? the?Georgian?
leadership.?At?the?same?time,?Western?actors?maintained?the?general,?all?
encompassing? conditional? policy? of? territorial? integration? and? central?
authority.?In?this?manner,?Western?demands?were?the?constant?addressees?
of? Georgian? territorial? integration? efforts.? As? a? result,?Western? policies,?
starting?from?the?support?of?the?road?maps?in?2004,?gradually?triggered?the?
change? in? local? behavior? that? installed? Sanakoev? and? undermined?
permissive?options?through?multilateral?formats.??
?
August?war?
From?2006?until?the?2008?August?war,?the?international?level?of?the?conflict?
created?a?reinforcing?spiral?with?strong?Western?and?Russian? involvement?
in?the?framework?of?Georgia’s?NATO?integration.?Simultaneously,?assertive?
policies?at?the?national? level?were?supported?by?the?shaky? internal?power?
base? of? the? Saakashvili? regime? and? harsh?Western? criticism? of? national?
politics.? In? this? regard,? during? 2007? the? internal? power? basis? of? the?
Saakashvili? regime? suffered? from? strong? internal? opposition? when? anti?
government?protests?by?political?groups?and?the?population?that?lasted?for?
months.? The? situation? escalated? on? 7? November? 2007,? with? Georgian?
military?police?cracking?down?on?demonstrators?(Mitchell?2009,?Areshidze?
2007,?Tatum?2009).??
The? incident? sparked? outrage? in? Georgian? society,? and? solicited? sharp?
critique? from?Western? partners? for? disproportionate? use? of? force? (HRW?
2007).?This?temporarily?strained?relations?with?Western?partners?and,?as?a?
senior? member? of? the? EU? Delegation? suggested,? put? pressure? on? the?
Georgian?government?to?restore?trust?in?its?democratic?capacities?(I?14).?
?
However,? after? 2006,? the? Western? focus? on? Georgia’s? integration? into?
Western? structures? concentrated? at? the? international? level? with? strong?
Russian?opposition? to? further?Western?Georgian? integration.?At? the? local?
level?where?OSCE?and?Russia? interacted?directly,?the?relations?of?Western?
and?Russian?actors?had?deteriorated?over? the?South?Ossetia?conflict? from?
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as?early?as?2004.? In?November?2004,? the?Kokoity?Zhvania?agreement?had?
handed? over? the? strategically? important? Georgian?held? Sarabuki?
checkpoint?in?the?conflict?zone?to?Ossetian?forces?(I?9,?OSCE?AR?21/04).?
This? agreement? was? a? result? of? Russia’s? initiative? vis?a?vis? Western?
representatives?that?raised?the?Georgian?assertive?action?of?closing?Ergneti?
market? as? worrisome? evidence? of? Georgian? aggressive? tendencies.?
Therefore,?Russia?demanded?from?OSCE?and?EU?representatives?to?provide?
security? for? the?Ossetian?population?and?demanded? that? they?hand?over?
the?crucial?checkpoint?to?the?Ossetian?PKF.?The?repeated?shifts?of?Georgian?
policies? to? assertive? measures? provided? grounds? for? Russia? to? push? its?
claims?and?whereas?Western?bilateral?support?of?Georgia?remained?stable,?
the?argument?weakened?the?West’s?pro?Georgian?stance? in?opposition?to?
Russia.?
?
By?2008,?Western?and?Russian?struggles?over?a?stance?on?Georgia’s?internal?
politics? were? taken? to? the? international? level.? The? intensified? Western?
course?of?Georgia? led?to?Western? interference?with?Russian? interests,?and?
therefore? not? only? Georgia? increasingly? collided? with? Russia? on? an?
international?level,?but?also?the?EU?and?US?who?entered?the?Russian?sphere?
of? interest? over? the?Georgia? row? (I? 29,? I? 1453,? Fischer? 2009,?Nicol? 2008,?
Allison?2008,?Loewenhardt?2005,?Asmus?2010).??
In? February? 2008,? the? declaration? of? independence? of? the? Serbian?
international? protectorate,? Kosovo,? created? a? precedent? for? secessionist?
entities.?Russia?disagreed?with?EU?member? states? supportive?of?Kosovo’s?
independence.?Disgruntled?Russia? threatened?with? consequences? for? the?
situation? in?the?South?Caucasus?conflicts?(I?5,? I?14,? I?16,? I?24,? I?2954,?Aaron?
2008,?Averre?2009,?Cerone?2009,?Aaron?2008).?Russian?officials?particularly?
hinted?to?the?possibility?of?Kosovo?being?a?blueprint?for?the?South?Ossetia?
                                                          
53? In? particular? international? analysts? and? decision?makers? depicted? in? interviews? the?
arising? conflict?of? European? states? and? the?US?with?Russia?by?way?of? a? close?Western?
Georgian?alliance.?
54? Numerous? interview? partners? emphasized? the? immediate? effect? of? Kosovo’s?
independence?on?the?conflict?in?South?Ossetia,?especially?vivid?by?a?senior?member?of?the?
European?Union?Special?Representative?to?the?South?Caucasus?and?the?Crisis?in?Georgia?(I?
24).?
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case.?In?the?wake?of?the?Western?Russian?row?over?Kosovo,?Moscow?used?
the?situation?to? its?advantage?and?established?official?diplomatic?relations?
with?Tskhinvali?and?Sokhumi?in?April?2008.?
?
That? same?month,? the? NATO? summit? in? Bucharest? was? to? decide? over?
further? steps? of? Georgia’s? accession? to? the? transatlantic? treaty.?
Expectations?prior?to?Bucharest?ran?high,?not?only?in?Georgia:?Georgia?was?
the?most?active?NATO?partner? in?Europe’s?neighborhood,?had? fulfilled?all?
requirements? superbly? and? had? received? adequate? approval? through?
assessments?and?NATO?officials?over?the?years?(I?1,?I?5,?I?6,?I?7,?I?9,?I?2955).?
Military? reforms? had? been? successful.? Political? impediments? such? as?
territorial? integrity?were?factually?disregarded?by?NATO?Secretary?General?
De?Scheffer?ahead?of?the?Bucharest?summit.?In?a?surprising?statement,?De?
Scheffer?announced?that?lack?of?territorial?integrity?was?not?a?hindrance?for?
Georgia? to? receive? the? formal?admission? to? the?NATO?membership? track,?
opposing?critical?voices?that?hinted?to?the?persisting?problems?with?Cyprus’?
unresolved?territorial?status.?Whereas?the?Bush?administration?vehemently?
lobbied?for?Membership?Action?Plan?(MAP)?status?for?Georgia?and?Ukraine,?
Germany’s?Chancellor?Merkel?strictly?opposed? this? (I?1,? I?29,? I?656,?Asmus?
2010)?as?she?put? forward? that?Georgia?was?not?ready? to? join? the?West? in?
the?near? future?due? to?poor?performance? in?democratic? reform? (see? the?
insightful?study?of?Asmus?2010).?However,?at?the?time?of?Bucharest?summit?
Merkel? already? held? the? opinion? that?Georgia?was? not? ready? to? join? the?
West? in? the?near? future?due? to?poor?performance? in?democratic? reform?
(ibid.).? However,? the?Western? leaders? established? that? Georgian? would?
eventually?become?a?NATO?member?and?left?the?question?of?timing?open.?
Although? Germany? and? France? had? openly? opposed? MAP? prior? to? the?
                                                          
55?The?following?account?on?the?impact?of?Georgia’s?ambitions?to?become?a?NATO?member?
on?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?is?based?on?numerous?interviews?that?traced?Georgia’s?NATO?
process?from?the?beginning?of?the?2000s?or?accounted?for?an?inside?view?of?certain?parts?
of?the?political?process.?
56? Three? interview? partners,? two? senior? analysts? of? Georgia?bsed? think? tanks? and? an?
opposition? member,? reported? on? the? perspective? of? the? Georgian? leadership? on? the?
events?on?the?international?level.?These?accounts?frame?the?following?paragraph.?
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summit,? the? drop?out? was? nevertheless? reinforced? by? dynamics? on? the?
ground.?
?
The? result? of? the? Bucharest? summit? had? closed? the? door? not? only? for?
Western? integration,?but?also?posed?a?rebuff?to?Georgia’s?overall?political?
choice? to?an?overwhelming?extent:?NATO?membership?had?been? the?one?
fixed,?palpable?goal?of?Georgia’s?post?Soviet?politics?and?a?cornerstone?of?
security?perceptions?in?the?country.?Bucharest?wiped?out?all?this?at?once,?so?
the?Georgian?perception.?In?addition,?the?Saakashvili?regime?was?subject?to?
ongoing? internal?protests? and? ensuing?Western? criticism.? The? inability? to?
reintegrate? the? territories? as? initially? promised? to? the? population?
additionally? weakened? Saakashvili’s? power? base.? The? reluctance? of?
Western? partners? provided? grounds? for? Russia? to? be? reassured? in? its?
unilateral,? arbitrary? stance? in? fostering? secessionism.? Therefore,? the?
decision?of?the?NATO?summit?in?Bucharest?put?a?reinforcing?impetus?to?the?
situation,?with?the?result?of?escalation?(see?footnote?14:?I?1,?I?6,?I?9,?I?29).?As?
a?result,?amid?the?deteriorating?dynamics?and?Russia’s?advances?to?bolster?
separatism?on?the?ground,?Western?policies?swayed?the?situation?decisively?
and?within? four?months?of? the? summit? the? conflict?escalated? into?war? in?
August?2008.?
During? the? first?week? of? August,? the? situation? escalated? into?war?when?
Georgian? and?Russian?military? clashed?on? the? territory? of? South?Ossetia.?
The?war?lasted?five?days?and?took?a?toll?of?several?hundred?dead,?including?
a?high?number?of? civilians? (HRW?2009,?Asmus?2010,?Garthon?2010,?King?
2008).?Russian?forces?moved? into?Georgian?central?territory?as?close?as?40?
km? from?Tbilisi.?After?a?diplomatic? intervention?by?head?of?the?French?EU?
presidency? Nicolas? Sarkozy,? Russian? troops? retreated,? but? permanently?
remained?deployed?in?South?Ossetia?and?Abkhazia.?
?
Assessment?of?Western?policies?
Prior? to? the? August? war? the? escalation? cycle? had? been? kicked? off? by?
Western?support?for?a?divisive?stance?of?the?Georgian?leadership,?rooted?in?
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increasingly? assertive? measures? on? the? ground? with? the? simultaneous?
promotion?of?a?peaceful?settlement?in?international?frameworks.?This?cycle?
led? to?Western? policies? triggering? change? in? local? behavior? to? assertive?
policies? in? 2006?when? the?Georgian? state? elite? introduced? the? Sanakoev?
administration?in?the?Georgian?controlled?areas?of?South?Ossetia.?After?the?
installation?of?Sanakoev,?Western?policies? reinforced? local?dynamics?with?
agency? at? the? international? level,? especially? at? the? NATO? summit? in?
Bucharest.?Withdrawal?of?Western? support? in? the?Bucharest? summit,? for?
the? Georgian? elite,? meant? loss? of? the? power?sustaining? prospect? of?
territorial? reintegration? and?helped?push? the? clash?between?Russian? and?
Georgian?military?in?the?escalation?of?the?August?2008?war.?
?
Altogether,? Western? policies? prior? to? the? 2008? escalation? confirm? the?
pattern?of?the?previous?two?escalations?in?2002?and?2004?on?an?even?more?
intense? scale.? In? reaction? to? the? Georgian? foreign? policy? agenda? of?
promoting?the?peace?road?maps?from?2004?with?strong?Western?support,?a?
wide? array? of? interviews? gave? the? impression? that? Western? policies?
interacted?with?policies?of? local?and? international?actors? to? the?extent?of?
setting?off?a?cycle?of?escalation?(for?interview?references?on?this?argument?
see?in?the?analysis?above:?I?1,?I?3,?I?4,?I?8,?I?9,?I?14,?I?17,?I?20).?Thereafter,?the?
interaction? of? Western? policies? with? Georgian,? Ossetian? and? Russian?
stakeholders? gradually? reinforced? local? dynamics? toward? assertive?
measures.??
Repeatedly? after? 2002? and? 2004,? Western? policies? at? the? start? of? the?
escalation?cycle?concentrated?on?the?local?and?national?level?of?the?conflict?
and?after?the?change?in?behavior?shift?from?there?to?the?international?level.?
In?the?international?context?of?the?conflict,?namely?through?the?Kosovo?and?
Bucharest? instances? as? several? interviews? supported? (for? interview?
references?on?this?argument?see?in?the?analysis?above:?I?5,?I?6,?I?7,?I?9,?I?14,?I?
16,? I? 24,? I? 29),?Western? efforts? at? the? integration? of? Georgia? in? NATO?
structures?and?Russia’s?opposing?stance?reinforced?the?deteriorating? local?
dynamics?that?led?to?the?escalation?in?2008.?
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Similar? to? the? previous? escalations,? Western? policies? continuously?
oscillated?between?stressing?democracy??and?state?centered?policies?in?the?
period? between? 2006? and? 2008.? The? paradox? of? democracy?? vs.? state?
centered? demands? addressed? simultaneously? to? the?Georgian? leadership?
by? Western? policies? pertained? to? these? dynamics.? On? the? one? hand,?
Western?policies?promoted?the?non?violent?settlement?of?the?secessionist?
conflicts,? thereby? vigorously? supporting? Saakashvili’s?proposals? for?peace?
road?maps? and? enhancing? the? ERP? format.?On? the? other? hand,?Western?
claims?take?the?form?of?strengthening?central?state?power? in?the?hands?of?
the? government.? Here,?Western? policies,? as? before,? continued? to? voice?
demands? of? crackdown? on? crime? and? corruption? and? economic? growth,?
targeting? regaining?central?control?over? the?breakaway? territory?of?South?
Ossetia.57?
?
The?discussion?suggests?that?local?dynamics?were?crucial?in?bringing?about?
escalations,?but?also?that?the?timing?of?the?escalation?cannot?be?explained?
solely?through?the?local?spiral?of?militarization?between?Georgian,?Ossetian?
and?Russian?forces.?Rather,?Western?policies?played?a?key?role? in?creating?
the? necessary? conditions? for? enabling? these? local? dynamics? at? specific?
points? in? time,? crucially? through? supporting? the? Sanakoev? administration?
and? the? Bucharest? decision.? In? this? fashion,? Western? policies? at? these?
points?in?time?created?a?vacuum?for?domestic?policy?choices?in?the?conflict?
and?put?the?domestic?power?base?in?peril.?Hence,?Western?policies?prior?to?
escalations? increased? the? pressure? for? the? local? state? elite? to? act? and?
fostered?assertive?policies?as?a?viable?option.?
?
The?discussion?gives?a?brief?overview?of?Western?policies?after?2008?and?
then? turns? to? the? discussion? of? the? empirical? findings? to? conclude? the?
empirical?analysis.?
                                                          
57? Several? local? experts?with? an? accurate? scrutiny? of? events? stressed? this? ambiguity? of?
European?and?US?policies? in?Georgia? (I?1,? I?6,? I?29).? Interestingly,?this?analysis?was?rarely?
shared?by?members?of?international?organizations.?These?would?more?often?tend?to?blame?
policy?failure?on? inefficient?state?structures,?corrupt?decision?makers?or?an?opaque?spiral?
of?events?(I?20,?Sigwart?2006).?
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Western?policies?after?2008?
In? the? four?years?after? the?2008?war,? incidents?of?violence? in? the?conflict?
area? considerably? decreased.? Nonetheless,? the? risk? of? escalation? has?
remained?high.?The?situation?in?and?around?South?Ossetia?operates?largely?
on?informal?arrangements?as?it?is?recognized?as?an?independent?state?only?
by?Russia?(Kolst?and?Blakkisrud?2008).?Shortly?after?the?2008?war,?Moscow?
formally? recognized? the? two? entities? of? South? Ossetia? and? Abkhazia? as?
independent? states?and?established? close? ties?with? their?administrations.?
Also,? Russia? vetoed? the? prolongation? of? both? the?OSCE?mandate? in? the?
South? Ossetia? conflict? and? the? UN?mandate? in? Abkhazia.?With? this,? the?
presence?of?the?international?community?in?these?areas?ended,?except?for?
access?of?few?humanitarian?organizations.?The?follow?up?institution,?the?EU?
Monitoring?Mission?(EUMM),?from?2009?has?in?fact?enhanced?EU?ties?with?
Georgia,?but?operates?only?on?Georgian?controlled? territory?and? includes?
the? international? framework? of? the? Geneva? talks? to? enhance? security?
measures? in? the?conflict?zone? (Gower?and?Timmins?2009,?Haukkala?2008,?
Fischer?2009).??
?
When? the? EU?mediated? the? cease?fire? agreement? in? 2008? installed? the?
EUMM,?Western?actors?again?assumed?the?role?of?a?facilitator,?but?without?
fixed?guarantees?(NYT?07.11.2008,?IIEECGS?2009).?The?West?stays?involved?
on? the? ground? and? on? the? central? level,? but? international?level? activity?
concerning?Georgia?is?reduced?to?the?Geneva?talks?and?economic?issues?of?
European? integration.?Thus,? just? as?after? the?2002? and?2004?escalations,?
Western?engagement?retreated?from?the?international?to?the?national?level?
of? the? conflict.? Thus,?Western? integration? seems? to? continue,? territorial?
integration?left?aside.?Therefore,?in?an?overall?perspective?compared?to?the?
steady? increase?of?Western?engagement?on? the? international? level?of? the?
conflict? from?2000,?a? sharp?decrease? in? international?activity? shows?after?
the?2008?escalation.?Direct?Western?conditionalities?of?territorial? integrity?
have?grown?more?succinct,?whereas?Western?policy?unchangingly?exhibits?
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the? paradox? of? those? oscillating? policies? that? gave? opportunity? for?
escalation?in?the?past.??
?
Therefore,?the?reality?of?possible?escalation?in?Georgia?remains?against?the?
backdrop? of?Western? support? in? Georgia.? In?March? 2010,? the? Georgian?
government?reiterated?its?will?to?return?the?secessionist?entities?peacefully?
and?to?start?a?dialog?with?both?leaderships?(Office?of?the?State?Minister?for?
Reintegration? 2010).?Western? actors? continue? to? support? Georgia,? with?
Secretary?of?State?Clinton?speaking?on?July?5,?2010?of?the?“occupation”?of?
Abkhazia? and? South?Ossetia? by? Russian? troops? (U.S.? Senate? 11.12.2010)?
and? a? resolution? of? the? European? Parliament? in? November? 2011?
condemned? that? “Russia? continues? to? occupy? the? Georgian? regions? of?
Abkhazia?and? the?Tskhinvali?region/?South?Ossetia”? (European?Parliament?
resolution? 17.11.2011).? Prior? to? the?Georgian? parliamentary? elections? in?
October?2012,? the?EUMM?uttered?warnings?of? increased?militarization? in?
the?conflict?zone?(RFE/RL?2012).?
?
In? light? of? the? previous? analysis,? therefore,? the? current? situation? shows?
characteristics? of? a? new? escalation? cycle,? particularly? with? respect? to?
Western? characteristic? policies.? This? is? even? more? the? case? as? the?
characteristics? of? Western? policies? prior? to? the? 2002,? 2004? and? 2008?
escalations?are?not?only?repetitive,?but?also?intensify?with?each?escalation.?
The?specific?findings?will?be?discussed?in?the?subsequent?section,?including?
an?interpretive?summary?of?the?events?in?the?South?Ossetia?conflict.?
?
3.4. Empirical?findings?and?model??
The?previous?sequential?depiction?and?discussion?of?events? leading?up? to?
escalations?of?violence?in?2002,?2004?and?2008?in?South?Ossetia?highlighted?
the?particular?role?of?specific?Western?policies?influencing?the?re?escalation?
of?violence? through? the?effects?on? local?power?consolidation?of?Georgian?
state?elites.??
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The?table?below?summarizes?the?results?of?the?specific?analytical?focus?on,?
first,? instances?of?policies?taking?place? in?different?arenas?regarding? levels?
of? agency? (local,? national? or? international)? and? possibly? simultaneously?
and,? second,? Western? democracy?? and? state?centered? policies.? Both?
features? have? been? analyzed? regarding? their? effect? on? local? power?
consolidation.?Therefore,?the?findings?are?summarized?as?follows:?
?
? 2002? 2004 2008
Sequence? End? of? Baden? process? ?>?
Shevardnadze’s? anti?
corruption? agenda? ?>? Anti?
crime? operations? in? conflict?
zone?
Regime? change? ?>? Ergneti?
closure? ?>? Shelling? of?
Tskhinvali?
Support?of?peace?road?map??>?
Sanakoev? administration? ?>?
August?war?
Western?
policy?
?W?calls?election?fraud?
?W? pushes? taxing? system?
between?SO?and?Geo?
?W? calls? for?anti?corr? reforms?
or?funding?will?be?cut?
?W?starts?NATO?integr?
?W?supports?Saaka?into?power
?W? supports? Saakas?
democratic?agenda??
?W? demands? terr? integr? and?
central?power?
?W? intensifies? EU? and? NATO?
cooperation??
?W?starts?ERP?
?W? supports?Geo? peace? road?
maps,?wider?reforms?
?W?specifies?conditionalities?
?W?raises?dem?reform?doubts?
in?Bucharest?
?
Character
?istics? at?
start/?end?
of?cycle?
Start:? loc+dem?state?? End:?
nat+dem?state?
Start:?nat+dem?state?? End:?
int?nat+state?dem?
Start:? loc?nat+dem? (ERP),?
int+dem?state? (road?map)???
End:?int+state?dem?
?
?
Table?3:?Characteristics?of?Western?policies?prior?to?escalations:?W?(West),?dem?
state? (democracy? and? state?centered? policies,? first? mentioned? performs?
stronger),?loc?nat?int?(local,?national,?international?level).?
The? analysis? finds? that? for? all? escalation? cycles? a? pattern? of? reactive?
interaction?of?Western?policies?with?other?units?of?agency?at? the? start?of?
the?cycle?and?a?subsequent?pattern?of?enforcing?effects?of?Western?policies?
triggering?change? in? local?behavior?to?assertive?policies.?The?table?depicts?
the?dynamics?of?two?more?characteristics?the?analysis?detected:?First,?the?
shift? between? levels? of? agency? of? Western? policies? from? the? local? or?
national?level?at?the?start?of?the?cycle?to?the?national?or?international?level?
at?the?end?of?the?cycle.?Second,?the?paradox?of?Western?policies?oscillating?
between?democracy?? and? state?centered?policies,?with? a? clear?priority?of?
state?centered? policies? (territorial? integration,? anti?corruption,? anti?
smuggling,?central?rule,? leadership?capacity),?but? the? tendency? to?employ?
democracy?centered? claims? and? formats? (non?use? of? force? rhetoric? and?
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conditionality,? negotiations,? confidence?building? measures,? multilateral?
cooperation)?when?attempting?to?raise?the?pressure?on?the?national? level?
of? state? elite? agency.? In? addition,? the? analysis? detects? that? after? each?
escalation,?Western?agency?shifts?back?to?the?national?level?with?reinforced?
state?centered?demands.?
?
Prior? to? the?2002?escalation,? the? analysis? accounts? for? the? failure?of? the?
Baden?process?as?the?starting?point?of?the?escalation?cycle?when?Western?
policies? interacted?with? local?stakeholders?at?the? local? level?by? facilitating?
this? negotiation?based? format.? Subsequently,?Western? policies? shifted? to?
the? national? level? of? governmental?politics? in?Georgia? and? to? addressing?
state?centered?demands?of?anti?smuggling?policies?of?the?Baden?format?to?
be? implemented? by? the? state? elite.? The? framework? of? the? Georgian?
government’s? larger? anti?corruption? campaign? was? identified? as? the?
reaction?of? the?Georgian? leadership? to? this?and? introduced? the?change? in?
local?behavior?that?gave?way?to?an?assertive?stance?in?the?conflict?through?
then?Minister?of?Justice?Saakashvili’s?run?of?anti?crime?operations?in?2002.??
The? analysis? identified? distinctive? Western? policies? addressed? to? the?
Georgian?state?elites? that? took?effect?after? the? failure?of? the?Baden? talks:?
Western? actors? called? significant? irregularities? in? the? 2000?parliamentary?
elections? in? Georgia;?Western? actors? pushed? the? introduction? of? freight?
controls?and?a?taxing?system?between?Georgia?and?South?Ossetia?through?
the?Georgian? side?within? the?OSCE;?Western? institutions?demanded?anti?
corruption?reforms?and?threatened?with?cancellation?of?external?financing;?
Western? partners? intensified? the? NATO? integration? process? of? Georgia.?
These?policies? illustrate?the? increasing?demands?that?Western?agency?put?
on?the?state?elite?at?the?national? level? in?the?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?
conflict.?
?
Altogether?for?the?2002?escalation,?the?table?therefore?depicts?1)?a?shift?of?
Western?policies?from?the?local?level?of?agency?within?the?Baden?format?to?
the?national? level?of?Georgian?national?politics,?and?2)?a?shift? from?state?
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centered? policies? of? territorial? integration? through? anti?smuggling?
measures?within?the?democracy?centered?format?of?the?multilateral?Baden?
negotiations?to?democracy?centered?anti?corruption?claims?at?the?national?
level.?Overall,?prior?to?2002?Western?policies?shift?to?a?more?disaggregated?
level?of?agency?from?the?local?to?the?national?level?and?also?exhibit?features?
of? oscillating? between? democracy?? and? state?centered? claims? with? the?
effect?of?creating?the?pressure?for?Georgian?state?elites?to?comply.?
?
Prior? to? the? 2004? escalation,? the? analysis? identified? the? 2003? regime?
change? to? the? Saakashvili? leadership? as? the?point?when?Western? agency?
interacted? with? Georgian? actors? at? the? national? level? to? the? extent? of?
providing? support? in? the? framework? of? democracy?centered? demands? of?
anti?corruption?policies?at?the?national? level.?Subsequently,?the?closure?of?
Ergneti? market? posed? as? the? point? from? which? local? behavior? of? the?
Georgian?state?elite?changed?with?the?result?of?the?shelling?of?Tskhinvali?in?
August? 2004.? The? empirical? account? identified? the? following? specific?
Western?policies? triggering? this? change? in? local?behavior:?Western?actors?
unanimously? supported? Saakashvili? into? power? on? democracy?based?
demands;?Western? actors? supported? Saakashvili’s? democratic? agenda? of?
non?violence? in?conflict? settlement?and?anti?corruption? reforms;?Western?
partners?demanded?establishing?territorial?integrity?and?centralized?power;?
Western?actors?intensified?EU?and?NATO?cooperation?with?Georgia.?
?
Altogether? in?the?context?of?the?2004?escalation,?after?the?regime?change?
Western? policies? 1)? shifted? the? field? of? action? from? the? national? to? the?
international? level? of? the? conflict,? pursuing? territorial? integration? in?
international? frameworks.? 2)? Western? policies? exhibited? a? mix? of?
democracy? and? state?building? policies? focused? on? the? national? level,?
particularly? stressing? enhancing? the? state? capacity? of? the? leadership? in?
order? to? fulfil?democratic? standards?of?eliminating?corruption.?Therefore,?
the? stress? of? democracy?related? issues? during? the? regime? change? period?
shifts? to? state?formation? issues? in? the? consolidation? phase? such? as?
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establishing?central?power.?As?a?result,?both?characteristics?perform?even?
stronger? than? in?2002,?as?Western?policies? shift? from? the?national? to? the?
international? level? and? as? the? ‘democracy? versus? state’? paradox? is?more?
visible? through? the? simultaneous? demands? of? non?use? of? force? and?
territorial?integration?demands.?
?
Prior?to?the?escalation? in?2008,?the?analysis? identified?Western?support?of?
the? South? Ossetia? peace? road? map? at? the? international? level? and? the?
implementation? of? the? ERP? at? the? local? level? as? the? democracy?based?
formats? targeting? state?centered? aims.? Subsequently,? the? analysis?
identified?the?start?of?the?Sanakoev?administration?as?the?point?from?which?
local?behavior?of? the?Georgian? state?elite?changed?with? the? result?of? the?
August? 2008?war.? The? analysis? identified? the? following?Western? policies?
taking?effect?on?local?behavior:?Western?actors?supported?Georgian?conflict?
settlement? proposals? und? the? general? reform? agenda;?Western? initiative?
started?the?Economic?Rehabilitation?Programme? in?the?Georgian?Ossetian?
conflict? zone;? Western? actors? supported? the? Sanakoev? administration;?
Western? actors? increased? conditionalities? for? integrating? into? Western?
structures;?Western? actors? refused? progress? on?NATO? integration? at? the?
Bucharest?summit.?
Altogether,?prior?to?the?2008?escalation,?Western?policies?1)?shifted?from?a?
simultaneous?track?of,?both,?policies?at?the?international?and?local?level?to?
after?the?change?in?local?behavior?most?activity?at?the?international?level?of?
the?conflict.?2)?Western?policies?shifted?from?democracy?based?formats?to?
foster?territorial?integrity?to?omitting?territorial?integrity?and?took?to?stress?
democracy?centered?claims?at?the?international?level?of?the?NATO?summit.?
Hence,? the? two? characteristics?again?performed?more? strongly? compared?
to? the? previous? escalation,? with? a? more? intense? reinforcing? effect? of?
Western?policies?on? local?behavior?prior? to? the?escalation,? the? shift? from?
the? local?and?national?to?the? international? level?and?an?extensive?paradox?
of?democracy?vs.?state?centered?policies.??
?
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To? conclude,? the? analysis? suggests? that? the? three? characteristics? of? 1)?
interaction?and?reinforcing?policies,?2)?shifts? from?the? local?or?national?to?
the?national?or?international?level,?and?3)?the?democracy?state?paradox?of?
Western?policies?oscillating?between?these?two?properties?are?instances?of?
the? conflict? dynamics? that? lead? to? violence? by? triggering? change? in? local?
behavior?to?assertive?policies?at?specific?points?in?the?process.??
Therefore,? the?conclusion?of? the?empirical?analysis?proposes?a?causal? link?
between?these?properties?of?Western?policies?and?change?in?local?behavior?
with? the? result? of? repeated? escalation.? The? discussion? on? this? basis?
proposes?case?specific?generalizations? in? form?of?mechanisms?of?Western?
policies?in?the?context?of?re?escalation?in?South?Ossetia.?In?this?regard,?the?
study? takes? the? step? to?move? from? specific? empirical? statements? (“The?
empirical? analysis? showed? that? when? x? happened,? then? y? resulted”)? to?
establishing?causal?claims?(“The?empirical?study?renders?the?claim?plausible?
that?if?x?happens,?then?y?results”)?of?violence?generating?mechanisms?in?the?
South?Ossetia?conflict:?
1) If? strong? interaction? of? Western? policies? takes? place? in? a? reactive?
manner?with?other?stakeholders? in?the?conflict,?this?contingency?starts?
an?escalation?cycle,?creates?a?reinforcing?dynamic?of?Western?agency?in?
interaction?with?other?stakeholders?and?leads?to?escalation.?
2) If?Western?policies?a)?shift?between?arenas?of?activity?and?b)?shift?within?
a?cycle?to?the?international?level?of?agency,?they?provide?for?the?context?
to?shift? in? favor?of?escalation,?because?a)? local?state?elites?profit? from/?
are?impeded?by?inconsistent?demands?of?policies?to?be?implemented?at?
the? local? and?national? level,?b)? the? interest?based? agenda?of?Western?
actors? generates? inconsistent? support? for? either? stakeholder? in? the?
conflict? including? the? respective? Georgian? government,? c)? when? a?
Western?policy? strategy? fails,?Western? agency? changes? the? arena? and?
puts?more?pressure?on?the?national? level?and?d)?they?shift?to?the?more?
disaggregated,?‘higher’?level?of?agency?at?the?international?level.?
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3) If? Western? policies? favor? state?building? strategies? over? democracy?
building?strategies,?but?use?of?democracy?centered?claims?to?push?their?
interests,? they? provide? for? the? context? to? shift? in? favor? of? escalation,?
because?a)?local?state?elites?make?use?of?enhanced?power?resources,?b)?
they?create?the?necessity?to?territorially?integrate?in?order?to?accomplish?
foreign?policy?goals,?and?c)?they?create?a?tension?between?integrity?and?
non?violence? demands? that? makes? assertive? local? decision?making? a?
viable?option.?
The? previous? discussion? suggests? general? causal? links? that? enable? re?
escalation?of?violence?in?South?Ossetia.?Based?on?these?statements?on?the?
role? of? agency,? the? discussion? seeks? to? present? an? inherently? coherent,?
plausible?model?of?re?escalation?on?the?basis?of?the?South?Ossetia?case.?The?
key? characteristic?of? recurring? escalation? is? the? inconsistency?of? external?
policies? that?expresses? itself? in?seemingly?contradictory?object?claims?and?
simultaneous?agency?at?different? levels.?These?properties?of? inconsistency?
interact?with?local?agency?in?the?process?in?a?manner?that?triggers?paths?to?
escalation.?Therefore,?the?model?of?re?escalation?in?South?Ossetia?specifies?
social?mechanisms,? the?most? immediate? empirical? expressions? of? actors’?
attempts?to?maintain?power?as?they? link?agency?to?violent?outcomes,?and?
can?be?presented?as?follows:?
?
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Graphic?3:?Model?of?re?escalation?of?violence?in?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?1989?
2008.?
?
The? model? describes? how? policies? of? Western? actors? translate? into?
mechanisms?of?Western?influence?that,?according?to?the?study,?repeatedly?
trigger? change? of? behavior? of? Georgian? local? state? elites? prior? to?
escalations.? In?this?respect,?the?model?specifies?the? link?between?Western?
agency? and? local? state? policies? through? three? mechanisms,? Interaction,?
Level?shift?and?Object?shift.?The?mechanisms?take?effect?in?a?stepwise?and?
path?dependent?manner?from?the?start?to?the?end?of?an?escalation?cycle.?In?
addition? to? triggering?change? in? local?behavior,? the?mechanisms?exhibit?a?
reinforcing?effect?on?local?behavior?over?time?prior?to?escalation.58??
                                                          
58?It?should?be?noted?that?the?properties?of?mechanisms?at?the?end?of?the?escalation?cycle?
are?observed? to? take?place?after? the? change? in? local?behavior.?This? confirms,? as?earlier?
discussed,?that?Western?policies?take?effect?only? in?reaction?with?and?to? local?dynamics.?
The?graphic?highlights?the?path?of?the?respective?mechanisms.?
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These? mechanisms? describe? a? recurring? process? prior? to? escalations?
enabling? the?pivotal?angle?between? local?agency?and?violent?outcome:?1)?
The? Interaction? mechanism? embraces? reactive? Western? policies?
progressing?to?reinforcing?policies?during?the?cycle.?The?mechanism?shows?
how?external?policies?induce?a?shift?in?the?context?of?the?conflict?that?starts?
an?escalation? cycle.?Agency? that? starts? the?escalation? cycle? is?of? reactive?
character? as? it?brings? about? the? shift? through? interacting?with? the? other?
involved?agents.? In?contrast,?as? the?escalation?proceeds,?external?policies?
are?much?more?resilient?to? interaction?with?other?agents?to?the?extent?of?
still?being?affected?by?their?actions,?but?not?amounting?to?the?contingency?
of?creating?another? shift.?Rather,?events? following? the? initial?condition?at?
the? start?of? the?cycle?are?of? reinforcing? character? intensifying? the?course?
toward? escalation,? 2)? the? Level? shift? mechanism? embraces? a? shift? of?
Western? policies? from? the? national? to? the? international? level? during? the?
cycle.? The? mechanism? shows? how? external? policies? at? the? start? of? the?
escalation?cycle?take?strong?effect?at?the?national?level?of?policies?and?shift?
to?the?international?level?of?the?conflict?at?the?end?of?the?escalation?cycle,?
often? after? the? change? in? local? behavior? took? place.? However,? external?
policies? engage? permanently? at? all? levels? of? the? conflict,? but? with? a?
regularity?of? these?varying? intensities,?and?3)? the?Claim? shift?mechanism?
does? not? proceed? in? a? linear? way? and? exhibits? democracy?? and? state?
centered? policies? simultaneously,? however,? with? a? tendency? toward?
democracy?centered? policies? when? exhibiting? increasingly? reinforcing?
effects.?The?mechanism?shows?how?external?policies?generally?emphasize?a?
state?centered? agenda? at? the? start? of? an? escalation? cycle? and? induce?
democracy?centered? policies? to? push? claims? at? certain? points? in? the?
process.? Hence,? both? agendas? are? put? forth? simultaneously,? but? with?
varying?intensity?at?the?start?and?end?of?the?escalation?cycle.?Therefore,?the?
analysis? suggests? a? paradox? of? agency.? However,?what? seems? to? be? an?
ambiguous? property? of?Western? agency? appears? to? be? a? compensating?
mechanism?of?Western?agency?aiming?at?preventing?risks?posed?to?power?
consolidation?of?local?actors?at?various?levels.?In?other?terms,?whereas?the?
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paradox? pressures? local? actors? and? creates? instability,? the? policies? are?
carried?out?with? the? intention?of? stabilization.?Therefore,? the?paradox?of?
Western?policies?shows?that?practice?they?prohibit?assertive?action?on?the?
one?hand,?while?on? the?other?hand?demanding?a?quick?settlement?of? the?
conflict? in? view? of? Western? integration? and,? second,? of? supporting?
leadership?capacities?in?order?to?fortify?central?power?on?the?one?hand,?but?
on?the?other?hand?strengthening?a?regime?with?a?volatile?power?basis?and?
potential?for?assertive?policies.??
?
Interestingly,?the?specific?policies?of?both?Western?and?local?agents?do?not?
exhibit? significant? variation? throughout? the? period.? Western? agency?
repeatedly?shows?the?same?inconsistencies,?whereas?local?actors?pursue?a?
unilateral? agenda? and? utilize? the?makeshift? paradox.? This? suggests? that?
whereas? structural? conditions? throughout? the? period? of? analysis? change?
(such?as?the?locality?of?agency,?the?shift?to?a?state?centered?character,?and?
increasingly? framed? agendas),? however,? agency? follows? the? same?
mechanisms.?In?other?words,?the?amplitude?or?intensity?of?the?mechanisms?
increases,?but?their?character?remains?consistent.??
?
In?this?respect,?Western?policies?seem?to?repeat?a?consistent?pattern?in?an?
increasingly? intensifying?manner.? They? stabilize? the? logic?of? sudden? local?
shifts? and?marginalize? potentially? consistency?generating? factors.? Part? of?
this? is? that?Western?actors?do?not?and? cannot?alter? stakeholders’?claims:?
The?general?escalative?tendency?of?the?conflict?is?given?at?any?point?in?time?
after? the? situation? turned? violent? in? 1989? through? persistently? assertive?
policies?of?Russian,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?actors.?The?worsening?reality?of?
external? influence? of?Western? agency? for? the? case? of? the? South?Ossetia?
conflict? lies? in?providing? the? incentive? for? the? situation? to? shift.? In?other?
words,? incentives? for? an? assertive? stance? of? Russia,?Georgia? and?Ossetia?
remain?equally?high?or?become?higher?under?Western? influence.?Western?
policies?do?not?provide?assurance,?but?feed?the?local?legacy?of?insecurity?–?
of?agency?and?contextual?outcomes.?
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To? conclude,? the? causal? link? established? at? the? start? of? the? study? is?
supported:?Throughout?the?period?of?analysis,?Western?policies?repeatedly?
affect? local?power?politics? to? the?extent?of? shifting? the? conflict’s? context?
toward?escalation.?The?following?and?last?chapter?discusses?the?findings?in?
light?of?existing?theories?and?embeds?them? in?the?state?of?research.?Then?
the?chapter?will?discuss?the?findings?empirically?on?the?basis?of?the?conflict?
contexts?in?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir.??
?
?
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4. Discussion?of?findings?
The?following?chapter?presents?the?discussion?of?the?findings?of?the?study,?
in?both? a? theoretical? and? empirical? context.? First,? the?discussion? reflects?
existing? research? on?mechanisms? of? violence,? uses? selected? research? to?
frame?the?findings?and?shows?the?generalizing?outreach?of?the?mechanisms?
proposed? for?the?South?Ossetia?study.?Second,?the?discussion?reflects? the?
empirical?outreach?of?the?findings? in? light?of?the?contexts?of?the?Sri?Lanka?
and?Kashmir?conflicts.??
?
4.1. Theoretical?scope?of?the?findings??
The? literature? review? at? the? beginning? of? the? study? already? stated? two?
important?shortcomings?of? research? in? the?study?of?violence:?On? the?one?
hand,? existing? research? grapples? with? the? phenomena? of? violence? at? a?
theoretical?level?and?often?fails?to?define?a?cogent?explanandum?in?the?face?
of?empirical?reality.?Existing?studies?attempt?to?address?forms?of?violence,?
types? of? agents? of? violence? or? levels? of? intensity.? However,? studies?
frequently?fail?to?provide?a?rigorous?definition?of?the?process?of?violence?at?
the? center?of? scrutiny.?Explanations?differ?greatly?depending?on?whether?
violence?is?at?its?onset?or?part?of?a?protracted,?ongoing?conflict?process?(see?
the? discussion? in? chapter? 2:? Beissinger? 2000,? Cederman? et? al.? 2010),? a?
shortcoming?which? requires? research? to?get?stronger?on? relating? rigorous?
scrutiny?of?the?dynamics?of?violence?to?their?underlying?triggers.?
?
On?the?other?hand,?existing?research?struggles?on?a?methodological?level?to?
identify? the? underlying? triggers? of? the? dynamics? of? violence? and? the?
respective? mechanisms? of? processes? of? violence.? Research? rarely?
encompasses?the?process?of?disaggregating?factors?before?presenting?them?
in?aggregated?theoretical?models?(Balcells/?Kalyvas?2010:?416).?Particularly,?
research?disregards?the?specific?properties?and?processes?of?agency? in?the?
context?of?struggles? for?social?power?that?catalyze?violence?(Capoccia?and?
Keleman?2007:?347,?Mahoney?2000a:?514).?In?this,?scholars?suggest?to?look?
at? the? functioning? of? state? agency? to? span? the? gap? between?meta? and?
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macro? processes? of? violence? (Cederman? et? al.? 2010:? 3?4,?Wimmer? et? al.?
2010:?89,?also?see:?Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?1998).??
?
Specifically,?studies?of?mechanisms?of?violence?often?center?on?instances?of?
non?state?violence?such?as?mass?civilian?uprisings?and?riots?(see?above?all:?
White?2006,?Horowitz?1985),? insurgency?violence? (Weinstein?2007,?Wood?
2003)?or?genocide,? terrorist?attacks?or?other? forms?of? collective?violence?
(Lemarchand?2009,?Martin?et?al.?2009,?Collier?and?Sambanis?2003).?These?
studies?do?not?establish? an?outreach? from?micro? level? findings? to?macro?
level?outcomes?as?they?center?on?change?of?behavior?at?the?micro?level?of?
motivations?with?the?result?to?engage?in?violence?at?the?meta?level?of?forms?
of?agency? (Tarrow?2007:?593,?also? see:?Weinstein?2007,?Covington?2002,?
McCauley?et?al.?2008,?Branch?and?Wood?2010).?Therefore,?mechanisms?as?
aggregated,? repetitive? forms?of?agency? leading? to?violence?are?either?not?
the?subject?of?study?or?are?treated?as?black?boxes,?as?explanatory?instances?
whose? functioning? remains?opaque? (Mayntz? 2005:? 207,? also? see:? Fearon?
2000).?Tarrow? concludes? it? to?be? "ambitious?enough"? to? seek? to? identify?
mechanisms? of? violence? at? the? onset? of? civil? war? and? continues:? "But?
identifying?the?operative?mechanisms?is?even?more?daunting?when?we?turn?
to? the? process? of? escalation,? for? example,? how? and? when? nonviolent?
protest?and?low?levels?of?violence?escalate?into?civil?war.?Sambanis?[Collier?
and?Sambanis?2003]?observes?that?such?transitions?are?poorly?understood”?
(Tarrow?2007:?595).?
?
This?discussion?highlights? the? seminal?work?of?Tilly,?McAdam?and?Tarrow?
(2001)?on?social?mechanisms?of?violence?to?frame?the?findings?of?the?study?
on?South?Ossetia.?In?drawing?on?Tilly?et?al.’s?mechanisms?and?a?few?other?
helpful? studies? (see? above? all:? Kalyvas? 2006,? Tarrow? and?McAdam? 2003,?
Levitsky? and? Way? 2010,? and? Mansfield? and? Snyder? 2007)? that? specify?
mechanisms? of? external? agency’s? effect? on? local? power? consolidation? in?
fragile? states,? the? discussion? highlights? the? possibilities? of? enhancement?
and? gains? for? the? study? of? violence.? Other? studies? rarely? address? the?
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findings?of?Tilly?et?al.? in?a?comprehensive?manner.?Rather,?research?treats?
the? work? as? one? example? of? research? of? violence? (see? for? example:?
Sambanis?2004,?Levy?and?Thompson?2010).?
?
The?2001? study?of? Tilly? et? al.? is? a? rare? instance?of? rigorous? scrutiny?of? a?
variety?of?mechanisms?of?violence?using?the?methodology?of?case?study.?As?
such,? the? research? highlights? specific? mechanisms? of? social? agency? of?
political? elites? for? different? phases? of? the? escalation? process.? The? study?
grounds?mechanisms?in?the?aggregating?property?of?power?seeking?agency?
and?local?actors’?attempts?to?utilize?the?conflict?context?to?their?ends.??
Therefore,? considering? existing? studies? of? mechanisms? of? violence,? the?
study?of?Tilly?et?al.?poses? in? two?key?aspects?an?exception? to? the?general?
shortcomings? of? the? debate? that,?moreover,? connect? their? study? to? the?
explanatory?outreach?of?the?South?Ossetia?findings:?First,?the?level?at?which?
Tilly?et?al.? look?at?violence?moves?beyond?micro??meta? level?research?and?
creates?a?link?between?agency?and?outcomes.?Agency,?in?their?study,?takes?
the? role? of? a? pivotal,? if? unintentional? determinant? link? between? actors’?
agendas? and? the? outcome? of? escalation.? In? addition,? the? study? links?
relational? factors? of? interaction? between? actors? to? the? macro? level? to?
explain? violence? and? encompass? agencies? as? environmental? factors? of?
violence.?Hence,?mechanisms?can?identify?categories?of?actions?and?specific?
sequences?of?actions?that?frame?the?path?to?escalations.?Those?studies?that?
use? the? theoretical? gains? of? Tilly? et? al.’s? research? systematically?mainly?
draw?on?the?micro?meta?connection?of?mechanisms?of?beliefs,?values?and?
identities?bringing?about?motivations?of?agency? in?the?context?of?violence?
(for? this? see:? Inglehart?and?Welzel?2005,? Lamont?and?Molnar?2002).?This?
fails? the? theoretical? challenge? to? address? the?meta?macro? level? link? that?
Tilly?et?al.’s?mechanisms?propose.?Moreover,?Tilly?et?al.?acknowledge?that?
violent?outcomes?are?closely?linked?to?leaderships’?attempts?to?consolidate?
their?power? resources.? In? this? respect,?Tilly?et?al.’s?study?can?support? the?
South? Ossetia? findings? in? that?Western? agency? performs? as? a? dynamic,?
interest?based? albeit? structural? property? that? triggers? local? behavior? in?
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relation? to? the? violent? outcome.? Second,? the? study? of? Tilly? et? al.?
distinguishes? itself? in?how? it?aggregates?patterns?of?violence?as?part?of?a?
given? process.? The? study? envisages? forms? of? agency? in? relation? to? their?
function? in? the? process,? e.g.?whether? they? puncture,? reinforce? or? show?
reactive? patterns? in? the? trajectory? toward? escalation.? This? favorably?
connects? to? the? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? case? as? generalizing?
mechanisms?across? cases? solidify? reliability,?but?generalizing?mechanisms?
within? the? same? case? facilitates? understanding? if? and? how?mechanisms?
change? over? time.? Lastly,?we? have? to? take? note? that? the? South? Ossetia?
study? focuses?on?mechanisms?of? external?policies? that? initiate? change?of?
local? behavior,? but? the? Tilly? et? al.? study? centers? on? local?mechanisms?of?
violence.??
?
The? study? of? Tilly,?McAdam? and? Tarrow? includes? mechanisms? that? are?
utilized?by? local?elites?during?different?phases?of?the?escalation?processes.?
Out?of? these,?particularly? the?brokerage? and? the?object? shift?mechanism?
take? effect?during? all?phases?of? escalation? and? aggregate?multiple,?more?
fine?tuned?mechanisms.?Therefore,?brokerage?and?object?shift?turn?out?to?
be?key?mechanisms? in?processes?prior? to?escalations?of?violence?and?are?
seen? as? complementing? the? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? case.? The?
following? table? lists?Tilly?et?al.’s?mechanisms? in? relation? to?other? relevant?
research?findings:?
? Brokerage Object?shift?
Mobilization? Social?appropriation? Attribution?of?threat?and?
opportunity?
(Re?)?Formation?
of?agenda?
Category?formation
Scale?shift?(Tarrow/?McAdam?2003)?
Leverage?(Levitsky/?Way?2010)?
Linkage?(Levitsky/?Way?2010)?
Bridging?the?local?global?gap?(Kalyvas?
2006)?
Interaction?(Sigwart)?
Certification?
Category?formation?
Turning?point?
to?escalation?
Radicalization?
Level?shift?mechanism?(Sigwart)?
Identity?shift?(also?Kalyvas?2006)
Convergence?
Claim?shift?mechanism?(Sigwart)?
?
Table?4:?Mechanisms?of?violence?during?three?phases?prior?to?escalation?
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Tilly? et? al.? include? social? appropriation? among? mechanisms? during? the?
phase? of?mobilization,? which? accounts? for? the?mobilizing? role? of? social?
localities?and?actors?where?social?capital?and?potential?agents?concentrate?
(e.g.?in?churches?or?mosques,?at?public?events?etc.)?and?which?can?be?seen?
as?brokering?resources?through? locality.?Further,?attribution?of?threat?and?
opportunity? describes? the? process? of? the? invention? or? importation? and?
subsequent?diffusion?of?a?shared?definition?of?concerning?alterations?in?the?
likely?consequences?of?possible?actions?which,?through?arbitrary?alteration?
of? claims,?performs? similarly? to? the?mechanism? of? object? shift? (92? ff.,? in?
detail?discussed?below).?Falling?last,?in?the?mobilization?phase?is?brokerage,?
the? linking? of? two? sites,? units? or? actors? through? a? broker? (142),? a?
mechanism?through?which?political?organizers?draw?disconnected?factions?
and? localities? into?a?common? front? (155).?Functions?of?brokerage?are?also?
reported?when?local?political?actors?seek?to?consolidate?power?by?bridging?
the?gaps?in?the?locality?of?agency?between?national?and?international?level?
(Kalyvas?2006:?chapter?2),?when?the?process?of?scale?shift?“through?which?
contention?at?one? level? is? transposed? to?a?higher? (or?a? lower)?one”? takes?
effect?(Tarrow?and?McAdam?2003:?2),?or?through?leverage?and?linkage?that?
describe?how?close? ties?between? local?regimes?and?Western?actors?might?
generate? (non?)democratic?outcomes? (Levitsky?and?Way?2010:?15ff.).?For?
mechanisms?during? the? formation?of?actors’?claims?and? resources? (155),?
Tilly? et? al.? likewise? account? for? brokerage? and,? moreover,? category?
formation? which? performs? through? an? aggregating? function? similar? to?
brokerage?and? creates? identities? through?unifying? separated?populations.?
Importantly,?Tilly?et?al.?list?object?shift,?the?alteration?in?relations?between?
claimants?and?objects?of?claims?during?which?actors?alternate? their?claim?
making?among?international?actors,?national?authorities,?and?local?targets,?
with? corresponding? shifts? among? repertoires,? rhetoric,? and? categories?
(ibid.).? certification? in? this? phase? of? escalation? which? catalyzes? the?
legitimization? of? actors? taking? shape? centrally,? both? in? international?
response? to? national? regimes? and? domestic? (re)validation? of? national?
actors.? Lastly,? Tilly? et? al.? list? for? mechanisms? during? turning? points? of?
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conflicts? (161)? as?well? brokerage,? and? furthermore,? identity? shift,?when?
actors? adopt? changed? group? perceptions? in? reaction? to? the? process? or?
interaction?with?other?actors,? leading? to?altered?motivations?and?actions.?
This? mechanism? supports? the? process? of? object? shift? when? identities?
change? throughout? processes? as? they? are? re?negotiated? and,? ultimately,?
result? in?reshaped?actions?and?policies?and,?consequently,?have?an? impact?
at?policies?at?different? levels?of? the?conflict? (Balcells/?Kalyvas?2010:?427).?
Radicalization,?according?to?Tilly?et?al.,?is?the?during?the?escalation?process?
increasing?contradiction?between?prevailing?claims?across? the?boundaries?
between? two? actors,? and? convergence,? the? ‘radical? flank? effect’? of?
radicalization? through? increasing? contradictions? to? drive? less? extreme?
actors?into?closer?alliances.?
?
According?to?Tilly?et?al.’s?study?brokerage?and?object?shift?appear?to?be?the?
most? effectual? mechanisms? of? escalation.? Altogether,? mechanisms? of?
external? influence? linked? to? escalation? seem? to? chiefly? evolve? around? a)?
locality? of? agency? and? actors’? claims? and? b)? points? in? time?when? taking?
effect.?As?a? consequence,? specific? functions?of? the?brokerage? and?object?
shift? mechanisms? appear? in? the? South? Ossetia? case.? Therefore,? the?
empirical?findings?enhance?these?mechanisms?as?theoretical?concepts?that?
explain?different?phases?of?escalation?processes.??
The? South? Ossetia? findings? point? to? mechanisms? taking? effect? in? two?
different?phases? that? successively?occur?and? shape? the? trajectory? toward?
escalation:? First,? the? (re?)formation? and? implementation? of? the?Western?
agenda? in?the?period?from?the?start?of?the?escalation?cycle?before?change?
in? local? behavior? occurs,? and? second,? what? Tilly? et? al.? describe? as? the?
turning?point? to?escalation,? the?period?between?change? in? local?behavior?
and? escalation?when?Western? agency? exhibits? reinforcing? effects? in? the?
aftermath?of?change?in?behavior.??
?
?
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a) Before? change? of? local? behavior:? The? (re?)formation? and?
implementation?of?the?Western?agenda:?
The?study?of?Tilly?et?al.? regards?brokerage?as? the? least?obvious,?but?most?
influential?mechanism? in?several?cases?studied?(Tilly?et?al.?2001:?254).?The?
overarching? function? of? brokerage? is? demonstrated? by? aggregating?
different? forms? of? action? through?which? political? actors? aim? at? unifying?
resources? to? gain? the? means? to? consolidate? power.? Brokerage? can? be?
observed?during?all?phases?of?escalation,?but?in?the?phase?of?(re?)formation?
and? implementation? of? the? Western? agenda,? the? efforts? of? brokering?
advantageous?settings?perform?strongly?and?thus?give?particular?impetus?to?
the?process.?As?such,?brokerage?connects?carriers?of?claims?such?as?agents?
or? localities? of? agency? (Tarrow? and?McAdam? 2003:? 12,? also? see:? Kalyvas?
2006,?Tilly?et?al.?2001).?At?this?point,?external?policies?in?the?South?Ossetia?
case?exhibit?specific?functions?of?how?brokerage?enables?drawing?together?
resources?for?action.?
In?the?South?Ossetia?case,?the?interaction?mechanism?specifies?how?specific?
functions? of? Brokerage? take? effect? from? the? start? to? the? end? of? the?
escalation?cycle.?Particularly?prior?to?change?in?behavior?of?Georgian?state?
elites,?Western? policies? exhibit? a? pattern? of? influence? on? local? behavior?
over? an? extended? period? of? time? spanning? months? or? years.? Linkage,?
meaning?close?ties?with?Western?actors,?turns?out?to?draw?stakeholders?of?
the? conflict? at? the? start?of? escalation? cycles? into? cooperation? formats?of?
negotiations? in?2002?and?of?intense?political?and?financial?support? in?2004?
and?2008? through?Western? actors.?After? change? in?behavior? to? assertive?
policies,? linkage?persists?through?close?ties? in?the?course?of?the?escalation?
cycle,?but?subsequent?policies?affect?local?behavior?in?a?reinforcing?manner?
as?opposed? to?changing? the? trajectory.? In?addition,? level?shift?of?Western?
agency?combines?resources?of?influence?on?local?politics?at?different?levels?
between?which?Western?actors?shift.?This?means?that?Brokerage?during?the?
formation? phase? of? Western? agency? prior? to? escalations? can? take? the?
specific? function? of? the? Interaction? and? Level? shift?mechanisms? through?
spanning? extended? periods? of? time,? drawing? local? actors? into? close? ties?
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through? cooperation? formats? and? intense?political? and? financial? support,?
determining?a?reinforcing?trajectory?through,?in?a?further?function,?drawing?
together? efforts? at? different? localities? of? agency? simultaneously,? with? a?
tendency?toward?the?international?level.?
?
In?addition,?during?the?run?up?to?the?escalations? in?South?Ossetia? in?2002,?
2004? and? 2008,? leverage? of?Western? influence? also? appears? to? take? a?
specific? function? of? the? brokerage?mechanism.? The? leverage?mechanism?
holds? that? the? stronger? the? local? regimes’? bargaining? power,? the? lower?
Western? leverage? or,? respectively,? effect? of?Western? influence? on? local?
behavior? (Levitsky? and? Way? 2010:? 28).? After? 2004,? Western? actors?
intensified? conditionalities? which? contributed? to? the? unilateral,? anti?
Western? stance? of? Georgian? state? actors.? This? culminated? in? the?
installment? of? the? Sanakoev? administration? in? 2006,? which? the? analysis?
identified?as?the?turning?point?to?assertive?policies.?Indeed,?the?policies?of?
Georgian?state?elites?in?the?conflict?repeatedly?show?low?Western?leverage:?
Local?policies?reflect?a?stance?independent?from?Western?demands,?as?well?
as?Western? agency? shows? reticence? toward? local? assertive? tendencies.?
Levitsky? and?Way?maintain? that? leverage? rarely? translates? into? effective?
democratizing? pressure? (2010:? 29)? as? Western? powers? usually? allow?
regimes? to?escape?sanction:?“Even? in? sub?Saharan?Africa,?where?Western?
leverage?is?greatest,?scholars?have?found?no?positive?relationship?between?
conditionality? and? democratization”? (Bratton? and? Van? de?Walle? 1997? in?
Levitsky?and?Way?2010:?30;?also?see?Crawford?1997,?Lawson?1999,?Ethier?
2003).?
?
However,?Levitsky?and?Way? study?democratizing,?not? state?strengthening?
policies?of?Western?actors.?In?this?respect,?the?South?Ossetia?study?reflects?
high? Western? leverage? vis?à?vis? state?centered? policies.? Whereas? the?
unilateral,? strong? bargaining? stance? of? the? Georgians? in? the? case? of?
Sanakoev? demonstrates? low? Western? leverage? regarding? democracy?
centered? policies,? it? simultaneously? proves? high? Western? leverage?
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regarding? state?centered? policies,? as? the? Sanakoev? administration? is? the?
larger? response? to?Western? policies? in? the? JCC? framework? to? establish?
effective? state? control? over? Georgian? territory.? This? also? relates? to? the?
other?heavy?handed?state?policies?of?the?Georgian?side? in?conflict?matters?
in?2002?or?2004,?since? the?underlying?claim?of?Western?agency? invariably?
proved?to?be?state?centered.??
Therefore,? leverage? in? the?South?Ossetia? case?proves? to?be?a? function?of?
brokerage,?since?Western?actors?will?employ?democratization?rhetoric?and?
promote?related?policies?even?when?state?centered?aims?are?at?the?center?
of? the? agenda.?Western? agency,? thus,?brokers? resources?by?bridging? the?
seeming?gap?between?democracy?and?state?centered?policies,?particularly?
prior?to?changes? in? local?behavior,?to?the?end?of?pushing?their?claims?and?
with?the?result?of?reinforcing?escalation.?
?
Also? prior? to? change? in? local? behavior,? object? shift? exhibits? specific?
functions?in?the?South?Ossetia?case.?Categories?in?forms?of?claims?that?had?
been? introduced? as? main? stakes? in? the? process? at? the? point? of? initial?
condition?generally?do?not?appear?to?change?until?after?the?change?in?local?
behavior? shortly? before? escalation.? Western? actors? will? employ? both?
democracy??and?state?centered?policies?throughout?the?cycle.?However,?in?
their? implementation? they?will? focus?on? strengthening?state?capacity?and?
utilize? democracy?centered? claims,? particularly? non?use? of? force,? when?
exerting? political? pressure? on? local? actors? to? fulfill? demands? of? state?
capacity.? After? change? in? local? behavior,? democracy?centered? demands?
additionally?reinforce?the?escalation?trajectory.?Therefore,?both?categories,?
anti?corruption? as? state?centered? and? non?violence? as? democracy?
centered,? are? employed? from? the? start? of? the? cycle.? In? this? respect,?
categories? such? as? anti?corruption? measures? for? the? purpose? of? state?
strengthening?will?be? stressed? throughout? the?cycle,?but?even?more? they?
will? be? backed? up? by? implementation? of? respective? formats? and?
institutions.? In? contrast,? the? non?use? of? force? demand? banks? more? on?
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situational? (though? repetitive)? use? of? rhetoric? than? on? agency? informing?
rules?of?behavior.?
?
b) After?change?of?local?behavior:?Before?turning?points?to?escalation?
The?functions?of?brokerage?serve?a?different?role?after?the?change? in? local?
behavior? has? occurred.? During? (re?)formation? of? the? Western? agenda,?
brokerage?specifically?serves?bolstering?power?resources?to?take?effect?on?
the? local? level.?When?dynamics? turn? to?escalation,?brokerage?exhausts? its?
aggregating? effect? of? unifying? resources? to? implement? policies.? Instead,?
brokerage? is? still? in? effect,? but?Western? policies? prove? inconsistent? and?
diffusive? by? switching? both? levels? and? claims.? The? phase? of? unifying?
resources? seems? to? have? concluded.? Instead,? the? brokerage?mechanism?
takes?a?negative,?disaggregating?function:?Western?policies?shift?the?locality?
of?agency?to?a?different?arena?of?the?conflict,?moving?to?the? international?
level?instead?of?concentrating?activity?on?one?level.??
?
Prominently?within? the? South?Ossetia? study,?before? the?2008? escalation,?
Western?policies?addressed? the?conflict?context?at? the? level?of? the?NATO?
summit? in? Bucharest,? reinforcing? the? escalating? trajectory.? In? 2004? after?
the?closure?of? the?Ergneti?market?and?amid? the?escalating? trajectory,? the?
West?concentrated?on?supporting?President?Saakashvili’s?peace?road?maps?
at?the? international? level.? In?2002,?the?OSCE?scheduled?work?meetings?on?
combating? smuggling? in? Castelo? Branco? and? Bucharest? while? the?
Shevardnadze? government? launched? anti?smuggling? operations? in? the?
conflict? zone.? In? all? these? instances,? Western? policies? disaggregated?
resources?they?had?focused?at?the?national?or?local?level?prior?to?change?in?
local? behavior? and? henceforth? addressed? actors? at? different? levels?
simultaneously,?albeit?mostly?at?the?international?level.?In?this,?brokerage?is?
still? intact? before? escalation? as?Western? agency? spans? sites,? units? and?
actors,? but? in? a? disaggregating,? negative? function.? As? a? result,? ‘negative?
brokerage’?seems? to?be?an?attempt? to?preserve?power? in? reaction? to? the?
changing? context? of? escalation,? a? pro?active? policy? of? raising? Western?
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actors’? stakes? in? dislocating? from? an? assertive? context? and? reinforces?
escalation?by?triggering?instability?through?inconsistence.?
?
According?to?Tilly?et?al.,?object?shift?occurs?during?the?phase?prior?to?change?
in? local? behavior? when? actors? gather? resources? prior? to? escalations.?
However? this?study? found? that?object?shift?also?plays?a?prominent?role? in?
shaping? the? process? after? change? of? local? behavior? to? assertive? policies.?
Particularly,?claim?shift?as?a?specific?function?of?object?shift?shows?that?the?
closer? the?shift?of? local?behavior? in? time,? the?more?Western?policies?shift?
their?stress? to?democracy?centered?policies? (while?keeping? their? focus?on?
state?centered?policies),?arguably? to? solidify? their?position? from?which? to?
influence?local?policies?in?the?conflict?context.?Western?agency?alters?claims?
and? rhetoric? through? shifts? between? addressees? at? international? or?
national? levels,? for? instance? addressing? the? NATO? summit? in? Bucharest?
while? enhancing? local? cooperation? in? the? ERP.? Even? more? significantly,?
Western? agency? performs? through? shifts? in? claims? or? forms? of? claims? in?
how? political? actors? change? claims,? how? claims? are? asserted? or? how?
different?actors?are?addressed?by?the?same?claim?at?different?points?in?the?
process.? This? includes? conditionalities,? re?negotiated? stakes,? shifts? in?
categories?or?change?in?rhetoric.?Within?the?same?conflict?process,?Western?
actors? appear? to? accommodate? this? switch? in? rhetoric? of? claims?with? a?
reinforcing?effect?whenever?escalation?approaches.?
?
c) After?escalations?
As?mentioned?earlier,?both? level?shift?and?claim?shift?are?active?also?after?
escalations? when? a)? Western? policies? switch? their? focus? back? to? the?
national? level,? b)? tone? down? on? forcing? demands? through? democracy?
centered?claims? (though?they?permanently?play?a?crucial?role)?and?c)?turn?
to?state?centered?policies.?However,?studies?of?dynamics?of?violence? look?
at? the?onset?of? violence,?at?escalations?as? singular?phenomena?or?at? the?
duration? of? violence? instead? of? systematically? studying? re?escalation?
processes.??
161?
?
Therefore,? the? mechanisms? of? this? study? 1)? need? to? be? regarded? as?
properties? that? at? least? take? a? crucial? part? in? triggering? re?escalation? of?
violence,? not? only? repeated? escalation? under? similar? conditions,? and? 2)?
introduce?the?post?escalation?period?as?an?additional?phase?of?violence?to?
the?study?of?dynamics?of?violence.?This?period?deserves?special?scrutiny?as?
it?exhibits? specific? functions?of?mechanisms?not?existent? in?other?phases,?
such?as?the?return?to?the?national? level?and?alteration? in?claims,?and?as? it?
opens? the? path? to? a? renewed? escalation? cycle.? Research? has? to?
systematically?consider?that,?in?re?escalative?systems?of?violence,?after?the?
escalation?is?before?the?escalation.?Therefore,?mechanisms?that?take?effect?
after?escalation?are?likely?to?be?part?of?and?eventually?lead?to?re?escalation.?
?
Lastly,? this? discussion? does? only? links? the? functioning? of?mechanisms? to?
specific?phases?of?escalation,?but?also?allows?establishing?a?more?specified?
concept?of?external?agency.?First,?the?discussion?suggests?that?the?seeming?
paradox?of?simultaneous?democracy?and?state?centered?policies?works?as?a?
compensating? mechanism? of? Western? power? claims? in? response? to?
perceived? risks? to? power? resources.? Prior? to? change? in? local? behavior,?
Western? actors? try? to? achieve? implementation? of? their? agendas? by?
employing? both? tiers? of? democratic? and? state? policies.?Western? policies?
never? lose? focus? of? either? democracy? and? state?centered? claims? and?
policies,? but? take? the? identified? form? as? they? employ? both? claims.?
Oscillation? between? both? strands? (which? creates? the? paradox)? serves? to?
consolidate? the?Western? stance? and? destabilize? the? local? context? during?
the?extended?process?prior?to?escalations.?Therefore,?the?clear?switch?to?a?
stress?of?democracy?centered?claims?before?escalation?and?the?clear?switch?
to?a? stress?of? state?centered?policies?after?escalation? reasonably?explains?
the? significant? role? the? ‘democracy? vs? state?claims? paradox’? plays? for?
consolidating?Western?policies.?
??
Second,? the? South? Ossetia? study? focused? on? mechanisms? of? external?
policies? that? initiate? change? of? local? behavior.? This?makes? an? important?
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distinction? to? the? works? of? Tilly? et? al.,? Levitsky? and?Way,? Kalyvas,? and?
Mansfield? and? Snyder? as? these? studies? center? on? local? mechanisms? of?
power? consolidation? in? and? through? violent? contexts.? However,?
mechanisms? of? external? actors? overlap? significantly? with? local? power?
mechanisms.?Western?actors?to?a?large?extent?utilize?the?same?mechanisms?
to? influence? the? local?context?as? local?power?actors?utilize? to?consolidate?
their?power?basis.?The?difference? in?conditions?of?external?agency?can?be?
presumed? to? derive? from? lower? commitment? through? lower? levels? of?
legitimization?pressure?(Schlichte?2009,?first?version?2007:?199ff.,?also?see:?
Toft? 2003),? access? to? different? resources? and? different? use? of? resources?
such?as? IMF?or?EU? conditionality?policies? (above?all? see:?Crawford?2000),?
and?different?cultures?and?practices?of?politics?forming?agendas?(Goodhand?
and?Walton?2009:?313).?
?
However,? the? similarities? of? external?Western?mechanisms? of? influence?
with? local? power? mechanisms,? such? as? aggregating? resources,? utilizing?
different?strategies?of?deterrence?or?coalition?building,? identity? formation?
mechanisms? or? employing? rhetoric? and? specific? formats? of? action,? ? are?
striking?and?should?be?taken?into?account.?Like?local?actors,?external?actors?
pursue? interests? through? (however? differently? tuned)? power? policies.?
Domestic? and? external? state? actors? follow? and? are? subjected? to? a? state?
centered?agenda?of?state?formation?in?their?states?of?origin?and?outside?in?
different? arenas.? Additionally,? Western? actors? equally? underlie? re?
negotiation? of? identities,? interests? and? alliances? as? they? are? part? of? the?
same?conflict?process?as?local?actors.??
?
The? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? study? have? been? generated? through?
tracing? of? plausible? causal? links? prior? to? escalations.? In? generalizing? the?
findings?to?contexts?of?violence?of?other?countries,?the?discussion?therefore?
looks? at? key? decision? points? in? these? conflict? processes.? The? following?
discussion,? though? refraining? from? an? in?depth? study,? examines? the?
contexts?of? the?Sri? Lanka?and?Kashmir? conflicts?and?discusses? the? role?of?
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Western?policies?prior?to?turning?points? to?escalation? in?those?conflicts? in?
light?of?the?South?Ossetia?findings.?
?
4.2. Empirical?scope?of?the?findings?
To?reflect?the?mechanisms?identified?in?the?South?Ossetia?case?and?deepen?
the? theoretical? gain? for? further? research,? the? discussion? chooses? the?
conflict?contexts?in?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?to?provide?a?basis?for?discussion?
of?the?South?Ossetia?process.?Sri?Lanka?grapples?with?a?violent?secessionist?
conflict?in?the?north,?characterized?by?periods?of?low?intensity?violence?and?
escalation? since? the? 1970s,?with? strong? incentives? for? domestic? elites? to?
engage?in?violence?(Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?304,?also?see:?Korf?2005,?
Selby? 2008;? for? an? overview? of? the? Sri? Lanka? context? see:? Rösel? 1997,?
Kreuzer?and?Weiberg?2005,?Uyangoda?2008,?Nieto?2008).?Kashmir?has?been?
experiencing? uprisings? for? self?determination? since? the? 1940s? and? is? a?
continuous?hotspot?of?violence?since?the?1965?Indo?Pakistani?War,?with?US?
policies?exerting?a?strong?influence?on?the?Indian?agenda?in?Kashmir?(above?
all? see:?Mohan? 1999,? Habibullah? 2004,? for? an? overview? of? the? Kashmir?
conflict?see:?Mohan?1992,?ICG?2010a,?Wirsing?1994,?Schofield?2003).?Both?
conflicts? are? subject? to? strong? outside? interests,? including? India? and? the?
Indian?state?of?Tamil?Nadu?in?Sri?Lanka?and?India?and?neighboring?Pakistan?
in? Kashmir.?Western? actors? also? pursue? their? stability? agendas? in? these?
territorial?conflicts,?the?US?in?cooperating?with?India,?but?also?with?Pakistan?
on? Kashmir?whereas? in? Sri? Lanka? the?US? and? a?wide? range? of? European?
actors?are?present.?
?
The? contexts? of? the? South? Ossetia,? Sri? Lanka? and? Kashmir? conflicts? are?
similar? in? features? such? as? dynamics? of? re?escalation,? territorial?
disintegration?of? the? central? state? through?and?ethnically? framed? conflict?
and? significant? levels?of?Western?engagement.59? It? is? to?be?expected? that?
                                                          
59? The? selection? of? these? two? conflicts? is? a? result? of? the? author’s? review? of? secondary?
literature?available?on?these?cases.?However,?other?conflict?contexts?would?meet?similar?
criteria,? for? instance? Lebanon? or? East? Timor? (Zahar? 2005,?Murden? 2000,? Sahin? 2007,?
Glassman?2003,?Wade?2002).?
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similar? features? of? domestic? power? consolidating? behavior? regulate?
dynamics? in? the? conflicts? and? that? external? policies? affect? on? power?
consolidation?opportunities? in? this? context.? The? characteristics?of? the? Sri?
Lanka? and? Kashmir? conflicts,? therefore,? offer? opportunities? to? identify?
patterns? similar? to? the? South? Ossetia? case.? Power?mechanisms? of? local?
state? behavior? can? be? expected? to? be? similar? across? conflicts? which?
provides? a? basis? for? generalizing? the? findings? of? the? South?Ossetia? case?
(Brubaker?and?Laitin?1998:?431).?Similarly,?George?and?Bennett?(2005:?81?
82)? and? Imig? and? Tarrow? (2001)?point? to? the? importance?of? establishing?
comparisons? of? similar? cases? with? different? contexts? or? environmental?
conditions,?but? similar?outcomes.?Voronkova? argues,? "This?perspective? is?
likely?to?produce?more?convincing?arguments?when?they?are?shown?to?be?
associated?with?similar?and/or?divergent?outcomes?emerging?under?diverse?
conditions?across?different?geographic?regions"?(Voronkova?2011:?14).?
?
This? discussion,? however,? refrains? from? systematic? comparison,? aiming?
instead? at? identifying? plausible? linkages? across? cases.? On? this? basis,? the?
reflection?of? findings? in?an?empirical?context?might?enable?an? insight? into?
how?mechanisms?of?Western? influence?play?out? in?processes?of?violence?
beyond? the?single?case?study.?As?such,?the?added?value?of? this?discussion?
lies?in?accounting?of?the?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?contexts?with?regard?to?links?
of? external? and? domestic? policies? that? seem? likely? to? have? significant?
effects? on? local? power? behavior? in? the? contexts? of? the? conflicts.? If? it? is?
possible? to? show? plausible? common? external?domestic? effects? similar? to?
the? South? Ossetia? findings? by? way? of? illustration? in? these? empirical?
contexts,?the?general?scope?of?the?mechanisms?can?be?sustained.?Further,?
the?discussion?expects?the?mechanisms?to?be?presented?in?these?cases,?but?
anticipates? that? they?will?show?variations? in? their? impact.?Similarly,? if? it? is?
possible? to? offer? plausible? reasons? for? why? the? functions? of? these?
mechanisms? might? differ? between? cases,? it? will? enhance? the? range? of?
interpretation?the?findings?offer?and?widen?the?scope?for?further?research.?
The? conclusions?of? this?however?brief?empirical?discussion?will?point?out?
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links? for? further? and? in?depth? research,? also? on? the? basis? of? the? above?
theoretical?discussion.?
?
The?section?is?set?to?loosely?discuss?the?relevance?of?the?three?mechanisms?
identified?in?the?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?for?the?Sri?Lanka?and?
Kashmir? contexts:? First,? the? Interaction? mechanism? of? early? reactive?
patterns? of?Western? actors?with? their? counterparts? and? later? reinforcing?
interaction? patterns;? second,? the? Level? shift? mechanism? with? Western?
policies? shifting?between?arenas?of?activity,?after?which?providing? for? the?
context?to?shift?in?favor?of?escalation;?and?third,?the?Claim?shift?mechanism?
when?Western?policies?during?the?run?up?to?escalation?gradually? increase?
stress?on?democracy?centered?claims?to?push?their?state?centered?agendas?
and?thereby?providing?for?the?context?to?shift?in?favor?of?escalation.?In?the?
South?Ossetia?context,?these?mechanisms?can?be?plausibly?traced?to?when?
Western? policies? impact? on? local? power? consolidating? opportunities? in?
specific?ways.?The?following?discussion?accounts?for?possible?similarities?of?
local? power? consolidating? behavior? of? the? Colombo? and? Delhi? elites? in?
reaction?to?Western?policies? in?the?contexts?of?the?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?
escalations.?
The? following?discussion?will? consecutively? take?account?of? the? Sri? Lanka?
and?Kashmir?conflicts?and?the?links?between?external?policies?and?repeated?
escalations.? For? each? conflict? the? text? discusses? the? chronologies? of?
violence? by? accounting? for? similarities? of? their? dynamics,? local? power?
setting? and? external? Western? influence? with? the? South? Ossetia? case,?
locates? if? possible? the? respective? mechanisms,? and? lastly? provides? for?
plausible?explanations?for?similarities?and?divergences.??
?
Sri?Lanka?
The? following? account,? first,? gives? a? reading? of? the? process? of? violence,?
depicting?how?power?consolidation?of?Sri?Lankan? local?elites?played?out? in?
the?conflict?context?and?how?external?engagement,?particularly?of?Western?
actors,?evolved?over?time.?Then,?the?Sri?Lanka?account?will?conclude?with?a?
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reflection? on? the? special? role? of? Western? external? influence? for? the?
dynamics?of?violence,?taking?specific?examples?of?Western?policies?and?by?
identifying?possible?links?with?the?mechanisms.??
?
After?gaining? full? independence? from? the?British?Empire? in?1948,?Ceylon,?
renamed? to? Sri? Lanka? in? 1972,? started? to? develop? a? local? elite? (for? this?
period? in? the?modern? history? of? Sri? Lanka? see:? Roesel? 1997,? Uyangoda?
2008,? Shastri? 2005).?During? colonial? rule,? competences? and? participation?
among?ethnic?groups,?particularly?between?the?majority?Sinhalese?and?the?
Tamils? being? the? second? largest? ethnic? group? of? Sri? Lanka,?was? divided?
along? and? cemented? through? administrative? structures,? legislative?
regulations?and?territorial?divisions.?When?colonial?institutions?broke?open,?
the?new?Sinhalese?ruling?elite?sought?to?consolidate?power?by?establishing?
ethnic?majority? rule,? based? on? Sinhalese?Buddhist? nationalism? (Weiberg?
2005:?9).?
?
As? a? result,? access? to? resources? such? as? property? and? land? became?
gradually? regulated? through? the? patronage? rule? of? the? two? Sinhalese?
majority?parties?Sri?Lanka?Freedom?Party?(SLFP)?and?United?National?Party?
(UNP)60.?The?Sinhalese?agenda?called?for?massive?settlement?policies?in?the?
Tamil?populated?north?(from?6?per?cent?Sinhalese?in?the?1940s?up?to?25?per?
cent? in? 2001),?made? Sinhalese? the? official? language? and? Buddhism? the?
official?religion?and,?establsihed?a?centralized?structure? in?1972,?the? latter?
consolidated? in? the?1978? introduction?of? the?presidential? constitution.? In?
addition? to?marginalizing? the? Tamil? and?Muslim?minorities,? these? shifts?
spurred? an? inner?Sinhalese? struggle? (on? the? factors? of? inner?Sinhalese?
conflicts? see:? Smith? 1999).? Both? political? parties,? alternatingly? in? power?
since?independence,?pursued?a?centralized,?elite?oriented?power?structure?
without? distributing? power? to? local? Sinhalese? party? representatives.? In?
1990,? the? central? state? de? facto? lost? control? over? insurgencies? by? the?
                                                          
60?The?following?backdrop?of?modern?Sri?Lankan?history? is?mainly?based?on?the? insightful?
accounts?of?Roesel?1997,?Weiberg?2005?and?Weiberg?2009.?
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radical?Sinhalese?movement?of?the?Janatha?Vimukthi?Peramuna?–?People?s?
Liberation?Front?(JVP)?in?the?south?(ibid.:?24).?
?
Altogether,? the? process? of? violence? in? Sri? Lanka? from? the? late? 1970s?
underwent? four? main? cycles? of? escalation,? punctured? by? extensive?
negotiations?and?by?power?oscillating?between?the?major?Sinhalese?parties?
(above? all? see:? Kreuzer? and? Weiberg? 2005,? ICG? 2010c,? Shastri? 2005).?
Externally,? India’s? influence? served? as? a? destabilizing? force? and?Western?
engagement?established?increasing?influence?at?the?same?time?as?violence?
escalated?into?war.?
?
In?the?first?phase?of?violence?from?1983,?the?separatist?Tamil?military?group?
Liberation?Tigers?of?Tamil?Eelam?(LTTE)?launched?a?war?against?the?central?
government?of?Sri?Lanka,?aiming?at?establishing?an?independent?Tamil?state?
in? the?north?of? the?country.?Previously? in?1976,? intensifying?violence?and?
political?tension?had?culminated?in?the?formation?of?the?LTTE.?In?1987,?with?
violence?showing?no?sign?of?abating,?the?Sri?Lankan?government?signed?an?
agreement?with? India? to?deploy?a?peace?keeping? force.?This? resulted? in?a?
further?three?year?engagement?with?the?LTTE?until?Indian?troops?retreated,?
leaving? the? country? in?a?worse? state? than?before.61?The? second?phase?of?
violence?started?in?1990,?when?fighting?between?the?government?and?LTTE?
escalated? again.? Fighting? acquired? a? new? quality:? In? 1991,? the? LTTE?was?
implicated? in? the?assassination?of? Indian?Premier?Ghandi?and? in?1993,?Sri?
Lankan?President?Premadasa?was?killed? in?an?LTTE?bombing.?This?surge?of?
violence? considerably? deepened? the? rift? in? Tamil?Sinhalese? relations.?
Meanwhile,? the? LTTE? continuously? gained?military? and? political? strength?
through? diaspora? and? Tamil? Nadu? support? (on? the? dispora? support? for?
Tamil?Nadu?see:?Zunzer?2004,?ICG?2010b).?The?third?phase?of?violence?as?of?
                                                          
61? India’s?short?performance?underlined? its?ambiguous? role,? supporting?alternatingly? the?
central?government?and?the?LTTE.?Delhi’s?access?to?Sri?Lanka? leads?through?the?southern?
Indian?state?of?Tamil?Nadu?and?often?through?the?preferences?of?the?local?administration?
there.?India’s?engagement?should?be?seen?as?an?inconsistent?set?of?strategies?of?a?regional?
stakeholder? that,? while? different? from? the? role? of? Russia? in? the? South? Ossetia? case,?
nevertheless?reinforces?local?tensions?(Iyer?1988,?Ganguly?1995,?Smith?1999:?18?20).?
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1994? continued?with? the? Sri? Lankan? army? suffering? considerable? losses.?
Later? that?year,?President?Kumaratunga?rose? to?power?on? the?promise?of?
bringing?peace,?vowed?to?end?war?and?opened?peace?talks?with?the?LTTE.?
In? 1995,? peace? talks? failed?with? the? LTTE? sinking? two? naval? crafts.?Amid?
intensifying?violence?in?the?end?of?the?1990s,?in?2001,?Kumaratunga?was?re?
elected?into?a?coalition?with?UNP,?then?with?opponent?Wickremasinghe?as?
Prime?Minister?(on?the?domestic?power?struggle?within?and?via?the?formal?
institutions?see?the?study?of?Shastri?2002).?Until?2002,?the?war?continued?at?
an?intense?level,?taking?place?in?the?north?and?east?of?the?country,?reaching?
the?capital? through?suicide?and?other?bombings,? including?an?attempt?on?
the?life?of?Kumaratunga?and?the?destruction?of?half?the?Sri?Lankan?air?force?
at?a?bombing?at?Colombo?airport?(ICG?2010c).?In?February?2002,?the?second?
attempt? at?peace? talks?opened?with? the? government? and? LTTE? signing? a?
Norwegian?mediated?ceasefire?agreement.?Peace?talks?wound?down?when?
the? LTTE?withdrew? from? the? negotiations? in? 2003,?with? the? first? suicide?
bombing? since? 2001? in? Colombo? in? 2004.? In? the? fourth? and? to? date? last?
phase,? violence? gradually? escalated? into?war? from? January? 2008,? ending?
with?the?full?military?defeat?of?the?LTTE,?dismemberment?of? its? leadership?
and?control?of?the?north?by?the?central?government?in?May?2009.??
Throughout?these?points?of?escalation,? local?power?trajectories?reinforced?
the?dynamics?and? laid?the?ground?for?Western?policies’? influence?at?those?
decisive?points.?The?devolution?of?power,?a?core?part?of?the?constitutional?
reform?tabled?in?1995,?aimed?at?calming?the?north?and?east?of?the?country.?
However,? the? government? utilized? the? judicial? procedure? to? re?allocate?
power? to?Sinhalese?bodies?and?Sinhalese?controlled? territories? (see?Smith?
1999).? In?1996,? the?constitutional? reform?was?voted?down? in?parliament.?
The?plan? failed?because? the?Sri? Lankan?elite?nonetheless?gave?priority? to?
the?military?solution,?the?LTTE?was?not?given?equal?leverage?in?negotiations?
(Weiberg? 2005:? 33?34)? and? the? autonomy? arrangement? offered? through?
the?devolution?plan?was?too?limited?to?be?accepted?by?the?broader?section??
of?Tamil?groups?(ICG?2006a:?1).??
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The? plan? played? a? key? role? during? and? immediately? after? the? election?
period? in?1994?as?a?part?of?the?peace?package?that?brought?Kumaratunga?
into? office.? However,? nationalist? Sinhalese? groups? did? not? support?
devolution? (ICG?2006a:?6,?Smith?1999:?26?28).?The? subsequent? refusal?of?
the? devolution? scheme? by? radical? Sinhalese? constituencies? are? credited?
with? bringing? about? the? loss? of? the? incumbent? government? in? the? 2004?
elections?much?more?than?the?government’s?unsuccessful?performance? in?
the? peace? process.? The? plan? came? to? be? refused? once? more? in? 2006.?
(Glasius?and?Kostovicova?2008:?94,?Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?321,?also?
see:?Bastian?2006,?Kelegama?2006).?Ropers?et?al.,?therefore,?maintain?that?
the?core? issue?of?violence? in?Sri?Lanka? is?the? inner?Sinhalese?struggle?over?
power?distribution,?and?the?conflict?with?the?Tamils?in?the?north?is?the?side?
stage?of?this?conflict?where?those?tensions?are?escalating?(Ferdinands?et?al.?
2004:? 14).? Yet,? throughout? 1994? and? 1995? violence? continued?
simultaneously?with?the?constitutional?efforts?and?even? intensified,?giving?
reason?to?assume?that?the?political?solution?was?never?considered?a?serious?
alternative? to? the?military? option? (ICG? 2006a:? 4).? Therefore,? the? inner?
Sinhalese?political?landscape?impeded?non?assertive?policies.??
This?discussion? supports? the?central?argument?brought?out? for? the?South?
Ossetia?case?as?the?domestic?landscape?proves?to?be?the?key?factor?of?state?
elite’s? ability? to?maintain? power? and? leaderships’? policies? in? the? conflict?
build? a?major? part? of? their? power? basis.? The? following? discussion? shows?
how? the? triggering? effect? of?Western? policies? can? be? seen? to? affect? on?
conflict?dynamics?through?their?impact?on?local?power?policies.?
?
This? trajectory? of? local? power? struggle? perpetuated? through? Western?
involvement? when? the? devolution? plan? was? rejected? in? parliament? in?
August? 2000,? again? amid? intensifying? violence? in? the? north.? Until? 2000,?
external?engagement?of?Western?actors?had?remained?at?a? low? level.?The?
new?round?of?talks?took?its?start?on?massive?initiative?of?Western?actors?(on?
the? international? process? see:? Weiberg? 2005).? Moreover? after? 2002,?
Western?actors,?most?of?all?the?US,?EU,?the?UK,?Germany,?Japan?and?World?
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Bank,? for? the? first? time? became? directly? engaged? in? the? negotiations?
(Goodhand? et? al.? 2011:? 14).? Starting? from? 2000,?Western? engagement?
aimed? at? taking? influence? on? the? process? of? violence? through?
conditionalities? linked? to? negotiations? and? funding? and? herein,? intensely?
aiming? at? taking? influence? on? the? central? government’s? policies? in? the?
conflict.? From? the? initial? discussions? of? a? constitutional? reform? to?
decentralize?power?in?the?mid?1990s,?Sri?Lankan?elites?started?campaigning?
in?elections?to?settle?the?conflict?through?talks.?A?pattern?of? local?policies?
evolved? that? established? ongoing? military? action? against? the? LTTE? with?
negotiations? simultaneously? taking? place.?Western? actors,? particularly? in?
the? context? of? Norway’s?mediation? initiative? in? 2002,? linked? continuing?
funding?to?continuing?negotiations?(Uyangoda?2009).?
?
At?the?point?of? intensifying?Western?engagement,?Kumaratunga?faced?yet?
another?election?round,?first?presidential?elections? in?December?1999?and?
then? parliamentary? elections? in? October? 2000.? Amid? a? weak? record,?
Kumaratunga? feared? losing? the?vote? (on? the?analysis?of? this?period? in?Sri?
Lankan?domestic?politics? see:?Shastri?2005).?At? this? stage?of? the?process,?
the? continuation? of? violence? had? become? profitable? for? both? sides.?
Particularly,? the? government? sought? to? divert? attention? from? the? poor?
economic? situation? and? allegations?of? fraud? against? Kumaratunga,?which?
could?come?up?into?focus?in?case?of?an?end?of?the?war?(see?Weiberg?2005).?
Instead,? the?government? renewed? the?offer?of?peace? talks? in? the?end?of?
1998,? just? prior? to? elections? while? prolonging? the? military? campaign.?
Kumaratunga? suffered? a? setback? in? the? 2001?parliamentary? election? and?
had?to?go?into?coalition?with?her?UNPF?political?opponent?Wickremasinghe?
who?headed?the?new?government?as?Prime?Minister.?
?
However,? talks? only? started? from? 2000?when?Western? engagement?was?
solicited?by?the?Sri?Lankan?government?(Weiberg?2005:?40,? ICG?2006a:?5).?
The?peace? initiative?was? led?by?Norway?and? co?chaired?by? Japan,? the?US?
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and? India.? The? EU? had? a? lesser? coordinating? role,62? but? was? a? main?
financing? party? together?with? the?UK? and?Germany.? The? funding? parties?
brought?out?conditionalities?of?payments?by?linking?continuing?payments?to?
ongoing?peace?talks,?most?bluntly?expressed?in?the?emblematic?World?Bank?
statement?of?February?2003,?‘No?talks,?no?money’(Weiberg?2005:?49).??
?
Nonetheless,? Western? support? was? focused? on? the? government? and?
international?engagement?largely?marginalized?the?LTTE,?pushing?it?to?give?
up?terror?tactics,?whereas?the?government?enjoyed? leverage?despite?open?
use?of?force?and?severe?human?rights?violations?(HRW?2012).?At?the?same?
time? in? 2002,? the? US? opened? negotiations? with? the? government? on? a?
defense? agreement? to? allow?US?military? access? to? Indian? and? Sri? Lankan?
territories,? simultaneously? stepping? up? pressure? on? the? LTTE.? Analysts?
continued? to? assess? the? government? to? pursue? the? double? strategy? of?
upholding? talks? to? attract? international? funding? and? political? support? for?
regaining? the? north? and? remaining? in? power,? whereas? the? military?
campaign?continued?(Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?311).?Western?policies,?
thus,? had? created? close? ties? with? the? government,? which? enabled? the?
western?agenda?to?table?conditionalities.?
The?pattern? of?Western?policies? further? reinforced? local?dynamics.? From?
2001,?the?Wickremasinghe?government?pursued?the?economization?of?the?
conflict? by? introducing? economic? development? and? making? fighting?
irrelevant?by?transforming?the?north?in?a?flourishing?region?through?and?for?
the?means? of? the? business? entities? that? had? supported? the? government?
during? the? elections? (Goodhand? and? Walton? 2009:? 308).? The? LTTE?
withdrew?from?the?talks?in?April?2004,?citing?exclusion?from?meetings?with?
international?donors? (ICG?2006a).?The? LTTE? leadership?broke? from?peace?
talks? as? their? possible? gains? seemed? minor? in? an? internationally?driven?
process?that? favored?state?actors?over?non?state?actors? (Uyangoda?2009).?
Also? in? 2004,? the? government? decided? that? intense? international?
                                                          
62?EU?engagement?surged? in? the?context?of? the?Tsunami?disaster? in?2004?when? joint?EU?
efforts?became?more? visible,?more? institutionalized?and? funding? volumes?and? readiness?
outdo?other?parties?(Glasius?and?Kostovicova?2008).?
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engagement?was?not? in? their? interests? as? it?was?not?believed? that? there?
could?be?a?political?solution?without?a?military?victory?(Uyangoda?2008).??
The?Wickremasinghe?government?lost?the?elections?of?2004?when?they?lost?
the?support?of?Southern?radical?constituencies,?whereas?the?newly?elected?
Rajapakse? government? moved? away? from? seeking? legitimacy? through?
Western? support? and? focused? on? domestic? support? through? nationalist?
goals? and? the? financial? support? of? non?Western? actors.? However,? the?
government? sought? to? avoid?Western? criticism? by? launching? yet? another?
round?of?peace? talks? in?2006?whilst?continuing? the?military?campaign.?By?
2007,? Germany,? the? UK? and? the? US? reacted? by? suspending? particular?
development?related? funds,? but? overall? support? continued.? From? then,?
violence?spiraled? into? the?war?of?2008? that? resulted? in?military?victory?of?
the?government.?
?
Goodhand?and?Walton?(2009:?310)?list?major?points?of?criticism?of?Western?
engagement?during? this?period? as,? first?of? all,?being? too? closely?engaged?
with?the?government?leading?to?de?facto?support?of?assertive?policies?(also?
see:? Lunstaed?2007)? and,? along?with? this,? an?overemphasis?on? structural?
management?of? the?peace?process?whilst? turning?a?blind?eye?on? real?life?
events?of?simultaneously?mounting?violence.?In?this?respect,?Goodhand?and?
Walton?indicate?instances?that?embed?Western?agency?in?Sri?Lanka?with?its?
characteristics?in?the?South?Ossetia?context.?
?
Western? influence? in? Sri? Lanka’s? conflict? context? displays? the? pattern? of?
triggering? shifts? in? local? dynamics? at? decisive? points? in? the? process,?
particularly? in? cooperation?with? the? government? in? 2001? and? 2004.? This?
impact?seems?to?be?possible?to?take?effect,?as?in?the?south?Ossetia?context,?
through? Western? agency’s? intense? sway? over? local? leadership’s? power?
interests.? This? particularly? showed? when? the? Rajapakse? government? in?
2004? took? a? distance? from? Western? support? to? secure? their? domestic?
power? basis.? Goodhand? and? Walton? hold? that? Western? engagement?
triggered? ambiguous? effects? when? the? same? policy? was? received? in?
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different?ways:?When?military?support?or?funding?is?provided,?the?Western?
actors?might? intend?to?push?attached?conditionalities?of?non?violence,?but?
various? local? actors? only? see? de?facto? support? for? the? governmental?
military? line? and? the? central? state? (Goodhand? and?Walton? 2009:? 314),? a?
pattern? similar? to? the? South? Ossetia? case? when? local? dynamics? are?
reinforced?through?Western?support?held?to?curb?Russian?interests.?
?
Against? this?backdrop,?Western?engagement? in? Sri? Lanka,? very? similar? to?
South? Ossetia,? proved? “incoherent”? when? actors? linked? aid? to? violence?
(Goodhand? and?Walton? 2009:? 312?314).?Western? donors,? for? lack? of? a?
consistent? strategy,? started? to?work? “around”? conflict,?meaning? partially?
and?temporarily?withdrawing?funds,?but?not?suspending?other?budget?lines?
or? political? support? (Goodhand? 2011),? creating? inconsistencies? similar? to?
the?shifting?policies?of?Western?agency?in?the?South?Ossetia?context.?
?
As? a? result,? the? Sri? Lanka? characteristics? translate? into? similarities? with?
mechanisms? identified? for? the?South?Ossetia?case.?First,?Western?policies?
proved? inconsistent? through? switching? claims? during? periods? of? risk? of?
violence.? In?a?striking?similarity?with?the?South?Ossetia?context,?the?major?
impact?on?local?behavior?seemed?to?occur?through?inconsistency?between?
democracy?and?state?centered?agendas?of?Western?actors?addressing? the?
Sri? Lankan? government.? Furthermore,?Western? actors? opted? for? pushing?
the?central?state?through?substantiating?democracy?related? issues?such?as?
non?use? of? force.? Further,? the? imperative? of? non?use? of? force,? however?
pursued? inconsistently?by?Western?actors,? caused?a?backlash?at? the? local?
level?through?mobilizing?radial?constituencies?and?the?military?against?the?
government.?Second,?Goodhand?and?Walton?list?that?Norway’s?double?role?
in?the?peace?process?as?both?facilitator?in?the?talks?and?as?monitoring?party?
on?the?ground?impeded?a?clear?cut?Western?policy?in?the?political?process.?
Similarly? in? the? South? Ossetia? process,? the? same? Western? actors? that?
implemented? conditionalities? for? the?post?Soviet?Georgian? leaderships? at?
the? national? level,? implemented? policies? outdoing? those? conditionalities?
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during? negotiations? at? the? international? level.? Third,? the? account? gives?
indications? that? Level? shift? might? have? played? a? role? in? creating?
inconsistencies:?Apparently,?donor?and?political?decisions?are?taken?outside?
the? country? in? Western? capitals,? such? as? at? the? UN? or? World? Bank?
headquarters.?
?
Here,? an? in?depth? analysis?would? have? to? show?which?Western? policies?
specifically?played?out?prior?to?escalations? in?Sri?Lanka,?and?how?Western?
policies?progressed?prior?and?after?change?in?local?behavior.?With?regard?to?
Level?shift,? it?should?be?detected?which?policies?took?effect?at?which? level?
prior?to?escalations.?However,?the?account?suggests?that? Interaction? in? its?
reinforcing? function,?Level?shift?and?Object?shift?play?decisive?roles? in? the?
context?of?escalations?of?violence?in?Sri?Lanka.?
?
Kashmir?
After? the?end?of?British?rule? in?1947,? the?region?of?Kashmir63?accessed? to?
India?and?the?first?war?between?India?and?Pakistan?broke?out?over?control?
of? the? region.? The? Muslim?majority? Kashmir,? from? 1957? by? its? own?
constitution?a?part?of? India,?became? the?most?contentious? issue?between?
Hindu?majority? India?and?Muslim?majority?Pakistan?with? two?of? the? three?
Indo?Pakistan?wars?(the?first?in?1947,?the?second?war?in?1965)?being?fought?
over?Kashmir?(see?for?example:?Ganguly?2006,?Lamb?1991).? In?1962,? India?
fought?another?war?over?Kashmir?with?China?(see?Schofield?2003).?In?1965,?
the?special?status?of?the?region?of?Jammu?and?Kashmir?was?estabslished?in?
the? Indian? constitution? under? article? 370,? erasing? large? parts? of? its?
autonomy? allowing? India? to? ban? laws? or? call? emergency? rule? (Schofield?
2003:?121?126).??
?
                                                          
63?Kashmir?denotes?a? larger?area? that? includes? the? Indian?administered? state?of? Jammu?
and?Kashmir? (the?Kashmir?Valley,? Jammu?and?Ladakh),?the?Pakistani?administered?Gilgit?
Baltistan? and? the? Azad? Kashmir? provinces? (Azad? Jammu? and? Kashmir,? AJK),? and? the?
Chinese?administered? regions? of?Aksai? Chin? and? Trans?Karakoram? Tract.? The? subject? of?
this?account,?however,?is?the?Indian?ruled?state?of?Jammu?and?Kashmir.?
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The? dynamics? in? the? Kashmir? conflict? follow? the? continuous? struggle?
between? India? and? Pakistan? for? control? over? the? region,? with? India?
maintaining? its? nominal? status.? Violence? also? includes? internal? Kashmir?
struggles? of? Muslim? groups? opposing? Indian? rule? or? the? Kashmir?
administration? with? the? aim? of? accession? to? Pakistan? or? independence.?
However,?much?of?the?conflict’s?dynamics?is?shaped?by?the?ongoing?regime?
consolidation? of? India’s? and? Pakistan’s? state? elites? which? overcasts? and?
influences? local? power? struggles? (ICG? 2003a:? 4).? The? unresolved? conflict?
over?Kashmir? is?often? assessed? to?be? the?one?main?obstacle? for? India? to?
consolidate?as?a?state?(Mohan?2006:?20).??
Indian? state? elites?maintained? a?Hindu?oriented?nationalism? to? legitimize?
the?strong?hand?approach?of?maintaining?rule?in?Muslim?majority?Kashmir.?
Therefore,?India’s?non?recognition?of?post?colonial?Pakistan?and?Pakistan’s?
support?for?Muslim?groups?in?Kashmir,?fueled?Indian?nationalist?claims?over?
Kashmir?(see?for?example:?Ganguly?1995?and?1996).?The?Western?agenda?is?
largely?represented?by?US?influence?on?Indian?state?politics,?also?on?Delhi’s?
Kashmir?agenda,?and? to?a? lesser?extent?on?Pakistan.?External? influence? in?
the?Kashmir? conflict? takes?place?mainly? through? the?U.S.? and? to? a? lesser?
extent? through?Europe.?Some? ties?of? India?with?France?and? the?UK?exist,?
but? have?marginal? influence? in? the? context? of? Kashmir? politics? (Mohan?
2006:?25).?
Internal?politics?in?Kashmir?largely?hinge?on?the?application?of?article?370?in?
India’s?constitution? (ICG?2002:?6,?on?Kashmir’s?domestic?politics?also?see:?
Lamb?1991,?Ganguly?1997).? The? article? is? the?most? important?means? for?
Delhi? to?maintain? control? in? Kashmiri? affairs.? The? special? constitutional?
status? as? a? measure? of? autonomy? rule? guarantees? local? elections? in?
Kashmir.?Violence?regularly?breaks?out?during?the?pre?election?period?due?
to? the? fueling?of? sentiments? through?Pakistan? and? insurgent?movements?
seeking? to? break? from? Indian? rule,? both? playing? on? ethnic? lines.? Indian?
authorities?are?quick?in?calling?a?state?of?emergency?on?the?basis?of?article?
370? when? the? situation? during? the? election? period? destabilizes.? This?
situation?grants?Delhi?full?military?and?legal?powers? in?Kashmir.?Therefore,?
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Kashmir’s? special? status? is? less? a? provision? of? autonomy,? but? more? an?
instrument?of? territorial?control? through? the? Indian?central?state,?utilizing?
lines?of?ethnic? conflict? for? the?purpose?of? central? control.?Therefore,? the?
special? status? increases? Kashmiri? nationalist? sentiments? and? furthers?
Pakistan’s?irredentist?claims?in?Kashmir.?
?
After?the?second? Indo?Pakistan?war?of?1965,?Kashmir’s?status?was?de?jure?
fixed? as? a? part? of? India.? In? the? aftermath,? there? have? been? five?major?
phases?of?escalation,?including:?first,?the?1984?conquering?of?Sichen?Glacier?
region?by?the?Indian?army;?second,?the?1990?killing?of?protesters?by?Indian?
troops,?marking?the?start?of?the?Kashmir?insurgency?uniting?large?strands?of?
the? otherwise? ethnically? divided? population;? third,? the? 1999? Kargil? war?
between? India?and?Pakistan? in? the?Kargil?district?of?Kashmir?when? Indian?
troops?between?May?and?July?aimed?at?pushing?back?Pakistani?troops?that?
had?infiltrated?the?Indian?administered?part?of?Jammu?and?Kashmir;?fourth,?
the?2001? terrorist?attack?on? the? Indian?parliament? in?New?Delhi,?bringing?
Pakistan?and?India?to?the?brink?of?an?all?out?war;?and,?fifth,?the?May?2008?
escalation? over? the? transfer? by? Indian? authorities? of? forest? land? in? the?
Kashmir?Valley?to?the?Hindu?Shri?Amarnath?Shrine?Trust.?
?
In? 1984,? the? conflict? in? Kashmir? reached? its? first? escalation? point? after?
India’s? victory? in? the? third?war?with? Pakistan? in? 1971? (ICG? 2003b:? 5?6).?
Following? the?war,? India? had? observed? an? all?control? line? as? opposed? to?
reconciliation.? This? claim? extended? to? internal? politics? in? Kashmir? with?
heavy?rigging?of?the?1972?elections?and?subsequent?Srinagar?governments?
following? a? loyal?pro?Delhi? course.? The? situation? reached? a? tipping? point?
when? in?1984? the?Delhi?critical?Minister? Farooq?Abdullah?was?dismissed.?
Abdullah’s?dismissal?was?widely?held?to?have?sparked?the?beginning?of?the?
Kashmir? insurgency? (ICG? 2002:? 6).? Also? in? 1984,? Indian? troops? took? the?
disputed?Siachen?Glacier?in?a?military?action?that?defeated?Pakistani?troops?
in? the? area? (ICG? 2006:? 4).? The? taking? of? Siachen?Glacier? –? including? the?
following? dispute? over? the? glacier? that? continued? as? of? 2012? –? and? the?
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heavy?handed?approach?in?Srinagar?politics?were?a?display?of?India’s?all?out?
attempts?to?consolidate?power?in?its?disputed?north.??
?
The?situation?had?been?strained?with?Pakistan?supporting?militant?groups?
and?with? civil? uprisings? against? the? government,?when? in? 1990,? Kashmir?
governor? Jagmohan’s? orders? caused? the? shootings? of? demonstrators?
(Schofield? 2003:? 143?154).? From? 1995,? the? situation? between? Kashmir?
resistance?and?Indian?central?rule?was?exacerbated?by?India?systematically?
using?militant?groups?for?counter?insurgency?strategies?(ibid.?158?163).??
?
Throughout? this? tense? trajectory? in? the?1990s,? the?United?States? took?up?
the?pattern?of?distinctly?supporting?the?Indian?line?of?consolidation?through?
force? in?Kashmir?under? the?Bill?Clinton?administration? (Mohan?2006:?20).?
Generally? it?must?be?noted,?that?external?influence?in?the?Kashmir?conflict?
continuously?took?place?at?the?national?level?of?Delhi?politics,?in?contrast?to?
the?South?Ossetia?context?where?Western?actors?were?present?at?the?local?
and? international? levels? prior? to? escalations.?US? support? for? India,? thus,?
focused? on? state? politics? at? the? Indian? national? level? and? on? non?
proliferation?and?confidence?building?measures? in? the?military? framework?
with? Pakistan.? In? 1998,?Washington? refused? an? active?mediation? role? in?
Kashmir? and? also? refrained? from? supporting? a? referendum? on? Kashmir’s?
status?(Ganguly,?R.?2001:?312?and?318;?Thakur?1992:?165?82).??
Against?this?backdrop,? in?1998,?the?year?prior?to?the?Kargil?escalation,?the?
United? States’? external? engagement? was? continuously? focused? on?
supporting? the? national? level? of? India’s? state? policies? and? on? sending?
dismissive?messages?to?Islamabad,?as?opposed?to?taking?action?on?the?local?
level? of? the? conflict.? The? 1999? Kargil? war? started? when? Indian? troops?
pushed?back?Pakistani?troops?and?Pakistan?backed?militants?infiltrating?the?
Indian?controlled?side?of?the?Line?of?Control? (LoC).?Strong?US?backing?and?
international? support? for? India? continued? and? condemned? Pakistan’s?
actions? during? the? war.? The? border? clash? ended? only? after? intense? US?
mediation? over? fears? of? a? nuclear? conflict? (ICG? 2002:? 10)? and? Pakistan?
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withdrew? its? troops? following? the? personal? intervention? of? President?
Clinton?(Ganguly?2006:?47?48).??
?
During? the? Kargil? dispute,? all? major? parties? in? India,? including? the?
opposition,?agreed? to?point? to?Pakistan’s?backing?of? terrorism? in?order? to?
attract?US?support?for?India?(ICG?2003b:?13).?Similar?to?the?South?Ossetia?or?
Sri?Lanka?contexts,?Western?external?influence?concentrated?policies?at?the?
national? level? instead? of? the? local? level.? Therefore,? and? similar? to? South?
Ossetia?and?Sri?Lanka,?the? Indian?state?elites?seemed?to?follow?the?stance?
of?external?policies?in?implementing?their?line?in?the?conflict.?In?attempting?
to?direct?US?pressure?toward?Pakistan,? Indian?state?politics? look?to?the?US?
approach?in?centering?on?the?international?level?instead?of?the?local?level?of?
the?conflict.? In?other?words,?the?side?of? India?or?the?US?did?not? initiate?or?
support?direct? cooperation?with?domestic? actors? in?Kashmir,?but,? rather,?
the? international?level?politics?of? the?Kashmir?conflict?provided? for?use?of?
violence?of?the?Indian?local?state?elites.?
?
The? Kargil? war? ended? after? a? two?month? campaign? in? July? 1999.? Even?
though? the? Kashmir? insurgency? had? already? been? abating? from? 1996,?
overall? violence? in? Kashmir? further? increased,? mainly? due? to? the?
reorganization?of?militant?groups?in?Pakistan?(ICG?2003b:?6).?In?the?wake?of?
Clinton’s?South?Asia?visit?in?2000,?Delhi?attempted?to?solidify?relations?with?
the?United?States?by? taking?action? in?Kashmir.? India? stepped?up?counter?
insurgency? actions? in? Kashmir? in?order? to? convey? a?message?of? counter?
terrorism? strategy?and?at? the? same? time? released? leaders?of? the?Kashmir?
independence?movement? (Ganguly,?R.? ?2001:?324).?Whereas?engaging? in?
local?politics?through?this?moderate?stance?can?be?seen?as?an?inclusive,?pro?
democratic? move,? India? at? the? same? time? intensified? the? counter?
insurgency?and?thus?directly?contributed?to?increased?violence?in?Kashmir.?
Hence,? it? seems? as? though? India’s? Kashmir? policy?was?more? focused? on?
keeping?US?support?for?Delhi’s?actions?than?on?ending?violence?in?Kashmir.??
?
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Therefore,? India’s? policies,? similar? to? the? South? Ossetia? and? Sri? Lanka?
contexts,? turn?out? to? simultaneously? implement?a?pro?democratic,? liberal?
peace? agenda? and? to? impose? central? rule? through? force.? Whereas? in?
Kashmir,? in?contrast?to?South?Ossetia?and?Sri?Lanka,?external?engagement?
through?Western?agency?and?in?particularly?the?US?was?non?existent?on?the?
local? level,? the?Western?agenda?pervasive? in? the?other?cases?did?have?an?
impact? in? Kashmir.? The? Western? stance,? nevertheless,? appeared? to? be?
implemented? indirectly? through? the? local?policies? of? India,? just? as? in? the?
cases?of?South?Ossetia?and?Sri?Lanka,?even?though?Western?actors?were?not?
involved?on?the?ground?in?Kashmir.??
?
The? 2001? escalation? of? the? terrorist? attacks? on? India’s? parliament?were?
considered? to? be? a? result? of? the? prior,?misled? Kashmir? policies? of? both?
Pakistan? and? India? (ICG? 2002:? 5?6).? International? condemnation? of? the?
attacks?put?pressure?on?Pakistan?to?end?its?support?for?terrorist?groups.?In?
the? years?after? the?attacks?of?September?2001?and? the? change? from? the?
Clinton?to?the?Bush?administration,?the?United?States?continued?to?tighten?
their?relations?with?India?promoting?anti?terrorism?alliances.?To?stress?this,?
in?2005,?Bush?and?Indian?Premier?Singh?signed?a?nuclear?pact?that?allowed?
India,?with? the? backing? of? nuclear? power,? to? pursue? an? even?more? self?
assured?line?in?Kashmir?(Mohan?2006:?24?25).?
?
After?the?nuclearization?politics?of?the?mid?2000s,?the?overall?trajectory?of?
the? Kashmir? conflict? persisted,? with? Indian? local? rule? holding? strong? in?
Kashmir? and? escalations? of? violence? both? on? the? local? and? the? national?
level.? In? the? escalation?of?May? 2008,? the? Indian? government? transferred?
Kashmir?territory?to?the?Shri?Amarnath?Shrine?Trust,?a?Hindu?religious?site.?
This? provoked? anger? among? Kashmiri? Muslims,? led? to? violent? street?
protests?extending?over?months,?and?to?a?breakup?of?the?ruling?coalition?in?
Kashmir.?As?a? result,?once?more? so?called? ‘Governor’s? rule’?was? imposed?
with?police?killing? several?protesters? (ICG?2010a:?4).?The? contention?over?
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the? land? row? led? to? the?break?between? the?Valley?on? the?one?hand?and?
Jammu?and?Ladakh?on?the?other,?adding?to?the?internal?divide?of?Kashmir.??
?
Altogether,? the?account? suggests? that?one?major?difference? in? triggers?of?
violence? in? Kashmir? lies? in? the? structure? of? external? influence,? largely?
diverging? in?crucial?aspects? from? the?Sri?Lanka?or?South?Ossetia?contexts.?
This,?together?with?strong?indications?of?the?same?mechanisms?at?work?as?
in? South?Ossetia,? gives? further? insight? into? their? functioning.?On? the?one?
hand,?dynamics? in?Kashmir?are?pinched?between?the?two?great?powers?of?
Pakistan? and? India,? but?without? a? greater? power? pressuring? the? smaller?
central? state? via? its? territorial? divide.? Interestingly,? dynamics? of? violence?
still? seem? to? be? decided? on? the? national? level? of? the? conflict? with?
cooperation? of? the?Delhi? elites?with?US? foreign? policy.? For? instance,? the?
massive?Mumbai?terrorist?attacks?of?November?2008?could?be?seen?as?one?
of? the? arenas? of? the? Kashmir? conflict? that? continuously? mars? relations?
between?India?and?Pakistan.??
?
However,? the? ‘great?power’? stand?off? in?Kashmir? seems? to? coincide?with?
very?little?direct?involvement?of?Western?policies?in?the?conflict,?at?the?local?
level,?and?in?Western?restraint?in?initiating?negotiation?formats?or?providing?
funding.?Western?policies,?nevertheless,?seem?to?play?a?decisive?role?in?the?
dynamics?when? influencing?on? local?power?politics?of? Indian? state?elites.?
Importantly,? the?Western? state? formation? agenda? including? its? focus? on?
central?state?support?still?plays?out?on?the?ground.?Even?to?a?greater?extent?
than? in? South? Ossetia? or? Sri? Lanka,? the?Western? agenda? seems? to? be?
adopted?and? translated?by? the? central? state?elites? in? the? conflict? context?
and?to?the?effect?of?triggering?violence?on?the?ground.?Western?influence?in?
this?respect?seems?to?work?through?the?formalized?legislative?setting?of?the?
special? status? and? the? dispute?with? Pakistan? over? territorial? integrity? in?
which? the?Western? anti?terrorist? agenda? interferes.? Furthermore,?on? the?
national? level?Western? policies? play? on? both? a? democracy? and? a? state?
centered?agenda,?which?aggravates?the?conflict.?This?particularly?showed?in?
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2000?when,?as?a?result?of?the?Clinton?policy,?Delhi?simultaneously?stepped?
up? assertive? and? permissive? measures? at? the? local? level,? striving? to?
generate?legitimacy?from?their?Western?partners.?
?
However?similar?to?the?Sri?Lanka?context,?an?in?depth?analysis?would?assess?
which? specific? external? policies? induced? escalations? on? the? ground? in?
Kashmir.?Analyses? should? look? not? only? to?US? policies? toward? India,? but?
also? to? the? dynamics? of? India?Pakistan? relations.? In? addition,? in?depth?
analysis?should?reveal?how? Indian? interference? in?Kashmir?affairs? leads? to?
local? escalations,? not? only? focus? on? post?escalation? Indian? intervention?
once?violence?has? flared?up? in?Kashmir.?From? specific? Indian?policies?and?
their?points?in?time?analyses?can?deduce?how?Western?policies,?most?of?all?
with?regard?to?Claim?shift,?affect?escalations.??
?
Mechanisms?of?violence?in?South?Ossetia,?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?
Both?the?Sri?Lanka?and?the?Kashmir?conflicts?show?striking?similarities?with?
mechanisms? of? external?Western? policies? in? the? context? of? dynamics? of?
violence? in?South?Ossetia.?The? three?conflicts?are?similarly?set? in? their?re?
escalation? dynamics? of? intra?state? territorial? disputes? linked? to? ethnic?
groups? claiming? self?determination? after? independence.? Moreover,? re?
escalation? can? be? seen? to? be? caused? by? local? state? elites’? power?
consolidation?politics,?being?triggered?by?external?and?domestic?resources?
of? legitimization,?nationalist?mobilization?of?ethnic?groups,? states?agents’?
use? of? force? for? territorial? control,? and? attracting? political? and? financial?
resources? from? external? supporters? of? state? formation.? The? broadened?
perspective?of? the?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?contexts?suggests? that?Western?
policies?of? liberal?peace?building? initiate? local? state?elites? to? comply?with?
demands? of? state? formation,?which? seem? to? be? globally? present.? These?
demands?are?facilitated?through?external?agendas?and?instruments?of?state?
formation? and? locally? driven? through? those? domestic? elites’? private? and?
political?power?interests.?
?
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The?findings?of?the?South?Ossetia?study?suggested?three?mechanisms?of?re?
escalation? through? external? influence,? first,? Interaction? of? reactive?
interaction? between? Western? and? other? stakeholders? kicking? off? the?
escalation? cycle? and? subsequent? reinforcing? interaction? until? change? in?
local?behavior,?second,?Level?shift?of?external?agency?switching?localities?of?
agency? prior? to? escalations? and,? third,? Claim? shift?with? external? agency?
switching? between? democracy? and? state?enforcing? policies.? The? South?
Ossetia? findings? revealed? specific? functions? framing? plausible? causal?
explanations?of?the?mechanisms’?effects.?However,? it?has?to?be?reiterated?
that?only?an? in?depth? study?of? the? Sri? Lanka?and?Kashmir? contexts? could?
reveal?functions?of?the?mechanisms.?Nevertheless,?the?three?mechanisms,?
even?in?their?micro?functions,?are?largely?represented?both?in?Sri?Lanka?and?
Kashmir.? The? below? table? accounts? for? the? intensity? of? the? three?
mechanisms? in? Sri? Lanka? and? Kashmir? and? for? differences? in? available?
power? resources? of? local? state? elites? that? might? enable? explanation? of?
differences? in? intensity? of? the? mechanisms? and? thereby? enhance? their?
hypothetical?functioning:??
?
? Inter?action?
Level?
shift?
Claim?
shift? Divergences?in?power?resources?
S.?Oss? strong? strong? strong
Sri?
Lanka? strong? strong? strong?
???professionalized?Western?engagement:?unchanged?
reinforcing?effect?of?Western?policies,?even?to?a?more?
intense?degree?
??non?Western?partners:?unchanged?assertive?tendency?on?
local?level?(relatively?new?phenomenon,?possible?change?
over?time?has?to?be?studied)?
??Western?anti?terror?agenda:?functions?as?but?one?
reinforcing?instance?at?the?national?level?
?
Kash?
mir? weak? weak? strong?
??more?consistent?Western?support?for?India?(than?for?
Georgia):?unchanged?pressure?on?the?national?level?
??lack?of?territorial?proxy?of?Pakistan?(such?as?North?
Ossetia?or?Tamil?Nadu):?unchanged?escalation?cycle?
??Western?anti?terror?agenda:?functions?as?but?one?
reinforcing?instant?at?the?national?level?
?
?
Table?5:?Differences?and?commonalities?of?mechanisms?of?violence?in?Sri?Lanka,?
Kashmir?and?South?Ossetia.?
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The?Interaction?mechanism?is?most?difficult?to?locate?as?the?discussion?does?
not?have?the?scope?to?trace?the?sequence?of?the?processes?in?depth,?which?
makes? it?difficult?to?ascertain?the?extent?to?which?stakeholder? interaction?
led? to? the? start? of? the? escalation? cycle,? or? merely? reinforced? their?
interactions? in? the? subsequent?course?of? the?process.? In?order? to? sustain?
the?mechanisms,? it?would?be?crucial?to? identify?the?respective?reinforcing?
instances.?However,?it?seems?that?in?the?Sri?Lanka?and?South?Ossetia?cases?
the?reactive?pattern?is?more?existent?than?in?Kashmir.?In?Kashmir,?it?seems?
as? though?a? shift?at? the?national?or? local? level? is? sufficient? to? kick?off?an?
escalation? cycle,? making? the? context? very? vulnerable? to? the? escalating?
effect?of?a?relatively?isolated?event?with?relatively?little?reinforcing?impact,?
or? a? high? level? of? inertia,? in? the? subsequent? trajectory,? specifically? by?
external?actors?at?the?national?level.??
?
The?Level? shift?mechanism?would? require?more? scrutiny?of? the? locality?of?
specific?West?policies?prior?to?escalations?to?make?a?sustained?statement,?
particularly? in? Sri? Lanka.?Western? policies? at? the? international? level? are?
used? by? both? Sri? Lanka? and? India? elites? to?maintain? their? claims? in? the?
conflicts.?Local?state?elites?intensely?respond?to?the?Western?paradigm,?by?
which?the?Western?agenda?works?through?the?national?to?the?local?level?of?
the?conflicts?in?both?cases.?The?switch?of?levels?of?Western?agency?is?more?
pervasive? in? Sri? Lanka? than? in? Kashmir? as? Western? agency? is? directly?
involved?at?all?levels,?whereas?in?Kashmir,?Western?actors?are?represented?
exclusively?on?the? international? level.?This?might,?first,?hint?that?the?more?
an?external?regional?power?pushes?its?agenda,?the?more?level?shift?occurs.?
This? strongly? relates? to? the? South? Ossetia? case? where? Russia? is? a?
stakeholder? via? the?West? and? to? Sri? Lanka?where? India? is? a? negotiating?
partner?of?Western?actors.?As?Level?shift?is?less?significant?in?Kashmir,?one?
could,? second,? further? hypothesize? that? the? existence? of? a? territorial?
neighboring?proxy? –? such? as? the? Indian? state? Tamil?Nadu?or? the?Russian?
Federation?republic?North?Ossetia?–?diversifies?activities?to?the? local? level.?
In? case?of? no? such?proxy,? the? national? state? elites? do? not? address? these?
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local? stakeholders? and?Western? activity?might?be? rather? confined? to? the?
national? and? even? more? the? international? level.? Considering? both?
hypotheses,?the?Kashmir?context?shows?equal?tendencies?of?escalation?as?
the?two?other?contexts,?but?Level?shift?occurs?not?involving?the?local?level.?
Therefore,? the? discussion? suggests? that? particularly? shifts? between? the?
national? and? international? level? of? the? conflicts? reinforce? escalation?
trajectories.?
?
The?Claim?shift?mechanism?is?prominent?in?all?three?contexts?and?seems?to?
be? the?most? important?mechanism? taking?effect?prior? to?escalations.?The?
oscillation? of?Western? policies? between? peace? talks? and? negotiations? on?
the?one?hand?and?support?of?militarizing,?central?state?elites?on?the?other?
hand? seems? a? general? pattern? of? Western? destabilization? of? volatile?
trajectories? of? violence.? As? Goodhand? and?Walton? point? out? for? the? Sri?
Lanka? case,?Western? agency? takes? on? a? double? role,? often? even? on? the?
same? level? of? agency.? This? circumstance? becomes? visible? in? the? case? of?
negotiations? over? conflict? settlement? in? an? international? context? when?
Western?actors?often?assume?a?leading?role,?as?initiators?or?facilitators,?but?
at? the?very? least?pointedly?address? their?expectations?of? the?outcome?of?
negotiations? to? the? central? state? elites? involved? in? them.? In? this? vein,?
Western? actors? often? link? success? in? negotiations? to? funding? or? political?
support.?However,?Western?actors?also?heavily?emphasize?the?process?and?
style? of? negotiations:?Western? partners? establish? issues? on? the? agenda?
(local? elections,? territorial? access? of? groups? of? population,? economic?
rehabilitation? etc.),? direct? small? decisions? along? the?way? of? negotiations?
(deployment?of?a?military?check?point?in?a?specific?area,?ethnic?composition?
of?peace?keeping?forces,?tasks?of?police?forces,?etc.),?or?establish?directives?
of? validation? or? legitimacy? of? the? negotiations? or? of? local? state? agency?
within?the?negotiations?(monitoring?reports?of?observers? in?conflict?areas,?
assumed?signs?of?commitment?by?local?actors,?election?monitoring?reports,?
etc.).? All? these? measures? have? considerable? impact? even? without? a?
formalized? mandate? of? the? involved? Western? agents,? but? more?
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importantly,? none? of? these? policies? is? addressed? or? implemented? to? a?
consistent?extent.? Instead,? international?negotiations?more?often?create?a?
platform? for? the? dual? role? of?Western? actors? in? simultaneously? stressing?
democracy? and? state?centered? demands,? which? fosters? the? ambiguous?
strategy? of? local? state? elites? in? prolonging? negotiations?while? seeking? a?
military?solution.?
?
Possibly?the?most?convincing?suggestion?of?the?importance?of?claim?shift?in?
triggering?escalation?can?be?attributed?to?the?Kashmir?context.?Out?of?three?
mechanisms,?only?claim?shift?shows?as?a?significant? indicator?of?escalation?
in? Kashmir.? Interaction? and? level? shift? perform? weakly.? However,?
escalations? occur?with? high? effects? of? assertive? policies? of? local? elites? in?
response? to? Western? policies? playing? at? both? democracy? and? state?
centered? policies? throughout? the? trajectory.? In? this? respect,? claim? shift?
seems?to?be?a?prevalent?trigger?of?the?escalation?trajectory.?
?
Divergences?
These? cross?context? similarities? seem? plausible? even? given? the? context?
specific? divergences,? and? seem? even? more? plausible? in? light? of? those?
differences.?Therefore,?table?5?also?accounts?for?divergences?between?the?
contexts.?Specific?divergences?between?contexts?might?make?for?different?
readings? of? similar? results,? but? more? importantly,? these? differences? in?
functions?of?mechanisms?bring?to?the?surface?the?explanatory?outreach?of?
the? causal? links? they? propose? to? embrace.? The? following? brief? list? of?
structural? differences? in? available? power? resources? for? local? state? shows?
that? even? though? these? differences? exist,? the? underlying?mechanisms? of?
Western? policies? nonetheless? trigger? local? policies? in? similar? ways.? The?
following?discussion?does?not?claim?completeness,?but?will?confine?itself?to?
those?differences?that?arise?from?the?above?discussion.?
?
Resources?to?which?local?elites?in?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?can?resort?in?order?
to?consolidate?power?differ?greatly.? In?one?example,?Sri?Lanka’s?two?party?
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system?creates?a?major?difference?to?Kashmir?or?Georgia?in?how?the?two?Sri?
Lankan? family? clans?at? the?head?of? state? swap?office? almost?every?other?
election?as?an?integral?part?of?the?established?democratic?procedure.?Even?
though?this?provides?a?solid?power?resource?elites?can?utilize? in?Sri?Lanka,?
but?which?does?not?occur? in?Georgia?or?Kashmir,?this?does?not?make?for?a?
difference?in?power?consolidating?behavior?of?local?elites?in?the?contexts?of?
the?conflicts.?First,?elites’?power?depends?on?strengthening? the?state?and?
state?policies?even?if?they?are?not?in?office.?This?might?plausibly?explain?why?
in?all?three?cases?opposition?parties?support? the?government? line?when? it?
comes? to? strong?handed? policies? in? the? conflicts,? also? with? respect? to?
corresponding?with?Western?engagement,?such?as?in?India?during?the?Kargil?
war.?Second,?more? than?on?Western?support,?elite’s?power?consolidation?
depends?on?other?local,?more?radical?domestic?actors?such?as?the?military,?
the? JVP?or? radical?Buddhist? groups? (above? all? see:?Rösel?2004,?Piechotta?
2003,?Weiberg? 2009)? in? Sri? Lanka? or? the?Orthodox? church? in?Georgia.?A?
case? in?point?was?when?the?Rajapakse?government? in?Sri?Lanka?turned?to?
an?anti?Western?stance?after?the?successor?government?had?lost?domestic?
support? over? too? close? cooperation?with?Western? agencies.? In? Georgia,?
leaderships? regularly? come? under? pressure? from? conservative? or? radical?
Orthodox? groups,?which? accuse? them? of? selling? out?Georgia? to?Western?
interests,? with? the? Georgian? Orthodox? church? ranking? by? far? the? most?
trusted? institution? in? Georgia? (CRRC? 2012).? When? the? church? outlet?
‘Episkopali’?after? the?2008?war?promoted? the? idea? that?God?had?sent? the?
Russian?troops?to?punish?Georgia?for?its?ties?with?the?West,?this?found?wide?
approval? among? the? population,? despite? the? fact? that? the? conflict? was?
already?considered? to?be?a?product?of? the?West?and?Russia?clashing?over?
Georgia.??
The?nationalist?stance?Georgian?state?elites?employ? in?the?conflict?to?keep?
domestic? support? significantly? impacts? on? options? in? those? critical?
moments?of?shifts?that?are?triggered?by?Western?policies.?This?appears?to?
support?the?central?argument?as?it?might?be?a?hint?that?the?conditionalities?
of?the?Western? liberal?peace?project?create?exactly? the?pressure?point?on?
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local? elites? that? gives? way? to? assertive? measures? as? it? alienates? the?
government?from?the?population.?
?
In? a? first? divergence,? the? pattern? of?Western? policies? toward? conflicting?
states?differs?across? contexts.? In? Sri? Lanka,? the?Western?peace?project? is?
much?better?implemented,?structured?and?professionalized?than?in?Georgia?
or?Kashmir.?As? the?discussion? shows,? it?does?not?make? for?differences? in?
effects.?Rather,? in?the?Sri?Lanka?case? it? is?plausible?to?assume,?also?on?the?
basis? of? the? Goodhand? and? Walton? study,? that? the? higher? level? of?
organization?concentrates?Western?impact,?makes?it?more?effective?and?to?
an?even?higher?extent?reinforces?escalation?trajectories.?Furthermore,?even?
though?Western?actors?do?not?engage?on?the?ground?in?Kashmir,?Western?
conditionalities? reinforce? trajectories? in? how? the? Indian? national? elites?
translate?Western? policies? via? their? democracy?centered? policies? of? local?
elections,? human? and? civil? rights? of? local? party? leaders? and? the? like.? A?
second?difference? in?Western?policies? is? found? in? the?Kashmir?case?where?
the?West? has? a? clear? and? far? more? consistent? line? in? supporting? India?
against? Pakistan? than? supporting? Georgia? against? Russia.? Mohan? even?
claims?this?led?to?a?more?compromising?stance?of?India?in?negotiations?with?
Pakistan? (Mohan? 2006:? 20),?but? effects? remain? unchanged? as? the? toll?of?
violence?has?not?abated.? In?a?general?view,?support?with?a?more?or?a? less?
clear?cut?bias?on?one?side?of?conflict?does?not?seem?to?correlate?with? less?
influence? of? Western? policies? on? the? national/? central? state? level.?
Therefore,? bias? does? neither? seem? to? lead? to? consistency? in? Western?
policies?with?regard?to?levels?and?claims,?nor?does?it?release?the?incentives?
for? local? elites? to? shift? to? escalation.? A? third? difference? is? posed? by? the?
Western? anti?terrorism? agenda? that? is? a? crucial? stake? in?Delhi?Islamabad?
relations?over?Kashmir?and?in?Colombo’s?stance?toward?LTTE.?The?terrorism?
agenda? has? led? to? a? tougher? approach? of? the? West? toward? LTTE? and?
Pakistan,?and?much?so?to?the?use?of?the?central?state?elites?in?Colombo?and?
Delhi?who? secure?Western? support?by? joining? the?anti?terrorism?alliance.?
International? terrorism,? on? the? other? hand,? is? not? an? issue? in? the? South?
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Ossetia?context?where?no? Islamist?militants?or?political?Muslim?groups?are?
involved?(on?the?North?Caucasus?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?see:?
Dzutsev?2012).?Nonetheless,? reading? the?effects?of? the? terrorism? agenda?
on? the? elites? in? Sri? Lanka? or? India? suggests? the? conclusion? that?Western?
anti?terrorism?policies?are? reinforcing? the?Western?globally?pursued?state?
formation? project.? In? other? words,? the? anti?terrorism? agenda? makes?
Western? actors? concentrate? their? policies? specifically? at? the? level? of? the?
central?state?as?this?organization?shares?the?common? interest?of?subduing?
elements? that? undermine? traditional? features? of? stateness.? This? leads? to?
the? strengthening?of? state? elites? that? generally? tend? to?opt? for? assertive?
measures?in?circumstances?of?territorial?disintegration.?A?fourth?difference?
is?the?trend?of?the?Sri?Lankan?government?to?seek?out?external?support?of?
non?Western?actors? such?as?China? to?keep?domestic? support?and?private?
gains,?whereas?Georgia?maintains?an?invariably?strong?pro?Western?course.?
However,?the?difference?does?not?withstand?closer?scrutiny:?Sri?Lanka?still?
adheres?to?the?Western?agenda?with?the?Rajapakse?government? initiating?
new?rounds?of?talks?after?2006.?Also,?Georgia?entertains?trade?relations?of?
comparably? considerable? volume? with? China? and? Iran? (Ministry? of?
Commerce? of? the? People’s? Republic? of? China? 12.07.2012,? Xinhua?
05.04.2010;?Kachia?2011).?Rather,?the?trend?of?small?states?with?territorial?
problems?turning?to?non?Western?support?reveals?how? little?commitment?
and?opportunity? to?pursue?non?assertive?measures? in? territorial?disputes?
exists?at?the?level?of?local?state?elites.?Therefore,?attracting?resources?from?
actors? that? do? not? link? their? support? to? democracy?centered?
conditionalities,?do?not?attempt?to? influence?domestic?affairs,?and?do?not?
trigger?criticism?by?local?constituencies?seems?a?favorable?option.??
?
Altogether,? divergences? in? patterns? of? external? policies? to? a? substantial?
extent?account?for?the?same?mechanisms?of?Western?agency?with?respect?
to? inconsistency?of?claims?and?arenas.?As?had?been?mentioned?earlier?as?
part? of? the? theoretical? discussion,? even? though? conditions? such? as?
availability? to? resources? or? agendas? might? differ? between? contexts? or?
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within? the? same? process,? this? exhibits? surprisingly? little? effect? with? the?
same? mechanisms? functioning? prior? to? re?escalation.? Therefore,? the?
findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? research? at? times? come? about? under?
diverging? functions?of?external?agency?by?weighing?differently?on?specific?
policies,? categories? of? actors,? or? level? of? agency,? or? operating? under?
differing?local?mechanisms?of?power?when?elites?are?composed?or?respond?
differently?to?Western?actors.?Generally,?the?causal?link?of?Western?policies?
and? local? elite? behavior? that?was? detected? in? the? South?Ossetia? case? is?
commonly? repeated? to? the? same? effect? of? re?escalation.? Therefore,? it?
seems? plausible? to? assume? that? when?Western? policies? proceed? in? the?
general?way?described,?local?elites?react?in?the?observed?way?to?the?effect?
of? providing? for? the? context? to? shift? toward? escalation.? In? other?words,?
similar?cross?case?patterns?are?not?only? rooted? in? similar?case? structures,?
but?also?in?similar?effects?on?similar?local?behavior?of?repetitive?patterns?of?
external?policies.??
?
The?Sri?Lanka?and?the?Kashmir?contexts?provide?excellent?examples?of?how?
Western? influence? in? contexts? of? violence? follows? a? defined? agenda? of,?
both,? state? formation? and? liberal? peace?building.?Goodhand? and?Walton?
have? already? stated? in? their? Sri? Lanka? study? that? this? agenda? envisages?
implementing?vested?interests?through?a?liberal?vision?of?importing?conflict?
resolution,? liberal? democracy? and?market? economy? and? their? effect? on?
local?elites’?policies?(Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?304).?
?
The? study? of? Lazarus? (2010)? examines? neo?liberal? state? building? and?
democracy?promotion?specifically?in?the?case?of?Georgia.?Regarding?illiberal?
effects?of?Western?policies?on?domestic? forms?of? rule? in?Georgia,?Lazarus?
comes? to?similar?conclusions?as? this?study? (Lazarus?2010:?2).? Importantly,?
Lazarus?emphasizes?that,?first,?the?self?interest?of?the?agendas?of?all?states?
results?in?support?of?autocratic?regimes?and,?second,?technocratic?needs?of?
external? actors? “produce[s]? a? centralising? rather? than? a? democratic? or?
participatory? bias? in? their? modus? operandi”? (ibid.).? Lazarus,? therefore,?
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criticizes? an? increasing? gap? of? legitimacy? of?Western? engagement? in? the?
field?of?democracy?promotion?(ibid.:?3).?
?
This? study? agrees? with? these? findings? and? found? that? these? illiberal?
outcomes?take?significant?effect?specifically?in?the?context?of?escalations?of?
violence? in? the? South? Ossetia? case.?Moreover,? the? empirical? discussion?
illustrated? important?considerations?for?studies?of?the?Western?project.? In?
the? contexts?of? South?Ossetia,?Sri? Lanka?and?Kashmir,? the?Western? state?
formation/? liberal?agenda? is?a?practical?expression?of?the?Western?pursuit?
of?power?outside? its?domestic?sphere,?generating?mechanisms?of?external?
influence? that? significantly? contribute? to? triggering? local? violence.? The?
discussion? of? the? Kashmir? context? illustrated? that? even? if? Western?
engagement? on? the? local? or? national? level? of? the? conflict? is? limited,? the?
structural?norm?pressure?of? the?Western?agenda?works? through?national?
policies?and?influences?contexts?of?violence.?The?Sri?Lanka?case?provides?a?
clear? example? of? how? ongoing? violence? provides? the? basis? for?Western?
actors?to?push?conditionalities?connected?to?their?agendas.?Once?violence?
ceases,?Western?actors? lose? their?stakes.?Therefore,?Western?policies?not?
only?trigger?violence,?but?they?also?only?function?in?contexts?of?violence.??
?
The?generalizing?empirical?outreach?of?the? findings?suggests?that? it? is? less?
specific? forms? of? external? policies? that? rule? the? game? and? lead? to?
escalations? (such? as? specific? forms? of? military,? political? or? financial?
support),?but?the?state?formation?and?liberal?peace?agendas?that?local?state?
actors? themselves? locally? interpret? make? for? re?escalating? dynamics? of?
violence.? It? is? surprising? to?what? an? enormous? extent? and? simultaneous?
precision? local? state? elites,? in? their? attempts? to? consolidate? power,? are?
capable? of? transforming? the? state?formation? agenda? through? the? lens?of?
local?politics?on?the?ground?of?their?respective?violent?conflicts.?This?can?be?
observed? in? all? instances? mentioned? above,? such? as? a? more?
professionalized? Western? peace? agenda? at? the? central? state? level,?
consistent?Western? support? for? the? central? state? in? the? conflict,? and? the?
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focus? on? democracy? features? of? non?violence.? In? all? cases,? the?Western?
two?pronged? role? on? various? levels? fosters? the? central? state? elite’s?
assertion?leaning?stance?in?the?conflicts?and?provides?for?re?escalation.?
?
?
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5. Conclusion?
This?dissertation?proposes?an?explanation?to?the?question?of?why?violence?
in? South? Ossetia? has? escalated? recurrently? since? its? start? in? 1989.? After?
careful? discussion? of? the? existing? arguments? in? light? of? the? empirical?
context,? the? study? examines? the? influence? of? Western? policies? in? re?
escalations? in? the? conflict.? Western? policies,? the? argument? maintains,?
influence? the? power? politics? of? Georgian? state? elites? to? the? extent? of?
providing? incentives? for? assertive? policies? toward? South? Ossetia.? This?
interaction,? intersecting? with? the? policies? of? Russian? and? Ossetian?
stakeholders? and? domestic? political? and? private? incentives,? repeatedly?
leads?to?the?escalation?of?violence?in?the?conflict.?
?
The? research? argued? that? studies? on? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? largely?
juxtapose?state?building?and?democratization?and?also,?ethnic?groups?and?
nationalism? as? key? factors? of? the? conflict.? Neither? strand? of? debate?
provides?an?explanation?as? to?why?escalations?occur?at? specific?points? in?
time? and?why? they? recur.? Those? factors?merely? explain? that? the? context?
deteriorated? in?favor?of?escalation,?but?do?not?explain?or?provide?credible?
links?why? and? how? escalations? occurred? at? the? points? in? time? observed.?
Therefore,?these?studies?refrain?from?addressing?the?specific?conditions?of?
the? South? Ossetia? case? and? link? secession? to? exogenous? factors.? The?
research? undertaken? here? is? an? attempt? to? contribute? to? the? debate? a?
systematic? study? on? triggers? of? violence? in? South? Ossetia? as? a?
representative?case?of?a?protracted?armed?conflict.?
?
The? study? traces? the?process?of?Western?policies’? influence?on?Georgian?
leaderships’?options?for?power?consolidation?prior?to?escalations.?The?study?
further? suggests? that? the? patterns? of? Western? agency? that? repeatedly?
occurred?prior?to?three?instances?of?escalation?–?in?2002,?2004?and?2008?–?
are? mechanisms? of? re?escalation? in? South? Ossetia.? More? precisely,? the?
study?maintains?that?the?three?mechanisms?of? Interaction,?Level?shift?and?
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Object? shift?each? take?effect? from? the? start? to? the?end?of? the?escalation?
cycle?and?hence?gradually?lead?to?escalation.?
?
In?its?most?crucial?finding,?the?study?claims?to?have?plausibly?sustained?this?
causal?link?by?showing?that,?first,?shifts?in?Western?policies?determined?the?
points? in? time? of? escalation? (as? opposed? to? the? impetus? of? Georgian,?
Ossetian?or?Russian?agency)?and,?second,?shifts?in?Western?policies?set?off?
escalation? cycles? (in? continuous? interaction? with? other? stakeholders).?
Therefore,?the?study?concludes?that?the? influence?of?Western?actors?such?
as? the? OSCE,? the? EU,? the? US,? NATO? and? EU? member? states? had? and?
continues? to? have? a? direct? and? decisive? impact? on? the? dynamics? of? the?
conflict? through? enabling? and? restricting? the? options? of? power?
consolidation?for?local?leaderships.?
?
These?closing?remarks?would?like?to?point?out?three?issues?of?relevance?for?
further?consideration,? relating? to?conclusions?about? the?case,? the?general?
properties? of? the? case? and? resources? for? further? research.? First,? the?
revelation? of? the? Bucharest? fallacy? emphasizes? the? importance? of?
unseating? the? false? perception? of? the? influence? of? Russian?Georgian? or?
Russian?Western? contentious? politics? in? the? context? of? the? conflict.? The?
2008?August?war?altered?the?structure?of?European?Russian?relations?since?
the?Second?World?War?in?a?lasting?manner,?as?it?gave?way?to?the?end?of?the?
European? Security?Charta.?Because?of? this,? it? is?widely?held? that?Russian?
pressure? at? the?NATO? summit? in?Bucharest? pushed? the? dynamics? of? the?
South?Ossetia?conflict?over?the?brink?to?war,?and?that?Western?actors?were?
the?guilty?but?weak?by?standers.?In?light?of?this?study,?however,?it?appears?
that?the?Bucharest?summit? in?April?2008?was?not?the?triggering?factor?but?
merely?a? reinforcing? instance?of?Western?actors’?passive? support?of? local?
assertive?politics?one? and? a?half? years?earlier.? The? study?points?out?how?
Western? policies,? once? the? escalation? cycle? had? started,? reinforced?
dynamics?through?the?Bucharest?refusal,?but?that?in?fact?Western?policies’?
triggering?effect?took?place?at?the?very? local? level? in? interaction?with?(and?
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support? of)? the? local? leadership.?At? least? in? this? important? instance,? the?
much?employed? argument?of? a?Western?Russian? struggle,?occurring?over?
the?heads?of? local?stakeholders?and?detached? from? local?affairs,?does?not?
hold.?A?remarkable?finding?of?this?study?is?that,?apparently,?Georgian?state?
elites?are?more?easily?led?into?assertive?policies?through?Western?influence?
than?through?domestic?or?Russian?incentives.?
?
The? prevalence? of?Western? influence? on? the? conflict’s? dynamics? is? also?
apparent? through? the? enormous? impact? of? the? paradigm? of? stateness?
translated?into?policy.?Western?influence?not?only?crucially?determines?the?
choice? of? policies? (anti?smuggling,? anti?crime,? anti?corruption,? territorial?
integration,? taxation? and? customs,? etc.),? but? also? of? agendas.? Stateness?
ranks?before?private?gains,?nationalist?ambitions,?democratic?goals,?or?even?
Western? integration.?The?norm?of?statehood,? facilitated?through?Western?
policies,?creates?the?necessity?for?local?state?leaderships?to?comply?with?it,?
regardless?of?Western?actors’?motives?or?local?leaderships’?aims.?As?actors?
work? through? the? norm? of? the? state,? not? only? does? the? specific? role? of?
Western? policies? prior? to? escalations? become? apparent? in? facilitating? in?
local? contexts.? It? is? also? clear? that? the? state? paradigm? weakens? the?
immediate?effect?of?local?Russian?or?Georgian? interests?in?the?conflict?and?
renders?the?Western?impact?on?re?escalation?dynamics?more?forceful.?
?
Therefore,? the?general?prevalence?of? the?paradigm?of? stateness,?working?
through?Western?policies? into? local?choices?and?affecting?the?dynamics?of?
violence,?is?the?most?important?finding?with?general?applicability?for?other?
contexts? of? violence.? In? this? respect,? the? study? sustains? the? paradox? of?
liberal? external? state? building? leading? to? illiberal? outcomes? such? as?
assertive? measures? of? state? leaderships? in? contexts? of? violence.? As?
Goodhand?and?Walton’s?discussions?of?Sri?Lanka?and?Lazarus’?discussions?
of?Georgia? impressively?show,?the?focus?of?Western?politics?on? local?state?
elites?largely?triggers?illiberal?outcomes?in?volatile?states.?This?study?would?
like?to?add?that?Western?policies?themselves?are?founded?on?the?paradigm?
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of?statehood?and?therefore?not?only?convey?a?norm?to? local?contexts,?but?
also?underlie?very?similar?power?restrictions?and?interests?as?the?local?elites?
who? then?guide?Western?policies? toward? illiberal?domestic?choices.?More?
precisely,? even? in? their? foreign? policy? agendas,?Western? policies? in? local?
contexts? of? violence? exhibit? mechanisms? largely? overlapping? with? local?
mechanisms?of?power?consolidation?in?the?same?contexts.?In?general,?it?can?
be?held?that?Western?actors?seek? influence,?or?power,? in?conflict?contexts?
while?being?subject?to,?and?subjecting?others?to,?the?norm?of?stateness.?In?
a?crucial?difference?from?local?elites,?Western?actors?enjoy?a?higher?degree?
of? free? range?between? levels?of?agency?and?claims,?which,?under?specific?
conditions,?has?a?particularly? intense?reinforcing?effect?on? local?dynamics.?
It?is?possible?that?Western?agents?might?enjoy?a?greater?freedom?of?range?
than? local? elites? in? part? because? they? are? less? accountable? to? their?
constituencies,?who?are?more?removed?from?their?leaders’?actions?abroad?
(there? are? of? course? exceptions? such? as? high? expenses? in? warfare? or?
casualties?of?soldiers).? In?this? light,?a?key?finding?of?the?study?tells?us?that?
not?only?the?power? interest?of? local?elites?triggers?escalation,?but?also?the?
power?interest?of?external?Western?actors.?
?
The?study?specifically?established?a? link?between?Western?policies?and?re?
escalations?of?violence.?The?findings?show?that?only?similar?circumstances?
of?agency?(interaction?of?stakeholders,?agendas,?policies,?etc.)?under?which?
the?conflict?escalates?recur?at?different?points?in?time.?Western?agency,?as?
well,? exhibits? a? pattern? that? specifically? upholds? the? dynamics? of? re?
escalation? over? extended? periods? of? time? and? encompassing? individual?
points? of? escalation.? This? was? revealed? by? the? overall? trajectory? of?
intensification? of? the? conflict,? which? was? discussed? at? the? start? of? the?
empirical?analysis,?showing?that?over?the?re?escalation?process,? increasing?
Western?engagement?coincides?with?an? increasing? focus?on? issues?of? the?
state?and?the? involvement?of?state?actors.?Similarly,?the?study?shows?that?
with? each? escalation? the? paradox? of? democracy? versus? state?centered?
policies? increases? whereby? Western? agency? not? only? aggravates? the?
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dynamics?prior?to?each?escalation,?but?also?seems?to?maintain?the?general?
tendency?toward?re?escalation.??
?
This?link?between?Western?policies?and?re?escalations?of?violence?might?be?
explained?by?considering? the?Sri?Lanka?context,? for?which?Goodhand?and?
Walton? (2010)? argue? that? the? formation? and? implementation? of? the?
Western?agenda?necessitates?the?existence?of?violence.?It?is?worth?looking?
at?the?preliminary?end?of?the?cycle?of?violence? in?Sri?Lanka?after?the?2009?
war.?During? the?military? campaign,? international? state? actors? reluctantly?
condemned?the?government?for?human?rights?violations.?Punitive?steps?of?
Western?agencies?against? the? Sri? Lankan?government?were? implemented?
with? years? of? delay,? among? them? the? cancellation? of? preferential? trade?
relations?with?the?EU?or?the?refusal?of?the?conditions?linked?to?an?IMF?loan?
(see? ICG? 2010).? Similarly,? when? the? UNHCR? announced? that? it? would?
investigate? human? rights? violations? in? March? 2012,? the? Colombo?
government? refused? the? request? citing? concerns? of? infringement? of?
sovereignty.? It?seems?to?raise? legitimate?questions?about?Western?agency?
that? when? the? Sri? Lankan? government? ceased? seeing? the? necessity? of?
military?violence?as?a?means?of?securing? internal?control?after?the?military?
victory?of?2009,? the? implementation?of? the?Western?agenda? in? Sri? Lanka?
lost?its?foothold.?
??
This?situation,? in?contrast?to?the?South?Ossetia?case,?can?be?seen? to?have?
arisen?because?the?Sri?Lankan?government?expected?the?military?conflict?to?
have? ended.? In? contexts? of? ongoing? violence? such? as? South?Ossetia,? the?
‘non?use? of? force’? demand? by? international? actors? continues? to? direct?
Western?local? relations,? such?as? in? the? framework?of? the?Geneva? talks? in?
which? the?Georgian? government? signaled? goodwill? to?Western? actors? by?
unilaterally? declaring? non?use? of? force? after? the?war? of? 2008.? If? the? link?
between? the?efficiency?of? the?Western? liberal?peace?agenda?and?ongoing?
violence?proves?to?be?as?strong?as?the?discussion?suggests,?it?is?critical?that?
the?agenda?be?revised.?
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As?discussed?in?the?examples?of?Goodhand?and?Walton?and?Lazarus,?a?very?
small? but? insightful? body?of? research? looks? at? the? effect? of? the?Western?
liberal?peace?agenda?on?local?regimes.?Western?actors?do?not?seem?able?to?
navigate?between? their?desire? for?a?strong?state?as?a?reliant?partner,?and?
their?poor?understanding?of? local?necessities?which,?one?way?or?another,?
seem?to?regularly?lead?to?authoritarian?features?of?rule,?particularly?in?light?
of?Western? support.?However,?with? respect? to? local? contexts?of? violence?
facilitated?by?these?regimes,?it?should?be?noted?that?local?violence?is?one?of?
the? outcomes? of? the?Western? agenda.?Vice? versa,? violence? seems? to? be?
among? the? most? powerful? catalyzing? forces,? providing? a? determining?
context? of? agency.? As? this? study? shows,? once? violence? has? started,? the?
initial? interests?and?conditions?persist,? intensify,?and?seemingly? inevitably?
lead?to?escalation.?This? is?particularly?valid?for?the?paradigm?of?statehood?
and?the?power?claims?of? local?and?external?actors?linked?to? it?–?especially,?
as?the?research?suggests,?for?the?impact?of?external?policies?on?local?power?
mechanisms.?
?
The?study?calls?for?further?research?to?be?done?in?the?field?of?re?escalation?
in? internal?contexts?of?violence.?First,?the? link?between?external?and? local?
policies?needs?to?be? further?explored.?Further?research?should? focus?on?a?
disaggregation?of?the?processes?in?the?chain?of?agency?leading?to?violence.?
In?this?respect,?there?is?a?need?to?identify?the?precise?external?mechanisms?
that? elicit? change? in? local? behavior? prior? to? escalation.? Research? should?
answer?whether? there?are? specific?mechanisms? that?are?more? likely? than?
others?to?trigger?change?in?behavior,?whether?this?effect?of?mechanisms?of?
external?agency?varies?according? to?points? in? time? (earlier?or? later? in? the?
escalation? cycle),? and? whether? further? research? can? derive? more?
generalized? statements? on? the? characteristics? of? the? mechanisms?
identified,? analyzing? the? effect? of? 1)? claim? or? action?based? properties? of?
state?and?democracy?centered?policies? (e.g.? rhetoric,? formats,? facilitation?
projects,? implementation? of? frameworks,? etc.)? or? 2)? the? effect? of? and?
connection? between? levels? of? agency,? in? further? exploring? how? external?
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agency?switches?arenas?of?agency?and?how?agency?at?different?levels,?such?
as? the? international,? national? and? local? level? of? the? conflict,? exhibits?
different?effects?on?the?dynamics?of?re?escalation.?In?this?respect,? it?might?
be? important? to? look?at? the?different?effects?of?state?centered?policies? in?
contrast?to?democracy?centered?policies?in?terms?of?the?level?at?which?they?
are? carried? out.? For? instance,? democracy?centered? policies? could? exhibit?
different?effects?at?the?international?as?opposed?to?the?national?level?of?the?
conflict.?This?study?gave?some?attention?to?that?topic,?but?further?research?
should?explore?the?issue?in?depth.?
?
The?second?suggestion?for?further?research?also?points?to?study?at?the?level?
of?agency,?but?with?the?aim?of?aggregating?social?mechanisms?of?violence.?
In? order? to? expand? the? scope? of? the? findings,? it?would? be? necessary? to?
compare?key?decision?points?prior? to?escalations?by?working?across?cases?
(also? see? Capoccia? and? Keleman? 2007).? In? the? context? of? the? previous?
analysis,?this?would?include?identifying?shifts?in?local?behavior?toward?more?
assertive?policies,?as?well?as?possibly?related?Western?policies?prior?to?the?
turning?points.?As?a? result,? social? research? could?make? statements?about?
when? in?the?escalation?cycle?behavior? is?generally?more? likely?to?shift?and?
under?which? circumstances,? including?not?only? external?Western?policies?
but?also?their?interaction?with?local?and?regional?factors?in?the?conflict.?
?
Lastly,?this?study?brings?up?the?question?of?why?South?Ossetia?seems?to?be?
the?major?place?of?contention?and?not?Abkhazia,? the? locus?of? the?second?
secessionist? conflict? on? Georgia’s? territory.? Escalations? of? violence? in?
Abkhazia?took?place?regularly?from?the?end?of?the?war? in?1994?until?2008,?
involving? the? UN?mandated? Georgian? and? Abkhaz? police? forces,? regular?
Georgian?troops?on? interior?as?well?as? local?Georgian?and?Abkhaz?militias,?
and,? since? 2008,? Russian? troops? deployed? in? Abkhazia.? Nonetheless,?
escalations?in?Abkhazia?seem?to?exhibit?much?weaker?effects?on?the?power?
basis?of?Georgian?elites?and?draw? less?vociferous?Western? reactions? than?
violence? in? the? South? Ossetia? context? (see? on? the? conflict? in? Abkhazia:?
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Derluguian? 2000? and? 2007,? Suny? 1994,? Beissinger? 2002,? Coppieters? and?
Legvold?2005,?Hanf?and?Nodia?2000).?Therefore,?the?discussion?would? like?
to? briefly? point? out? parallels? between? the? South? Ossetia? and? Abkhazia?
contexts? and? their? potential? for? framing? causative? statements? on? South?
Ossetia’s?dynamics.??
?
Two?aspects?are?central:?First,?a?possible?answer?to?differing?links?between?
dynamics?and?agency?might?be?that?the?conflict?with?Abkhazia?plays?a?very?
different?role? from? that? in?South?Ossetia? in? terms?of?power?consolidation?
for? Georgian? leadership.? The? Georgian? nationalist? narrative? usually?
establishes? Abkhazia? as? a? separate? nation? within? the? Georgian? state,?
whereas? this? attitude? does? not? extend? to? South?Ossetia? (Khinchagashvili?
2004,?Shatirishvili?2003).?Second,?separation?after? the?end?of? the?Abkhaz?
Georgian? war? in? 1994? took? the? form? of? a? far? more? formalized? and?
institutionalized? framework?of?de?facto? autonomy? than? in? South?Ossetia,?
with? the? emergence?of? a? local?political? culture,? the? formation?of? foreign?
relations?between?the?Abkhaz?elite?and?Western?agencies,?and?a?de?facto?
visa? regime?with? Georgia? through? the?UN?Mission.? In? post?Soviet? South?
Ossetia,? all? these? features?were? closely? linked? to? and? controlled? by? the?
Russian? Federation.? A? third? indicator? might? be? that? organized? armed?
conflict? in? Abkhazia? at? the? start? of? the? 1990s? was? an? arena? for? local?
Georgian? strongmen? struggling? for? power? in? the? capital? (I? 1,? also? see:?
Coppieters? and? Legvold? 2005).? This? suggests? that?whereas? secessionism?
might?have?been?based?on?and? implemented? through?ethnic?nationalism,?
the?dynamics?of?the?conflict?in?Abkhazia?generated?power?resources?linked?
to?ethnic?nationalism?and?external?involvement?through?Western?actors?to?
a? far? lesser?extent?than? in?South?Ossetia.?This?might?have? led?to?different?
dynamics? in? the?Abkhazia? context?and?a?different? link?between?Georgian?
power?consolidation?and?Western? impact? in? the?Abkhazia?context?than? in?
South?Ossetia.??
?
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However,?some?interview?partners?suggested?that?the?conflict?in?Abkhazia?
could?be?seen?as?a?smokescreen?for?the?South?Ossetia?context?(I?1,?I?2,?I?3).?
This?view?holds?that?Russia?has?a?stronger?interest?in?control?over?Abkhazia?
because?of?access? to?Black?Sea?waters? than? in? land?locked?South?Ossetia?
(also?see?Derluguian?2007).?Proponents?argue?that,?therefore,?Abkhazia? is?
in?fact?the?center?of?Russian?Georgian?contention?and?that?when?dynamics?
in?Abkhazia?shift,?the?ramifications?resonate? in?multiplied?form? in?the? less?
stable? South?Ossetia.? This? view? could? be? sustained,? as? just? two?months?
prior?to?the? installment?of?the?Sanakoev?administration? in?2006,?Georgian?
troops? recaptured? Kodori? Gorge? in? Abkhazia.? In? this? context,? a? shift? in?
Abkhazia?could?be?seen?as?having?preceded?and?possibly?being?part?of?the?
same?Georgian? agenda? of? territorial? integration? as? the? shift? to? assertive?
behavior?of?Georgian?elites?in?South?Ossetia.?Similarly,?the?view?holds?that?
the?2008?war?started?not?in?South?Ossetia,?but?with?Russian?troops?quietly?
moving? into? Abkhazia? days? prior? to? the? start? of? armed? action? in? South?
Ossetia.??
?
These? arguments? plausibly? sustain? that? there? is? a? link? between? the?
Abkhazia? and? the? South?Ossetia?dynamics? that? is?not?only? forged?by? the?
common?context,?but?also?shown?in?palpable?trajectories?of?events?on?the?
ground.? However,? the? diminished? scope? of? politicized? Western?
engagement?with?Abkhazia?when?addressing?state?elites?in?Tbilisi?suggests?
a?greater? impact?of?Western?policies?on? local?power?consolidation? in? the?
South?Ossetia? context.? It? seems? as? though? the? differences? between? the?
Abkhazia? and? South?Ossetia? contexts? actually? fortify? the? findings? of? the?
South?Ossetia? study:?They?explicitly? reiterate? that? shifts? in? local?behavior?
bring?about?escalations?in?South?Ossetia,?but?that,?simultaneously,?Western?
engagement? is? the? key? trigger? to? escalation? and? re?escalation? in? South?
Ossetia?and?possibly?in?other?cases?as?well.?
? ?
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7.?Annexes?
?
ANNEX?1:??Chronology?of?political?and?violence?events?1989?2007?
?
Based?on?research?at?the?archive?of?the?OSCE?office?in?Prague,?Czech?Republic,?January?and?February?2009?
?
When? Event? Casualties? Source Remarks
1989? ?? ?? ??
?? SO?appeal?to?the?Geo?
Supreme?Soviet?for?the?
upgrading?from?Aut?Region?
to?Aut?Republic?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
– ?“Since?then?tensions?escalate”
–??numerous?clashed?between?Geo?and?SO?populations?
1990? ?? ?? ??
Aug? SO?appeal?to?Moscow?for?
recognition?as?
independent?subject?of?
Soviet?Federation?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
Rejection?by?both?Moscow?and?Tbs
Oct? Parliamentary?Elections?in?
Geo?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
Oct? Declaration?of?sovereignty?
(of?independence)?by?SO?
Supreme?Soviet?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
Dec? Vote?to?abolish?SO?special?
administrative?status?with?
Geo?by?Geo?Supreme?
Soviet?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
RU?under?Gorbachev?termed?vote?unconstitutional,?Geo?in?turn?rejected
1991? ?? ?? ??
26?
Mar?
Khazbegi?Agreement?
signed?by?Yeltsin?and?Gams?
?? Dok RU?language
31?
Mar?
Referendum?on?Geo’s?
sovereignty?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
9?Apr? Declaration?of?
Independence?of?the?Geo?
Supreme?Soviet?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
226?
?
May? Presidential?Elections.?
Gams?elected?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
May?? SO?Supreme?Soviet?votes?
to?restore?SO’s?
autonomous?status,?but?
under?jurisdiction?of?the?
Russian?Soviet?Republic?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
Geo?Supreme?Soviet?rejects
fall? Bus?with?20?Oss?people?
goes?missing?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague, 30?September?
1993,?Supplemental?Report,?September?27?30,?1993?
– ?13?bodies?found?27?29?Sept?1993
22?
Dec?
–??SO?Parliament?adopts?
Declaration?of?
independence?and?calling?
for?unification?with?NO??
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
(21?)? –??Gams?leaves?country? ?? ??
Dec? Geo?internal?conflict?with?
Gams?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
– ??22?Dec?1991?6?Jan?1992?Gams?left?country,?violence?and?substantial?casualties?occured,?
and?Shev?took?over.?
–???Gams?had?so?called?“’Round?table’?coalition”,?main?slogan?“Georgia?for?Georgians”?seen?
as?core?conflicting?issue?by?report.?Report?in?favor?of?Shev’s?approach?towards?“equality?and?
tolerance”?
1992? ?? ?? ??
Jan? Ousting?of?Gams? ?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
Parl?Elections?initially?planned?for?May?June?are?now?scheduled?for?11?Oct
mid?
Jan?
SO?referendum?of?
independence?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
– ?boycotted?by?Geo?population
–??NO?Supreme?Soviet?often?expressed?support?for?SO?positions?
–??RU:?Congress?of?People’s?Deputies?of?the?RF?made?the?diplomatic?recognition?of?Geo?
dependent?on?the?peaceful?resolution?of?the?SO?conflict?
24?
Mar?
OSCE?admitted?to?OSCE? ?? Decision?by?the?CSCE?Council?of?Ministers
Apr? Decision?to?disband?the?
paramilitary?Mkhedrioni?
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
?? Shev?visits?SO>?WHEN?
EXACTLY??
?? Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
May? ?? 7?killed? Activity?Report?(issued?20?Apr?1993,?no?indication?on?
which?time?period)?When?exactly,?who,?and?
background?
Oss?PKF?soldiers?state?sorrow?still?although?one?year?later?in?1993?because?of?that?incident
227?
?
May? ?? eventually?
casualties?by?
intervention?of?
Geo??sec?forces?
in?
demonstrations?
Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992?
– ?preparation?process?of?Sochi?Agreement?
–??Geo?side?ready?for?soft?form?of?autonomy?(“functional?autonomy”)?
–?SO?side?(refers?to?Decl?of?Ind)?calls?for?third?force?to?neutralize?the?fighting?and?provision?of?
legal?guarantees?for?people?living?in?that?area?
–??“?The?Republic?of?Georgia?has?a?population?of?nearly?5,5?mio?.?of?which?64?%?are?Georgian,?
10?%?Russian?and?Ukrainian,?9?Armenian,?5?%?A'zerbaidjani,?3?%?Ossetian,?3?%?Adzhars?and?2?
%?Abkhaz?.?In?addition?there?are?also?Jewish,?Greek?and?some?other?ethnic?groups.”?
3?May? First?call?up?for?new?Geo?
national?army?
?? ?? Mkhedrioni?to?be?part?of?the?Geo?army
20?
May?
?? 36?civilians?
killed?on?road?
north?of?Tskh?
Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?the?
Republic?of?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication?No?.?186?Prague,?29?May?1992;?OSCE?
Communication?Vienna?6?June,?2000,?OSCE?MISSION?
TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/00?15?May???5?
June?2000?
– ?“Massacre”?in?SO?(By?Geo?troops?or?villagers)
??Oss?civilians?
–??Geo?gov?immediatley?condemns?act?
–???Geo?gov?assures?to?take?heavy?armament?away?from?Geo?villagers?in?SO?to?prevent?
violence?
25?
May?
?? Geo?student?
killed?in?SO?
CSCE?Communication?No.?115,?CSCE?Mission?to?
Georgia/Activity?Report,?May?21?28,?1993?
One?year?later?memorial?held?in?Tamaresheni,?calls?for?reconciliation
24?Jun? Sochi?Agreement?signed? ?? Annex?II?of?CSCE?Communication?No.?228?Prague,?5?
August?1992,?Report?of?the?CSCE?Fact?Findinq?Mission?
to?the?region?of?Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict,?25?30?July?
1992?
Signed?by?Yeltsin,?Sev?and?co?signed?by?SO?and?NO?representatives
–???full?cease?fire?from?28?Jun,?security?corridor?along?the?lines?of?contact,?withdrawal?of?
armed?formations,?disarmament/?disbandment?of?militias.?JCC?has?been?set?up.?Oss?Geo?RU?
PKF?created?and?deployed.?Military?obervers?subordinate?to?the?JCC?supervises?
implementation?of?cease?fire?
–??JCC?has?been?set?up?through?“Dagomys?Agreement”?WHERE?IS?IT??WHEN??
Jul? Estimate?of?RU?und?SO?on?
reconstruction?needs?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?150?Prague,?14?June?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?–?Activity?Report?June?5?–?13,?
1993?
– ?34?billion?rubles?from?both?RU?and?GEO?over?5?years
–??never?paid?out?for?SO?gov?refusing?transfers?through?Geo?banking?system?and?three?
monthly?accounts?for?it?
25?30?
Jul?
1st?CSCE?fact?finding?
Mission?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?228?Prague,?5?August?1992,?
Report?of?the?CSCE?Fact?Findinq?Mission?to?the?region?
of?Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict,?25?30?July?1992?
– ?Implementation?of?the?Monitoring?Mission
–??SO?most?cautious,?insists?on?full?autonomy?with?perspective?to?possible?unification?with?
NO?
–??RU?rejects?change?of?Geo?borders?
–??all?support?unanimously?tripartite?JPKF?
15?
Aug?
Deployment?of?JPKLFF? ?? ?? ?Joint?Peace?Keeping?and?Law?Enforcement?Forces
Oct? JCC?meetings?come?to?a?
complete?halt?
?? ?? – ?after?two?or?three?meetings
11?Oct? Parliamentary?Elections?in?
Geo?
?? Information?by?the?Office?for?Democratic?Institutions?
and?Human?Rights/ODIHR?on?the?elections?in?Georgia,?
CSCE?Communication?No.?302?Prague,?16?October?
1992?
Elections?held?in?consistence?with?international?standards?and?democratic?procedures
–??except:?complex?election?system,?refugee?situation,?lack?of?explanation?for?voters?
–??election?postponed?in?nine?districts?
228?
?
8?Dec? MoU?signed?between?PR?
and?SO?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?408,?11?Dec?/?Activity?
Report?of?the?HoM,?12?Dec.?
Reports:– Activity?Report?of?HoM:?Lengthy?discussions?on?Status?and?reporting?mandate?of?
the?PKFs?(which?information?is?to?be?gathered)–?Interim?Report?of?PR:?First?sentence:?“On?
our?way?to?Tbilissi?we?transited?Moscow,?where?we?had?a?first?round?of?negotiations?with?
the?aim?to?finalize?the?Protocol?on?assistance?offered?by?the?Russian?Federation”?
1993? ?? ?? ??
Jan? ?? 2?villagers?
killed?
CSCE?Communication?No.?41,?Activity?Report,?Jan?22?
29?
Incident?in?the?end?of?the?week
25?
Feb?
Start?of?CSCE's?mandated?
activity?in?Geo?
?? ??
30?
Mar?
Meeting?SO?OSCE?in?Tskh? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?41,?Activity?Report?13?April?
1993?
– ?Re?establishment?of?working?groups?of?JCC
?
??Start?of?efforts?to?revive?the?JCC?
6?9?
Apr?
Geo?RU?talks?in?Sochi? ?? Activity?Report?1?9?April?1993,?CSCE?Communication?
No.?61?20?April?1993?
– ?Negotiations?stalled?#?No?JCC?meetings
–??after?this?sharp?increase?of?violence?
14?
May?
?? 3?Oss?farmers?
killed?
CSCE?Communication?No. 107?Prague,?25?May?1993,??
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?–?Activity?Report?May?12?20,?
1993?
– ?Killings?by?unidentified?uniformed?men,?6?km?West?of?Tskh?while?farmers?were?working?in?
the?fields?
–??quarrels?between?PKFs,?Oss?deny?Geo?access?to?roads,?Geo?unidentified?take?Oss?PKF?
hostage?
–??Tensions?in?SO?have?increased?
–??Growing?social?and?economic?ties?between?NO?and?SO;?NO?downplays?political?
significance?
21?22?
May?
Congress?of?the?Ossetian?
People?in?Vladikavkaz?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?107?Prague,?25?May?1993, ?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?–?Activity?Report?May?12?20,?
1993?
21?25?
May?
Ioseliani,?head?of?
Mkhedrioni,?visits?Nikosi?
where?Geo?PKF?is?located?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?115,?CSCE?Mission?to?
Georgia/Activity?Report,?May?21?28,?1993?
– ?Tensions?remain?after?killings?of?14?May
30?
May?
?? 2?bodies?of?Geo?
JPKF?military?
personnel?
found?//?1?Oss?
soldier?killed?
CSCE?Communication?No.?145?Prague?10?June?1993,?
Activity?Report?of?the?Georgia?Mission,?31?May?–?4?
June?1993?
– ?went?missing?on?15?May
–??according?to?JPKF?officials?retaliation?for?killed?Oss?soldier?
3?Jun? Geo?PM?signs?Government?
Decree?for?financial?and?
economic?links?with?SO?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?150?Prague,?14?June?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?–?Activity?Report?June?5?–?13,?
1993?
– ?PM?Sigua?signs?"On?the?reestablishment?of?the?economy?and?the?social?safety?of?the?
population?of?the?Tskhinvali?region."?
–??500?million?rubles?for?reconstruction?
–??retroactive?benefits?for?ethnic?Geo?in?SO?
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?
9?Jun? Visit?of?RU?MFA? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?150?Prague,?14?June?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?–?Activity?Report?June?5?–?13,?
1993?
– Special?Envoys?from?RU?and?Geo?on?SO?matter?(Kavsadze/?Pastukhov)
10?11?
Jun?
?? 8?killings?in?SO? CSCE?Communication?No.?150?Prague,?14?June?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?–?Activity?Report?June?5?–?13,?
1993?
– ?gun?battels?betwenn?local?police?and?narcitics’’?gangs
–??“strictly?criminal?nature”?
Jun/?
Jul?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?169?Prague,?June?23,?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?June?14?23,?
1993?
attention:?graph?with?violent?incidents?
– ?Negotiations?in?a?halt,?many?plans?on?both?sides?to?make?appeals?or?dcrees,?but?never?
finalized?
14?23?
Jun?
RU?refuses?to?sign?state?
treaty?over?acceptance?of?
GEo’s?boundaries?until?Geo?
has?granted?autonomy?to?
Abkh?and?SO?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?169?Prague,?June?23,?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?June?14?23,?
1993?
– ?Shakhray?(in?charge?of?RU?nationalities’??policy)?responsible
–??SO?points?at?increasing?nationalistic?statements?in?Tbs?
–??Chochiev?(Deputy?Chairman?of?SO?Supreme?Soviet)is?hardlining?
–?"Some?leaders?threaten?to?launch?a?campaign?to?destabilize?the?North?Caucasus?if?events?
do?not?go?their?way."?
–??Idea?of?a?conference?on?the?settlement?of?the?conflict?along?with?international?
involvement??
–??Status?Quo?#?Geo?accepts?SO’s?pre?war?adminstrative?set?up?and?SO?tacitly?drops?seek?ofr?
independence?(report?says?there?is?wide?acceptance?in?SO?leadership)?
–??JPKF?#?for?SO?important?part?of?status?quo?is?being?part?of?JPKF?and?guarding?their?borders
–??Guarantees?#?SO?demands?guarantees?on?int?monitoring?of?Geo?troop?movement?and?
possible?use?of?force?against?SO?and?presence?of?PKF,?Russian?or?int.?
–??Report?urges?to?press?Embassies?of?CSCE?member?states?to?raise?the?topic?of?SO?with?Geo?
gov?(not?only?the?CSCE?mission)?
?? OPKF?obviously?gets?
armament?from?RU?
?? Military?Addendum?to?June?23?Activity?Report,?June?
30,?1993.?See?CSCE?Communication?No.?169?Prague,?
June?23,?1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?
Report,?June?14?23,?1993?
– ?OPKF?better?equipped?than?Geo
–??Leningori?region:?territory?is?equally?controlled?by?Geo?and?SO.?SO?claimed?that?territory?is?
completely?in?Geo?hands.?
24?
Jun?6?
Jul?
CSCE?Mission’s?ongoing?
efforts?to?set?up?an?int?
conference?
Killing?of?SO?
police?chief?in?
gun?battle?
CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague?July?6?1993,?CSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report,?June?24?July?6,?
1993?
– ?two?sides:?either?independence?with?ongoing?economic?blockade?from?Geo?or?a?federal?
subject?within?Geo?
–??SO?press:?death?of?police?chief?is?a?result?of?the?struggle?of?the?two?sides.?Peace?of?
independence.?
–??Irina?Sarishvili?of?the?National?Democratic?Party,?considered?to?be?the?number?two?of?the?
Geo?parliament;?from?Sept?vice?prime?minister?
–??Sandro?Kavsadze,?Personal?Representative?of?the?HEad?of?State?for?Abkh?and?SO?
18?Jul? CSCE?concept?of?a?
settlement?of?the?SO?and?
Abkh?conflicts?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague?July?18?1993,?CSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?A?CSCE?Plan?for?Georgia,?July?
18,?1993?
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?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague?July?26?1993,?
Mission?Activities?(18?26?July?1993)?and?Visit?of?UN?
Planning?Group?to?Abkhazia.?26?July?1993?.?
– ?strong?efforts?of?CSCE?mission?to?accomplish?agreement,?several?meetings?in?Tskh?
conducted?
?? ?? 16?killed?during?
previous?month?
(1?in?Tskh,?rest?
in?villages)?
CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?August?5,?1993,?
Activity?Report,?July?27?–?August?5,?1993?
– ?4?shooting?incidents?at?JPKF?posts,?2?at?villages
–??CSCE?mission?focusses?on?moderate?elements?on?SO?side?
–??SO?and?Geo?say?informal?contacts?the?only?way?possible?to?restore?contacts?
–??So?and?Geo?both?reluctant?as?for?int?conference?immediately?
6?14?
Aug?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?August?14,?1993,?
Activity?Report,?August?6?14,?1993?
– ?no?support?for?CSCE?concept for?the?settlement?of?the?SO?conflict?(Jul?18)
–??CSCE?mission?pushes?SO?leadership?to?make?progress?on?time?with?progress?in?Abkh?(Abkh?
is?used?as?a?comparison)?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?24?August?1993,?
Activity?Report:?15?24?August?1993?
– ?Kulum:?Geo?takes?more?territory?for?GEO?settlements;?Geo?does?not?allow?Oss?to?return?to?
Geo?villages?in?SO?
–??has?addressed?RU?for?reestablishing?JCC,?but?no?response?
–?Begoyeva?(Information?Secretary?to?SO?Supreme?Soviet):?Int?Comm?does?take?Geo?
perspective?in?the?conflict?and?sees?SO?as?an?internal?Geo?problem/?Kulum:?Ru?Yeltsin?does?
see?SO?as?an?internal?GEO?matter,?too?
7?Sept? Geo?Parliament?approved?
law?to?form?new?
government?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?13?September?
1993,?Activity?Report,?August?25?September?13?
– ?Interethnic?tensions?remain?too?strong?to?start?the?return?of?refugees
14?
Sep?
Geo?RU?Agreement?on?
Econ?Rehab?of?the?conflict?
areas?signed?
?? ?? ?gains?momentum?as?a?basis?for?SO?Geo?political?settlement?negotiations?in?May?1998?(see?
No.5/98)?
17?
Sept?
Chib?elected?Head?of?SO?
Supreme?Soviet?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?303?Prague,?28?September?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?
September?14?26,?1993;?CSCE?Communication?No.?
Prague,?30?September?1993,?Supplemental?Report,?
September?27?30,?1993?
– ?in?the?2nd?half?of?Sept?SO?leadership?totally?consumed?with?struggling?for?power,?no?
efforts?on?the?local?level,?no?contact?with?JPKFs?
–???Session?of?the?SO?Supreme?Soviet:?Kulum?leaves?SO,?Chochiyev?(Deputy?Head)?ousted?
–??civilians?cutting?wood?are?armed;?no?other?sources?for?heating?available?
–??“?In?conclusion,?it?appears?that?the?introduction?of?peacekeeping?forces?without?a?
subsequent?political?regulation?of?the?conflict,?normalization?of?economic?activity,?and?
establishment?of?the?rule?of?law?has?led?to?the?strengthening?of?lawless?elements?in?the?
larger?part?of?the?zone?of?conflict.?(...)?A?tendency?toward?hidden,?anarchic?or?mafia?style?
methods?of?governing?has?arisen,?the?alternative?to?which?can?only?be?dictatorship.?“(No.?
303)?
27?
Sept?
Sukhum/i?falls?to?Abkh?
forces?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?307?Prague,?29?September?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Situation?in?Georgia?
(28?September?1993)?
?? Gams?returns?to?Abkh? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?30?September?
1993,?Supplemental?Report,?September?27?30,?1993?
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27?29?
Sept?
?? 13?bodies?of?
Oss?civilians?
found??
CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?30?September?
1993,?Supplemental?Report,?September?27?30,?1993?
– ?near?Eredvi,?from?a?bus?missing?for?two?years,?several?bodies?with?arms?and?legs?tied
1?11?
Oct?
Geo?forces?lost?control?of?
all?of?Abkh?during?first?days?
of?Oct?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?11?October?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?October?1?
11,?1993?
?? Gams?lost?momentum?in?
Western?Geo?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?11?October?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?October?1?
11,?1993?
– ?Geo?Ru?relations?are?improving
–??Geo?starts?considering?CIS?membership?(good?relations?with?Yeltsin),?parliamentary?
session?planned?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Prague,?11?October?1993,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?October?1?
11,?1993?
– new?SO?leadership?under?Chib?mistrustful?because?of?unstable?situation?in?Geo
?and?“pro?Geo”??CSCE?conflict?settlement?concept?–??Uruzman?Dzhioyev?(MFA)?
?hardlining?
?–??Kulum?was?dismissed?by?the?SO?parliament?because?he?was?too?much??
in?favor?of?the?CSCE?concept,?new?SO?leaders?say?
12?27?
Oct?
Shev?decides?CIS?
membership?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?352?Prague,?28?October?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?
October?12?27,?1993?
– ?supported?by?majority?of?parliament,?but?dividing?main?political?forces?in?Tbs
24?Oct? Visit?of?CIO?to?SO? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?352?Prague,?28?October?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?
October?12?27,?1993?
– ?Chib?and?Gassiev?(Chairman?Parliamentary?Committee?on?Foreign?Relations)?moderate
–??But?official?line?very?tough,?very?harline,?demanding?more?recognition,?CSCE?seat?ect.?
2?Nov? SO?parl?adopts?"?First?
Constitution?of?SO"?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/01?for?
the?period?of?16?March?2001?–?31?March?2001?
?proclaims?parliamentarian?republic?with?Supreme?Soviet?as?highest?authority
??1996:?SO?changes?constituion?into?presidential?republic?
??2001:?On?8?Apr?referendum?shall?be?held?on?new?amendments?to?constituion?for?the?1996?
version?is?now?considered?to?insufficient?
22?
Nov?
Opening?of?gas?pipeline?
from?NO?to?SO?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?399?Prague,?14?December?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?23?
November?–?13?December,?1993?
– ?Further?separation?of?SO?from?NO
5?Dec? ?? 4?Oss?killed? CSCE?Communication?No.?399?Prague,?14?December?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?23?
November?–?13?December,?1993?
– ?by?gunfire?in?Achabeti.?4?Geo?arrested,?but?released?for?fear?of?lynching,?Geo?authorities?
say?
7?Dec? First?Geo?parliamentary?
session?after?two?months?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?399?Prague,?14?December?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?23?
November?–?13?December,?1993?
– ?three?major?political?groupings?in?Geo?parliament:?1)?majority?pro?Shev,?supported?his?pro?
CIS?course?connected?to?Union?of?Citizens?of?Geo,?Zhv?head?of?party;?2)?followers?until?pro?
CIS?decision,?most?of?them?National?Democratic?Party;?3)?opposing?all?along:?National?Front?
(head?Nodar?Natadze),?Chart?91,?Association?of?M.?Kostava,?Association?of?I.?Chavchavadze,?
TRaditionalist?Party?
9?Dec? ?? 2?or?4?Oss?die?
in?mine?attack?
on?vehicle.?
CSCE?Communication?No.?399?Prague,?14?December?
1993,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?23?
November?–?13?December,?1993?
– ?vehicle?attack?assumed?retaliation
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?? ?? 3?Geo?bodies?in?
Oss?village?
found.?
?? – ?Geo?bodies?assumed?provocation?against?Geo
“a?few?
days?
before?
22?
Dec”?
?? 5?killed?on?JPKF?
base?by?
explosion?
CSCE?Communication?No.?419?Prague,?4?January?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?December?
14?29,?1993?
– ?Deputy?Head?of?SO?Supreme?Soviet?wounded,?rest?of?SO?gov?left?neighboring?room?only?
moments?before?blast?
–??connection?with?escape?of?suspect?in?the?killing?of?Alan?Dzhioev.?Dzhioev?was?leading?the?
radical?group?within?the?OJPKF.?(Cross?check!!!)?
22?
Dec?
Moderate?members?of?SO?
gov?meet?with?CSCE?
mission?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?419?Prague,?4?January?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?December?
14?29,?1993?
– ?“In?a?candid?discussion?they?(the?moderates)?told?us?that?they?desired?to?move?towards?
negotiations?with?the?Georgian?side?as?soon?as?possible?,?but?were?prevented?from?doing?so?
by?the?more?extremist?elements?in?the?leadership?,?who?apparently?have?links?to?Mafia?
groups?that?profit?from?the?situation?of?unresolved?conflict.”?
–??accused?of?treason?by?hardliners?
–??15?or?16?people?within?the?OPKF?contingent?support?hardliners?in?SO?gov,?threaten?to?use?
force?against?anyone?holding?a?pro?peace?line.?They?profit?from?situation.?#?probably?
responsible?for?blast?
–??Moderates?hope?NO?authorities?can?take?JPKF?hardliners?into?custody?(NO?only?
counterweight?/?executive?power?in?SO)?
?–??moderates’??strategy:?promote?round?table?discussions?without?mandate.?Hardliners?
support?this.?
29?
Dec?8?
Jan?
Gams?dead.?Shev?calls?
commission?to?investigate?
the?cirumstances?of?his?
death.?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?422?Prague,?10?January?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?29?
December?1993?to?8?January?1994?
1994? ?? ?? ??
9?21?
Jan?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?437?Prague,?24?January?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?
January?9??21,?1994?
– ?SO?leadership?condemns?unannounced?Geo?PM?(Patsatsia)?visit?to?Geo?villages?in?SO
??anticipation?of?hardline?moderate?decision?after?elections?on?27?Mar?
?
??No?contacts?between?SO?police?and?Geo?villages,?meeting?of?JPKF?officers,?representatives?
of?local?comm,?law?enforcement?bodies?in?SO?and?representative?of?Geo?villages?
??lack?of?cooperation?reason?for?failure?to?cope?with?criminalty.?JPKF?does?not?feel?
responsible?for?police?work,?but?police?sees?JPKF?as?entitled?to?use?force?
??criminal?activities?tie?into?NO,?across?border?via?Roky?pass?
?
??all?sides?continuously?affirm?willingness?to?re?establish?JCC.?Geo?says?the?JCC?can?first?be?
meeting?without?SO,?only?Geo,?RU,?NO?and?SO?joins?in?later?(?)?
22?
Jan?4?
Feb?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?457?Prague,?4?February?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?
January?22???February?4,?1994?
?New??SO?party:?Republican?Party?of?People's?Unity.?Moderate,?but?declared?goal?is?unity?
with?NO?
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?
3?Feb? Yeltsin?visits?Geo?
??Treraty?of?Friendship?and?
Negotiation?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?457?Prague,?4?February?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?
January?22???February?4,?1994?
???Demonstrations?in?SO?against?Yeltsin?visit?and?against?good?relation?between?RU?and?Geo,?
because?good?relations?between?Geo?and?Ru?are?considered?to?have?negative?effects?on?SO's?
interests?
??Yel?stresses?terr?integrity?of?Geo,?RU?participation?in?PKFs?and?negotiations,?agreements?
singed?on?free?trade,?military?support?(develppment?of?armed?forces,?granting?credits?[this?
role?obviously?incrementally?taken?over?by?US!]?
?? ?? Geo?deputy?
Minister?of?
Defense?killed?
in?bomb?blast,?
Minister?
slightly?injured?
CSCE?Communication?No.?457?Prague,?4?February?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?
January?22???February?4,?1994?
?on?the?morning?of?Yelt?visit,?Defense?Minister?had?tendered?his?resignation
??probably?forces?who?are?in?opposition?to?the?good?RU?Geo?relations?
6?Feb? CSCE?visits?Shev? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?469?Prague,?16?February?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?5?15?
February?1994?
?Shev's?proposal:?
"The?settlement?of?the?conflict?should?take?place?in?four?stages:?restoration?of?the?JCC,?direct?
political?dialogue?with?the?South?Ossetians,?a?
program?for?the?return?of?refugees,?and,?finally,?agreement?on?the?political?status?of?the?
territory."?
??CSCE?promotes?its?participance?in?JCC,?all?sides?agree,?first?SO,?then?Geo?
7?Feb? PR?and?military?visits?Tskh/?
JPKF?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?469?Prague,?16?February?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?5?15?
February?1994?
?seperate?reports?by?General?Schaerli?and?General?Bergh on?their?visit?of?the?JPKF:?WHERE?
21?
Feb?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?500?Prague,?2?March?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?16?28?
February?1994?
pre?SO?elections???
Chib:?12?registered?pol?parties?in?SO,?new?leader?expected?to?be?from?the?radical?spectre?
??ethnically?based?division?of?forces?in?Tskh?deepens.?Geo?population?of?SO?organized?as?
"Union?of?Geo?Citizens"?sent?letter?to?Geo?praliament?to?prevent?the?SO?elections?
?
??JCC:?SO?underlines?they?want?to?be?an?equal?part?of?it.?SO?complains?Geo?did?not?want?
political?aspects?int?he?work?of?the?former?JCC.?SO?wants?auhtority?in?law?and?order?and?
clearly?separated?mandate?of?JCC?and?JPKF?
??SO?for?the?first?time?did?not?demand?a?return?of?SO?territories?lost?during?the?war?as?a?
preliminary?step?to?negotiations?
JPKLF?meeting?supports?CSCE?participation?on?JCC,?Geo?says?40?obervers?too?much,?15?
usfficient?
?
??Geo?National?Independence?PArty:?Radical?opposition,?leader?Irakli?Tsereteli,?anti?RU?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?512?Prague,?16?March?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?1?15?March?
1994?
?Turmoil?in?Geo?parliament?because?of?CIS?decision,?parties?change?to?opposition
???
?PC?requirements?on?mandate?of?JPKF:?WHERE?
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?
9?Mar? CSCE?visit?to?Tskh? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?512?Prague,?16?March?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?1?15?March?
1994?
?SO?leadership?displays?a?more?militant?line?than?during?the?last?meetings
23?28?
Mar?
Hostage?Incident?in?SO? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?541?Prague,?30?March?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia:?1)?Report?on?Hostage?
Incident?in?South?Ossetia,?2)?Report?on?Trip?to?
Tshinvali,?Elections,?March?22?28,?1994?
?Znauri?region:?first?two?Geo?seized,?then?8?Oss?by?Geo?villagers?kept?hostage?until?28?Mar,?
the?day?after?the?election?
??incident?expected?to?have?serious?consequences?on?elections?
??release?of?all?captives?on?28?Mar,?mediated?by?JPKF?
??See?hostage?crisis?report?No.?560:?details?on?negotiations,?no?ethnic?background?
25?
Mar?
Governmental?Conference?
on?the?Regulation?of?the?
Geo?Oss?conflict?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?535?Prague,?28?March?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia:?Governmental?Conference?
on?Resolution?of?the?Ossetian?Conflict;?
CSCE?Communication?No.?546?Prague,?5?April?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?16?31?
March?1994?
?Conference?with?participants?mostly?pro?soft?autonomy?and?pro?contacts?with?SO?
leaderships?
27?
Mar?
SO?parliamentary?elections? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?541?Prague,?30?March?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia:?1)?Report?on?Hostage?
Incident?in?South?Ossetia,?2)?Report?on?Trip?to?
Tshinvali,?Elections,?March?22?28,?1994?
?radicals?after?preliminary?results?with?a?slight?majority
31?
Mar?
Geo?police?surges?Geo?
parliament?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?546?Prague,?5?April?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?16?31?
March?1994?
?From?22?Mar?Parliamentary?struggles,?debate?on?constitution?of?cabinet
??police?upsurges?in?protest?of?confirming?MIA?Shota?Kviraya?into?office,?attack?on?Shev?
??Shev?withstands?and?pushes?through?his?candidate?for?Deputy?PM,?Margiani?
??In?this?period:?First?congress?of?the?CUG?
4?Apr? RU?Geo?sing?Abkh?
Agreement?on?return?of?
refugees?and?IDPs?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?587?Prague,?26?April?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia:?Activity?Report,?April?1???
April?15,?1994?
?Heated?reactions?in?Geo?and?Abkh,?violence?in?Kodori?valley
10?
Apr?
2nd?round?of?SO?
parliamentary?elections?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?587?Prague,?26?April?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia:?Activity?Report,?April?1???
April?15,?1994?
?Chib?won?75%?of?the?seats
??Geo?discreet?press?statement?denouncing?SO?elections,?not?to?enhance?a?more?radical?vote;?
but?high?level?attitudes?more?tense?
??Vazha?Khatchapuridze,?PR?of?Head?of?Ste?of?Geo?for?SO?affairs?named?
??stressing?that?any?Abkh?agreements?are?no?precendents?for?SO?
14?
Apr?
First?meeting?of?JPKF,?CSCE?
with?Boluievski,?head?of?RU?
troops?in?the?South?
Caucasus?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?587?Prague,?26?April?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia:?Activity?Report,?April?1???
April?15,?1994?
235?
?
16?30?
Apr?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?606?Prague,?3?May?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?April?16???
April?30,?1994?
?strengthening?of?broder?control?at?Roki?tunnel?meets?SO?criticism,?because?it?could?hinder?
SO?contacts?with?NO?
??Chib?reelected,?Gassiev?reelected?as?deputy?
??CIS?summit?with?Shev,?recognizing?Abkh?statehood,?deployment?of?UN?troops?approved:?
WHEN?ACTUALLY??
20?
Apr?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?606?Prague,?3?May?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?April?16???
April?30,?1994?
?Deputy?MIA?shot?in?car?with?driver?and?body?guard
12?
May?
First?meeting?of?SO?Geo?
representatives,?in?
Vladikavkaz?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?627?Vienna,?13?May?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Georgian?South?Ossetian?
Agreement?in?Vladikavkaz?
?informal,?decision?to?set?up?expert?group.?In?public?meeting?was?declared?as?discussing?the?
refugee?problem;?NO?minister?for?nationality?affairs?
??situation?in?SO?after?parl?elections?tense:?shooting?incident?in?the?streets?of?Tskh,?turmoil?in?
parliament?and?internal?struggle?in?gov?
??struggles?between?RU?and?SO?PKF,?SO?tried?to?disarm?RU?soldiers?
??SO?wants?to?dissolve?de?facto?MFA?with?hardline?minister?Dzhioyev?into?a?parliamentary?
department?head?by?moderate?Gassiev?
??meeting?of?Gassiev?and?Galazov,?NO?president,?NO?hardline?pro?unity?of?"one?Ossetia"?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?658?Vienna,?25?May?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?16?21?May?
1994?
?follow?up?meeting?for?Vladikavkaz?did?not?take?place;?confirmation?of?both?sides?of?
willingness?of?talks,?but?reluctance?as?for?difference?esp?in?status?questions?
??opening?of?CSCE?office?in?Tskh?delayed,?because?of?non?secure?location?
30?
May?
?? 1?to?3?Oss?killed? CSCE?Communication?No.?671?Vienna,?1?June?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Trips?to?Tskhinvali?on?30?31?
May?1994;?CSCE?Communication?No.?677?Vienna,?3?
June?1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Trip?to?Tskhinvali?
on?2?June?1994?
??RU?PKF?blocks?all?roads into?Tskh,?Ergenti?closed
???immediately?hostage?taking?on?both?sides?in?conflict?zone,?threats?of?further?killings;?CSCE?
mediated?release?on?2?Jun?
??stalls?preparation?of?second?Geo?SO?meeting?in?Vladi;?after?solution?SO?parl?decides?
participation?on?second?Vladi?meeting?
killings?likely?to?be?connected?to?stalling?the?Vladi?talks,?mainly?from?SO?side?
8?10?
Jun?
Geo?Constitutional?draft? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?700?Vienna,?20?June?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?(1?June??16?
June,?1994)?
?forsees?special?status?for?Ajara?and?Abkh,?but?not?for?SO
14?Jun? Second?meeting?So?Geo?in?
Vladi?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?700?Vienna,?20?June?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?(1?June??16?
June,?1994)?
?strengthens?role?of?monitoring?mission;?confirms?will?of?political?settlement,?in?this?respect?
revival?of?JCC?envisaged?[JCC?as?a?tool?for?pol?settlement]?
20?Jun? Shev?for?the?first?time?
admits?Geo?mistakes?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?727?Vienna,?4?July?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?16?30?
June,?1994?
?in?his?weekly?radion?address;?Vladi?results?in?Geo?positively?met
??new?market?north?of?Tskh?where?Geo?farmers?sell?their?products,?protected?by?RU?PKF;?
greater?bus?travel?from?and?to?Tskh?
??RU?PKF?redeployed?to?posts?formerly?held?by?SO?and?Geo,?because?of?lacking?impartiality,?
f.ex.?SO?troops?were?using?checkpoints?as?custom?control?
??monitors?meet?villagers?regularly?and?for?the?first?time?took?part?in?the?weekly?security?
committee?meeting?of?the?JPKF?
236?
?
27?Jun? SO?Geo?agree?on?joint?
repair?of?the?water?system?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?727?Vienna,?4?July?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?16?30?
June,?1994?
?since?two?years?sabotage?of?water?pipeline;?agreement?on?restoring?supply?from?Geo?lines?
to?Oss?villages;?core?demand?of?moderate?SO?leaderhip?to?get?backhold?over?coop?with?Geo?
in?population?
4?8?Jul? Geo?RU?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?749 Vienna,?21?July?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?1?15?July,?
1994?
?Geo?+?RU?deputy?PMs;?agreement?over?reconstitution?of?PKF;?SO?did?not?participate,?was?
informed?
??major?taks?of?the?JCC?shall?be?directing?the?JPKLEF?[!]?and?its?law?enforcing?and?crime?
fightin?mechanisms?[?before?SO?insisted?on?the?division?of?both.?See?later,?in?2004?when?Gori?
police?and?financial?police?interfere?with?regional?authority?on?the?ground]?
??CSCE?shall?play?major?role?in?defining?the?future?status?of?SO?
12?Jul? British?Amb?to?Ru?visits?
Tskh?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?749?Vienna,?21?July?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?1?15?July,?
1994?
16?31?
Jul?
?? 3?killed?in?
Nikosi,?shot?
CSCE?Communication?No.?759?Vienna,?2?August?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?the?
Period,?16?31?Jul??1994?
?monitoring?of?the?JPKLF;?"criminal?incidents"
??inter?communal?tensions?because?of?water?supply?in?northeast?of?SO?
inter?ethnic?tensions?when?stealings?happen?(sheep,?cars)?
19?21?
Jul?
NO?Minister?for?
Nationalities?visits?Geo?
?? ?? ?with?Khatchapuridze?
26?Jul? JCC?Agreement?singed?in?
Tbs?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?759?Vienna,?2?August?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?the?
Period,?16?31?Jul??1994?
?Geo?Vice?PM,?Menagarashvili?and?RU?Deputy?MFA,?Pastukhov
JCC?permanent?secretariat?to?be?in?Tskh;?working?laguage?RU,?no?official?translation;?
meetings?at?least?every?two?minths?
??question?of?JCC?charimanship?
CSCE?to?be?part?of?JCC?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?769?Vienna,?10?August?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Reconstitution?of?the?
Joint?Control?Commission?on?the?Resolution?of?the?
Georgian/Ossetian?Conflict,?dated?10?August?1994?The?
Terms?of?Reference,?in?both?the?original,?Russian'and?
in?an?unofficial?English?translation,are?included?
?CSCE?handed?over?the?26?Jul?Agreement?to?SO?leadership;?now?SO?leadership?in?turmoil?to?
defend?it?against?internal?forces?
237?
?
1?15?
Aug?
?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?775?Vienna,?16?August?
1994,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?1)?The?Political?
Situation?in?South?Ossetia,?2)?Activity?Report?for?the?
Period?1?15?August?
?Increasing?radicalization?of?political?scene?in?SO;?radical?opposition?starts?to?wield?power,?
starts?to?militarize,?has?powr?in?the?SO?security?forces?
??Gassiev?resigned?after?pressure?because?of?singing?the?Vladi?Agreement?of?14?Jun,?plus?SO?
parliament?annulled?SO?consent?with?the?document;?SO?parl?is?reviewing?the?Doc?now?????Ru?
and?Geo?expres?hope?to?hold?JCC?meeting?15?Aug?
??main?SO?radicals?Bagayev,?Minister?of?National?Security?and?Kabisov,?a?parl?deputy?
chariman;?brother?of?B?heads?one?of?two?major?SO?criminal?groups,?the?other?by?the?sons?of?
a?high?ranking?police?officer;?B's?loyals?as?well?in?PKF?
??"?Anything?enhacning?stability?is?(therefor)?perceived?as?a?threat"?
??radicals?are?euqally?anti?RU?as?anti?Geo,?even?in?favor?of?an?anti?Ru?Caucasus?coalition?if?Ru?
lets?SO?down?against?Geo.?Dudayev?in?Chechnia?is?major?ally?
??tensions?between?Ru?and?SO?PkFs?rise?
22?24?
Aug?
RU?delegation?visits?Tskh? ?? CSCE Communication?No.?Vienna,?6?September?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?the?
Period,?16?31?August?1994?
?deputy?ministerial?level;?tries?to?convince?SO?groups?of?progress,?reconstruction?and?JCC?
reconveing?discussed,?but?little?effect?
??Deputy?HOM?in?round?table?discussion?in?skh?television?session?on?19?Aug?
?
??CSCE?distributes?concept?of?SO?constitutional?status?[WHY?NOW,?WHEN?EVEN?THE?JCC?
MEETING?IS?STALLED??]?
15?
Sep?
?? ?? Memorandum,?Ambassador?Eiff's?meetings?with?Mr?
Atsamaz?Kabisov,?deputy?chairman?of?the?State?
Nykhas?(Parliament)?and?Mr.?Dmitriy?Medoev,?foreign?
minister?in?Tskhinvali?on?15?september?1994,?Tbilisi?17?
September?1994?
?Kabisov?says?status?paper?inacceptable?even?for?parl?review,?because?it?considers?SO?as?a?
part?of?Geo,?reluctance?for?talks?with?Geo;?SO?del?currently?in?Moscow?because?of?JCC?
decision?
1?15?
Oct?
?? 1?Geo?villager?
killed?
CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?20?October?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?1?15?
October?1994?
?(When?exactly?not?indicated)
??in?Dicevi,?12?km?east?of?Tskh.?Geo?villagers?abducted?40?50?Oss?which?were?releasec?over?
the?day.?Spilled?over?to?Artsevi,?Geo?hostages?taken.?PKF?medition?RUssian?led?
?
??SO?RU?negotiations?on?JCC?no?results.?RU?support?of?OPKF?continues?to?be?frozen.?But?1.5?
of?the?5?mio?for?reconstruction?paid?through?NO.?
13?14?
Oct?
Delegates?from?secessionst?
regions?in?Tskh,?220th?
anniversary?of?"RU?Oss?
union"?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?20?October?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?1?15?
October?1994?
?Transnist,?Nagorno,?Gagauzia,?treaty?of?friendship?and?coop?signed.?No?delegations?from?
RU,?NO?or?Abkh.?
16?Oct? ?? 3?Oss,?3?Geo?
killed?(Oss?PKF?
and?Geo?Mkhe)?
CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?3?November?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?16???31?
October?1994?
?one?Mkhedrioni?taken?hostage?by?Oss?criminals,?financial?claims.?Mkhe?? Oss?shoot?out?at?
Oss?PKF?checkpoint.?One?SO?PKF?seized?in?retalaiton,?civilains?on?both?sides?took?hostages,?
too.?Whereabout?of?key?hostages?unclear.?
??CSCE?in?direct?contact?with?Mkhe?
??Officials?agree?that?PKFs?of?alls?ides?too?much?part?of?the?local?environment?to?be?impartial?
238?
?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?18?November?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?1?15?
November?1994?
?Oss?threaten?to?kill?geo?hostage,?Hostages?not?held?by?authorities?of?either?side.
31?Oct? Agreement?of?reconvening?
of?the?JCC?signed?in?
Moscow?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?18?November?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?1?15?
November?1994?
?without?SO,?SO?parl?waited?to?approve.?SO?against?JCC?secretariat?(planned?to?be?in?Tskh)?
and?against?political?working?group?within?JCC.?SO?deputy?head?of?gov?threatens?to?
withdraw?signature?in?case?of?death?of?SO?hostage.?
7?Nov? First?JCC?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?18?November?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?1?15?
November?1994?
?SO?delegation?to?Moscow?exerted?pressure?on?RU.?CSCE?no?member?of?JCC,?no?political?
working?group?established?during?first?meting?(econ,?refugee,?PKF?working?groups)?
??Geo?threaten?to?kill?Oss?hostage?is?Geo?is?not?released.?Geo?authorities?no?access?to?Oss?
hostage.?
??Oss?illegal?PKF?checkpoint?at?Ubiati,?0.5?km?to?Geo?village?Nuli,?9?km?west?to?Tskh,?in?
reactionto?hostage?taking,?denies?Geo?access?to?fields.?Geo?PKF?has?withdrawn?from?joint?
Oss?Geo?checkpoint?at?Muguti,?baklash?because?CSCE?favors?as?many?joint?ckepoints?as?
possible.?No?regular?JPKF?command?meetings?during?the?period.?
#####? Colloquium?Geo?MFA?and?
CSCE?on?constitutional?
status?of?SO?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?18?November?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?1?15?
November?1994?
#####? Second?JCC?meeting?took?
place?in?Vladikavkaz?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?6?December?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?16?30?
November?1994?
?SO?took?part?despite?prior?threats?of?boycott
??major?issues?improved?discipline?of?PKFs?(which?means?impartiality,?increase?of?criminality,?
weapon?smuggling)?and?RU?for?unified?command?and?control?mechanisms?
Dec? Geo?opposition?leader?
Giorgadze?killed?
?? ??
2?Dec? Colloquium?SO?CSCE?on?
constitutional?status?of?SO?
(follow?up?11?Nob)?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?21?December?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Biweekly?Activity?Report?(1???
15?December?1994)?
6?Dec? Third?JCC?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?21?December?1994,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Biweekly?Activity?Report?(1???
15?December?1994)?
?RU?given?full?command?of?all?three?JPKF?for?first?period?of?three?months,?then?RU?names?
commander?each?six?months.?Meant?to?create?acceptance?of?local?forces.?????background?
more?contraol?over?discipline?of?PKFs?
21?
Dec?
Geo?Oss?meet?without?
outside?initiative?on?local?
criminality?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?4?January?1995,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?the?
period?December?16?31,?1994?
?tackle?crime?issues?where?the?two jurisdictions?interact
??SO?very?reluctant?to?bilateral?contacts?with?Geo?on?high?level?
??major?issue?anti?crime,?increasing?crime?among?PKF?member,s?increasing?of?armed?
robberies?in?general?
?
??constitutional?process?in?Geo?procedes.?Constitutional?Commission?in?charge.?Federalism,?
self?rule?ect.?major?issues?of?concern.?Check?other?sources?
?? 1995? ?? ??
239?
?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?17?January?1995,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?(1???15?
January?1995)?
?Joint?Oss?Geo?meeting?on?constitutional?issues?delayed,?probably?until?after?Geo?parl?
decided?over?constitutional?draft.?Oss?(like?Abkh)?refused?to?take?part?in?Geo?constituional?
process?after?Geo?offered?this?very?belatedly.?
??Start?of?dismantling?of?illegal?checkpoints,?delay?of?disarmament?of?civilian?population?
??Oss?and?Geo?police?men?attend?JPKF?regularly?
??Geo?hostage?reportedly?killed,?SO?PKF?held?captive?by?the?Geo?hostage's?brother????grown?
into?private?vendetta?including?criminal?activities?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?20?February?1995,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?the?
period?1?15?February,?1995?
?Geo?and?Oss?PKF?ignore?direct?orders?of?joint?RU?PKF?command.?RU?wants?to?replace?all?
forces?with?Russian?ones.?No?liaison?between?troops?on?the?lower?levels?with?all?lines?leading?
bacl?to?JPKF.?
??Second?report?on?illegal?checkpoint:?Geo?set?up?checkpoint?to?Geo?village.?MIA?dispatched?
Geo?police?in?Geo?villages?in?conflict?zone.?RU?Command?approves?of?that,?but?not?of?illegal?
checkpoints?
1?Mar? Geo?Oss?Round?table?in?
Vladikavkaz?on?future?
bilateral?relations?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna,?10?March?1995,?
CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?16?February?
??1?March?1995?
?Geo?participants?admitted?serious?mistakes?in?1990/91
?
??former?Geo?minister?Giorgadze?accused?of?murder?of?opposition?leader?Chanturia?in?Dec?
1994?and?attempted?murder?of?Abahsidze?in?Ajara.?
20?23?
Mar?
RU?MFD?in?Tbs?signs?25?
year?treaty?for?Russ?
military?bases?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/18/95?18?April?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only?Vienna,?13?April?
1995,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?15?
March???31?March?1995?
?13?000?RU?troops?based?in?Geo,?unclear?whether?Geo?receives?payment
??SO?continues?to?be?hardline,?next?JCC?meeting?put?off?from?Feb?to?May?
??Badri?Kahtidze?new"?PR?of?Geo?Head?of?Ste?to?Shida?Kartli",?Geo?re?deistricts?SO?to?bring?
areas?with?majority?of?Geo?population?under?control.?Unilateral?action.?
??sporadic?shoot?outs?between?SO?and?GEo?posts?regular?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/21/95?20?April?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only?Vienna,?20?April?
1995,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report,?1?15?
April?1995?
?RU's?enhanced?policy?towards?conflict?with?focus?on?terr?integrity?and?settlement?seem?to?
have?"serious"?impact?on?SO?attitudes?
?
??Thur?meeting?discussed?land?tenures,?anti?crime,?disarmament?of?civilian?population,?
exchange?of?lists?of?refugees,?stolen?cars;?Geo?issued?1.5?for?recosntruction,?to?be?followed?
by?1.2?credits?from?RU?
??first?mentioning?of?firm?US?statement?supporting?Geo?terr?integrity,?US?Amb?to?Geo?
?? ?? ?? CSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/59/95?11?May?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only?Vienna,?11?May?
1995,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?(16?30?
April,?1995)?
?JCC?meeting?again?delayed?from?early?May?to?late?May
??report?sees?"growing?acceptance?by?the?South?Ossetians?that?the?regions?future?lies?whtin?a?
Georgian?state"?
??Geo?and?SO?PKFs?fail?to?rotate?their?personnel,?draw?personnel?from?the?local?population?
??problem?of?contradicting?chains?of?command?????Geo?PKF?adheres?to?Geo?MFD,?not?to?JPKF?
command.?
240?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.?SEC/81/95?23?May?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?23?May?
1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?1?15?
May?1995?
?SO?upset?about?Memo?between?RU?and?Geo,?does?not?accept?it?as?a?start?of?negotiations.
??SO?demands?guarantee?that?Geo?in?future?does?not?try?to?change?the?region's?demography?
??Thur?meeting,?11?May:?tlephone?lines?between?Tskh?and?Tbs?partially?restored,?no?funding?
for?water?suplly?project?
??most?common?issue?about?PKF:?fee?collecting?from?passing?traffick?at?checkpoints.?Geo?and?
Oss?PKF?soldiers?blame?Oss?police?cahrgin?high?fees?for?transporting?lorries?to?and?from?Roky?
tunnel?
19?
May?
trilateral?PKF?patrols?start?
//?Bichenow,?SO?PKF?
soldier?held?hostage?
released?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/91/95?5?June?
1995O?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?5?June?
1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?
the?period?May?16?31,?1995?
?RU?exertin?considerable?pressure?on?SO?to?give?up?claims?of?independence?and?integrate?
into?Geo?and?draft?own?basic?demands?for?future?status.?SO?tries?to?slow?down?the?process,?
f.ex.?Impeding?a?JCC?meeting?in?Tskh?on?30?May?by?not?letting?participants?enter?SO?
("finessing?the?RUssians"),?downgraded?to?consultative?gathering.?
??RU?Generals?openly?demanding?SO?to?accept?itnegration?into?Geo,?angered?that?SO?has?
done?nothing?to?prepare?the?SO?public?for?the?step.?SO?only?stiffens.?
???
??Thur?meeting:?SO?represaentatives?report,?244?Geo?families?returned.?But?SO?officials?do?
not?allow?Geo?to?inspect?the?list?because?they?want?to?protect?the?returnees?from?retaliation?
from?the?Geo?side?(somewhat?unclear?why?Geo?should?retaliate?Geo)?
??Geo?repres,?PR?Khatidze,?announces?fuding?for?water?system?
?
Monitoring:?Illegal?checkponts?in?Ubiati?and?Nuli?removed,?now?trilateral?patrolling?can?
continue?
??Unregular?payment,?esp?of?the?SO?PKF?is?held?responsible?for?the?criminal?activites?
9?Jun? Fourth?Session?of?JCC?in?
Moscow?[there?was?a?fifth?
already,?but?whatever]?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?:REF?8EC/l18/95?22?June?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?22?June?
1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?1?16?
June?1995?
?discussion?about?JPKF:?Oss?PKF?meant?to?be?NO,?but?in?fact?entirely?SO,?for?SO?sign?of?
statehood?
??recontruction?funding:?RU?has?given?so?far?4?mio?USD,?Geo?nothingcept?for?conditional?
promises?
??Monitoring:?residents?in?rural?areas?live?well?together,?increasingly?helping?out?each?other,?
residents?say.?
??RU?PKF?permos?professionally,?SO?desastruous,?Geo?far?from?standard,?too.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/140/95?7?July?1995?
OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?7?July?1995,?
OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?16?30?June?
1995?
?RU?concerned?with?Chechen?provocations?in?SO,?Chechen?attempts?to?penetrate?Geo?
through?SO.?Wants?to?increase?PKFs?unilaterally,?sees?joint?JCC?decision?with?SO?and?Geo?as?
impediment.?
??Monitor:?some?PFK?posts?not?occupied,?no?proper?control?of?small?weapons?
??Thur?meeting:?water,?energy,?telephone.?Geo?proposes?to?upgrade?electricity?lines?from?NO?
and?in?exchange?repair?natural?gas?pipeline?to?SO.?
??Two?companies?in?Tskh?and?Gori?agreed?on?ccop?
??problem:?Allocation?of?formerly?communal?land?
30?Jun? SO?parl?issues?declaration?
on?status,?unpublished?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/168/95?24?July?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?24?July?
1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?
the?Period?of?July?1?15,?1995?
?bad?relations?with?Geo,?aggressions?suffered?from?Geo?1989?to?1992?and?determination?to?
join?RF?as?a?part?of?NO?
241?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/168/95?24?July?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?24?July?
1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?Report?for?
the?Period?of?July?1?15,?1995?
?Ru?clearly?frustrated?over?SO?attempts?to?foot?drag?negotiations
??SO?insists?that?JCC?was?always?meat?as?a?means?for?political?talks,?not?as?a?frame?for?
substantive?discussions?
??NO?in?a?financial?squeeze,?Moscow?covers?80%?of?their?budget.?When?NO?in?financial?crisis,?
it?is?reflected?in?fianancial?crisis?in?SO,?Majority?of?SO?leadership?ackonwledges?that?long?
term?solution?is?integration?into?Geo,?but?actions?are?obverse.?
??SO?refers?to?Abkh?withstanding?RU?pressure?to?join?Geo?
early?
Jul?
?? ?? ?? ?SO?sends?resolution?on?its?own?legal?status?to?RU?Duma?in?order?to?sway?RU's?actions
???
19?20?
Jul?
Fifth?JCC?session?in?Tskh?
and?Tbs?//?First?visit?of?
offical?SO?delegation?to?
Geo?controlled?territory?
since?1989?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/183/95 8?August?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?ENGLISH?only?Vienna,?7?
August?1995,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?report?
16?31?July,?1995?
?Geo?ready?to?pay?1?mio?USD?reconstruction?funds,?promises?5?mio?more?if?RU?gives?credits
??CSCE?missions?starts?first?independent?inititiative?in?JCC,?issuing?proposal?for?economic?
rehab?programme?initiated+E214?????DOK???
27?Jul? SO?withdraws?signature?of?
5th?JCC?session?declaration?
?? CSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/197/95?22?August?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?ENGLISH?only?Vienna,?22?
August?1995,?CSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?
Report?for?the?period?August?1?15,?1995?
?inside?SO?pressure?by?parl?indicated?by?reports.?Now?all?sides?withdraw?from?signing
??SO?plays?on?delaying?decision?(often?the?case,?reports?indicate)?no?clear?vision?on?SO?side,?
no?pro?or?cons,?so?foot?dragging?the?process?
??Kochiev?leading?figure,?Minister?of?Information,?leader?of?communist?party?who?holds?70%?
of?the?seats,?pro?integration?into?RU;?SO?mafia?either?wants?to?reintegrate?with?Geo?
?
??Weekly?Thursday?meetings?(PROTOCOLS?)?under?chairmanship?of?RU?JPKF?commander,?
bring?together?opearational?officials?from?SO?and?Geo?neighboring?regions??
??subject?matters:?irrigation?water,?farmland?division,?city?water?supplies,?telephone?
connections,?repair?of?highway?and?railway?links,?industrail?enterprise?cooperation,?
exchange?of?natural?gas?versus?electricity?supplies.?F.ex.?permission?of?passage?through?Geo?
territory?for?isolated?SO?village,?on?deputy?minster?level?
?
??"Interestingly?enough,?top?level?Georgian?reaction?in?private?has?been?that?the?question?of?
the?restoration?of?Georgia's?sovereignty?over?Abkhazia?and?South?Ossetia?is?basically?in?
Russian?hands."?
?
?Association?of?Caucasian?Republics?to?whcih?Abkh?and?SO?have?been?admitted?full?members
?
??Decision?over?GEo?constitution?not?this?year?
29?
Aug?
Attempt?to?Shev's?life?//?
Geo?parl?passes?
constitution?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/202/95?1?
September?1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?
Vienna?1?Septmeber?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?
Activity?report?16?30?August?1995?
?Shev?managed?to?pass?Geo's?constitution,?extremists?reacted?in?exasperation
??no?paragraph?on?Geo's?territorial?structure?as?initially?planned,?like?referring?to?self?rule?in?
Abkh,?SO,?Aja.?New?election?law?forthcoming.?
??RU?tries?to?nail?down?SO?to?its?own?former?demand?to?have?bilateral?negotiationswith?Geo,?
but?now?they?refuse?
242?
?
15?
Sep?
RU?MFA?visits?Geo? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/246/95?25?
September?1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?
Vienna?25?September?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?
Biweekly?Activity?Report?(31?August???15?September?
1995)?
?Chernomyrdin,?only?Abkh?discussed,?SO?hardly?a?topic,?"strategic"?relations,?BTC?first?time?
mentioned?
??no?direct?talks?in?sight,?time?of?next?JCC?meeting?still?unclear?
20?
Sep?
Fifth?anniversary?of?SO?
independence??
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/246/95?25?
September?1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?
Vienna?25?Septemeber?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?
Georgia/?Biweekly?Activity?Report?(31?August???15?
September?1995)?
?RU,?JPKF?and?OSCE?boycott?the?celebration
??SO?backed?out?from?own?proposal?of?1?Mar?to?implement?Geo?So?commission?on?origins?of?
the?conflict.?Tskh?demanded?the?comm?to?start?out?with?examining?SO?settlement?from?the?
1st?century?BC.?
??Some?SO?PKF?soldiers?marched,?NO?pres?did?not?participate,?but?NO?PM?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/262/95?4?October?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?4?
October?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Biweekly?
Activity?Report,?16?30?September?1995?
?HoM?achieved?SO?consent?to?bilateral?talks?during?meeting?with?Chib?in?Tskh
2?Oct? Attempt?of?life?of?SO?PM?
Gabarayev?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/306/95?27?October?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?27?
October?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?
Report?(1?24?October,?1995)?
?Background?unclear?
??2?Oct?Introduction?of?Lari?
??conflicts?kept?out?of?election?campaigns,?SO?and?Abkh?forbade?Geo?elections?
??RU?cancelled?18Oct?JCC?meeting?in?Vladi?
???
4?Oct? Second?Econ?Rehab?Prog?
Meeting??
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/306/95?27?October?
1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?Vienna?27?
October?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?Activity?
Report?(1?24?October,?1995)?
?OSCE?launched,?first?meting?was?held?in?September?in?Tskh
30?31?
Oct?
Geo?SO?meeting?in?Vladi? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/363/95?21?
November?1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?
Vienna?20?November?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?
Activity?Report?25?October???18?November?1995?
?RU,?NO,?OSCE?as?intermediaries.?Decision?to?start?negotiating?process?on?political?status
??Seen?as?Äthe?start?of?the?political?negotiation?process?three?zears?after?then?end?of?the?
hostilities"?(421)?
5?Nov? Geo?parl?and?presid?
elections?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/363/95?21?
November?1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?
Vienna?20?November?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?
Activity?Report?25?October???18?November?1995?
#####? SO?refuses?to?open?OSCE?
branch?office?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/363/95?21?
November?1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?
Vienna?20?November?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?
Activity?Report?25?October???18?November?1995?
?Letter?of?MFA?Medoyev.?Only?acceptable?if?office?is?run?directly?by?Vienna,?otherwise?
"indirect?confirmation?of?the?extension?of?the?sovereignty?of?of?the?state?where?it?is?
accredited?to?South?Ossetia."?(transl?OSCE)?
243?
?
13?
Dec?
Geo?SO?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/421/95?27?
December?1995?OSCE?RESTRICTED?English?only,?
Vienna?27?December?1995,?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia/?
Activity?Report?for?19?November???17?December?1995?
?plus?3?(RU,?NO,?OSCE).?MoU?on?security?and?confidence?building?measures,?signed?by?the?5,?
demilitarized?zone,?facilitated?border?regime?between?NO?and?SO?
??SO?makes?it?clear?that?SO's?final?approval?will?be?no?easy?matter?
??Geo?made?clear?freely?that?hostilities?were?committed?by?the?Geo?policy?makers?of?the?
Gams?area.?
?? 1996? ?? ??
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?January?15,?1996,?OSCE?
Mission?to?Georgia/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?period?
of?18?December?1995?through?13?January?1996?
?Geo?will?not?ratify?basing?agreement?with?RU?until?terr?integrity?is?restored.?CIS?matter???? in?
the?framework?of?CIS?mailny?Abkh?discussed?
??SO?did?not?approve?of?agreement?from?13?Dec,?watitng?for?political?shift?after?Ru?parl?
elections?
??Monitoring:?four?times?per?week,?2?personnel?each?day?
26?Jan? Shev?speech?on?SO? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?February?13,?1996,?OSCE?
Mission?to?Georgia/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?period?
of?14?January?through?10?February?1996?
?Shev?sees?"perspectives?for?a?relatively?quick?settlement?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?conflict.?
Meeting?Yeltsin?Shev?on?Jan?18?on?the?sides?of?CIS?summit?in?Moscow,?where?Yelts?assures?
cutting?econ?assistance?to?SO?and?and?withdraw?RU?PKF?if?SO?does?not?participate?in?
negotiation?process?
??drug?business?in?SO,?first?time?mentioned?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?April?3,?1996,?OSCE?Mission?
to?Georgia/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?period?of?Mid?
February???End?of?March?1996?
?signing?of?MoU?from?13?Dec?still?deadlocked.?Geo?talked?to?Moscow,?Mission?sent?
representative,?no?result.?Then?SO?appealed?to?RU?deputy?MFA.?Then?Mission?took?up?
wokring?meetings?with?negotiators?from?TBs?and?Tskh?and?on?the?respective?ministerial?
levels.?
??Thur?meetings?on?property?and?land?for?spring?approaches?
8?Mar? Shev's?Initiative?ofr?a?
peaceful?Caucasus?signed?
in?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?April?3,?1996,?OSCE?Mission?
to?Georgia/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?period?of?Mid?
February???End?of?March?1996?
12?
Mar?
NO?president?Galazov?visits?
Tbs?for?NO?Geo?football?
game?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?April?3,?1996,?OSCE?Mission?
to?Georgia/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?period?of?Mid?
February???End?of?March?1996?
?seen?as?a?demonstration?of?Oss?Geo?friendship
22?
Apr?
PCA?Agreement?with?EU?
signed?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?May?15,?1996,?OSCE?
Mission?to?Georgia/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?period?
of?April?Mid?May?1996?
?11?May,?RU?MFA?Primakov?visits?Tbs?and?praises?mutual?tolerance
??in?beginning?of?May?first?informal?meeting?of?SO?and?Geo?parl,?five?each?
??SO?PKF?poor?provision?with?food,?in?comp?to?RU?and?Geo?
16?
May?
MoU?signed?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?July?9,?1996,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?mid?May?end?of?June?1996?
?in?Moscow,?Shev?Chib,?security?and?confidence,?later?econ
??SO?very?satisfied?with?MoU,?in?turn?offered?new?talks?about?OSCe?branch?office?ion?Tskh?[it?
seems?like?OSCe?wants?to?push?it?to?an?OSCE?branch?office,?although?the?talks?initially?were?
about?a?JCC?office,?OSCe?really?sneaked?in]?
??Geo?refuses?official?SO?statement?on?the?MoU?implementation,?because?de?facto?
recognition?
??13/14?Jun?RU?CIS?minister?visits?Tbs?and?Tskh?
?
Ombudsman?law?adopted?on?16?May,?but?introduction?only?in?2004,?parl?did?not?approve?of?
Shev's?candidate?Kavsadze?
???
244?
?
16?Jun? RU?presid?elections?for?RU?
citizens?in?SO?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?July?9,?1996,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?mid?May?end?of?June?1996?
?at?JPKF?headquarter?in?Tskh?out?of?800?ballots?600?were?RU?PKF?soldiers
??replacement?of?JPKF?commander,?old?one,?erkuyev?transferred?to?Vladi?as?chief?of?staff?of?
3rd?army?
23?24?
Jul?
JCC?meeting?in?Vladi? "murders?in?
first?half?of?
1996?reaches?
15"?
OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?August?2,?1996,
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?July?1996?
?report?of?mil?monitoring
??as?first?step?of?demil?the?withdrawal?of?heavy?armament?is?envisaged?
??first?JCC?meet?after?one?year's?interval,?focus?on?military?issues.?No?agreement?on?
demilitarization?
??RU?institute?publishes?poll?in?Jul,?that?1.5?want?to?return?to?Geo,?38.6?unite?with?RU,?30?
keep?up?independence?
??journalists'?coop:?Geo?media?cover?SO?issues?and?SO?newspaper?Yuzhnaya?Ossetia?covers?
GEo?news?
??econ?rehab:?telecommunications,?agricultural?and?industrial?expert?each?start?work?at?
mission?
???
27?
Aug?
Shev?Chib?meeting?in?Vladi? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?September?5,?1996,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?August?1996?
?meeting:?reestablishment?of?high?level?negotiationson?the?status,?econ?and?parl?=?journ?
meetings?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?September?26,?
1996,?OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?
for?the?period?of?September?1996?
?SO?announces?delay?of?status?negotiations?because?of?announcement?of?SO?elections?on?10?
Nov.?Shev?says?he?understands?that?Chib?wants?to?secure?his?presidency?before?starting?neg.?
??Gabarayev,?chairman?of?SO?council?of?ministers,?is?Chib's?fiercest?internal?opponent?and?
rival?in?the?elections?
??Second?SO?Geo?journalists?roundtable?on?18?Sept?in?Tbs?
??econ?rehab:?Norway?and?GTZ?invovled?from?the?very?first?
??monotoring?patrols?reduced?from?four?to?three.?Oss?posts?often?undermanned,?still?
irregular?pay?for?Oss?PKF?
22?
Sep?
Ajara?elections? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?September?26,?
1996,?OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?
for?the?period?of?September?1996?
?Ajar?leadership?denies?OSCE?to?monitor?elections?and?accuses?HoM?of?plot?to?break?the?
elections?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?November?1,?1996,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?October?1996?
?SO?elections:?Chib?and?Gagloity?moderate,?Gabarayev?and?three?others?hardline.?Telephone?
poll?sees?65%?in?favor?of?Chib?
???
??[constant?impression?that?SO?ledership?covers?negotiations?up?from?SO?public]?
16?Oct? SO?OSCE?Agreement?to?
open?OSCE?branch?office?in?
Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?REF.SEC/621/96?21?October?
1996?OSCE?RESTRICTED?ENGLISH?ONLY?Annexes:?
RUSSIAN?only,?Vienna,?21?October?1996,?OSCE?
Mission?to?Georgia,?Branch?Office?in?Tskhinvali?
?negotiations?since?Apr?1995
??staffed?by?Tbs?office,?run?under?OSCE?office,?seen?as?reconciliatory?step?of?SO?leadership?
because?of?elections?on?10?Nov?
245?
?
#####? SO?pres?elections?//?SO?and?
NO?sign?treaty?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?November?21,?1996,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?1??15?November?1996?
?Chib?reelected?
??situation?stable?during?elections,?no?incidents?
??Geo?increased?contacts?with?RU?
?? ?? "every?week?
people?are?
wounded?or?
even?killed"?
OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?December?5,?1996,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?15??30?November?1996?
?mil?monit?says,?because?of?criminality,?poverty?and?smuggling.?JPKF?head?thinks?about?
extending?the?curfew.?
5?Dec? RU?makes?public?
disavowment?of?SO?NO?
treaty?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?December?18,?1996,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?1??20?December?1996?
?RU?send?note?to?Geo?embassy?in?Mosc,?RU?alterted?NO?that?it?considers?SO?NO?treaty?to?be?
illegal?and?that?NO?shall?inform?SO?about?it?(in?violation?of?RU?and?international?legal?
norms")?
??joint?Oss?Geo?powerplant?in?Kartli?region?opened?
???
7?Dec? First?meeting?of?SO?and?
Geo?"law?protection?
authorities"?in?Gori?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?December?18,?1996,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?ACTIVITY?REPORT?for?the?
period?of?1??20?December?1996?
?Delegations?headed?by?Deputy?Ministers?of?Justice?and?General?Prosecutors.?Plus?JPKF?head?
and?head?of?Gori?administration?(governor?)?
??law?protection?in?the?conflict?zone.?SO?demanded?legal?protection?of?citizens?of?both?sides?
in?hte?conflict?zone,?imrpove?coordination?within?law?protection?authorities,?mutual?
handover?of?SO?residents?to?respective?authorities?plus?files?
19?
Dec?
Third?journ?round?table?in?
Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?January?17,?1997,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?for?the?period?of?16?
December?1996???15?January?1997?
?programme?launched?by?OSCE
?? 1997? ?? ??
15?Jan? Oss?speaker?of?parl?visits?
Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?No.?Vienna?January?17,?1997,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?for?the?period?of?16?
December?1996???15?January?1997?
?Dzugayev?holds?talks?with?Shev?and?Zhv,?counterpart.
??Chib?reshuffeled?SO?leadership,?all?key?positions?with?moderates?now,?all?approved?by?parl.?
Kochiev?dismissed,?Gagloity?increases?influence?
??due?to?winter?shortfalls?energy?supply?from?Ru?cut,?Roky?tunnel?blocked?
17?Jan? Oss?MDF?Sanakoyev?visits?
Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?February?6,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No?.?2/97?for?
the?period?of?16???31?January?1997?
?first?visit?of?high?ranking?SO?official?to?Geo?territory,?preparations?of?JCC?meeting
??18?Jan?assassination?attempt?on?SO?Head?of?org?working?on?domestic?crimes?
20?Jan? Zhv?visits?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?February?6,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No?.?2/97?for?
the?period?of?16???31?January?1997?
?second?visit,?met?with?chib?and?Dzugayev
??meeting?of?Ge?Oss?intellectuals?in?Tskh?
?? ?? ?? ?? Note:?There?is?a?JCC?all?party?working?group?regularly?convening,?and?there?are?in?the?other?
hand?the?official?JCC?meetings?
246?
?
13?
Feb?
Seventh?JCC?meeting?in?
Vladi?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?February?25,?1997,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?3/97?
for?the?period?of?1???21?February?1997?
?JCC?decided?to?reduce?JPKF,?gradual?transfer?into?civilian?bodies,?reduction?from?26?to?16?
checkpoints,?only?Oss?and?Geo?checkpoints?reduced?????Oss?and?Geo?voluntarily?offrered?to?
reduce?the?forces,?formal?agrrement?prevented?by?Oss?drawback.?
??Note:?Number?of?checkpoints?and?posts?that?are?indicated?are?highly?unreliable.??
??compisiton?of?SO?PKF:?old?fighters?gradually?replaced?through?conscripts,?no?other?armed?
formations?in?the?conflict?zone?(no?remilitarization),?RU?asked?to?finance?Oss?PKF?
??econ?working?group?halted,?current?budget?for?1997?RU?9?billion?rubles,?Geo?1?mio?GEL?
??work?on?branch?office?started?
?
HOW?MANY?CHECKPOINTS/?POSTS?ARE?THERE???
4?5?
Mar?
First?status?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?March?19,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?4/97?for?
the?period?of?22?February???15?March?1997?
?procedural?matters,?tense?and?shaky,?only?through?mediators
??Chib?HoM?meeting?24?Feb:?Chib?complains?about?fianancial?means?to?SO?from?RU?and?Geo,?
HoM?says?finances?conditional?on?settlement,?then?more?int?money,?SO?must?open?up?to?int?
org?and?that?they?are?working?only?through?Tbs?
??JPKF:?five?Oss?posts?that?were?to?be?closed?down?still?opened.?
??exchange?of?prisoners?Geo?SO?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?April?4,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?5/97?for?
the?period?of?16?31?March?1997?
?Article?"CIS?the?beginning?or?the?end?of?history",?26?Mar,?Nezavisimaya?Gezeta??? neo?
imperial?line?of?RU,?destabilizing?Geo,?making?use?of?secessionist?conflicts?only?chance?to?act?
upon?anti?Russian?movement?
??JPKF:?Geo?army?units?seen?in?conflict?zone,?Geo?MFD?reminded?that?no?troops?an?weapons?
shall?be?introduced?
4?Apr? First?So?Geo?meeting?
within?UNDP?Steering?
Committee?on?econ?rehab?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?April?18,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?6/97?for?
the?period?of?1?15?April?1997?
?for?1997?6?mio?USD?rehab?for?all?conflict?area
??delay?in?closure?of?posts/?checkpoints,?because?Oss?soldiers?have?no?accommodation?
??
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?June?4,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?8/97?for?
the?period?of?12??31?May,?1997?
?working?group?drafted?guidelines?for?joint?LEB?law?enforcement?bodies?work???? Dok?only?in?
RU,?bad?quality?
30?
May?
?? 1?Oss?refugee?
killed?in?Geo?
village?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?June?18,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?9/97?for?
the?period?of?1?15?June,?1997?
this?and?several?other?criminal?incidents?east?of?Tskh,?JPKF?head?has?set?up?a?joint?mobile?
task?group,?observers?and?PKFs,?to?react?fast;?troop?has?a?post?between?Artsevi?and?
Plavismani?????obvious?desinterest?of?local?law?enforcement?agencies?
??JPKF?comm?tried?to?solve?the?incident?by?bringing?together?law?enforcement?bodies?at?the?
RU?post?in?Artsevi?on?4?Jun,?but?Oss?delegation?did?not?come?and?Oss?villagers?threatened?to?
take?Geo?delegation?and?JPKF?comm?and?OSCE?repr?hostage,?JPKF?comm?resolved?tensions?
??Ossposts?at?Tsenelisi?and?Dsvileti?remain?open?
??Chib?lifts?curfew?for?tskh?from?9?Jun?[first?time?in?at?least?one?year..]?
4?Jun? First?joint?training?of?
military?observers?from?all?
three?parties?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?June?18,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?9/97?for?
the?period?of?1?15?June,?1997?
247?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?June?30,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/97?for?
the?period?of?16???30?June,?1997?
?parties?of?the?working?groups?for?the?full?scale?res?still?consider?a?document?introduced?by?
RU?MFA?in?early?Jun?
?? ?? 1?Oss?head?of?
village?killed?by?
predecessor?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?July?18,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/97?for?
the?period?of?1???15?July,?1997?
21?Jul? Opening?of?OSCE?branch?
office?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?6,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No?.?12/97?for?
the?period?of?17?31?July,?1997?
?mainly?refugge/?IDP?matters
??meetings?of?UNDP?Steering?Comm?to?be?held?there?
24?Jul? partila?SO?parl?elections? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?6,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No?.?12/97?for?
the?period?of?17?31?July,?1997?
?six?exclusively?Geo?seats?remain?vacant
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?6,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No?.?12/97?for?
the?period?of?17?31?July,?1997?
?blast?at?Geo?museum?in?Tamarasheni?directed?against?joint?work?of?Geo?and?Oss?LEBs,?
criminal?
??SO?MIA?forces?too?little?to?ensure?security,?ask?JPKF?for?personnel?
?? ?? 1?Oss?
policeman?
killed?by?Geo?
policeman?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?23,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/97?for?
the?period?of?1?22?August?1997?No?SR?
?SO?curfew?reintroduced?due?to?crime?increase
??Another?bomb?blast?in?Tamrasheni?
??unresolced?is?provision?of?security?for?returning?refugees?by?JPKF,?possibly?relocation?of?
posts?and?expanding?of?tasks?
??meeting?of?Geo?and?Oss?representatives?of?the?Commission?for?the?Dead?and?Unaccounted?
on?14?Aug,?during?next?meeting?a?list?will?be?presented?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?September?15,?1997,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
14/97?for?the?period?of?23?August?12?September,?
1997?
?Abkh?leader's,?Ardzinba,visit?to?Tbs?makes?it?easier?for?Chib?to?have?similar?meeting?with?
Shev?
??econ?rehab:?energy?project?at?risk,?because?in?sufficient?number?of?bid?for?project?tender?
[why?]?
??Assessement?for?future?TACIS?project?about?to?start?
26?
Sep?
8th?JCC?meeting?in?Java? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?October?6,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/97?for?
the?period?of?13???30?September,?1997?
?transfer?of?law?and?order?main?topic.?Protocol?signed.?Meant?to?facilitate?the?final?
demilitarization?action?
??Surprisingly,?Geo?and?Oss?decided?to?close?down?three?posts?along?the?main?route?through?
SO.?Monitoring?of?the?transport?of?arms,?narcitics,?explosives?transferred?to?police?
authorities?of?both?sides.?[because?they?have?a?deal?among?themselves?]?
??SO?independence?day?ignored?by?Geo?pres.?In?SO?delegations?from?Pridnestrovje,?Kabard?
Balk?and?NO,?RU?duma?sent?five?people?headed?by?chairman?of?the?Committee?on?CIS?issues?
Tikhonov?who?said?he?is?in?favor?of?the?creation?of?a?new?Soviet?Union?
??Several?Oss?PKF?soldiers?participated?in?the?celebration?
?
??Find?Doks?that?initiated?the?Law?dimension?of?the?JPKF?and?any?formal?agreements?on?it?
248?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?October?31,?1997,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?17/97?for?
the?period?of?16???31?October,?1997?
?Second?meeting?of?Oss?and?Geo?intellectuals
??JCC?Ad?hoc?Comm?on?Refugees?met?in?Vladi?on?21?Oct?
??Shev?issued?decree?on?establishing?a?state?commission?on?rehab,?in?charge?of?all?
communication?with?SO?and?int?orgs?
??Fifith?Steering?Committee?held?on?20?Oct?
#####? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?November?25,?1997,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/97?for?the?period?of?1?20?November,?1997?
?Public?Prosecutor?of?Gori?region?kidnapped?7?km?north?of?Tskh.?No?solution?to?it?yet.
#####? Shev?Chib?meeting?in?Java? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?November?25,?1997,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/97?for?the?period?of?1?20?November,?1997?
joint?declaration,?operative?parts?hold?SO?concern?about?econ?assistance,?above?all?further?
joint?work?on?refugees?stressed?
8?9?
Dec?
RU?Deputy?PM?Serov?to?
Tbs,?talks?aboout?border?
dispute?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?December?15,?1997,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/97?for?the?period?of?21?November???10?December,?
1997?
?RU?post?extended?into?neutral?zone?on?Georgian?military?highway?between?Khazbegi?and?
Vladi,?Geo?post?moved?hundred?meters?north,?too,?demonstrations?infront?of?RU?embassy.???
??Shev??Serov?agree?on?moving?back?both?troops?to?their?former?positions,?patrol?neutral?
stretch?jointly,?settle?delimitation?of?border?soon?
??NO:?48?families?returned?to?SO,?4?to?Geo.?
?
??for?the?first?time?this?year?no?serious?criminal?incidents?reported?during?the?two?weeks?
???
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?January?6,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?19/97?for?
the?period?of?11???31?December,?1997?
?nego?still?stalled?because?of?RU's?intermediary?doc.?Chib?faces?internal?opposition?to?his?
course.?SO's?coruse?now?uncompromising,?meeting?with?Dzugayev?now?hardlines.?
??Taking?advantage?of?econ?crisis,?nationalist?youth?organization?anti?Chib?
??SO?further?privatizes?land,?Geo?anti?
?
??first?consecutive?period?where?no?serious?violations?were?registered?
?? 1998? ?? ??
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?January?30,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?1/98?for?
the?period?of?1?25?January?1998?
?Oss?wait?for?Geo?to?draft?an?intermediary?doc?[as?response?to?RU's];?all?sides?inf?avor?of?
expert?meeting?prior?to?formal?second?round?of?nego?
18?Jan? new?NO?pres?Dzasokhov?
elected?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?January?30,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?1/98?for?
the?period?of?1?25?January?1998?
?proclaims?will?to?settle?Geo?SO?conflict
??Dzugayev?(speaker)?stresses?infront?of?pael?"ravnosubjektnost",?equal?subject?relationship?
to?Geo,?a?line?taken?from?nego?in?Mar?1997?in?Mosc?
??JPKF>?Geo?unilaterally?removed?two?posts,?Disevi,?Dvani?
249?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?February?18,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?2/98?
for?the?period?of?26?January???15?February?1998?
?JPKF:?criminal?tensions?in?Tamarasheni
??Shev?sees?SO?sonflict?easier?to?resolve?than?Abkh;?SO?conflcit?might?be?caught?in?"Abkhazia?
trap"?with?the?Oss?waiting?for?what?the?Abkh?get?and?delaying?the?nego?process?with?
inacceptable?reconstruction?aid?demands,?Shev?says?
??RU,?Amb?Mayorov,?visits?Tbs?5?12?Feb,?confirms?rehab?programme?through?tenders,?RU's?
eforts?for?energy?supply?to?SO,?confirms?SO?itnegration?to?Geo?
??Jan?30?Dzasokhov?says?SO?rehab?through?GEO?RU?implementation?plan,?NO?supports?
settlement?of?conflict,?Chib?stresses?NO?SO?integration?process?
9?Feb? Ass?attempt?on?Shev? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?February?18,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?2/98?
for?the?period?of?26?January???15?February?1998?
?6?Zviadists?arrested?
??Chib?condemns?attempt?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication Vienna?March?5,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?3/98?for?
the?period?of?16?February???28?February?1998?
?Econ?rehab:?reconstr?of?individual?houses?due?to?start?on?15?Mar,?problems?with?NO?energy?
firm?with?signed?contract?and?disappeared,?handover?to?local?Geo?or?Oss?company.?
??Taking?of?int?hostages?in?Vladi?and?Zugdid?
??ICRC?pulled?out?of?SO?because?calm?and?stable?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?March?18,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?4/98?for?
the?period?of?1?March???15?March?1998?
?because?Ankh?hot,?SO?Geo?keep?low?profile,?JCC?postponed
??land?disputes?in?aoreas?with?mix?population,?detention?of?Oss?by?Geo?police?without?coop?
of?LEBs?
??question?whether?Oss?PKF?will?be?under?SO?MIA?or?NO?M?for?Emergencies?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?April?7,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?5/98?for?
the?period?of?16?March???31?March?1998?
?SO?Geo?talks?go?on?exclusively?about?financial?issues?on?reconstr
??JPKF:?SO?asked?JPKF?to?reestablish?four?checkpoints,?due?to?unilateral?Geo?police?
movements?
20?
Mar?
SO?in?North?Caucasus?
meeting?in?Rostov?on?Don?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?April?7,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?5/98?for?
the?period?of?16?March???31?March?1998?
?SO?joined?the?"Association?of?Social?and?Economic?Development?of?Northern?Caucasus"
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?April?15,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?6/98?for?
the?period?of?1???15?April?1998?
?in?early?1998?serious?escalations?between?Zviadists?and?Geo police,?between?
demonstrators?in?Tbs?and?in?Gali?region.?Hostages,?leading?figures?of?Zviadists?killed?by?Geo?
police,?internal?Zviadist?struggle?between?moderate?and?extremist?wing?(acts?of?revenge?
against?moderates)?
1?22?
Apr?
?? 3?killed,?1?Geo?
by?RU?PKF?
soldier??
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?May?4,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?7/98?for?
the?period?of?16???30?April?1998?
?in?Tamarasheni?
21?
Apr?
Mayorov?visits?Geo? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?May?4,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?7/98?for?
the?period?of?16???30?April?1998?
?Geo?failed?to?present?their?intermediary?doc,?supposedly?still?discussed?within?Geo?gov.?
Rehab?discussed?
?
??Mayorov?is?Ambassador?for?what???
250?
?
27?
Apr?
Geo?MDF?resigns?because?
he?fails?to?ensure?Shev's??
security?escort?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?May?4,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?7/98?for?
the?period?of?16???30?April?1998?
?new?MDF?Tevsadze?Abkh?and?SO?veteran
??UNHCR?head?after?90?days?still?hostage?in?Vladi?
4?May? Declaration?by?SO?MFA?on?
lacking?Geo?finances?for?
rehab?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?May?15,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?8/98?for?
the?period?of?1?May?–?15?May?1998?
?SO?leadership?high?member?says?informally,?further?approachment?between?SO?and?Geo?
only?with?real?commitments?of?Geo?in?the?field?of?econ?rehab,?this?shall?prevent?
radicalization?of?public?opinion?in?SO?when?econ?condicitons?worsen?
30?
May?
?? SO?Deputy?
chariman?of?
Gov?shot?in?
Vladi?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?June?4,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?9/98?for?
the?period?of?16?May?–?31?May?1998?
?in?charge?of?econ?devel?of?the?region,?hardliner?as?to?status.
?
??nego:?Because?violence?broke?out?in?gali?district?19?20?May,?Geo?version?of?intermediary?
doc?not?endorsed?
5?Jun? Fourth?summit?of??BSEC?
Black?Sea?Economic?
Cooperation?in?Yalta?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?June?18,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/98?for?
the?period?of?1?June?–?15?June?1998?
?Ukraine?ensures?partnership?and?support?to?solution?of?Geo?Abkh?conflict
20?Jun? Shev?Chib?meeting?in?
Borjomi?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?July?7,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/98?for?
the?period?of?16?June?–?30?June?1998?
?third?meeting?in?three?years;?joint?declaration?focused?on?econ?matters?and?appealed?to?int?
donors?
??status?not?metioned,?they?believe?public?opinion?not?ready?yet,?Chib?favorably?towards?
concept?of?"assymetrical?federalism"?
7?Jul? Press?serivce?of?Adamon?
Nichias?releases?anti?Chib?
statement?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?July?21,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/98?for?
the?period?of?1?July?–?20?July?1998?
?radical?voices?in?SO?and?NO,?and?their?backers?in?RU?call?into?question?Borjomi?results?and?
role?of?OSCE;?although?majority?of?SO?population?supports?Chib?course?
??Chochiev?leader?of?AN,?recently?pardonned?by?Chib?and?released?from?prison,?radicals?want?
him?to?be?pres?
??8?Jul?anti?OSCE?articel?in?RU?Nezavismaya?gazeta"?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?18,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/98?for?
the?period?of?21?July?–?10?August?1998?
?RU?delays?appointing?new?head?to?JCC????What?caused?the?Russian?anti?consensus?turn??
Internal?RU?debate?that?has?radicalized??
??Baramidze?was?head?of?CUG?parl?group?????because?he?is?on?a?one?year?study?leave?to?the?
US?he?is?replaced?by?Saaka?
3?Aug? First?CoE?visit?to?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?18,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/98?for?
the?period?of?21?July?–?10?August?1998?
?Dzugayev?offers?10?seats?for?Geo?in?parl
10?
Aug?
Chib?dismisses?gov? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?18,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/98?for?
the?period?of?21?July?–?10?August?1998?
?because?of?inability?to?fight?econ?crisis?and?corruption?of?state?bodies
12?
Aug?
Armenians?threaten?Geo?
soldiers?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?31,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/98?for?
the?period?of?11?August?–?31?August?1998?
20?armed?men?stop?Geo?unit?on?the?way?ti?the?RU?Akhlakalaki?base;?parts?of?Arm?nationalist?
movement?Javakh,?mailny?local?citizens?
??same?night?blast?at?main?building?of?local?administration?in?Akhal?
251?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?August?31,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/98?for?
the?period?of?11?August?–?31?August?1998?
?econ?rehab?financing:?Geo?wants?share?of?funds?earmarked?for?SO?although?SO?sufferend?
80%?of?the?damage?
?
??Machavariani?PR?of?pres?on?the?Geo?SO?conflict?settlement?[already?for?a?long?time]?
5?Sep? ?? 1?Oss?villager?
killed??
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?September?20,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
15/98?for?the?period?of?1?September?–?20?September?
1998?
?incidentially?by?RU?PKF's?training?missile;?adeuqate?reaction?bu?RU?PKF,?apologies,?financial?
compensation.?Chib?visits?scene.?
18?
Sep?
Econ?Rehab?Prog?and?MoU?
signed?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?September?20,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
15/98?for?the?period?of?1?September?–?20?September?
1998?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?October?7,?1998,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?16/98?for?
the?period?of?21?September?–?7?October?1998?
?some?SO?locals?hand?in?weapons?to?SO?authorities?(why?)
??4th?session?of?the?JCC?Ad?Hoc?Committee?on?refugees?and?IDPs?at?the?end?of?Sept?
?
Machavariani:?Special?Representative?of?the?President?on?Political,?Security?and?Conflict?
Settlement?Issues?
???
#####? Geo?elections?on?local?self?
government?bodies?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?December,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/98?for?the?period?of?14?–?30?November?1998?
?JPKF?commander?promises?that?int?election?observers?are?not?going?to?be?kidnapped?[?]
#####? Machavariani?visits?Tskh?
and?hands?over?intermed?
doc?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?December,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/98?for?the?period?of?14?–?30?November?1998?
?Geo?NSC?discusses?intermediary?doc,?Mengarishvili?indicates?before?as?important?step
??SO?continuously?stresses?that?econ?rehab?ist?conditional?for?political?settlement?[Why??
Because?of?embezzlement??Internal?opp?pushes??????Das?macht?es?klar,?warum?viele?in?Geo?
nicht?vom?Argument?der?"weichen"?Konfliktloesung?ueberzeugt?sind,?weil?sie?den?Diskurs?
seit?Jahren?kennen?und?vemuten?was?dahitner?steht]?
??Zhv?two?weeks?ago?proposed?the?introduction?of?GEL?in?SO,?Dzugayev?at?first?in?Geo?pres?
positive.?Now?he?withdrew?and?said?he?always?wanted?to?keep?the?Rubel?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?December,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/98?for?the?period?of??1?–?15?December?1998?
?preparations?for?SO?parl?elections,?out?of?33?seats?(before?41)?4?are?offred?to?Geo?enclaves
??econ?crisis?in?Geo:?in?order?to?cover?the?budget,?tax?revenues?have?to?increase?by?45%?
?? ?? 2?Geo?killed? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?December,?1998,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/98?for?the?period?of??1?–?15?December?1998?
?in?Artsevi.?PKF/?local?police?coop?and?arrested?people.
?? 1999? ?? ??
252?
?
9?Jan? First?meeting?Chib?and?
Lordkipanidze?in?SO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?11?January,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?1/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?December?1998?and?1???10?
January?1999;?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?11?January,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Spot?Report?No.?2/99,?A?Spot?
Report?on?Tskhinvali?High?Level?Meeting?on?9?January,?
1999?
?considered?to?be?the?restart?of?negotiations?because?of?especially?high?level
??Lordk?says,?Geo?draft?on?Geo?RU?Econ?Rehab?Agreement?will?be?issued?fast;?and?[treat?for?
the?Russians]?that?Geo?and?RU?will?negotiate?condictions?for?energy?supply?to?SO?from?NO.?
??RU?has?finally?nominated?JPKF?head?[maybe?in?turn?for?Lordk's?concessions]?
??JPKF:?In?the?last?5?months,?3?more?posts?have?been?dismantled.?11?military?posts?remain?at?
present?in?the?conflict?zone?
?
??Lordkipanidze's?appointment?is?a?sign?that?Geo?"equalizes"?So?and?Abkh?matters?(quote?
No.2/99)?
27?Jan? Geo?enters?CoE? ?? ??
?? ?? 2?[Oss?]?killed? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?February,?1999,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?3/99?
for?the?period?of?1?–?15?February?1999?
?in?the?Oss?villages?of?Znauri?and?Java
1?Feb? Declaration?of?Council?of?
Natives?of?Samachablo?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?February,?1999,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?3/99?
for?the?period?of?1?–?15?February?1999?
?on?alleged?discrimination?of?the?Geo?population
16?17?
Feb?
First?meeting?of?SO?and?
Geo?expert?groups?on?the?
comprehensive?settlement??
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?March, 1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?4/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?28?February?1999?
?>>?Spot?Report?No.?4/99
??Geo?wants?parallel?pol?settlement?and?econ?rehab,?SO?wants?rehab?prior?to?sttlement?
??JPKF:?so?called?"free?market?area"?at?the?entrance?of?Tskh?[ergneti?market?]?has?problem?of?
violence?????[first?mentioning?of?Ergneti]?
??JPKF?commander?proposes?to?establish?a?joint?checkpoint?with?three?Oss?and?three?Geo?
PKF?soldiers?to?control?the?area?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?March,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?6/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?March?1999?
?preparation?of?SO?elections:
??out?33?districts,?4?to?Georgians?
??6?political?movements?competing:?Communist?Party;?All?Ossetian?Movement?“Styr?Nykhaz”;?
Youth?Union?of?South?Ossetia;?Union?of?the?Defenders?of?the?Fatherland?(leader?–?Mr.?V.?
Gabaraev,?former?“Prime?Minister?of?South?Ossetia”);?Socialist?movement?“Fatherland”?
(leader?–?Mr.?V.?Gobozov,?“Vice?Minister?of?External?Affairs”,?Personal?Representative?of?the?
South?Ossetian?leader?Mr.?Chibirov?to?political?negotiations);?National?Democratic?Party?
(leader?–?Mr.?H.?Gagloiti,?employee?of?the?“Ministry?of?External?Relations”?and?son?of?the?
former?“Minister?of?External?Relations”).??
??JPKF:?number?of?checkpoints?now?down?to?10,?ongoing?closures?
253?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?April,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?7/99?for?
the?Period?of?1?15?April?1999?
?second?expert?meeting?(of?the?plenipotentiary?delegations?of?Geo?and?SO?sides)?will?be?
postponed?due?to?SO?elections?
?
??ab?jetzt?hat?man?das?Gefuehl?beginnen?sie?langsam?das?Schreiben?der?Reports?ernst?zu?
nehmen,?achten?auf?die?richtigen?Titel,?Daten,?Detailinfos..?
???
"A?sociological?poll?among?200?respondents?in?Tskhinvali,?carried?out?by?the?Tskhinvali?
Information?Center,?has?shown?that?48,8?%?of?them?consider?that?over?the?last?year?the?
Georgian?Ossetian?relations?have?improved,?while?41,6%?saw?no?significant?changes.?18,4%?
believe?that?this?year?the?situation?will?improve?crucially,?10,4%?are?pessimistic,?52,8%?do?
not?foresee?major?changes.?9,9%?are?for?an?independent?state,?3,2%?accept?South?Ossetia?
under?control?of?both?Russia?and?Georgia,?3,2%???preserving?the?status?quo,?4,8%???as?a?
territory?under?international?control?and?protection,?4,8%???as?a?subject?of?a?confederation?
of?South?Ossetia,?Abkhazia,?Ajara?and?Georgia?with?equal?rights,?21,6%?prefer?South?Ossetia?
within?the?Russian?Federation,?49,6%????South?Ossetia?as?a?part?of?Republic?of?North?Ossetia?
Alania."?
31?
Mar?
JCC?meeting?in?Moscow? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?May,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?8/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?30?April?1999?
agreement?of?signing?RU?Geo?Agreement?on?rehab?soon
16?
Apr?
Machav?stalls?nego?
because?of?SO?elections?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?May,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?8/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?30?April?1999?
?Tibilov?underlines?econ?rehab?by?Geo?to?SO?as?an?obligation,?Machav?says?signing?RU?Geo?
agreement?on?rehab?will?be?postponed?
17?
Apr?
?? Death?of?JCC?
commander?
Major?General?
Anatoly?
Krassovsky?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?May,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?8/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?30?April?1999;?SR?19?Apr?1999?
?no?further?information,?he?was?replaced
??SR?says,?that?he?was?killed?by?a?company?commander?of?the?same?battalion?in?Tskh.?Drunk,?
overreacted?to?criticism.?
27?
Apr?
Khazbegi?company?owner?
Topadze?opens?restaurant?
in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?May,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?8/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?30?April?1999?
?employs?Oss?
May? ?? One?cadidate?
killed?
SR?30?Jul?1999 ?running?for?"Deputy"?during?parl?elections?[maybe?deputy?head?of?parl]
6?May? ?? Artsevi?Mayor?
killed?
SR?6?May?1999 ?criminal,?[not?clear?if?it?is?the?same?like?the?previous?]
254?
?
12?
May?
SO?parl?elections? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?May,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?9/99?for?
the?period?of?01?16?May?1999?
?Geo?parl?issues?elections?illegitimate,?both?reconfirm?elections?do?not?halt?nego
??Dzugayev,?a?moderate,?lost?in?the?elections?
??9?parties?were?admitted?to?the?elections,?11?seats?and?18?deputies,.?Comm?Party?won?
??large?group?of?Geo?journ?visited?Tskh?for?elections,?NO?and?TRandistria?delegations?
observes?elections,?says?SO?
???
JPKF>?two?illegal?checkpoints?at?Sunisi?and?Otrevi,?both?dismantled.?Sunisi:?GEo?refugees?
returneee?area,?post?by?Geo?PKF?established,?then?dismantled?Otrevi:?Geo?shepherd?used?
OSs?graze?land,?beaten?up?by?Oss,?local?Oss?established?checkpoint?with?was?dismentled?by?
JPKF?observers?
?
??"Reportedly?the?“Communist?Party?of?the?Republic?of?South?Ossetia”?emerged?first,?
receiving?7?seats,?followed?by?the?new?Socialist?Peoples’s?Movement?“Fatherland”?(2?seats),?
the?All?Ossetian?Assembly?“Stir?Nihas”?(1?seat)?and?the?Youth?Union?(1?seat).??Only?four?
“deputies”?have?been?elected?by?constituencies,?while?the?remaining?candidates?will?
compete?for?14?seats?at?the??run?off?elections."?
?
??Gobozov,?Personal?Representative?of?the?South?Ossetian?leader?for?the?Georgian?Ossetian?
conflict?settlement?
29?
May?
SO?parl?elections,?second?
round?//?NO?high?level?del?
in?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?June,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?No.?10/99?for?the?period?of?17?
–?31?May?1999?
?NO?visit?on?return,?meeting?with?UNHCR?and?OSCE.?NO?says?it?is?for?speedy?return?process??
???obviously?cooperation?intensifies?and?meetings?on?the?IDP/?refugee?return?become?more?
frequent?
??Chib?in?Moscow?on?energy?supply?talks?
??SO?elect:?Gobozov?not?reelected,?but?main?figure?in?nego.?he?doubts?serious?intentions?of?
Geo.?
??JPKF>?RU?PKF?constittues?of?increasingly?more?Oss.?Imbalance?in?command?structure,?
because?commander?is?only?low?rank,?increase?of?instability?of?the?JPKF?[hae?]?
3?Jun? RU?affirms?EU?as?an?
observer?to?the?JCC?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?June,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?ReportNo.?11/99?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?June?1999?
?all?other?sides?positive,?too
??JPKF?commander?decided?to?establish?regular?Thurs?meetings?between?LEBs?due?to?
increased?criminal?activity?[Did?the?former?Thur?meetings?stop??Or?are?there?only?officials?
from?the?local?administrations?participating,?and?not?from?the?police?as?is?is?the?case?with?
the?new?format?]?
9?Jun? Kochiev,?head?of?Comm?
Party,?elected?Speaker?of?
SO?parl?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?June,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/Activity?Report?No.?11/99?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?June?1999?
?Koch?wins?against?Gobozov;?replaces?Dzugayev,?who?is?now?advisor?to?Chib,?Chib?supports?
Koch?
?
??Mikhail?Mayorov,?Ambassador?at?large?of?the?RU?MFA?
22?Jun? Shev?at?EU?summit?in?
Luxembourg?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?July,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?June?1999.?
?further?deepening?of?Geo?EU?ties,?Shev?wants?more?EU?support?on?econ?rehab?in?SO????
only?for?Abkh?he?voices?wish?of?EU?participation?in?conflict?settlement?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5 July,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?June?1999.?
?Lordk?and?Chigoyev,?head?of?SO?gov,?discuss?energy?supply?from?Geo?to?SO,?SO's?electricity?
debt?to?RU,?econ?rehab,?joint?fight?against?contraband?
255?
?
25?Jun? Geo?election?law?has?
passed?parl?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?July,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/99?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?June?1999.?
13?Jul? First?working?meeting?of?
JCC?Co?chairmen?in?Tskh?
1?Geo?former?
IDP?killed?
("without?clear?
motivation")?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?July,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/99?for?
the?period?of?1?15?July?1999?
?RU,?Geo,?SO,?and?NO?participates;?bilateral?econ?cooperation?discussed,?promoted?joint?
LEBs?activities?
??Chib?says,?on?rehab,?RU?has?fulfilled?10%,?Geo?1%?
??JPKF>?3?cases?of?kidnapping,?int?NGOs?recall?their?int?staff?from?SO;?JPKF?tries?to?ensure?
security?for?int?Orgs?in?Tskh?
?
Any?meeting?that?takes?place?during?these?months?was?befreoehand?postponed?for?
months?and?several?times?from?either?side?(expert?group,?JCC,?RU?Geo?econ?rehab..)?
23?Jul? ?10th?JCC?session?in?
Tsinandali,?Geo?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?August,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/99?for?
the?period?of?16?31?July?1999?
?working?groups?on?joint?LEBs?and?rehab?convened?before?JCC
??rehab:?draft?work?on?RU?Geo?agreement?of?Econ?Rehab,?SO?group?severely?accuses?Geo?of?
trying?to?locate?money?out?of?the?conflict?zone,?danger?of?SO?dropping?out?of?rehab?
agreement?
????JPKF/?LEB?coop:?JCC?agreeas?that?JPKF?stays?"?major?guarantor?of?peace?and?stability?in?the?
area".?
??rotation?of?the?JPKF?critized?and?stability?in?the?conflcit?zone,?commander?calms?Geo?about?
ethnic?composition?of?RU?PKF,?Geo?demands,?rotation?not?on?the?basis?of?units?from?North?
Caucasus.?In?addition?to?the?10?posts,?JCC?decides?to?open?4?more?posts?in?areas?were?the?
land?disputes?are?hot?
??[Interestingly,?the?JPKF?accords?to?the?same?ethnic?division?logic?like?ethnic?territorialiy?
during?the?SU]?
??Coordination?body?for?joint?LEB?activities?to?be?set?up?at?JCC,?IOs?return?to?SO?as?a?result?
of?enhanced?security?measures?
?
??seriuos?issue?is?ethn?Geo?return?to?SO:?can?they?choose?where?to?return?,?SO?side?refuses?
3?4?
Aug?
?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?23?August,?1999, OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/99?for?
the?period?of?01?21?August?1999?
?the?"Large?Russian?Georgian?Intergovernmental?Commission?on?Economic?Cooperation"?
was?held?in?Moscow,?with?no?final?agreement?on?joint?Georgian?Russian?economic?
assistance?to?the?zone?of?conflict.?
18?
Aug?
Geo?closes?down?Gori?Tskh?
highway?for?shipping?traffic?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?23?August,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/99?for?
the?period?of?01?21?August?1999?
?Geo?State?Customs?Department,?prevent?smuggel?entrering?Geo?proper,?Deparment?and?Sp?
continue?to?discuss?the?Roki?tunnel?as?a?tax?colelction?point;?Geo?proposes?that?ITS,?a?
Bristish?conmpany?to?control?tax?collection?at?Roki,?ITS?already?does?controls?throughout?
Geo?
10?11?
Sept?
Second?Geo?SO?expert's?
meeting?in?Java?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?27?September,?1999,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/99?for?the?period?of?22?August?–?24?September?
1999.?
?"resumption?of?the?settlement?process"?(CIO)?[phase]
??meeting?procedural,?demilitarization:?maitain?JPKF?until?decision;?and?rehab:?multilateral?
control?mechanism?on?expenditures;?SO?condemns?de?facto?econ?blockade?like?the?cut?of?
electricity?since?recently?[justified?by?Geo?through?non?payment?by?SO?to?Geo]?
??JPKF:?less?criminal?acts?in?rep?period;?tensions?between?villagers?in?Artsevi?due?to?alleged?
unequal?land?distribution?
??20?Sept:?NO?and?TRansnistria?attended?SO?independence?celebatraion?
256?
?
?? Geo?Oss?talks? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?October,?1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?17/99?for?
the?period?of?25?September?–?15?October?1999?
?early?Oct:?Geo?SO?meet?in?Tbs,?discuss?electricity?and?customs?control,?SO?about?to?harden?
line;?mid?Oct:?informal?Geo?Oss?talks?in?Varna,?Bulgaria?launched?by?American?NGO?Conflict?
Management?Group,?Macha?and?Dzugayev?(now?Chairman?of?the?State?Committee?on?
Information?and?Press)?
??Amb?of?Austria?and?France?visit?SO?
13?Oct? ?? 1?NO?killed?at?
Falloy?market?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?October, 1999,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?17/99?for?
the?period?of?25?September?–?15?October?1999;?SR?13?
Oct?1999?
?robbery?at?Falloy?market?outside?Tskh,?SO?police?says?suspects?are?local?Oss
30?Oct? SO?demands?de?facto?visa?
application?of?foreign?
citizens?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?November,?1999,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/99?for?the?period?of?16?31?October?1999?
?in?conformity?with?the?“Decree?of?the?President?of?South?Ossetia”?of?1?August?1997
#####? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?November,?1999,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/99?for?the?period?of?1?–?17?November?1999?
?bomb?found?under?fuel?truck?in?market?area
??since?the?beginning?of?Sept?electricity?supply?from?Geo?to?conmflict?zone?unpredictable,?
absent?for?days?in?row;??Chib?because?of?this?under?open?public?pressure?to?resign,?leaflets?
circulate?in?Tskh?
??Geo?currently?in?regress?with?electricity?payments?to?RU?
???RU?Geo?econ?rehab?agreement?delayed?again?
#####? Geo?electricity?supply?to?
SO?resumes?//?OSCE?
summit?in?Istanbul?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?7?December,?1999,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/99?for?the?period?of?17?30?November?1999?
?17?Nov:?150?demonstrate?in?center?of?Tskh?against?Chib, when?on?22?Nov?electricity?supply?
resumes?it?is?five?days?before?another?demonstration?is?announced.?Since?Nov?22?no?
demonstrations?anymore.??
??Leaflet?action?condemed?by?SO?parl?in?Yuzhanya?Ossetia?newspaper?26?Nov?
??23?Nov:?"10th?anniversary?of?the?outbreak?of?Geo?Oss?conflict"?(report?itself)?????Was?war?
am?23.?Nov?1989?genau??March?to?Tskh??Geo?police?to?Tskh??
??????Check?OSCE?summit?in?Istanbul,?which?decisions,?Shev?says?on?Nov?18?summit?was?most?
impotant?event?in?the?world?since?the?end?of?the?cold?war"?
?
??Nov?26,?Hom?meets?Menagarishvili:?"The?Hom?again?underlined?that?lack?of?electricity?is?
providing?an?excellent?opportunity?to?Chibirov's?opponents?to?openly?challenge?the?
moderate?South?Ossetian?leader."?[Also,?entweder?bringt?er?ihn?auf?eine?Idee?oder?er?warnt?
ihn]?
?
JPKF>?3?of?4?temporary?posts?closed,?meant?during?the?harvest?season?
17?19?
Dec?
GYLA?presents?draft?
restitution?law?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?24?December,?1999,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/99?for?the?period?of?01???23?December?1999?
?JPKF:?Geo?families?from?Eredvi?have?begun?to?hand?over?weapons?to?JPKF?and?local?police;?
temporary?pst?at?Ioncha?remains?
?[?RU?mediates?bilateral?meeting?of?Geo?S,?Geo?accepts?RU?as?meditor]?14?Dec?Macha?Chib?
Koch?meet?in?Tskh?with?mediation?of?Mayorov?
?? 2000? ?? ??
257?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?January,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/00?for?
the?period?of?24?December?1999???15?January?2000?
?energy?supply?from?Geo?still?sporadic,?from?RU,?too
??JPKF?voluntary?handover?programme?continues?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?7?February,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?2/00?16???
31?January?2000?
?SO?MFA?publishes?statement?in?which?it?stronlgy?condemns?Geo?accusations?that?weapons?
are?smuggeled?through?SO?from?RU?military?base?near?Tbs?to?the?North?Caucasus?
??Weapon?collection:?since?start?50?pieces?of?arms?and?some?kilos?of?explosives?
??22?Jan:?OSCe?office?in?Tskh?burglered,?second?time?in?three?months?
??bomb?detonation?near?restaurant?in?Tskh,?tensions?between?Geo?and?Oss?at?Falloy?
??28?Dec:?Geo?Ru?rehab?draft?initialled?in?Moscow,?but?not?singed?yet?
??Shev?presses?to?clearify?status?of?Ajara?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?February,?2000,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/00?for?the?period?of?01?15?February?2000?
?9?Feb>?Shev?says?that?his?and?Putin's?views?to?SO?and?Abkh?the?same
??7?Feb?shev?announces?that?Geo?RU?rehab?agreement?will?be?signed?after?Geo?and?RU?
elections?
??JPKF:?Geo?Oss?jointly?control?road?between?Tskh?and?Kekhvi?to?rpevent?vehicle?robberies?
19?
Feb?
SO?Geo?meet?in?Tskh?on?
customs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?March,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?4/00?for?
the?period?of?15?29?February?2000?
?first?high?level?meeting?on?cooperation?in?the?field?of?custioms,?Lordk?proposes?coop?
because?smuggel?is?Geo?most?improtant?security?problem,?Chib?says?jinto?custom?policy?
possible?
28?
Feb?
NO?pres?visits?Tbs?on?SO? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?March,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?4/00?for?
the?period?of?15?29?February?2000?
?customs?and?transport?discussed,?and?TRACECA?project
29?
Feb?
Joint?Coordination?Center?
with?JPKF?in?force?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?March,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?4/00?for?
the?period?of?15?29?February?2000?
?on?joint?LEBs?
1?Mar? RU?visa?restrictions?for?Geo?
and?Aze?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?7?February,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?2/00?16???
31?January?2000?
?So?hopes?to?be?exception
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?March,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?5/00?for?
the?period?of?I???15?March?2000?
?SO?refuses?joint?Geo?SO?customs?control?at?Roki?tunnel?
??Press?Service?of?SO?Pres?and?Gov?condems?article?in?RU?newspaper?Isvestiya?of?4?Mar,?
which?says?that?recent?meeting?between?Geo?and?SO?press?officials?is?secret?meeting?to?
discuss?status?of?SO?
??JPKF:?"Since?the?beginning?of?this?year,?more?than?90?pieces?of?firearms,?over?40?kilograms?
of?explosives,?mines,?grenades?have?been?handed?over?by?local?Ossetian?and?Georgian?
population?without?any?compensation"?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?3?April,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?6/00?for?
the?period?of?16???31?March?2000?
?JPKF?began?patrolling?ther?oad?between?Tskh?and?Artsevi?on?11?Mar?due?to?increased?crime
10?
Apr?
Shev?announces?early?
solution?of?Ajara?status?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?April,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?7/2000,?1?
–?15?April?2000?
?says,?this?offers?a?real?model?to?Abkhand?SO
??recurring?spring?theme?is?land?disputes?
258?
?
12?
May?
?? 1?Geo?killed?in?
Tskh?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17 May,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?9/00?for?
the?period?of?5?16?May?2000?
?criminal,?no?consequences
??JPKF:?Geo?plated?car?at?Sunisi?carried?15?kg?of?explosives;?Falloy?still?tense,?some?explosives?
found?
??12?May?CoE?meeting?in?Tskh,?Chib?very?critical?of?Geo?
12?
May?
Geo?spies?on?Falloy? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?May,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?9/00?for?
the?period?of?5?16?May?2000?
Geo?Special?Services?representative?disguised?as?journalists?took?pictures?etc.?of?Falloy?
market?area,?discovered,?beaten,?detained?by?SO?LEB;?released?with?apologies;?offocial?on?
both?sides?admit?they?spy?on?the?aerea?as?for?terrorist?attacks?
??in?Nikozi?armed?persons?checked?docs?of?Geo?passing?by?demanding?RU?language?docs?
20?
May?
?? 5?Geo?killed? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?June,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/00?15?
May???5?June?2000?
?car?ambush?in?Geo?village?Kheiti,?joint?Geo?SO investigation?group?established?on?1?Jun?
upon?insistance?of?JPKF?commander.??
??commemoration?day?of?1992?killing?of?36?Oss?by?Geo?????"one?of?the?most?painful?memories?
of?the?conflict",?report?says?
??As?a?consequence,?voluntary?weapon?handover?has?virutally?stopped?
26?
May?
?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?June,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/00?15?
May???5?June?2000?
?group?of?SO?militia?tried?to?occupy?a?building?rented?by?the?company?Kuravodjstry?Trest?at?
the?falloy?market.?An?armed?unit?of?RU?PKFs?convinced?them?to?leave.?
??What?or?who?is?"South?Ossetian?militia"??The?police??????The?reports?start?here?to?call?
them?militia,?maybe?a?downgrading?for?they?are?not?to?considered?legitimate?police?
forces??
31?
May?
Third?Geo?SO?experts'?
meeting?on?pol?nego?in?
Java?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?June,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/00?15?
May???5?June?2000?
?intermediary?doc?for?refugee?return?with?RU,?NO,?OSCE?in?Java?[when?the?term?intermed?
doc?was?introduced,?1.?the?informal?meetings?started?and?2.?it?became?an?institution?in?
playin?gout]?
SO?authorities?let?Geo?jounralists?visit?Tskh?prisons?to?prove?that?conditions?for?Geo?good?
12?Jun? Geo?SO?protocol?on?joint?
LEB?activities?signed?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?June,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/00?5?–?
15?June?2000?
?It?states?that?crimes?committed?in?the?area?are?not?ethnically?motivated
??weapon?collection?started?again?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?July,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/00?for?
the?period?of?16???30?June?2000?
?JPKF?comm?officially?complains?about?SO?police?harrassing?JPKF?forces,?warns?that?they?will?
be?disarmed?
15?Jun? Zhazhiev?article?in?Neza?
Gazeta?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?July,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/00?for?
the?period?of?16???30?June?2000?
?SO?gov?says?article?individual?opinion
??Zhazhiev?was?recently?appointed?"Director?of?the?Information?Agency?Ir?Press?with?the?
President?of?South?Ossetia"?.?Referring?to?a?possible?Vienna?experts'?meeting?in?the?
framework?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?political?negotiations,?Mr.?Zhazhiev?wrote,?inter?alia,?
that?"no?doubt,?the?delegation?of?the?Republic?of?South?Ossetia?does?not?expect?a?
constructive?nd?deliberative?approach?in?Vienna?to?the?problems?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?
conflict,?but?rather?a?hitherto?unknown?pressure?and?arms?twisting?by?OSCE?clerks?in?order?
to?exact?catastrophic?concessions?.?And?all?this?is?being?done,?so?that?Georgia?could?try?on?
the?NATO?uniform?as?soon?as?possible!??However,?such?attempts?.?.?.?are?doomed?to?fail.?
South?Ossetia?can?hardly?imagine?itself?to?be?within?a?state,?that?is?member?of?a?
militarypolitical?alliance,?of?which?Russia???mildly?speaking???is?not?quite?on?friendly?terms?
with".?
259?
?
11?13?
Jul?
4th?expert?meeting?in?
Baden?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?July,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/00?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?July?2000?
?reports?satisfied?with?epxert?meetings'??progresses:
??"Three?issues?emerged,?which?the?experts?found?expedient?to?be?dealt?with?as?part?of?one?
package,?such?as:?
•?Recognition?of?the?territorial?integrity?of?Georgia:?Building?of?state?legal?relationships?
within?its?internationally?recognised?borders?and,?concurrently,?acceptance?of?the?vital?links?
between?South?Ossetia?and?North?Ossetia???Alania?of?the?Russian?Federation;?
•?Attributes?of?a?future?South?Ossetian?status:?Creation?of?own?constitution,?institutions,?
emblems?and?contractual?powers?within?trade,?economy,?science?and?technology?and?
culture.?In?this?context,?a?particular?bone?of?contention?is?the?name?of?the?future?entity.?
•?International?guarantees:?To?be?introduced?to?support?the?above?arrangement."?
?
??SO,?GEO,?EC?Del,?OSCE:?EU?Platform?on?economic?rehabilitation?projects?signed:?1)?
electricity?Geo?to?SO,?1)?rehab?Gori?Tskh?railway?and?Tskh?train?station,?3)?rehab?Tskh?gas?
supply?grid?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?August,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/00?for?
the?period?of?15?31?July?2000?
19?17?Jul?Transcaucasian?motor?highway?(Roki?tunnel)?between?SO?and?RU?was?closed?due?
to?mudslide,?only?conncetion?via?Geo?military?highway?(Khazbegi)?
??inhabitants?of?Ergneti,?Marana?and?Tamarasheni?wanted?to?block?the?roads?to?Tskh?in?
protest,?because?of?energy?cuts?and?mudslide?
??30?Jul?Liakhvi?ponds?opened?in?repsonse?to?the?drought,?Terefoni?irrgiation?canal?will?be?
filled?
??SO?wants?OSCE?as?mediator,?Geo?wants?interntional?involvement,?both?want?RU;?Macha:?
SO?must?nulliofy?declaration?of?independence?and?Geo?in?turn?will?grant?extensive?
autnonomy?rights?
??Kakabadze?HoM,?Geo?Minister?for?Special?Affairs?says,?Geo?electricity?supply?starts?from?25?
Jul,?to?Tskh?and?neighboring?villages,?also?water,?passports?dicussed?
??JPKF:?Kekhvi?region:?anti?tank?mine?found?and?destroyed,?planted?as?a?warning?agaist?illegal?
wood?cutting?
??25?Jul:?Oss?OMON?stop?Geo?driver?in?Geo?part?of?Ergneti,?harrass?him,?Geo?crowd?gathers,?
JPKF?rapid?response?force?resolves?it?[it?seems?like?local?population?adapted?to?the?
unsettled?situation?and?created?their?mechanism?of?Selbstjustiz,?demonstrating,?hostage?
taking..]?
??RU?stops?JPKF?fuel?transport?at?Roki?tunnel?and?SO?authorities?replaced?some?SO?JPKF?
tankers?with?unauthorized?tankers?[not?really?clear?to?me?what?was?going?ont?here?actually]?
??weapon?coll?goes?on,?more?than?200?collected?an?106?kg?exploseves?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?August,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/00?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?August?2000?
?8?10?Aug?RU?JPKF?post?fored?on?twice?from?the?direction?of?the?SO?village?Dmenisi;?crime?
increases?recently?with?two?lethal?incidents?in?rep?period,??
?
??Vladikavkaz?Center?for?Social?and?Humanitarian?Research???
18?
Aug?
Shev?Putin?discuss?SO?at?
CIS?meeting?in?Yalta?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?September,?2000,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/00?for?the?period?of?15???31?August?2000?
?Shev?says,?stnace?of?RU?and?Geo?less?fierce?and?NO?pres?Dzasokhov?very?willing?to?help
260?
?
26?
Aug?
SO?Geo?meet?in?Tbs? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?September,?2000,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/00?for?the?period?of?15???31?August?2000?
?SO?PM?Chigoyev?,?State?Minister?Arsenishv?and?Kakabadze?talk?on?electricity?from?Geo?to?
SO.?Kakab?notes?jopint?control?of?Roki?tunnel;?participants?want?new?RU?GEO?rehab?
agreement?
??Chib:?RU?accepts?Soviet?passports?of?SO?residents?as?from?1974?as?valid?travel?docs?
??Gobozov?reinstalled?as?PR?of?Chib?on?SO?
??SO?"special?militia?forces"?have?been?sverely?harrassing?GEo?shepherds,?have?been?fired?
after?JPKF?has?uncovered?this?and?SO?officals?pay?apologies?
19?20?
Sept?
10th?celebration?of?
indepence?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?October,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?18/00?for?
the?period?of?15?30?September?2000?
?del?from?RU?state?duma,?NO,?Abkh,?Nagorno,?Transnist?take?part,?SO?PKF?takes?part,?parts?
of?SO?power?minsitries.?Chib?reiterates?"?resolution?of?teh?conflict?and?integration?with?NO".?
RU?MP?Alksnis?says?SO?integration?into?RU?legally?psossible.?
??SO?chariman?of?Parl?Comm?for?Defense?and?security?states?that?JPKF?mission?is?coming?to?
an?end,?denied?by?Chigoyev?
??Geo?NSC?reviews?the?results?of?the?Badern?meeting?and?initiates?further?action?[it?seems?
like?NSC?is?main?body?of?decision?making]?
??Targamadze,?Geo?MIA,?says?number?of?Geo?posts?has?to?bee?increased?in?order?to?protect?
Geo?population?????currently?3?RU,?3?Geo,?5?SO?posts?
??23?Sept?Sanakoyev?promoted?by?Chib?to?Major?general?
27?
Sep?
Geo?police?detains?five?Oss?
in?SO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?October,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?18/00?for?
the?period?of?15?30?September?2000?
5?Oss?detained?by?geo?police?on?TRansc?highway,?robberies,?joint?LEB?group?was?informed,?
JPKF?confirms,?SO?denies?
7?Oct? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?October,?2000,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?19/00?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?October?2000?
?SO?MFA?issues?statement?that?Geo?police?itnereferes?into?SAO?internal?affairs?and?does?not?
stick?to?former?agreements?
??JPKF:?13?Oct?temporary?Geo?post?established?in?Geo?village?Kaleti,?because?Geo?IDPs?
concerned?about?security?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?7?November,?2000,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/00?for?the?period?of?16???31?October?2000?
?19?Oct?RU?Geo?meeting?jointly?condemns?contraband?through?Roki?tunnel
??JPKF:?Joint?Operation?center?of?the?two?LEBs?situated?at?the?SPKF?compound,?is?hamered?by?
insufficient?equipment?and?data?storage?facilities?
9?10?
Nov?
Geo?RU?nego?on?visa?
regime?fail?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?21?November,?2000,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/00?for?the?period?of?1???15?November?2000?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?12?December,?2000,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
22/00?for?the?period?of?16???30?November?2000?
?20?22?Nov?Group?Hope?of?South?Ossetia?spreads?leaflets?against?Chib,?beginning?of?cold?
period,?insufficient?electricity?supplies.?Chib?verbally?attackes?SO?speaker?of?parl?on?22?Nov.?
??20?22?Nov?MFAs?of?Nogaron,?Transn,?Abkh?and?SO?meet?in?Tiraspol?to?coordinate?their?
activities?
??17?Nov?LEB?meeting,?several?murders?in?Liakhvi?valley,?JPKF?commander?calls?to?not?release?
criminals?detained?and?delivered?by?the?other?side.?Protocol?on?ad?hoc?group?adopted.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?20?December,?2000,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
23/00?for?the?period?of?1???15?December?2000?
?2?Dec?press?conference?Chib?reiterates?expectation?of?simplified?visa?regime?for?SO?to?RU?
and?possiblity?of?SO?citizens?to?obtain?RU?citizenship?
??JPKF:?because?of?increased?criminal?incidents?on?Trans?highway,?JPKF?conducts?mor?patrols?
261?
?
5?Dec? RU?visa?regime?for?Geo?
citizens?in?effect?
?? ??
23?
Dec?
2nd?Geo?RU?rehab?
agreement?in?Tbs?signed?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?January, 2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/01?for?
the?period?of?15?December?2000???15?January?2001?
?bilateral?"Agreement?on?Mutual?Assistance?in?the?Restoration?of?the?Economy?in?the?Zone?
of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict?and?on?Return?of?Refugees".?SO?positive.?
??Falloy?market?hot?area,?shooting?incidents?
?? 2001? ?? ??
?? MEETINGS? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?February,?2001,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/01?for?the?period?of?I???15?February?2001?
?SO?started?in?the?end?of?last?year?[has?not?been?mentioned?before]?taxing?goods?destined?
to?Geo,?upon?request?of?the?JPKF?commander?the?taxation?is?postponed?until?20?Feb?
??only?supply?to?Tskh?now?through?mainline?from?RU,?which?runs?through?Geo?enclave?
consisting?of?several?villages?north?of?Tskh.?SO?has?announced?at?teh?adminstrative?meeting?
that?it?intend?to?build?another?line?circumventing?the?Geo?villages??
?
[Now?it?seems?there?are?follwoing?categories?of?meetings:?
?????weekly?admistrative?meeting?(builateral)???"weekly?administrative?and?security?meeting?
between?the?Georgian?and?South?Ossetian?sides?under?the?chairmanship?of?the?JPKF?
commander"?
?????weekly?joint?LEB?meeting?(JPKF?attached)?
?????weekly?JPKF?meeting?with?monitors?
?????occasionally?JCC?meetings,?as?for?now?none?in?18?months?
?????bilateral?RU?GEo?meetings?on?econ?rehab?
?????bilateral?SO?GEo?working?group?on?status?issues,?"pol?expert?group"?(JCC?attached)?
?????preparatory?working?groups?to?the?JCC?meetings?(econ,?refugees,?LEB/?security)?
?????bilateral?working?group?on?refugee/?IDP?return?(on?the?intitiative?of?Geo,?it?was?discussed?
and?I?think?it?has?already?at?least?wo?times?convened)?
?????three?meetings?between?Shev?and?Chib?1996?Jun?1998?
26?
Feb?
JCC's?joint?LEB?meeting?in?
Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?9?March,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?04/01?for?
the?period?of?16???28?February?2001?
?[the?report?says,?the?last?meeting?took?place?in?Jul?99,?but?they?have?met?in?the?meantime..]
?
??Geo?wants?less?military?presence?in?the?SO?Geo?conflict?zoen?and?advocates?more?int?
support?for?joint?Geo?Oss?police?force?
?
??The?Joint?Control?Commission's?"?Working?Group?on?the?Activities?of?the?Joint?Peace?
Keeping?Forces?and?Coopeartion?between?the?Law?Enforcing?Bodies?in?the?Georgian?
Ossetian?Zone?of?Conflict?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?23?March,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/01?for?
the?period?of?1?March?2001???15?March?2001?
?JPKF:?crime?increases,?esp.?robberies?on?main?roads;?Tskh?LEBs?involved?in?crime,?one?
arrested.??
??Electricity?temporarily?restored?for?few?hours?per?day.?669?arms,?136?kilos?of?explosives?
handed?over?
262?
?
15?
Mar?
Energy?supply?line?from?RU?
to?SO?restored?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/01?for?
the?period?of?16?March?2001?–?31?March?2001?
?was?destroyed?in?parts?by?avalanche?in?Feb
20?22?
Mar?
JCC?prep?working?groups?
met?in?Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/01?for?
the?period?of?16?March?2001?–?31?March?2001?
?WG?on?LEBs?and?econ?
??Econ:?Did?not?agree?to?establish?joint?agency?to?implement?econ?rehab?program?in?conflict?
zone.?Geo?wants?bilateral?composition,?RU?wants?multilateral?one?like?JCC.?[One?of?the?first?
times?that?it?seems?to?me?that?RU?takes?clear?stance?on?foot?in?doort?policy]?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/01?for?
the?period?of?16?March?2001?–?31?March?2001?
?SO?official:?223?crimes?in?200?(1999:?23?less),?2000:?84,?3%?cleared?(1999:?74,6%)
??24?Mar:?NO?JPKF?was?fired?on?heavily?
3?Apr? ?? 3?Oss?killed?in?
Tskh?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/01?for?
the?period?of?1?April?–?16?April?2001?
?"apparent"?gangland?fight,?shootout
??11?Apr:?SO?shows?trial?against?burglers?on?TV?
8?Apr? SO?referendum?on?
constitution?held?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/01?for?
the?period?of?16?March?2001?–?31?March?2001;?OSCE?
Communication?Vienna?19?April,?2001,?OSCE?MISSION?
TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/01?for?the?period?
of?1?April?–?16?April?2001?
[No?SR????sign?of?sort?of?a?boycott?by?the?Mission]?
SO?referendum?held?on?amendment?to?1996?constitution.?SO?authorities?set?up?five?
constituencies?to?hold?referendum?(see?2?Nov?1993?and?Spot?report)?
??SO?officials:?69,1%?turnout?(23,660?people),?66,7%?approved?of?the?constitution.?Geo?
villages?(approx.?9,000?people)?boycotted?
??Changes:?presidential?candiates?must?have?lived?ten?years?in?SO?(barring?Russian?
competers),?Oss?and?RU?official?languages,?though?in?mainly?Geo?populated?areas?Geo?has?
official?status?
??RU?MFA?and?OSCE?issue?concern?about?referendum?hampering?resolution?process?
??JPKF:?situastion?tense,?telephone?threats?to?hospitals?and?schools?on?mining?and?bombing,?
IDP/refugee?return?to?places?of?origin?whicha?re?taken?over?by?others?
20?21?
Apr?
11th?JCC?session?in?Vladi? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/01?for?
the?period?of?17???30?April?2001?
?EC?first?time?joined?JCC?meeting
??Results:?
??Special?Coordination?center?to?be?established?,?joint?police?body.?Bilateral?
??econ:?to?be?established:?Ru?Geo?agency?to?finance?rehab?programs?from?their?state?budget?
and?int?resources,?and?Geo?SO?agency?to?attract?int?Donors?and?investors?????on?IDP/ref?no?
decisions?
??All?sides?agree?that?"the?JPKF?is?the?main?stabilising?factor?in?the?zone?of?conflict".?Mission?
stresses?that?criminal?incidents?can?"trigger?off?widespread?violence"?
??Geo?and?RU?wants?to?establish?three?additional?posts?along?main?route,?but?SO?refuses.?
22?23?
Apr?
Fifth?meeting?of?experts?on?
pol?issues?in?Vladi?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?April,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/01?for?
the?period?of?17???30?April?2001?
?Title:?"Experts’?Group?of?the?Authorised?Delegations?of?the?Sides?within?the?Framework?of?
the?Negotiation?Process?on?a?full?scale?Resolution?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict"?
??decides?to?continue?pursueing?the?talks?
5?May? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna 17?May,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/01?for?
the?period?of?1???15?May?2001?
?Gobozov?(chib?advisor)?sees?nego?with?Geo?in?deadlock.?Says,?situation?has?changed?as?for?
RU?has?a?new?leadership?and?int?orgs?have?become?more?involved.?G?stresses?that?neither?
side?has?a?legal?document?and?this?is?why?Geo?can?interprete?the?existing?agreements?
whicha?re?based?on?goo?will?and?are?merely?political)?deliberately.?
263?
?
9?May? Geo?police?arrests?Geo?PKF?
commander?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?May,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/01?for?
the?period?of?1???15?May?2001?
?on?charges?of?selling?weapons
13?
May?
?? 1?SO?police,?2?
(supposedly)?
Chechen,?1?
hostage?killed?
in?Tskh?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?May,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/01?for?
the?period?of?1???15?May?2001?
?Chechen?? SO?police?shoot?out;?SO?police?controls?four?RU?citizens?with?Chechens?names?in?
Tskh.?SO?police?killed?during?control.?Then?SO?police,?JPKF?fast?eraction?unit?and?JPKF?military?
observer?took?action,?arrived?on?the?scene.?After?the?gun?battle,?two?of?the?Chcechens?and?
their?hostage?were?killed.??
??Travel?restrictions?until?15?May,?temporary?posts?established?until?29?May?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?June,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/01?for?
the?period?of?16???31?May?2001?
?16?May?interview?with?Kasayev,?Deputy?Chair?of?NO?parl?in?Yuzhnaya?Ossetia:?Geo?does?not?
acknowledge?the?new?realities/?the?developments?in?SO?
??29?May?Sakinform?critizes?JPKF?for?not?being?able?to?protect?ethn?Geo?in?Proni?Gorge?in?SO,?
100?families?return?and?were?expulsed?by?local?SO?authorities?(JPKF?monotoring?on?1?Jun?
says?article?was?false?and?real?situation?different,?see?No.11/01)?
???
??JPKF:?[there?seems?to?be?a?constant?hazzle?as?for?the?posts/?checkpoints???their?number??
and?their?location?seesm?to?be?continuously??unclear,?even?to?the?Mission?itself]?
??SO?proposes?to?establish?trilateral?checkpoint?at?Kekhvi?to?control?Ergneti?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?June,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/01?for?
the?period?of?1???15?June?2001?
?nego?protracted?
??21?May?Chib?signs?MuO?in?Mosc?with?Mosc?mayor?on?trade?and?travel.?Chib?says?Geo?RU?
agreement?on?rehab?can?be?a?basis?for?this?[?].?Macha?says?after?3?years?of?SO?NO?talks?on?
mere?econmoics?niow?Geo?is?sidelined.?The?planned?Geo?RU?meeting?in?Mosc?on?6?Jun?was?
postponed.?SO?MFA?says,?Geo?refused?due?to?SO?RU?MoU?
???
4?Jun? Chib?dismisses?gov? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?June,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/01?for?
the?period?of?1???15?June?2001?
?possibly?due?to?upcoming?pres?elections?or?to?"the?Chechen?factor"
??Tibilov?named?Acting?Head?of?Gov.?T?was?JCC?Co?chairman?and?head?of?pol?expert?group.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?July,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/01?for?
the?period?of?16?June???3?July?2001;?OSCE?
Communication?Vienna?18?July,?2001,?OSCE?MISSION?
TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/01?for?the?period?
of?4??15?July?2001?
?28?Jun,?3?Jul?JCC?Co?Chairmen?meet?in?Tskh?and?agree?on?agenda?for?JCC?prep?WGs;?
earmark?the?three?previously?discussed?(and?by?SO?rejected)?additonal?checkpounts?along?
the?mainroad?at?Kekhvi?(Geo/Oss),?Tamarasheni?and?Ergneti,?no?final?decision.?additional?
JPKF?observers?????intensified?security?measures?after?13?May?[Chechnia?instability?spills?over?
and?set?the?situation?in?SO]?
??[JPKF?rapid?reaction?force?reportedly?often?arrives?on?the?spot?and?calms?escalating?
situation?between?local?police?and?others.?Who?calls?them?]?
16?Jun? Sanakoyev?appointed?PM? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?July,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/01?for?
the?period?of?16?June???3?July?2001?
?Sana?as?a?reformer?to?renew?system?of?governance.?"He?(Chib?in?an?interview?with?YO?20?
Jun]?described?Mr?.?Sanakoev?as?an?able?man?withoutany?ambitions,?who?would?deal?purely?
with?economic?issues."?
??JPKF:?joint?SO?Geo?police?action?in?which?local?criminal?in?Dzhava?region?was?detained,?on?
request?of?Geo?
?
??In?2000,?24?families?returned?from?NO?to?SO,?6?to?other?parts?of?Geo?
264?
?
2?3?Jul? Second?secessionist?MFA?
meeting?in?Stepanakert?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?July,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/01?for?
the?period?of?4??15?July?2001?
?acknowledge:?role?of?int?and?RU
8?Jul? ?? 2?found?dead?in?
Tskh?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?July,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/01?for?
the?period?of?4??15?July?2001?
?no?further?information?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?September,?2001,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
15/01?for?the?period?of?16???31?August?2001?
?UNHCR?closes?office?in?Tskh?by?the?end?of?Oct.?Number?of?returnees?too?little.
??JPKF:?bomb?attack?on?Dzugayev's?father's?house?(Dz?formerly?chariman?of?SO?parl,?now?
Head?of?SO?State?Committee?on?Informatiopn?and?Press)?
14?19?
Sept?
Sixth?expert?meeting?on?
pol?issues?in?Bucharest?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?September,?2001,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/01?for?the?period?of?1???15?September?2001?
?Koch:?establish?legal?relations?between?two?independent?countries,?no?discussion?of?pol?
status,?enhance?Geo9?RU?agency?for?implementing?hte?rehab?program,?and?joint?work?on?
econ?rehab?
??JPKF:?13?Sept?weekly?adminstrative?and?security?meeting?reaches?general?agreement?for?
registering?permission?to?carry?firearms?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?October,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?17/01?for?
the?period?of?16?30?September?2001?
?4?SO?police?officers?detained?for?armed?robbery
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?October,?2001,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?18/01?for?
the?period?of?1???26?October?2001?
?Geo?accuses?SO?of?tolerating?the?presence?Chechen?fighters,?SO?denies?any?link?with?
"terrorism"?
??25?Oct:?EU?financing?meeting?in?Tskh,?first?meeting?canceled?by?SO?because?of?situation?in?
Abkh?
#####? First?round?of?SO?pres?
elections?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?November,?2001,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/01?for?the?period?of?27?October???18?November?
2001?
?preliminary:?Kokoyev?[they?call?him?kokoev,?in?01/02?the?get?that?it?is?kokoity]?49%,?Chib
26%?
??35,000?voters?registered,?75?polling?stations?
??14?Nov:?Kokoyev's?office?attacked?
??JPKF:?five?unauthorized?helicopters?observed,?two?landed?at?Kehiti,?Geo?village;?two?more?
incidents?like?this?on?following?days?close?to?Geo?viallges?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?December,?2001,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/01?for?the?period?of?18???30?November?2001?
?official?results:?Chib?20.9,?Kochiev?24.1?(Chairman?of?parl,?runs?for?Communist?Party),?
Kokoyev?45.3?(Eduard?Kokoyev,?former?business?man?and?head?of?Tskh?City?Committee?of?
Komsomol).?Chib?declares?resignation?
??Kochiev?under?pressure?to?withdraw?from?ther?ace?
?? ?? 4?killed? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?December,?2001,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/01?for?the?period?of?18???30?November?2001?
?1?event:?Oss?youth?gang?shots?down?Geo/Oss?police?control,?one?Oss?attacker?killed;?2?
event:?1?Oss?and?2?Geo?passengers?in?a?car?killed?
6?Dec? Second?rpund?of?SO?pres?
elections?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?December,?2001,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/01?for?the?period?of?1?–?15?December?2001?
?Kokoyev?wins?with?55%,?Koch?40%
??15?Dec:?friendly?relations?with?Geo,?first?condition?for?dialogue?is?Geo?aknowledgement?of?
genocide?against?SO?people?
??Khugayev,?Revaz?to?be?PM?(alreadz?in?1993/94,?had?been?living?in?Moscow?during?the?past?
years)?
265?
?
20?
Dec?
EC/OSCE?grant?concluded?
in?Brussels?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?9?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?22/01?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?December?2001?
?210,000?Euro,?to?strengthen?the?activities?of?Geo?SO?conflict?settlement?mechanisms
?? 2002? ?? ??
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/02?for?
the?period?of?1?15?January?2002?
JPKF:??SO?continuously?complains?about?helicopter?flights.?Over?Tskh.?Since?12?Oct?nine?
unidentified?helicopter?flights?over?"the?zone?of?conflict"?[Did?the?flights?start?in?the?end?of?
2001?or?have?they?been?always?happening,?but?noone?complained?]?
??Roki?is?closed?due?to?avanlaches,?as?a?result,?Falloy?is?almost?emtpy?and?prices?esp?on?fuel?
have?increased?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?February,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?02/02?for?
the?period?of?16???31?January?2002?
?Kokoity?reportedly?absent?from?SO?to?RU?already?for?two?weeks,?SO?leadership?in?inertia?
and?refuses?continuing?the?nego?process?without?him?
??JPKF:?during?last?two?months?weapon?hand?over?process?has?slowed?down?because?
residents?now?demand?money?in?return/?as?a?compensation.?Mission?willing?to?give?fuel,?
flour,?agricutlrual?etc.?equipment?to?villages?who?jointly?hand?over.?
??Special?Coordination?Center?for?LEBs?NOT?set?up?yet;?SO?has?not?named?a?new?JC?Co?
Chairman?
??Geo?MDF?has?allegedly?assumed?a?command?role?of?the?Geo?PKF,?this?would?circumvent?
chain?of?command?as?agreed?in?Sochi?
?
Abkh:?Geo?issues?doc?on?status?of?Abkh?in?Geo?although?Abkh?has?repeatedly?said?it?will?not?
consider?the?doc?[Geo?strategy?unilateral?all?the?same?in?SO?in?mid?90,?OSCE?supportive?to?
that]?
27?Jan? Dzasokhov?reelected?pres?
of?NO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?February,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?02/02?for?
the?period?of?16???31?January?2002?
14?
Feb?
LEB?representatives?to?
Special?Coordination?
Center?named?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?February,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/02?for?the?period?of?1???15?February?2002?
?at?weekly?administrative?meeting.?Presentation?of?the?names?to?the?Council?of?Permanent?
Representatives?[first?time?I?am?aware?of?this;?"supervisory?body?to?the?Special?Coordination?
Center]?
??Kokoity?returns?to?SO?after?three?weeks?in?RU?[without?really?giving?word]?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?04/02?for?
the?period?of?16?–?28?February?2002?
?28?Feb?JCC?Co?chairs?convene?in?Tskh?[JCC?Co?chairs?prepare?the?working?meetings?of?the?
working?groups?that?prepare?the?JCC?session]?
5?6?
Mar?
CIO?Gama?visits?Geo? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/02?for?
the?period?of?01???15?March,?2002?
?in?Focus?weapon?hand?over?program,?community?based?projects?for?weapons
?
??10?Mar:?[First?]?Meeting?of?Kok?and?Dzakh?in?Vladi,?decide?to?intensify?relations,?regularity,?
information?exchange?
8?Mar? SCC?officially?inaugurated? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/02?for?
the?period?of?01???15?March,?2002?
?EU?hands?over?equipment
??monthly?running?costs?25,000?Euro.?EU?funded.?
266?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?8?April,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/02?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?March?2002?
?16?Mar:?YO?publishs?appeal?to?RU?Duma,?that?uner?the?pretext?of?fighting?terrorism?in?
Pankisi?NATO?troops?shall?be?deployed?in?Geo,?this?is?"a?real?threat?of?military?aggression?
against?SO"?
??[Was?there?a?NATO?meeting?or?visit?recently??What?initiated?this?article?]??
??JPKF:?car?thefts?frequent?
??26?Mar:?14th?observation?of?unidentified?helicopter,?near?Oss?village?Muguti?[since?
mid/end?of?2001?the?reports?indicate?the?ethnicity?of?the?respective?village,?ethnicizing]?
??15?Mar:?hidden?weapons?found?near?Transc?highway,?in?case?of?explosion?the?main?
electricity?line?from?RU?to?SO?destroyed?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?April,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/02?for?
the?period?of?1–15?April,?2002?
?6?Apr?Kok?interview?with?Severnaya?Ossetiya:?No?working?contacts?with?Geo?established?so?
far;?explosives?on?highway?bear?"no?Chechen?or?Geo?implication"?
17?
Apr?
Irrigation?project?for?Geo?
and?Oss?villages?signed?by?
MoU?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/02?for?
the?period?of?16?30?April,?2002?
?in?Tskh,?i.a.?signed?by?UK?Embassy,?in?framework?of?weapon?hand?over?project
??JPKF:?few?incidents?of?criminal?nature?
?
??The?Mission?facilitated?"Programme?of?Voluntary?Hand?Over?of?Small?Arms?and?Light?
Weapons"?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/02?for?
the?period?of?1–15?May,?2002?
?JPKF:?calm?and?stable?
??[The?Mission?considers?the?Geo?SO?conflict?settlement?process?to?be?"supported?by?two?
mechanisms":?JCC?and?Experts'?Group?on?Compr?Settlem]?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/02?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May,?2002?
?"end?of?May",?PC?at?Interfax,?Moscow,?Kok?and?Jergenia?(Abkh?PM):?Kok:?Geo?upgrades?
military,?prepares?for?clout?against?SO,?trained?by?"foreign?instructors".?He?says,?only?close?
cooperation?with?RU?military?attack?of?Geo.?
??JPKF:?calm?and?stable?
5?Jun? meeting?JCC?WG?on?Mil?
and?Sec?//?JCC?Co?
Chairmen?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?22?June,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/02?for?
the?period?of?1?15?June?2002?
?Co?Chairmen's?meeting's?prepare?JCC?WGs?and?organize?econ?rehab
??"since?28?February,?three?JCC?Co?chairmen?sessions?have?been?held;?two?ad?hoc?committee?
meetings?on?refugees?and?IDPs?and?one?meeting?of?the?working?group?on?military?and?
security?issues?[prep,?not?administrative]"?
??JPKF:?calm?and?stable.?JCC?decides?to?include?two?MI?24?attack?helicopters?into?inventory?
because?of?unidentified?flights?
267?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/02?for?
the?period?of?16?30?June,?2002?
?In?recent?weeks?there?are?increasing?numbers?of?Abkh?and?SO?that?have?obtained?RU?
citizenship;?Chochand?RU?say,?more?than?50%?of?them?already?hold?RU?passports.?From?1?Jul?
there?will?be?new?RU?citizenship?law?introduced?that?makes?it?easier?to?obtain?citizenship.?
??[Quote?from?the?AR?that?presumably?quotes?from?the?legal?text]?"simplified?procedure?to?
obtain?Russian?citizenship?for?applicants?“who?were?citizens?of?the?Soviet?Union,?resided?and?
continue?to?reside?in?the?states?formerly?constituting?the?USSR,?but?did?not?receive?
citizenship?of?these?states?and?remain?–?as?a?result?of?this?–?persons?with?no?citizenship”."?
??28?Jun,?NG,?Dza:?SO?conflict?of?all?post?Soviet?conflict?the?one?"closest?to?a?settlement"?
??10?Jun:?Shev?says?that?RU?"secretly?annaxes"?SO?and?makes?its?role?as?a?mediator?less?
credible.?[Shev?openly?critizes?RU?for?the?first?time,?I?think]?
??JPKF:?several?cases?of?serious?crime,?three?armed?attacks?[In?general,?often?inter?ethnic?
quarrels?because?Geo?or?Oss?pass?through?respective?villages?by?car?and?are?attacked?or?
insulted?by?residents.?Small?weapons?a?porblem,?no?deaths?so?far]?
??floods?damaged?road?between?Tskh?and?Vladi?
?
SO?JCC?Co?Chair?Boris?Chochiyev?
8?9?Jul? JCC?Co?Chairs?meet?in?
Mosc?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/02?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?July?2002?
?From?now,?meetings?of?JCC?CO?Chairs?will?be?considered?as?"JCC?meetings"?because?they?
are?on?equal?footing?with?the?"JCC?sessions"?
??Choch,?Macha,?for?NO?Teimuraz?Kuzov?
??SO?and?Geo?reluctant?to?agree?on?modalities?on?2.5?mio?Euro?EU?grant?
??SO?and?Geo?jointly?stood?against?EU/OSCE?proposal?to?establish?a?freight?and?control?center?
Gori?Tskh?Vladi.?Until?now?it?is?a?tax?free?zone,?center?could?retrieve?revenues.?Vested?
interests?on?the?road?seem?to?remain?strong.?
??OSCE/EU?say?rehab?should?be?earmarked?to?nego?process.?[OSCE/EU?first?time?openly?state?
that?they?are?willing?to?do?rehab?first?then?nego.?Before,?it?was?SO?who?always?said?this.]?
??JPKF:?calm?and?stable?
??10th?celebration?of?JPKF:?Geo?MoD?orders?Geo?PKF?not?to?participate.?Macha?says,?decision?
"confrontational"?[Who?heads?the?MoD??Which?political?group??????MoD?and?PR?for?Conflict?
settlement?are?pitching?against?each?other]?
???
18?Jul? Kok?replaces?MIA?and?
deputy?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/02?for?
the?period?of?16?July?–?15?August?2002?
?with?former?OMON?commander.?Fourth?appointment?to?this?position?since?Kok?resumed?
office.?
??Water:?SO?says,?water?pipe?through?Geo?village?was?damaged?so?water?supply?to?Tskh?was?
stopped?for?four?days.?On?weekly?admin?meeting?on?1?Aug,?SO?threatened?to?close?water?
pipe?to?Gori.?On?next?meeting?on?8?Aug?Geo?authorities?informed?that?they?repaire?the?pipe?
and?prosecute?the?saboteurs?
??[weekly?admin?meetings?seem?not?to?have?been?interrupted?since?theit?start]?
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?
30?Jul? Extraordinary?JCC?session?
in?Tskh?
?? OSCE Communication?Vienna?16?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/02?for?
the?period?of?16?July?–?15?August?2002?
?serious?problems?in?JPKF:?Geo?PKF?stays?away?from?JPKF?celebration,?JCC?says,?breach?of?
Sochi?and?breach?of?orders.??
??As?well,?understaffed?and?ill?equipped?Geo?PKF?has?no?combat?ability,?and?the?same?for?Oss?
battalion;?in?mid?Jul?eight?RU?PKF?soldiers?abandonned?their?post?because?they?were?
unsatisfied.?
??29?Jul:?Choch?informs?JCC?that?SO?defence?authorities?have?order?"to?open?fire?gainst?
helicopters??which?are?conducting?unauthrozed?flights"?over?SO?territory?
19?
Aug?
Shev?says?SO?can?be?called?
SO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
15/02?for?the?period?of?15?31?August?2002?
?JPKF:?several?cases?of?crime?raising?tensions.?15?Aug?abduction?of?1?Geo?PKF.?Geo?critizes?
that?JPKF?search?nits?extend?over?Eastern?border.?20?Aug?Geo?villagers?in?protest?close?road?
to?Avnevi/?mainly?GEo.?22?Aug?at?weekly?admin?meeting,?JPKF?commander?justifies?the?
extension?with?urgendcy,?Geo?says?it?did?not?receive?prior?notice.?
??Occasional?movements?of?armed?persons?in?and?around?CZ?
2?9?
Sept?
?? 5?killed? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?8?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?16/02?for?
the?period?of?1?30?September?2002?
?5?Sep?weekly?administrative?meeting:?LEBs?of?both?sides?discuss?measures?to?increase?anit?
crime;?JPKF?comm?announces?that?joint?patrols?shall?be?implemented?
???
??[now?for?the?first?time?since?the?start?of?the?reports,?the?length?of?the?SO?section?exceeds?
the?Abkh?section?and?it?exceeds?it?by?far.?More?violence/?tensions?in?SO]?
13?
Sep?
Kok?announces?partial?
moblization?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?8?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?16/02?for?
the?period?of?1?30?September?2002?
?against?"international?terrorism".?Securing?the?Northern?border
??27?Sept?JPKF?commander?announces?search?operation?including?JPKF?checkpoints?at?the?
Georgian?main?East?West?road?between?Tbs?and?Gori.?JCC?refused,?SO?and?GEo,?too.?
??20?Sept:?SO?shows?heavy?armament?at?military?parade,?Geo?says?breach?of?agreement?
??[report?creats?direct?link?between?Shev?speech?(SG,?30?Sept)?on?anti?terror?fight?in?Pankisi?
and?Kok?statement?at?the?same?day?(Interfax)?that?SO?mobilization?proves?that?SO?can?
"restore?order?if?need?be"?(the?report?indirectly?quoting)]?
??Irrigation?canal?project?finished?on?12?Sept,?supervised?by?OSCE,?financed?by?UK,?30km?
canal?both?for?SO?and?Geo?villages?
29?
Sep?
Burja?visits?Geo?villages?in?
CZ?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?8?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?16/02?for?
the?period?of?1?30?September?2002?
?Buja,?Chairperson?of?Geo?parl,?OSCE?accompanied
3?4?
Oct?
JCC?meets?in?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?17/02?for?
the?period?of?1?15?October?2002?
?as?well,?pol?expert?group?meets?in?Tskh
??JPKF:?MIA?has?increased?police?presence?in?Gori?region?and?Security?zone,?three?"Block?
posts"?[means:?road?blocks]?to?be?established,?JPKF?and?SO?informed?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?November,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/02?for?the?period?of?16?–?31?October?2002?
?Weekly?Sec?and?Admin?meeting?canceled?because?the?JPKF?commander?who?is?the?chair?
was?released?from?this?occupation?by?his?superior.?
??JPKF:?tension?has?remained.?
??Mid?Oct:?Geo?MIA?carries?out?large?scale?sec?operation?in?Shida?Kartli?region,?anti?crime?
action.?Police?and?MIA?troops?establish?additional?road?blocks,?i.a.?at?Tkhiavi.?In?effect,?entire?
North?South?axis?under?control,?from?Gori?to?Vladi.?JPKF?comm?says?this?is?increasing?
tensions.?
??24?Oct?SCC?meeting?in?Tskh,?serious?intentions?apprehended?
?
??18?Oct?JCC?AD?Hoc?Committee?on?Refugees?and?IDPs?met?for?the?fourth?time?this?year?
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?
26?29?
Oct?
Expert?group?meeting?in?
Castelo?Branco,?Portugal?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?November,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/02?for?the?period?of?16?–?31?October?2002?
?Results:
??tax?control?in?SO:?tax?vignet?system?for?truks?to?be?introduced?
??EU?not?to?be?full?member?of?JCC?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?22?November,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/02?for?the?period?of?01???15?November?2002?
?JPKF:?calm.?JPKF?was?involved?into?hunting?Chechen?fighters.?Tensions?abated?because?the?
djacent?areas?to?SO/CZ?are?calm.?[Who?decided?to?involve?the?JPKF?into?the?hunt?of?
Chechen?fighters?]?
??12?Nov?Kok:?SO?wants?to?set?up?regular?army?
??Mission?about?to?prepare?second?canal?system?in?framework?of?arms?control?project?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?December,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/02?for?the?period?of?16?30?November?2002?
?JCC?Co?Chairs?say?they?want?to?continue?with??the?Joint?Customs?Control?Project.?Going?to?
be?TACIS?financed.?
??Weekly?admin?meeting?after?break?of?two?weeks?was?again?chaired?by?(the?new)?JPKF?
commander?[it?turned?out?that?the?former?commander?was?altogether?dismissed?and?the?
new?proceeds?in?the?usual?way]?
??JPKF:?calm,?no?flights?
??GEO?MFA:?hope?that?new?commander?"will?act?strictly?within?the?the?limits?of?his?power"?
[Geo?steps?up?retorics]?
13?
Dec?
Rcheulishvili,?Vakhtang?
named?PR?of?the?pres?for?
Geo?Oss?conflict?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?December,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/02?for?the?period?of?1?–?15?December?2002?
?Rcheu?leader?of?the?Socialist?Party?and?Deputy?Chair?of?Parl
??JPKF?relatively?calm.?No?flights.?Less?reports?of?criminality,?maybe?due?to?increase?in?Geo?
and?SO?LEBs?in?the?region.?
??Geo?PKF?supports?Geo?police?on?Gori?Tskh?road?in?anti?crime?operation?
??Weekly?Admin:?electricity?supply?to?some?Geo?villages;?deforestation?as?for?heating?
??[end?of?2002:?Geo?line?hardens?remarkably,?MIA?troops?close?to?CZ,?Geo?PKF?used?for?other?
purposes,?fierce?retorics?of?GEO?MFA?and?MoD,?Geo?PKF?refuses?participance?in?JPKF?
anniversary..]?
??this?year?6?JCC?meetings?
??Personal?Representative?of?the?President??for?the?settlement?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?
conflict?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/03?for?
the?period?of?16?December?2002?to?15?January?2003?
?JPKF?stable,?no?flights?
??JPKF?commander?wants?to?make?JPKF?visibkle?by?establsihing?"mobile?checkpoints"?
??Weekly?Admin:?Some?smaller?villages?around?Tskh?without?electricity?for?lack?of?payment?
?? 2003? ?? ??
6?Jan? Chib's?son?arrested?in?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/03?for?
the?period?of?16?December?2002?to?15?January?2003?
?by?SO?authorities,?Alexei?Chibirov,?former?deputy?head?of?SO?Secret?Service
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?
18?Jan? Rcheu?and?Kok?meet?in?
Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?02/03?for?
the?period?of?16?31?January?2003?
?step?up?SCC?with?trainings?of?officers?
??Chib?son?accused?of?coup?d'etat?
??JPKF:?calm.?Heavy?armament?under?Oss?authority?found?in?Grubela,?"not?in?accordance?
with?the?agreement?covering?size?and?type?of?weapons?in?the?zone?of?conflict"?
??22?Jan?Group?of?traders?blocks?Falloy?in?rpotest?against?rising?prices?for?entering?the?market?
[what?means?entering??trading?there?]?
5?Feb? Rheu?and?Dza?meet?in?
Vladi?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?February,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/03?for?the?period?of?01?15?February?2003?
?agenda:?econ?rehab?
??JPKF:?SO?has?admitted?presence?of?haevy?armament,?says?it?is?going?to?destroy?it?in?the?
near?future?
??Vehicle?hijacking?is?starting?to?cause?ethnic?tensions?in?the?Tamarasheni?Kekhvi?area,?27?Jan?
and?13?Feb?demonstrations?on?road?at?Tamar?against?car?theft?
??Chib?son?released?from?jail,?but?not?allowed?to?leave?region?and?waiting?for?trial?
9?Feb? JCC?meeting?in?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?February,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/03?for?the?period?of?01?15?February?2003?
?enhancing?the?SCC,?fighting?organized?crime
??WG?on?mil?and?sec?issues?will?review?the?expediency?of?the?bilateral?LEB?post?Kekhvi,?Geo?
LEB?to?consider?block?posts?at?Tkiavi?and?Artsevi?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?28?February,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
04/03?for?the?period?of?16?28?February?2003?
?Rcheu?and?Koch?say?(both?on?13?Feb)?that?they?are?willing?to?have?Geo?and?SO?MPs?
meeting.?Rcheu?wants?RU?Deputy?MFA?Loshchinin?in?the?meeting,?too.?
??13?Feb?Mayorov?in?SG:?RU?side?is?"strongly?in?favor?of?the?continuation?of?nego,?process",?
this?is?important?because?situation?in?the?CZ?has?deteriorated?lately.?
??M?says?RU?side?has?facilitated?all?three?hig?level?meetings?between?Chiband?Shev,?but?now?
the?conditions?ofr?such?meetings?"do?not?allwo?for?it"?
??JPKF:?stable.?[since?the?recent?deterioration?the?reports?state?not?anymore?:calm?and?
stable",?but?"stable?and?nothing?unusual?was?reported",?and?then?listing?the?criminal?
incidents]?Increase?in?crime,?Tamar?Kehvi?remains?tense.?
6?Mar? SCC?meeting? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/03?for?
the?period?of?01?15?March?2003?
?review?of?work?during?past?12?months.?So?far,?no?permit?for?LEB?members?to?carry?weapons?
in?the?CZ?
??10?Mar?Rehb?meeting?for?restoration?of?Gori?Tskh?highway?
??11?Mar:?Shev?says?after?meeting?with?Putin?at?CIS?meeting?in?Sochi?(6?7?Mar)?[no?further?
information?given,?no?SR?found],?that?“parallel?to?the?Abkhaz?problem,?we?shall?be?working?
for?the?solution?to?other?complex?issues,?such?as,?for?example,?the?ultimate?settlement?of?
the?Georgian?Ossetian?conflict?and?the?restoration?of?relations?with?this?region”.?
JPKF:?stable?
10?
Mar?
Geo?JPKF?subordinated?to?
Head?of?Geo?Military?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/03?for?
the?period?of?16?31?March?2003?
?Mission?will?investigate?whether?chain?of?command?is?affected
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?
21?
Mar?
JCC?Co?chair?meeting?at?RU?
Embassy?in?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/03?for?
the?period?of?16?31?March?2003?
?agenda:?delay?of?Geo?Ru?interstate?program?and?third?phase?of?EC?rehab?program?[What?
were?the?first?and?the?second?phase??Check?reports]?
??JPKF:?stable,?several?heavy?cases?of?armed?robbery.?
??Trilateral?checkpoint?at?Megvrekesi?is?withdrawn?and?instead?a?mobile?checkpoint?is?
deployed?which?cover?the?area?Ergneti?Eredvi?Tkiavi??
??Geo?Oss?dispute?over?landownership?in?Nuli?prevented?to?turn?violent?
1?Apr? SO?police?launches?
"security"?operation?
started?for?one?month?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?April,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/03?for?
the?period?of?01?15?April?2003?
?JPKF:?stable,?maybe?due?to?SO?operation
??Falloy:?SO?"immigration"?officials?have?introduced?the?collection?of?fees?for?escorting?
vehicles?from?the?market,?at?the?same?time?Geo?continues?with?its?cumstom?posts?between?
Gori?and?Tskh.?Discussed?at?weekly?admin?meeting,?comm?says?it?can?only?be?decided?by?the?
JCC.?
??Geo?custom?post?is?meeting?protest?from?local?population?from?both?Geo?and?OSs?side.?
Post?at?Brotsleti.?[Geo?started?with?road?blocks?on?the?Gori?Tskh?route]?
??1?Apr?Round?Table?of?12?SO?NGOs?in?Tskh?
18?
Apr?
JCC?WG?on?Mil?and?Sec?
meets?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?April,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/03?for?
the?period?of?16?30?April?2003?
?endorses?porposals?for?enhacnincg?SCC?from?18?Jan?by?the?Mission?and?handed?in?on?31?
Jan:?trainings?in?Kosovo,?external?Instructors?in?CZ?and?conducting??OSCE?assessment?
??NO?proposes?to?have?representative?of?the?NO?MIA?to?the?SCC?
??working?meetings?to?be?in?Tskh?on?Thursdays?
??discussion?about?checkpoints?at?Tkiavi?and?Artsevi???
??JPKF:?stable,?decrease?in?crime,?maybe?duet?to?SO?police?operation?
3?May? ?? 3?Geo?shot?
dead?at?Tamar?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/03?for?
the?period?of?1?15?May?2003?
?rapid?JPKF?reaction?prevented?further?escalation?among?popul?of?Tamar.?No?evident?
criminal?background,?three?sons?and?father.?
??7?May:?Rcheu?says?that?Geo?PKF?is?understaffed?and?not?able?to?protect?the?Geo?population?
in?the?CZ?
??Deputy?MIA?says,?Geo?police?wills?tep?their?presence?to?30?personnel?in?Kurta?(north?of?
Tamar?on?the?road?between?Tskh?and?NO)?
??JPKF?commanders?says?that?Geo?PKF?is?since?10?Mar?subordinated?to?the?Headquarters?of?
the?Geenral?Staff?in?Tbs?is?not?in?accordance?with?the?JCC?of?1994?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/03?for?
the?period?of?1?15?May?2003?
?Rcheu?meets?Kadokhov,?First?Deputy?Chairman?of?the?Committee?on?Regional?Issues?of?the?
Council?of?Federation?of?the?Russian?Duma,?on?Geo?SO?conflict,?idea?of?Geo?Oss?economic?
forum?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/03?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May?2003?
?JPKF:?stable,?flights?
14?16?
May?
JCC?meeting?in?Gori? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/03?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May?2003?
?agenda:?implementation?of?RU?Geo?intergov?Agreement?from?23?Dec?2000?by?setting?up?an?
agency;??
??canceled?to?use?EC?rehab?funds?for?setting?up?the?tax?vignette?system?on?the?Transc?
highway,?because?SO?refused?to?subordinate?its?tax?authorities?to?a?joint?GEo?SO?body?even?
though?under?JCC?supervision.??
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?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?June,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/03?for?
the?period?of?1?15?June?2003?
?5?Jun?Koch?says,?Kok?ready?to?meet?Shev.?Since?taking?office,?Kok?has?stressed?that?Geo?
acknowledgement?of?tis?guilt?is?precondition?of?meeting?between?him?and?Shev?
23?25?
Jun?
28th?JCC?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?June,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/03?for?
the?period?of?16?30?June?2003?
?[When?did?they?do?all?the?others????Probably,?because?they?renamed?the?JCC?Co?Chair?
meetings?into?JCC?meetings]?(see?SR?30?Jun?2003)?
30?Jun? KOK?dismisses?heads?of?
security?structures?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/03?for?
the?period?of?1?15?July?2003?
?decree?issued?that?dismisses?"the?heads?of?“State”?Security,?Defense,?Justice?and?Customs?
administrations.?The?decree?ordered?the?personnel?of?the?“Reconnaissance?Department”?of?
the?“Ministry?of?Defense”?and?of?the?“Escort?Unit”?of?the?“State?Security?Committee”?to?
disband."?
??Kok?declares?he?wants?to?cut?the?link?between?officials?and?crime?
??Geo?MIA?and?other?Geo?officials?praise?Kok?
??JPKF:?tension?increased?as?aresult?in?the?vicinity?of?Tskh.?Forces?loyal?to?Kok?protected?TV?
station,?post?office?and?state?buildings?
??All?PKFs?participated?in?the?JPKF?anniversary?
??Geo?has?increased?its?PKF?personnel,?newly?traiend?and?deployed?troops?
4?Jul? Kok?informs?public?about?
appeal?to?Putin?to?join?RF?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/03?for?
the?period?of?1?15?July?2003?
?no?official?response?from?RU,?internal?source?to?media?that?it?will?not?be?considered
14?15?
Jul?
29th?JCC?meeting?//?9th?
Pol?experts?meeting?in?
Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/03?for?
the?period?of?1?15?July?2003?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/03?for?
the?period?of?16?31?July?2003?
?18?Jul,?Caucasus?Press,?SO?MFA?Djoev?says?that?“the?Ossetian?side?is?concerned?with?the?
presence?of?Georgian?commandos,?trained?by?American?instructors,?in?the?region?of?the?
Georgian??Ossetian?conflict.”,?referring?to?newly?deplioyed?Geo?PKF?troops?[Check?on?NATO?
activities?in?Geo,?when?did?they?start,?when?and?how?was?it?decided?]?
13?
Aug?
Kok?informs?parl?about?
dismissal?of?gov?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/03?for?
the?period?of?1?15?August?2003?
?in?line?with?anti?corruption?fight
??rehab?of?So?section?of?Trans?Cam?goes?on?with?NO?and?RU?money?
??JPKF:?calm,?Oss?PKF?relocated?post?at?Ioncha?to?a?new?location?near?by?with?more?defensive?
features?which?the?Oss?PKF?has?not?done?before?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/03?for?the?period?of?15???31?August?2003?
?Khugayev,?SO?PM,?moves?to?Vladi?after?being?dismissed
??Tensions?on?Trans?Cam?because?of?unilateral?actions:?SO?does?road?repairs,?Geo?anit?
smuggling?operations?
??JPKF:?calm.?
??Nabdzorov,?Actring?JPKF?Commander,?says?he?will?raise?flgiht?issue?with?JCC?and?Geo?MoD,?
he?protests?against?additional?deployment?of?Geo?officers?to?Geo?PKF,?not?in?accordance?
[very?late?complaint]?
??[It?is?really?with?the?start?of?EC?funding?from?approx.?2000?that?int?money?starts?to?flow?into?
Geo]?
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?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
17/03?for?the?period?of?1???15?September?2003?
?3?Sept:?Kok?reconfirms?peaceful?settlement
??JPKF:?calm.?JPKF?comm?complains?about?unauth?Geo?police?checkpoint?at?Adzvi,?eastern?
part?of?CZ.?JPKF?post?at?Kekhvi?withdrawn.?
??Weekly?Admin?Meeting?skipped.?
??SO?deputy?MoD?tells?Geo?news?agency?that?the?planned?6000?troops?army?is?almost?
completed,?reports?tates?no?sign?of?it.?
17?
Sep?
Igor?Sanakoyev?appointed?
PM?of?SO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/03?for?the?period?of?15???30?September?2003?
?RU?citizen,?appointed?by?parl.
??Zelim?Muldarov?appointed?MoD,?before?in?the?58th?army?of?RF?
??JPKF:?calm.?Quarrels?abput?withdrawal?of?post?in?Kekhvi,?SO?demands?that?Geo?completely?
withdraws?its?troops?just?like?SO?has?done?it.?Geo?PKF?commander?publicly?refuses?to?deploy?
saying?the?checkpoint?controls?movements?to?the?rest?of?Geo?
???
20?
Sep?
SO?Indep?Day?held?in?very?
low?key?manner?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/03?for?the?period?of?15???30?September?2003?
?in?contrast?to?last?year,?no?military?parade
25?
Sep?
JPKF?Command?announces?
to?deploy?all?unauth?posts?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
18/03?for?the?period?of?15???30?September?2003?
?Akhmetov,?Yuri,?Chief?of?Staff?of?the?JPKF?announces?to?check?all?posts?until?2?Oct
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?19/03?for?
the?period?of?1???15?October?2003?
?2?Oct?Kok?appoints?Vazha?Khatchapuridze?Deputy?Head?of?the?Tskh?regional?admin,?
Kahtcha?was?1993?1997??Represnetative?of?the?Geo?pres?in?the?region?of?Shida?Kartli.?Black?
Sea?Press:?"?He?resigned?for?serious?differences?with?the?Georgian?central?authorities".?
Rcheu?strongly?criticizes?his?appointment?
??JPKF:?calm.?flights.?
??Geo?police?still?staffs?Kekhvi?checkpoint,?SO?police?has?withdrawn.?
??SO?declares?its?intention?to?shot?down?unauth?heilicopters?
2?Oct? Trilateral?meeting?on?pol?
status?of?SO?in?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?19/03?for?
the?period?of?1???15?October?2003?
?Geo,?SO,?RU?Co?Chairs?of?the?JCC,?Macha:?prep?to?Experts'?Meeting
14?17?
Oct?
10th?Expert?Meeting?on?
Pol?Issues?in?The?Hague?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?20/03?for?
the?period?of?15???30?October?2003?
?SO:?relations?have?deteriorated?during?past?2?3?years.?
??First?time,?the?Expert?meeting?was?not?concluded?with?a?document.?This?is?because?SO?
insisted?on?including?genocide?and?Geo?insisted?on?Baden?document?[which?is?actually?the?
status?issue]?
??[Check?Baden?doc]?
22?Oct? SCC?meeting? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?20/03?for?
the?period?of?15???30?October?2003?
?OSCE?official?SMPU?(Strateguc?Police?Matters?Unit)?visited,?attended?the?meeting???? SO?side?
canceled?the?meeting?and?the?offer?to?send?SO?SCC?personnel?for?training?to?Kosovo?
??OSCE?Mission?considerably?disappointed?
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?
26?Oct? ?? 1?Geo?police?
killed?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?20/03?for?
the?period?of?15???30?October?2003?
?in?Khviti?2km?of?Gori?in?conduct?of?an?operation
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?November,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/03?for?the?period?of?1???15?November?2003?
?HoM?says?to?Kok?that?donor?perspectives?lessen?considerably?given?the?poor?profile?of?SO?
in?The?Hague?and?at?the?SCC?meeting,?SO?must?be?more?active?in?nego?process.?Kok?
reassures?will?for?peaceful?settlement.?
??JPKF:?calm,?flgihts.?
??SO?says?troops?in?state?of?emergency?as?for?Geo?elections?
??SO?JCC?Chair?tells?Geo?media?that?SO?wants?to?send?officers?to?training?to?Kosovo?as?invited.?
Directly?contrasting?with?previous?SO?demand?that?in?exchange?there?should?be?a?change?in?
the?structure?of?SCC?with?NO?MIA?official?participating?
#####? Kok?meets?RU?MFA?Ivanov?
in?Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?December,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
22/03?for?the?period?of?15???30?November?2003?
?Kok:?SO?worried?about?situation?in?Geo,?will?wait?for?whom?the?Geo?population?will?elect,?
restating?will?for?peaceful?settlement?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?December,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
23/03?for?the?period?of?1?–?15?December?2003?
?Mission?discusses?rehab?funds?with?SO
??JPKF:?calm?
??11?Dec:?Geo?security?forces?carry?out?anti?smuggling?campaign?at?Megvrekisi,?3?km?south?
east?of?Tskh?on?Geo?controlles?terr.?JPKF?Command?notified?before.?
??SO?MoD?sazs?SO?armed?forces?in?alert?before?Geo?elections,?Mission?did?not?observe?
increased?activity?
18?
Dec?
Putin?says?RU?respects?terr?
int?of?Geo?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?December,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
24/03?for?the?period?of?15?31?December?2003?
?at?the?same?says,?"the?highland?people?form?a?kind?of?community?and?Russia?cannot?ignore?
this"?(Itar?Tass)?
??Geo?names?Malkhaz?Kakabadze?Miniter?for?Special?Affairs?to?be?in?charge?of?the?EC?funds?
from?Geo?side?
??JPKF:?anti?smuggling?operation?by?special?unit?of?the?Minstry?of?Sate?Security?at?Tirdznisi?
(10?km?south??east?of?Tskh?in?the?CZ).?Unlike?the?first?one?this?month,?this?one?not?
coodinated?with?the?JPKF?command.?
??temporary?JPKF?posts?at?Kekhvi?and?Megvrekisi?to?monitor?Geo?Special?forces?
?? ?? 1?killed? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?December,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
24/03?for?the?period?of?15?31?December?2003?
?at?Archevi?in?firefight,?three?injured
?? 2004? ?? ??
3?Jan? Saaka?visits?CZ? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?January?2004?
?for?the?first?time?idicated?that?the?visits,?Tamarasheni,?with?MIA?Baramidze.?SO?Miniter?for?
Internal?Affairs?asks?him?to?leave?the?territory;?4?Jan:?Kok:?"provocative?move"?
?[?Note:?This?visit?happened?one?day?before?the?Geo?pres?elections]?
??JPKF:?calm,?flights?
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?
26?Jan? SO?MFA?statement:?
increase?in?belligerent?
statements?by?Geo?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?02/04?for?
the?period?of?15???31?January?2004?
?against?SO?since?the?resignation?of?Shev,?in?particular?Ilia?II?who?said?that?under?the?new?
Geo?flag?"we?will?enter?both?Sukhumi?and?Tskhinvali".?
??JPKF:?calm.?19?Jan?JPKF?redeploys?checkpoint?at?Kekhvi.?Geo?police?had?never?withdrawn.?
Now,?again,?it?is?a?joint?JPKF/Geo?police/SO?police?checkpoint.?Redeployment?caused?strains?
in?the?region?
31?Jan? MoU?on?Rehab?signed? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?January,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?02/04?for?
the?period?of?15???31?January?2004?
?JCC,?EC,?OSCE,?UNHCR,?UNDP.?2.5?mio?Euro
??MoU?on?the?Implementation?of?the?third?EC?funded?rehabilitation?program?in?the?zone?of?
Georgian?Ossetian?conflict.??
??Procedures:?"UNDP?will?implement?the?projects?through?a?local?Project?Implementing?Unit?
(PIU),?assisted?by?an?international?expert.?The?PIU?will?work?under?the?supervision?of?a?
Steering?Committee,?chaired?by?the?Mission.?The?Georgian?and?South?Ossetian?sides,?the?
EC,?and?UNDP?will?also?participate?in?the?Steering?Committee."?
6?Feb? ?? Dep?Comm?of?
the?SO?Special?
Forces?killed?by?
Geo?police?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?February,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/04?for?the?period?of?1??15?February?2004?
?Geo?police?controlled?the?car?at?a?checkpoint?at?Eredvi,?shootout.?Geo?police claims?car?was?
stolen.?
JPKF:?sometimes?mix?up?of?auhtorities?between?SO?immigration?service?and?JPKF?
14?
Feb?
Khain?named?State?
Minister?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?February,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/04?for?the?period?of?1??15?February?2004?
?for?Conflict?Resolution,?entire?Geo?gov?appointed
21?
Feb?
?? 2?Geo?die? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?29?February,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
04/04?for?the?period?of?16???29?February?2004?
?in?Tamarasheni,?in?street?fight,?Geo?villagers?block?the?road,?SO?police?blocks?all?roads?
surrounding?Tskh?by?order?of??SO?MIA?
??Geo?changes?its?JPKF?policy:?Geo?JPKF?representative?says,?Geo?PKF?has?been?disbanded,?
only?one?is?still?there?and?two?battalions?will?be?reinstalled?elsewhere?in?the?CZ.?The?Geo?PKF?
will?in?future?not?comprise?conscripts,?but?recruited?locals.?Press?reports?say,?the?Geo?PKF?
has?not?been?disbanded.?
??24?26?OSCE?RU?MFA?meeting?in?Moscow,?RU?reiterates?appreciation?for?work?of?OSCE?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?March?2004?
?9?Mar?Imedi:?Saaka?says?in?Paris?he?will?no?longer?tolerate?"non?sense?talk?by?feudal?lords",?
referring?to?SO?
??JPKF:?calm?and?stable?
??Heavy?armament?discovered?10?km?NW?from?Tskh.?OSCE?monitoring?officers?and?JPKF?both?
were?preventerd?from?checking?the?site.?Kok?expresses?regret.?(See?SR?12?Mar?2004)?
5?Mar? Geo?police?carries?out?
operation?at?Falloy?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?March?2004?
?anti?smuggling.?On?the?spot,?SO?police?and?JPKF?Rapid?reaction?arrived
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?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?March,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/04?for?
the?period?of?15?–?31?March?2004?
?29?Mar?Black?Sea?Press?Saaka:?“as?soon?as?power?is?consolidated?in?the?rest?of?Georgia,?we?
shall?reach?an?agreement?with?the?Ossetians,?our?friends.?We?have?nothing?to?argue?about”,?
as?well?smuggling?a?problem,?NO?involvement?welcome,?improvement?of?Geo?RU?relations?
??JPKF:?c/s,?several?flights?[observations?of?heavy?armament?becomes?more?frequent,?
observers?usually?access?denied?by?Oss?military,?See?SR?16?Mar]?
??land?dispute?in?Nuli,?OSs?beaten?up?by?Geo?
??[Note:?There?are?OSCE?Monitoring?Officers?and?JPKF?Military?Observers]?
3?Apr? SO?calls?for?conscription? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?April,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/04?for?
the?period?of?1???15?April?2004?
?JPKF:?c/s,?flights.?JPKF?comm?informs?Mission?that?monitoring?will?be?carried?out?from?now?
only?together?with?a?representative?of?the?SO?MoD.?Details?of?the?route?to?be?announced?in?
advance???
??[up?until?now?HoM?has?held?at?least?three?meeting?with?Khain]?
8?Apr? ?? 2?killed?by?Geo?
police?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?April,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/04?for?
the?period?of?1???15?April?2004?
?when?police?tried?to?stop?the?car?Ptsa?for?it?was?reportedly?stolen
15?
Apr?
JCC?meeting?in?Tskh?//?
here,?Kok?and?Khain?meet?
for?the?first?time?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?April,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/04?for?
the?period?of?16???30?April?2004?
?after?six?months?break?
??endorses?appointment?of?NO?represenataive?to?SCC.?Until?very?recently,?Geo?was?opposed?
to?this?proposal?from?SO?which?was?blocking?progress?in?the?SCC.?
??JPKF:?c/s.?SO?MoD?dies,?"death?believed?to?be?from?natural?causes",?Alimbegovich?new?
MoD?
14?
May?
JCC?CO?Chairs?meet?at?RU?
Embassy?in?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/04?for?
the?period?of?1???15?May?2004?
?agenda:?draft?proposals?for?structure?of?SCC
??JPKF:?c/s?
23?
May?
SO?parl?elections? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/04?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May?2004?
?26?May:?Saaka?addresses?SO?""brothers"?to?start?immediate?talks?on?the?restoration?of?a?
single?state"?pledged,?status?of?Oss?language?will?be?guaranteed,?speaks?Oss.?SO?MFA?
Djioyev?says?SO?is?interested?only?in?good?newighborly?relations.?
31?
May?
Geo?MIA?deploys?in?CZ? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/04?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May?2004?[See?all?SRs?and?ARs?
from?here]?
?deployed?to?protect?Geo?police?checkpoints.
????MIA?special?forces?by?helicopter?to?Tkviari,?protect?police?carrying?out?anti?smuggling?
operation?
1?Jun? Roelofs?tries?to?visit?CZ? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?May,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/04?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May?2004?
Geo?children?in?village,??is?held?back?by?SO?authorities
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?June,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/04?for?
the?period?of?1?15?June?2004?SR?4,7,?11June?
?Saaka?introduces?Vice?PM?to?cross?task?SO?activities?among?Geo?bodies;?Vano?Merabishvili,?
former?Secretary?of?the?NCS,?now?Sec?Minister?
??Anti?smuggling?ongoing;?SO?against?Geo?checkpoint?at?Tkiavi,?reduces?links?with?Geo?
authorities,?does?not?allow?them?to?entr?SO,?postpones?meetings?with?int?frameworks?
??12?Jun?Saaka?announces?on?RUstavi?2?that?Geo?"has?stopped?contraband"?from?SO.?
??JPKF:?tense?but?stable.?flights.?Geo?PKF?now?provided?by?MIA?troops.??11?Jun:?Choch?
complains?about?bias?of?the?OSCE?against?SO.?
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?
24?Jun? JCC?Co?Chair?informal?
meeting?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?30?June,?2004,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/04?for?
the?period?of?15?–?30?June?2004?SR?16,?17,?23?June?
?JPKF?tension?further?escalated.?Geo?police?detains?trucks?such?as?JPKF?fuel?trucks,?increases?
personnel?and?armament?at?checkpoints.?>>>"None?of?these?armaments?exceed?the?
limitations?of?the?respective?agreements?between?the?conflicting?sides."?
??Constantly?movement?of?unidentified?armed?troops?in?the?CZ?[reports?indicate?that?illegal?
checkpoints?are?due?to????from?Geo:?police/?MIA?troops,?and?????from?SO:?unidentified?armed?
persons].?SO?deploys?checkpoints,?and?officially?says?so,?as?for?protection?of?population.?SO?
and?GEo?deploy?checkpoints?right?next?to?each?other,?whtin?hours?and?withdrawing?again.?
?
???Saaka?introduces?Vice?PM?to?cross?task?SO?activities?among?Geo?bodies;?Vano?Merabishvili,?
former?Secretary?of?the?NCS,?now?Sec?Minister?
????Anti?smuggling?ongoing;?SO?against?Geo?checkpoint?at?Tkiavi,?reduces?links?with?Geo?
authorities,?does?not?allow?them?to?entr?SO,?postpones?meetings?with?int?frameworks?
??12?Jun?Saaka?announces?on?RUstavi?2?that?Geo?"has?stopped?contraband"?from?SO.?
???
??JPKF:?"tense?but?stable".?flights.?Geo?PKF?now?provided?by?MIA?troops.?Geo?anti?smuggling?
ongoing.?SO?condemns?the?"blockade"?on?SO,?continues?banning?journalists?and?foreigners,?
enforces?checkpoints?at?borders,?restricts?movements?of?Geo?living?in?SO?
??11?Jun:?Choch?complains?about?bias?of?the?OSCE?against?SO.?
??25?Jun?Loshchinin?RU?Dep?MFA?visits?Tskh?and?Zurabishvili,?Zurab?says,?Geo?made?conrete?
porposal?for?joint?control?of?Roki?(press?conference?at?Imedi?TV)?
30?
Jun?1?
Jul?
JCC?meeting?Moscow? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?July?2004?
?Khain?(Geo?JCC?Co?chair)?in?opening?statement?demands?the?release?of?three?members?of?
Geo?Sec?Ministry,d?etained?in?Tskh.?SO?refuses,?the?meeting?was?canceled.?
???
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?July?2004?
?5?Jul?Talivieti?(EUSR?European?Union?Special?Representative)?in?SO,?main?issue?finishing?of?
Gor?Tskh?railway?
6?Jul? Informal?JCC?Co?Chair?
meeting?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?July?2004?
?Geo,?SO,?NO,?JPKF?Command.?Series?of?proposals?for?removal?of?checkpoints.
8?Jul? Hostage?taking?of?42?Geo?
nationals?in?CZ?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?July?2004?8?SRs?in?reporting?
period?
?JPKF?Extremely?tense.?"Close?to?develop?into?violent".
??7?Jul,?increase?of?tensions:?two?RU?lorries?taken?by?Geo?MIA,?SO?deploys?in?Prisi,?Geo?Senior?
Military?Represntative?in?JPKF?[not?the?Geo?KF?commander!!]?detained?by?SO?for?1.5?hours,?
and?released?
??8?Jul:?39?released?OSCE?mediated?on?9?Jul?
??10?Jul:?Extraordinary?JPKF?meeting?in?Tskh.?RU?commander?of?RU?Ground?forces?urges?
easing?of?tensions.?MMO?(Mission?Monitoring?Officer)?apprehended?by?SO?
14?15?
Jul?
JCC?high?level?meting?
Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/04?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?July?2004?
?urges?implementation?of?JCC?decisions?of?2?Jun?2004
??16?Jul:?demonstration?outside?OSCE?office?in?Tskh?[no?further?information]?
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?
25?28?
Jul?
Zhelev,?President?of?
Bulgaria,?Special?Envoy?of?
CIO?visits?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?July,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/04?for?
the?period?of?16?–?31?July?2004?SRs?20,?21,?30?Jul?
?urges?parties?to?stick?to?nego?commitments,?meets?Saaka,?Burja,?Zurabi,?Kahin.?OSCE?issues?
statement?calling?for?all?sides?to?control?their?armed?personnel?in?the?CZ.?
??JPKF:?Extremely?tense.?situation?worsened.?
??22?Jul:?RU?PKF?helps?SO?authorities?to?remove?Oss?raod?block?between?Tskh?and?Tamara?on?
Trans?Cam,?Gei?post?remains.?
??27?Jul:?GEo?police?and?MVD?troops?found?at?Eredvi.?Deputy?head?of?the?Eredvi?
Administration?threatens?Senior?Russian?Military?Oberserver?tha?the?will?be?shot?at?if?he?
shows?up?again.?
??27/28?Jul?overnight?fire?on?Tamarasheni,?Achabeti?and?Kurta?(all?Geo,?north?of?Tskh)?
??>>>masses?of?illegal?heavy?armament?found?by?MOs.?troops?movements?without?giving?
prior?notive?to?JPKF?command?frequent.?
13?
Aug?
Kok?and?Zhv?sign?ceasefire?
agreement?
casualties? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/04?for?
the?period?of?01?15?August?2004?SR?4,?5?,?12,?16?(2?
reports?for?16?Aug)?Aug?
?JPKF:?situation?gradually?deteriorated.?Exchanges?of?fire?increased,?civilian?villages?under?
fire,?both?military?and?civilian?casualties.?[First?time?casualties?mentioned?in?the?AR?since?
31?May]?
??2?more?staff?for?mil?observer?mssion?
13?
Aug?
Geo?parl?sets?up?
Committee?on?Restoration?
of?Territorial?Integrity?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/04?for?
the?period?of?01?15?August?2004??
?First?session?on?16?Aug?on?SO.?Issues?for?both?for?Abkh?and?SO.?23?members.
17?18?
Aug?
Extraordinary?JCC?meeting?
with?Kok?and?Zhv?in?Tskh?
and?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?16/04?for?
the?period?of?16?31?August?2004?
?decision?to?continue?high?level?meetings
??decision?to?clear?heights?overlooking?the?Georgian?by?pass?road?in?a?joint?Geo/?Oss?
operation.?Planned?for?19?Aug,?but?abandoned?on?18?Aug,?after?renewed?Geo?shelling?of?the?
heights.?JCC?then?agreed?on?loacting?JPKF?observers?at?the?same?site.?
19?
Aug?
Saaka?issues?statement?to?
withdraw?all?armed?troops?
from?CZ?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?31?August,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?16/04?for?
the?period?of?16?31?August?2004?5?SRs?
?except?for?PKF?and?Geo?police.
??JPKF:?situation?gradually?calmed?down.?15?18?nightly?firefights?with?use?of?heavy?artillery.?
No?exchange?of?fire?being?reported?since?evening?of?19?Aug.??
??However,?the?sides?use?the?ceasefire?to?imrpove?previous?and?new?defensive?positions?
throughout?the?CZ.?As?well,?deliberate?non?cooperation?by?both?sides?with?JPKF?and?OSCE?
on?the?ground?(during?monitoring..)?
??no?full?withdrawal?bei?either?side.?Geo?PKF?ratotates?replacing?MIA?troops?with?MoD?troops
??SO?MFA?does?not?allow?Geo?villagers'?religious?procession?from?Nikozi?to?Tamar?through?
Tskh,?Khain?to?clarify?it.?Procession?used?by?pass?road.?
??Geo?media?call?the?provision?og?humanitarian?aid?by?the?Geo?gov?to?Geo?and?Oss?villages?in?
the?CZ?the?"humanitarian?attack"?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
17/04?for?the?period?of?1?15?September?2004?
?JPKF:?stable.?Despite?occasional?light?arms?fire,?ceasefire?held.?"The?Mission?believes?that?
the?bulk?of?the?Georgian?Interior?Ministry?troops?have?been?withdrawn?from?the?zone?of?
conflict."?
5?9?
Sep?
23?OSCE?Ambassadors?visit?
Geo?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
17/04?for?the?period?of?1?15?September?2004?
?meet?with?entire?Geo?leadership,?with?SO?leadership?and?raise?issues?of?escalation?and?
settlement?
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?
8?Sep? Kulakhmetov?replaces?
Nabdzorov?as?JPKF?
commanders?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?September,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
17/04?for?the?period?of?1?15?September?2004?Weekly?
Mission?Military?Reports?from?7?Sep?
?[I?recall?an?incident?linked?to?Nabdzorov,?related?to?SO?status???? he?said?smth?that?he?is?no?
sure?to?which?country?SO?belongs?and?was?dismissed?shortly?after?that]?
21?
Sep?
Saaka?addresses?UNGA? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?October,?2004,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?18/04?for?
the?period?of?16?30?September?2004?
?1.?confidence?building,?2.?demilitarization/?decriminalization;?increased?role?of?int?comm,?
which?“in?the?case?of?South?Ossetia?means?immediately?increasing?and?expanding?the?OSCE?
mandate?along?the?Roki?tunnel?border”,?3.?broadest?from?of?autonomy?
30?
Sep?
?JCC?meeting?in?Moscow? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?October,?2004,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?18/04?for?
the?period?of?16?30?September?2004?
?preparation?of?Zhv?Kok?meeting
??JPKF:?tense?but?stable.?Improvised?explosives?(IED)?found?on?Trans?Cam?near?RU?post?at?
Kekhvi.?The?report?says?possibilities?are:?"a)?the?condition?and?age?of?the?explosive,?the?lack?
of?camouflage?of?the?IED?and?the?timing?of?the?find,?point?to?the?likelihood?that?this?was?an?
IED?meant?to?be?found?rather?than?to?be?used;?b)?this?was?an?attempt?to?set?an?IED?by?non?
professional?persons?intended?to?disrupt?traffic?on?the?Transcam?or?to?ambush?a?JPKF?
convoy;?c)?this?was?an?attempt?to?provoke?some?sort?of?reaction,?either?from?local?
inhabitants?in?both?communities?or?from?the?JPKF;?d)?this?was?an?attempt?to?maintain?a?high?
level?of?tension?in?the?zone?of?conflict?amongst?the?population?(from?both?communities).?It?
also?might?be?a?mixture?of?any?or?all?of?the?above."?
12?Oct? ?? 2?Oss?PKF?
soldiers?killed?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?October,?2002,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?19/04?for?
the?period?of?01?15?October?2004?
?ambush?on?four?OSs?PKFs?belonging?to?NO?PKF?battalion.?4km?SE?of?Didi?Gromi,?close?to?
Kirbali.?Geo?police?detained?the?wounded?at?Gori?hospital?and?released?them?later.?>>>?SR?
12?Oct?
??due?to?this,?Steering?Committee?for?rehab?did?not?take?place?
??Geo?policedetains?buses?traveling?through?Roki?to?Armenia.?Kareli?says,?passengers?only?
allowed?to?travel?through?Lars?checkpoint.?[first?time,?Kareli?is?mentioned?as?an?authority]?
??JPKF:?situation?has?worsened.?Daytime?shooting?resumed,?nighttime?shooting?increased.?
No?flights.?
??NO?and?Geo?report?having?come?under?fire?from?resp?side.?[Soldiers?wounded?happens?
more?often?than?that?soldiers?disappear,?but?disappearances?give?rise?to?hostage?taking?
accusations?and?have?far?more?escalating?potential.?They?go?immediately?up?to?the?JPKF?
level?which?communicates?it?to?the?resp?authroities]?
20?Oct? JCC?Co?chair?meeting?at?RU?
Embassy?in?Tbs?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?November,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/04?for?the?period?of?16?31?October?2004?
?25?Oct?Steering?committee?on?rahb?took?place?in?Tskh,?agreements?on?budget?adjustments
??JPKF:?stable?but?tense.?Flight.?Overnight?shooting.?Inhabitants?of?Achabeti?and?Kurta?(norht?
of?Tskh)?closed?Trans?Cam?three?times?in?protest?of?friring?on?their?houses.?
??17?18?Oct?Nuli:?Dispute?over?apple?orchard.?90?Oss?and?Geo?villagers?firing?at?each?other.?
JPKF?commander?could?not?get?the?Geo?and?SO?authorities?to?agree?on?a?division?of?the?land.?
5?Nov? Kok?Zhv?meeting?in?Sochi? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?November,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/04?for?the?period?of?01?15?November?2004?
?agree?to?withdraw?all?armed?units?from?the?CZ.?EC,?Loshchinin,?JCC?CO?chairs.?>>>SR?8?Oct
??JPKF:?stable?but?tense.?Overnight?shootin?with?light?arms.?Flights.?RU?and?Geo?PKF?stated?
joint?demining.?
19?10?
Nov?
JCC?meeting?Vladi? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna 30?November,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
22/04?for?the?period?of?15?30?November?2004?
?demilitarization?
??JPKF:?first?week?very?tense.?Second?week?"calmed?down??considerably?…?down?to?one?or?
two?incidents?[of?nightly?exchanges?of?fire]?per?night"?
??renewed?Geo?police?activity?in?the?southern?CZ,?19?Nov?ambush?on?Geo?PKF?with?two?
280?
?
wounded
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?December,?2002,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
23/04?for?the?period?of?1?15?December?2004?
?15?Dec?Second?meeting?of?the?Sterring?Comm?on?Rehab?on?the?third?program?for?rehab
??JPKF:?situation?improving?until?8?Dec,?then?slight?deterioration,?since?then?stable?but?tense?
??[as?for?shooting?incidents,?OSCE?reports?relate?to:?SO?and?Geo?side,?JPKF?and?OSCE?Mission?
Monitoring?OFficers?(MMOs)]?
??7?Dec:?Geo?police?stops?RU?PKFs?accusing?them?of?transproting?contraband.?Senior?RU?MO?
facilitated?the?release?of?the?vehicle.?SO?put?200?men?on?instant?readiness?ro?release?the?
JPKFs.?
??Geo?anti?smuggling?ongoing?
?
?>>>?2nd?meeting?of?the?Steering?Committee?on?the?3rd?EC?funded?rehabilitation?program?in?
the?zone?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?conflict?
?? 2005? ?? ??
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?January,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/05?for?
the?period?of?1?15?January?2005?
?JPKF?tense?but?calm.?Flight.?Halt?of?demil.
??[Geo?Dzevera?base?now?for?months?ongoing.?Reservist?training?of?Geo?inside?CZ]?
19?Jan? Hostage?Crisis? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?3?February,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?02/05?for?
the?period?of?15?31?January?2005?
?SO?resident?detained?by?Geo?police?being?suspected?of?two?murders?in?Tamarasheni?last?
year.?Same?night,?Geo?chief?of?police?of?Eredvi?taken?hostage?while?being?on?duty?in?Ergneti.?
27?Jan?last?hostage?released.?
??JPKF:?Small?arms?shooting.?Refusel?of?MoD?to?grant?OSCe?access?to?Dzevera.?New?illegal?SO?
positions?
24?Jan? Emergency?Session?of?the?
JCC?in?Tskh?
?? ?? ?>>held?to?be?the?easing?point?of?hostage?crisis
??24?Jan:?SO?parl?appeals?to?CoE?to?send?its?representatives?to?study?the?situation?on?the?
ground.?
26?Jan? Saaka?delivers?speech?at?
PACE?
?? ??
7?Feb? US?diplomats?meet?Choch?
in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?February,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
03/05?for?the?period?of?1?15?February?2005?
?5?Feb?third?meeting?of?Steering?committee
??JPKF:?relatively?calm,?shooting?incidents?diminuished.?
??Open?appearance?of?SO?MoD?untis?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?March,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?04/05?for?
the?period?of?16?28?February?2005?
?24?Feb?SPMU?met?with?Khain?>>>?SCC?process?on?joint?policing?restarted
??JPKF:?calm?but?tense.?Mainly?small?arms,?but?some?grande?explosions.?Restriction?of?OSCE?
personnel?by?SO?MoD?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?March,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/05?for?
the?period?of?1?15?March?2005?
?Weekly?Administrative?Meetings?(Thursday?meetings)?under?the?chairmanship?of?the?
JPKF?commander?have?resumed?after?a?break?of?one?year.?
??1?Mar:?Fourth?meeting?of?the?Sterring?Committee?
??JPKF:?calm?but?tense.?Low?level,?but?shooting?increased?in?some?areas?from?the?Dmenisi?
Satikhari?Eredvi?triangle?along?the?Lesser?Liakhvi?River?to?the?north?east?of?Tskhinvali?
281?
?
16?17?
Mar?
JCC?Co?Chairs?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?April,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/05?for?
the?period?of?16?31?March?2005?
?agree?on:?drafting?action?plan?for?"completing"?demil,?as?well?special?focus?to?jpint?LEB?and?
rehab?
??17?Mar:?Geo?gov?issues?decree?on?controling?humanitarian?aid?into?CZ,?coordinating?Geo?
bodies,?certifying?goods?etc.,?Khain?tasked?with?coordination?and?liaison?with?JPKF?
??JPKF:?calm?but?tense.?flights.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?April,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/05?for?
the?period?of?1?15?April?2005?
?JPKF:?calm?[this?genreally?means,?small?arms?fire?remaisn?at?a?low?level?with?several?
grenade?xplosions]?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?3?May,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/05?for?
the?period?of?16?30?April?2005?
?Informal?meeting?of?the?Steering?Committee
??JPKF?calm.?Sides?agree?for?the?first?time?on?small?steps?for?demil.?
??19?Apr?MoD?says?it?has?closed?the?reservist?training?base?in?Tv?intercview,?too.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?May,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/05?for?
the?period?of?1?15?May?2005?
?5?May?Sixth?meeting?of?the?Sterring?Committee
??JPKF:?calm.?Dzevera?fully?dismantled.?Demil?stalled?again.?
??7?May:?Geo?students?hold?demonstration?at?JPKF?post?in?Megvrekisi?against?RU?bases?in?
Geo?
29?
May?
Geo?and?SO?security?forces?
clash?
4?Oss?
uniformed,?1?
Geo?police?
killed?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?June,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/05?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May?2005;?OSCE?Communication?
Vienna?30?May,?2005,?SEC.FR/225/05?RESTRICTED,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Spot?Report:?At?least?five?
dead?after?shooting?incident?in?the?zone?of?the?
Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict,?30?May?2005?See?other?
SRs?
?in?Geo?viallages?north?of?Tskh.?SO?opens?fire?at?Geo?police?in?Kurta.?At?Tamarasheni?
stopped?by?Geo?police,?opens?fire?again,?Geo?returned?fire.?Deaths.?One?dead?SO?driver?of?
SO?MoD.?
??JPKF:?calm?but?fragile,?after?29?May?unpredictable.?Large?number?of?Geo?police?posts?and?
SO?MoD?and?"militia"?posts?incl.?in?Tskh?itself?remain?without?JCC?auhorization.?
30?31?
May?
JCC?Co?Chairs?meet?in?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?1?June,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/05?for?
the?period?of?16?31?May?2005?
?initially?in?Vladi,?but?due?to?shooting?on?29?May?relocated?to?Tskh,?prep?of?meeting?
between?Geo?and?SO?MIA?
?? Mamsurov?says?only?
option?is?unification?of?SO?
and?NO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?15?June,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/05?for?
the?period?of?1?15?June?2005?
?[when?exactly?unclear]?Mamsurov?recently?appointed?NO?pres
(Among?other?sources,?reported?by?Novaya?Gazeta?10?June?2005,?Civil?Georgia?11?June?2005,?
NewsRu?16?June?2005,?Kommersant?17?June?2005)?
??JPKF:?calm?but?fragile.?6?Jun?4?Geo?disappear?in?Tskh?area,?have?not?been?found?yet;?
??discussion?with?SO?MoD?and?JPKF?about?SCC?refreshed?
??7th?meeting?of?the?Steering?Committee?
22?23?
Jun?
JCC?Meeting?in?Moscow?
[supposedly?the?44th,?I?
never?see?how?they?count]?
1?Geo?dead? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?July,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/05?for?
the?period?of?16?30?June?2005?
?shepherd,?body?found,?as?a?result?of?a?mine?accident.
??JCC:?with?participation?of?LEBs.?Agenda:?Joint?LEBs,?demil,?rehab?SEC.FR?272/05?
??JPKF:?c/f.?Tensions?increase?as?a?result?from?failor?to?find?the?four?missing?Geo.?Geo?local?
police?chief?says,?"local?population?out?of?his?control",?they?refuse?to?talk?with?any?auhtority?
and?threaten?to?take?hostages.?
10?Jul? Batumi?Conference?on?SO?
conflict?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?July,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/05?for?
the?period?of?1???15?July?2005?
?"International?Conference?on?the?Peaceful?Resolution?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict"?
See?SEC.FR/298/05?
??organized?by?Geo?gov.?"Strategic?plan"?presented?by?the?Geo?gov?and?discussed.?
282?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?18?July,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/05?for?
the?period?of?1???15?July?2005?
?7?Jul?8th?meeting?of?the?Steering?Committee
??JPKF:?c/f.?four?Geo?still?missing,?tensions?ongoing.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?August,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/05?for?
the?period?of?16???31?July?2005?
?JPKF?c/f.?four?Geo?still?missing,?tensions?continue.
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?August,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?15/05?for?
the?period?of?1???15?August?2005?
?7?Aug?Saaka?assures?of?Geo?not?reparing?military?operation,?due?to?earlier?statements?of?
Kok?
??JPKF:?c/f.?Limited?traffic?on?TRansCam?under?JPKf?escort?through?Geo?villages.?
??2?Aug??9th?meeting?of?the?Steering?Committee?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?September,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/05?for?the?period?of?16???31?August?2005?
?24?Aug?Khain?says?Geo?willing?to?pay?rehab?from?Central?State?Fund?and?Georigan?Social?
Investment?Fund?(GSIF)?(funded?by?WB,?KFW?and?International?Development?Association)?
??JPKF:?c/f.?19?Aug?Geo?boy?kidnapped.?
9?Sep? Saaka?on?strategy? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?21?September,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
17/05?for?the?period?of?1???15?September?2005?See?AR?
?first?speech?after?summer?break.?Three?stages,1.?state?apparatus?reform,?2.?infrastrucutre?
and?energy,?3.?jobs?and?economy.?All?three?stages?of?the?plan?serve?the?"ultimate?goal?of?
uniting?Georgia".?RU?fosters?the?militarization?of?CZs.?Wants?Americans?in?to?SO?settlement:?
"For?the?first?time?in?many?years,?the?Americans?have?expressed?their?readiness?to?get?
directly?involved?in?the?settlement?of?conflicts?in?Georgia."?
??JPKF:?tense?
??15?Sept:?10th?Steering?Committee?
20?
Sep?
15th?SO?Day?of?Ind?//?MoD?
operation?in?SO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?October,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?18/05?for?
the?period?of?16???30?September?2005?
?MoD?(Okrua)?closes?Transcam?at?Achabeti?after?mil?parade?in?Tskh,?did?vehicle?searches?
without?prior?JPKF?consultation;?early?evening?mortars?strike?civilian?buildings?in?Tskh?
??21?Sept:?Seven?explosions?near?Geo?villages?north?of?Tskh?
11?Oct? Geo?parl?resolution?on?
JPKF?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?20?October,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?19/05?for?
the?period?of?1?–?15?October?2005?
?Resolution?“Regarding?the?Current?Situation?in?the?Conflict?Regions?on?the?Territory?of?
Georgia?and?Ongoing?Peace?Operations”.?
??Geo?gov?to?hold?talks?with?all?sides?to?imrpove?performance?of?JPKF.?Report?back?to?parl?10?
Feb.?If?negative?assessment?of?nego,?parl?"shall?demand?the?cessation?of?the?peace?keeping?
operation?and?(...)?abolition?of?the?xisting?structures?from?15?Feb?2006"?
24?25?
Oct?
45th?JCC?meeting?in?
Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?3?November,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/05?for?the?period?of?15?–?31?October?2005?
?three?stage?approach?for?sttlement:?1.?demil,?2.?rehab,?3.?pol?settlement?by?status,?on?the?
basis?of?Saaka's?UNGA?proposal?from?Sep?2004?and?Kok's?statement?from?24?Dec?2004.?
??JPKF:?first?time?since?20?Sep?more?stable,?but?still?tense?
26?Oct? First?LEB?meeting?hosted?
by?OSCE?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?3?November,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/05?for?the?period?of?15?–?31?October?2005?
?SO?MIA?Mindzayev,?representatives?of?the?neighboring?police?departments?of?Shida?Kartli,?
Racha?Lechkhumi,?Mtskheta?Tsianeti,?Chief?Shida?Kartli?regional?police:?Jugheli.?
??Consent?of?Geo?MIA,?one?representative?
???Signing?of?joint?action?plan.?
??27?Oct:?Geo?PM?Noghaidelirequests?JCC?CO?chair?of?visiting?Geo?villages,?who?says?he?
should?contact?SO?MFA.?Visit?was?postponed.?
283?
?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?November,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/05?for?the?period?of?01?–?15?November?2005?
?11?Nov:?NAS?working?teams?completed?and?starting?work:?1.?Road?(NO/RF),?2.?Business?
development?(RF),?3.?Agriculture?(US),?4.?Energy?(Austria)?
??????OSCE?initiated?Needs?Assessment?Study.?
??10?Nov?11th?Steering?Committee,?Geo?Oss?gas?experts?have?jointly?begun?to?assess?the?
Java?Tskh?pipeline?in?view?of?the?connection?of?Geo?villages?thgough?the?Kekhvi?Tskh?
segment?of?the?pipe?
??OSCE?still?expects?to?receive?a?final?Geo?investigation?report?on?explosions?of?20?Sep?
??JPKF:?t/s.?flight.?
15?17?
Nov?
JCC?Co?Chairs?meet?in?
Ljubljana?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?December,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
22/05?for?the?period?of?15?–?30?November?2005?
?only?joint?positons?in?NAS?and?rehab,?in?other?issues?the?protocol?only?points?out?the?
differences.?
??JPKF:?t/s.?Geo?boy?from?19?Aug?released?after?joint?SO?ans?Geo?police?operation?(SRs)??
??15?Nov?near?escalation?when?Geo?car?with?non?valid?JPKF?plates?was?stopped?by?RU?PKF,?
one?occupant?was?Geo?Dep?Chief?of?Special?Forces?of?the?MIA,?20?masked?and?armed?men?
arrived?and?the?OP?coammander?ordered?his?men?into?combat?alert.?Geo?MOs?discussed?
with?Geo?MIA?personnel?and?eased?tensions.?
12?
Dec?
Kok?proposes?joint?
settlement?steps?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?16?December,?2005,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
23/05?for?the?period?of?1?–?15?December?2005?
>>>SR/5004/05?
?JPKF:?situation?deteriorated?significantly,?then?to?T/s.
??9?Dec?again?all?cars?irrespetive?of?their?plates?and?origine?let?through?Geo?checkpoints?
??7?Dec?all?detainees?released.?
??6?Dec?SO?detains?four?Geo?police?and?20?Geo?civilians.?Later?that?day?Geo?police?detains?
four?SO?officials.?SO?MIA?orders?to?open?fire?on?unauthorized?armed?formations.?
??5?Dec?one?SO?police?arrested?by?Geo?Military?police?for?counterfeit.??
??4?Dec?Geo?police?earlier?that?day?closed?road?along?the?Lesser?Liakhvi?River?for?cars?with?RU?
and?Geo?plates.??
??4?Dec?Relatives?of?the?four?missing?Geo?block?Transcam.?Blockade?of?relativess?until?13?Dec.?
15?Dec?SO?police?recovers?bodies?of?the?men,?Geo?and?Oss?detained.?
??2?Dec?SO?MoD?post?attacked?by?Geo?Sepcial?forces,?MOs?cannot?find?sings?of?attack.?
???
24?
Dec?
Kok?agrees?with?Geo?on?
settlement?road?map?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?January,?2005,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?24/04?for?
the?period?of?16?31?December?2004?
?22?23?Dec:?JCC?Co?chairs?meet?in?Tbs?on?Sochi?5?Nov?and?Vladi?20?Nov.?Choch?criticizes?
OSCE?policy?of?duble?standards,?ignores?Geo?violations?and?is?tight?on?SO.?
??24?Dec:?JCC?Co?chairs?meet?in?Tskh.?Agreement?that?Geo?and?Oss?JCC?CO?chairs?inspect?all?
key?positions?in?the?CZ?including?hills?surrounding?Liakhvi?Gorge.?
??29?Dec:?Djioyev:?MMOs?not?needed?at?Roki,?their?number?sufficient?enough?to?be?unbiased?
??JPKF:?tense?but?calm.?Flight.?Complete?halt?of?demilitarizatuion?activities.?
?? 2006? ?? ??
284?
?
27?28?
Dec?
47th?JCC?Session?in?
Moscow?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?13?January,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?24/05?for?
the?period?of?16?December?2005?–?8?January?2006?
?no?agreement?on?action?plan?although?acknowldgement?that?there?are?new?initiatives.?
Most?divergent?issue?demil.?Mistrust?of?SO?because?of?Resolution?of?Geo?parl?from?11?Oct?
concerning?possible?withdrawal?of?PKF.?Geo?calls?for?prompt?demil,?independent?from?a?joint?
peace?plan.?Other?sides?considered?thsi?as?a?refusal?to?work?on?a?joint?peace?plan.?
??19?Dec?OSCE?receives?a?copy?of?the?Final?Investigation?Report?of?the?Geo?MIA?on?the?
shelling?of?Tskh?on?20?Sept?WHERE?IS?THE?DOC??
????JPKF:?c/s?
??5?Jan:?Chief?of?Staff?of?JPKF?tries?to?cancel?joint?monitoring?by?JPKF?and?OSCE?because?the?
security?of?OSCE?could?not?be?guaranteed?anymore.?HoM?replies?that?JPKF?is?the?only?
authrotized?military?force?in?the?CZ?and?is?very?much?able?to?maintain?its?own?securtiy.?CoS?
refers?to?misunderstanding.?
??JPKF?has?monitored?the?positions?mentioned?in?the?exchange?of?letters?of?the?two?JCC?Co?
chairs,?which?is?24?Geo?sites?and?38?Oss?sites.?
??RU?and?NO?PKFs?do?not?control?an??SO?plated?vehicle?carrying?armed?men?
28?Jan? ?? 1?Oss?found?
dead?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?February,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?01/06?for?
the?period?of?9???31?January?2006?
?close?to?Geo?villages?to?the?norht?of?Tskh
??5?Jan:?SO?JCC?CO?chair?refuses?meeting?in?Tbs?due?to?his?security.?Geo?Co?Chair?reiterates?
invitation?and?asures?that?sec?will?be?guaranteed.?18?Jan?NO?Co?Chair?invites?to?Vladi,?but?
Geo?Co?Chair?refuses?due?to?snow.?SO?Co?Chair?offers?to?travel?through?Transcam,?but?Geo?
Co?Chair?says?this?would?mean?crossing?an?international?border?illegally.?
??JPKF:?t/s.?flight.?SO?complains?about?frequent?rotations?of?Geo?PKF,?allegedly?in?prep?of?
future?mil?operations.?
??16?Jan?JPKF?comm?address?strong?letter?to?Geo?because?deployment?of?Geo?police.?
15?
Feb?
Geo?parl?calls?for?abolition?
of?JPKF?(revision?of?Sochi)?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?22?February,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
02/06?for?the?period?of?1??15?February?2006?
See?this?AR?on?Security?Situation?for?a?typical?compilation?of?incidents?as?an?example?to?
what?the?situation?sttlled?into?gradually?since?2004.?
??calls?for?intensified?coop?of?the?gov?with?Ios?and?partner?states?to?"replace?the?
peacekeeping?troops?of?the?Russian?Federation?by?an?“effective?international?peacekeeping?
operation”,?and?to?develop?a?new?negotiation?format?which?can?help?implementing?the?
“peace?plan?approved?by?the?Foreign?Ministers?of?the?OSCE?member?states”"?
??JPKF:?more?tense.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?March,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?03/06?for?
the?period?of?16??28?February?2006?
?17?Feb?RU?Co?chair?proposes?to?relocate?JCC?meeting?from?Vienna?to?Moscow.?Geo?
immediately?refuses.?Scheduled?Vienna?meeting?20?21?Feb?canceled?and?took?place?in?
Moscow?only?with?NO,?SO?and?RU,?without?Geo,?OSCE?and?EC.?[Locations?of?JCC?meetings?
start?to?become?a?tense?issue,?last?one?Tbs?or?Vladi]?
??JPKF:?increased?SO?military?activity?observed.??
??Second?rotation?of?Geo?PKF?in?six?weeks,?temporary?SO?road?blocks?to?rpeventit,?Geo?block?
sin?response?N?and?S?of?Tskh?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?17?March,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?04/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?March?2006?
?JPKF:?t/f.?flight.?
??Geo?Mil?Pol?Chief?says,?RU?PKFs?must?hold?valid?Geo?visa,?JPKF?Comm?announces?that?non?
Geo?personnel?can?leave?posts?only?on?official?duty.?
285?
?
27?29?
Mar?
48th?JCC?meeting?in?Vladi? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?4?April,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?05/06?for?
the?period?of?16??31?March?2006?
?Geo?criticizes?fulfilment?of?JPKF?mandate,?SO?in?turn?criticizes?MMOs?and?patroling?activites?
only?in?presence?of?JPKF.?Agreed?on?forwarding?recommendations?to?their?resp?leaderships?
??JPKF?t/f,?then?c/s?
??Especially?NO?PKFs?are?mistrustful?against?MMOs.?
??Because?of?Geo?police?anti?smuggling?in?South?of?CZ?lack?of?oop?between?SO?and?Geo?LEBs?
and?due?to?this?the?resulting?damage?between?the?local?populations?on?both?sides.?[de?facto?
means,?lack?of?coop?rises?etnic?tensions]?
??17?Mar:?13th?Steering?Committee,?agrees?that?most?projects?are?completed,?remaining?is?
gasification?of?Kekhvi?and?hydro?power?station.?
30?31?
Mar?
Geo?Oss?dialogue?meeting?
in?Vladi?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?20?April,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?06/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?April?2006?
?“Georgian?Ossetian?dialogue?meeting”?on?“Compensation,?Restitution?and?Restoration?of?
rights?for?the?victims?of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?conflict”,?organized?by?International?Institute?
for?Strategic?Studies?(IISS).?????SO?authorities?refused?to?take?part?
??14?15?Apr?Third?NAS?meeting?
??JPKF:?c/s?
???
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?3?May,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?07/06?for?
the?period?of?16???30?April?2006?
?JPKF:?c/s
??21?Apr:?NAS?Comm?dicides?to?reduce?projects?from?12.5?to?10?mio?Euro?
5?May? NATO?Parl?Assembly?visits?
Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?23?May,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?May?2006?
?visit?headed?by?president?of..?Meeting?with?Kok,?JPKF?comm,?Mmos.
11?13?
May?
49th?JCC?session?in?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?23?May,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?08/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?May?2006?
?agree?on?NAS?rehab?package,?the?Co?Chairs?"endorsed?the?list?of?participants?in?the?
Working?Group?entrusted?with?the?harmonization?of?existing?peace?initiatives?from?the?
sides"?[Is?this?the?substitute?for?the?Pol?Expert?WG?on?the?pol?status?]?
??disagree?on?security?guarantees?[wording,?sic]?and?the?adoption?of?a?declaration?of?non?
use?of?force.?
??JPKF:?c/s?
??11?May?Kok?says,?MMOs?conduct?monitoring?with?Geo?Intelligence?Service?and?must?quit?or?
MMOs?will?be?expulsed.?
286?
?
27?28?
May?
SO?detains?Geo?citizens? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?2?June,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?09/06?for?
the?period?of?15?31?May?2006;?OSCE?Communication?
Vienna?1?June,?2006,?SEC.FR/257/06?RESTRICTED,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Spot?Report:?Sudden?
increase?in?tension?and?associated?incidents?around?
Tskhinvali?27???28?May?2006?
?SO?LEBs?detain?Geo?citizens?for?30?min?for?document?check.?Four?hours?later,?Geo?police?
detains?2?Oss?at?Khelchua,?then?further?eight?detained?and?taken?to?gori.?More?people?
detained?in?other?places.?SO?police?and?the?RU?PKF?OP?at?Tamrasheni?close?the?Transcam.?At?
Kurta?furhter?8?SO?detained.?Dep?Gov?of?Shida?Kartli?arrives?at?Kurta.?Order?for?detentions?
from?Gori?Chief?of?Regional?Police.?Operation?however?diffuse,?not?clear?who?is?in?charge.?
Geo?PM?and?MIA?express?concern?to?Mission.?Other?Geo?sources?say,?Oss?are?checked?as?for?
entering?through?Roki.?60?Geo?Special?Forces?surround?Pauk?OP?and?hold?JPKF?personnel?at?
gunpoint,?take?detainees?to?Eredvi.?In?the?course?of?28?May,?all?detainees?are?released?and?
TransCam?reopened.?????SR?assess?Geo?actions?as?extremely?irrespible?and?over?handed,?as?a?
reaction?to?the?detention?of?a?small?number?of?Geo?by?SOs.?
??SR?257:?details?on?responsibilities,?chain?of?actors,?behavior?
??17?May:?14?th?meeting?of?Steering?Comm?
14?Jun? OSCE?Donor's?Conference?
on?SO?in?Brussels?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?23?June,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?10/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?June?2006?
?NAS?process?preparation?for?Donor's?Conf/?ongoing?rehab
??Geo?PM?Nogh?and?CIO?open?conf.?Four?JCC?Co?chairs.?More?than?10?mio?Euros.?
??SO?continuously?accuses?OSCE?of?spying?for?Geo,?passing?on?biased?information?to?CIO.?
??JPKF:?c/s.?Increased?activity?by?Geo?Special?Forces,?so?that?on?14?jun?a?group?of?Oss?
residents?came?up?to?OP?and?asked?MMOs?for?help,?MMOs?accompanied?them?back?to?their?
villages?until?armed?SO?volunteers?arrived?[That's?that?about?the?OSCE?weapon?hand?over?
program..]?[out?of?hand?situation,?vigilantism?tolerated,?OSCE?concept?failed]?
20?Jun? 50th?JCC?session?in?Tskh? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?July,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?11/06?for?
the?period?of?16??30?June?2006?
?attended?by?Geo?and?SO?LEB?heads?and?respective?representatives?of?the?RU?and?NO?
bodies.?Most?immediate?secuurity?decision:?Removal?of?two?recendtyl?moved?and?reinforced?
checkpoints?at?Avnevi?(by?SO?police)?and?Zemo?Prisi?(by?Geo?police)?SR?297/06?
??JPKF:?t?and?unpredictable.?Conitnued?improvemets?of?SO?positions,?increased?number?od?
Geo?LEBs?at?posts?in?CZ.?
??22?23?Jun?Tskhinvali?radio?calls?for?demonstration?infront?of?OSCE?office?against?the?"pro?
Georgian?activities?of?the?OSCE",?demo?against?post?in?Prisi?only?disperses?when?confirmed?
that?the?post?had?been?removed.?[Before?the?escalation?in?May?2004,?SO?leadership?praised?
the?OSCE's?activities?even?in?public?statements]?See?SR?298?on?internal?SO?atmosphere?
against?Int?
7?Jul? First?meeting?of?Steer?
Comm?with?SO?and?Geo?
represent?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?24?July,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?July?2006?
?only?on?the?ground?project?issues.
??13?Jul:?HoM?discusses?11?Jun?detention?of?MMOs?with?Choch?and?JPKF?comm.?
??JPKF:?t?and?unpredictale.?
9?//?
14?Jul?
?? head?of?SO?NSC?
killed?in?bomb?
blast//?2?in?
explosion?in?
Tskh?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?24?July,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?12/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?July?2006?
?until?15?Jul?major?Geo?military?exercise?at?Orpolo
??media?warnings?that?situation?could?be?detabilzed?by?either?side?in?the?context?of?St?
Petersburg?G8?meeting??
287?
?
?? Merab?Antadze?new?
Minister?for?CR?and?JCC?Co?
chair?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?3?August,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?13/06?for?
the?period?of?16???31?July?2006?
?JPKF:?t/u.?many?overflights.
??14?Jul:?expiry?of?"Georgian?period?of??'grace'"?for?people?already?traveling?to?and?from?RU?
??23?Jul:?SO?volunteers?at?Didmukha?(Oss)?open?fire?at?Geo?police?officer?driving?by,?seriously?
injured,?manages?to?reach?Avnevi?(Geo)?
??28?Jul:?discovery?of?250?m?of?new?trenches?SE?of?Tskh?built?by?SO?MIA?
??[Where?does?actually?derive?the?word?"Immigration?post"??from?Russian?use??Used?for?
SO?police?checkpoints,?introduced?only?several?years?ago]?
4?Aug? 16th?Steering?Comm?
meeting?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?21?August,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?14/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?August?2006?
?Ruslan?Abashidze,?Geo?Dep?Minister?for?CR?is?the?new?representative?of?the?Geo?side.?
Setting?of?the?format?of?the?meetings,?enlarging?list?of?participants.?
??JPKF:?t/u.?several?flights.?
??6?Aug:?Geo?Financial?Police?detains?100?Sos?after?their?return?from?shopping?near?Tbs.?
??7?Aug:?Three?Geo?police?fired?at,?at?Avnevi?post.?two?seriously?injured.?All?roads?closed.?
17?18?
Aug?
51th?JCC?in?Moscow? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?7?September,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
15/06?for?the?period?of?16??31?August?2006?
?participants?could?not?even?agree?on?the?agenda.?Session?delayed?even?until?mid?sept.?SR?
391?
??15?Aug?SO?authorities?start?issueing?SO?passports,?Kok?announces?preparations?for?
Referendum?in?SO?
??19?Aug?RUssia?Pension?Fund?opens?office?in?Tskh?
???20?23?Aug?Constitutional?Experts?visit?on?the?intitiative?of?OSCE.?Meet?Geo?MFA?and?MCR,?
SO?MFA?and?MoJ.?Talks?on?status?issues.?
??27?Aug?John?McCain?and?Congressional?delegation?visit?Tskh,?Kok?
??JPKF:?t/u.??
??24?Aug:?Geo?PKF?reinforced?by?100?more?men.?
28?
Aug?
Shooting?at?Saaka?
helicopter?at?CZ?overflight?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?7?September,?2006,
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
15/06?for?the?period?of?16??31?August?2006?
?Helicopter?carried?Saaka?and?US?senators.?Missile?found,?handed?over?to?US?military?for?
investigation?
??4?Sep?(AR?16/06):?US?Embassy?discounts?claims?that?missles?were?fired?at?the?helicopter.?
Helicopter?in?violation?of?JPKF?agreements?overflying?CZ.?
8?Sep? ?? 3?SO?police,?1?
Geo?police?die?
in?shooting?
incident?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?22?September,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/06?for?the?period?of?1??15?September?2006?
14?
Sep?
Informal?JCC?Co?Chair?
meeting?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?22?September,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
16/06?for?the?period?of?1??15?September?2006?
?agree?on?full?JCC?meeting?which?did?not?take?place,?because?SO?banned?a?member?of?Geo?
del?from?entering?SO.?
??1?Sep:?Geo?Mfa?issues?statement?where?it?declares?the?new?pipeline?from?RU?to?SO?(Alagir?
Tskh)?illegal.?SO?PM:?start?Oct?2006???end?2007?
??11?Sep?EU?parl?del?meets?SO?leadership?and?JPKF?comm.?
???JPKF:?t/u.?
??3?Sep:?Geo?MoD?helisopter?hit?by?heavy?machine?gun?over?CZ.?
?? ?? 2?Geo?die?close?
to?CZ?of?
gunshot?
OSCE?Communication?Vienna?5?October,?2006,?OSCE?
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?17/06?for?
the?period?of?16???30?September?2006?
?26?Sep?17th?Steering?Comm?with?Geo?and?SO
??JPKF?t/u.?23?Sep:?Two?SO?police?injured?in?shooting?incident.??
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12?13?
Oct?
Third?round?of?talks?of?
the51st?JCC?session?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?20?October,?2006,?OSCE
MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?18/06?for?
the?period?of?1??15?October?2006?
?reaffirmation?of?antagonistic?positions
??6?Oct:?First?meeting?of?the?new?Steering?Comm?[Steeering?Comm?changed?format?to?
including?SO?and?Geo?at?the?same?time?when?JCC?got?deadlocked.?Do?the?Thursday?
meetings?continue?]?
??JPKF:?t/u?
??5?Oct:?Geo?local?self?government?elections,?increase?of?Geo?police?in?Geo?administered?
areas.?
??[Shev?was?much?more?face?to?face?and?non?public?than?Saaka.?Shev?seemed?to?have?a?
more?balanced?approach,?more?talk?oriented,?calmer,?more?compromise?oriented,?let?alone?
his?choice?of?words]?
20?Oct? NO?announces?to?create?
Liaison?Office?in?Tskh?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?November,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/06?for?the?period?of?16??31?October?2006?
?Gerasim?Khugayev?to?be?head,?was?SO?PM?1993?95,?NO?PM?Nikolay?Khlintsov:?"enhance?
coop?between?the?two?republics"?
??"Salvation?Union?of?Ossetians"?sets?up?alternative?elections?in?opposition?to?Kok.?Election?
Commmittee?sits?in?Eredvi.?SO?claims?Tbs?tries?to?establish?puppet?government?in?Tskh.?
Candidates:?Maia?Chigoeva?Tsaboshvili,?Georgiy?Chigoyev,?Teymuraz?Dzheragov,?Tamara?
Charayeva?and?Dmitriy?Sanakoyev.?
??28?Oct?NO?parl?call?Duma?to?condemn?1920?acts?of?"Geo?national?extremist?forces"?as?
genocide.?
??30?Oct?13th?Steer?Comm?
??JPKF:?t/u.?
?
??"Ossetian?Road?of?Life"?bypasses?Geo?villages?along?Transcam?n?of?Tskh?
???
23?Oct? ?? 1?Oss?dies? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?November,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/06?for?the?period?of?16??31?October?2006?
?in?hospital?after?incident?on?9?Oct?between?Geo?and?SO?locals?
26?Oct? ?? 1?Geo?dies? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?November,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/06?for?the?period?of?16??31?October?2006?
?as?a?result?of?mine?explosion?between?Kurta?and?Kekhvi.
?
[most?common?reaction?of?both?sides?after?casualties?occur:?closing?down?of?their?
respectively?controled?roads,?mostly?the?TransCam.?If?members?of?the?services?die,?controls?
of?goods?and?documents?tighten,?are?arbitrarily?performed,?with?subsequnet?arrests,?abuse?
in?detention?????it?is?mainly?the?free?movement?in?the?CZ?that?is?affected?first]?
27?Oct? Start?of?Dzaurikau?Tskh?gas?
pipeline?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?6?November,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
19/06?for?the?period?of?16??31?October?2006?
?Mamsurov?and?Kok?attended
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#####? SO?pres?elections?in?Tskh?
and?alternative?elections?
Eredvi?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?24?November,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
20/06?for?the?period?of?1??15?November?2006?
?SO?"presidential?election"?result?in?land?slide?victory?of?Kok?together?with?the?approval?of?
independence?in?the?"referendum?of?independence"?
??"Alternative?election"?declares?Dimitry?Sanakoyev?the?winner?(Oss?and?former?PM?and?
MoD?of?SO)?and?"alternative?referendum"?asks?for?start?of?nego?with?Geo?on?federal?
grounds.?
??????two?rival?Ossetian?camps?in?SO?might?seriously?deteriorate?tensions?in?CZ.?[Are?the?pro?
Sana?guys?really?Ossetians?]?
??OSCE?strengthens?rehab?team?
??JPKF:?t/u.?During?election?11?13?Nov?SO?police?strengthened?positions?and?armed?
personnel.?
?? ?? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?7?December,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
21/06?for?the?period?of?16???30?November?2006?
?28?Nov:?Working?Meeting?(WM)?of?Steer?Comm?[which?is?the?executive?body?to?the?econ?
Rehab?Programme/?NAS]?in?Tskh.??
??All?sides?agree?that?project?contributes?to?building?trust?betweem?the?sides?[only?setting?
where?this?is?said?in?a?long?time]?
??24?Nov:?the?Parliament?of?Georgia?discussed?the?draft?law?on?Property?Restitution?and?
Compensation?on?the?Territory?of?Georgia?for?the?Victims?of?Conflict?in?Former?South?Ossetia?
District?at?its?second?hearing.?
??JPKF:?t/u.?flight.?
??Geo?MOs?repeatedly?refuse?to?take?part?in?JPKF?monitoring.?
??[Military?Monitoring?is?constantly?hampered?by?SO?auhtorities?not?allowing?them?to?pass,?
following?them?in?cars]?
6?Dec? RU?Duma?calls?on?int?
comm?to?recognize?ind?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?December,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
22/06?for?the?period?of?1??15?December?2006?
7?Dec? Sana?appoints?gov? ?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?December,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
22/06?for?the?period?of?1??15?December?2006?
?Kurta?based?
12?
Dec?
SO?hands?in?draft?to?
redefine?role?of?OSCE?in?SO?
?? OSCE?Communication?Vienna?19?December,?2006,?
OSCE?MISSION?TO?GEORGIA/?Activity?Report?No.?
22/06?for?the?period?of?1??15?December?2006?
?draft?MoU?on?the?basis?of?1993?Mo?U.?So?repeatedly?tried?to?change?the?1993?MoU.
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ANNEX?2:?Casualties??
?
Account?of?casualties?in?the?Georgian?Ossetian?conflict?zone?based?on?reports?of?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?1994?–?2006?
?
Year? Date? Total? JPKF? other?LEBs? Civilians? Unspecified? Oss? Geo? Location? Remarks?
1994? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 16?Oct? ?? 3? ?? ?? 3?Mkhe? 3? 3? ?? ??
1995? ?? none? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
1996? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? first?half? >15? ?? ?? ?? 15? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
"every?week?people?are?wounded?or?
even?killed,?mil?mon?AR?15?30?Nov?
1996?
1997? ?? 3? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 30?May? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? east?of?Tskh? refugee?in?Geo?village?
??
first?half?of?
Jul? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ?? head?of?village?by?predecessor?
??
first?half?of?
Aug? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? by?Geo?policeman?
1998? ?? 6? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
??
first?half?of?
Apr? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? Tamarasheni? by?"drunk"?RU?PKF?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? maybe? ?? ?? ??
?? 5?Sep? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ?? by?RU?training?missile?
??
first?half?of?
Dec? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? 2? Artsevi? locals?arrested?in?joint?LEB?activity?
1999? ?? 4? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
??
first?half?of?
Feb? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? maybe? ??
Znauri?and?
Java?(Oss)? ??
?? 13?Jul? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? ?? former?IDP?
?? 13?Oct? ?? ?? ?? 1? 1?NO? ?? ??
Falloy?
market? robbery,?suspects?are?local?Oss?
2000? ?? 6? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 12?May? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? Tskh? criminal?
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?? 20?May? ?? ?? ?? 5? ?? ?? 5? Kheiti?(Geo)?
car?ambush,?commemoration?day?of?
1992?killings?of?Oss?by?geo?
2001? ?? 13? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 3?Apr? ?? ?? ?? 3? ?? 3? ?? Tskh? gangs'?shootout?
?? 13?May? ?? ??
1?police?
(SO)? 3? ?? 1? ?? Tskh?
2?Chechen,?1?hostage;?supposedly?
Chechen,?shootout?at?control?by?SO?
police?
?? 8?Jul? ?? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? Tskh? found?dead?
?? end?Nov? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ??
gang?shoots?at?Geo/SO?police?
control?
?? end?Nov? ?? ?? ?? 3? ?? 1? 2? ?? shoot?out?
2002? ?? >5? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
for?sure?a?higher?figure,?but?no?
coverage?(not?indicated,?but?
indirectly?because?crime?increases?
constantly)?
?? early?Sep? ?? ?? ?? 5? ?? ?? ?? ?? criminal?
2003? ?? 5? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 3?May? ?? ?? ?? 3? ?? ?? 3? Tamarasheni? sons?and?father?
?? 26?Oct? ?? ??
1?police?
(geo)? ?? ?? ?? 1? Khviti? during?operation?
?? end?Dec? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? ?? Archevi? firefight?
2004? ?? >5? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 6?Feb? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? ?? Eredvi?
Deputy?Commander?of?the?SO?
Special?Forces?shot?by?Geo?police?
during?control?
?? 8?Apr? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? ?? Ptsa? by?Geo?police?during?control?
?? 13?Aug? ?? ?? ?? ??
both?military?
and?civilian? ?? ?? ??
first?time,?casualties?are?mentioned?
since?May?31?
?? 12?Oct? ?? 2?(Oss)? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? Kirbali? NO?PKF,?ambush?
2005? ?? 6? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 29?May? ?? ??
5?(4?Oss?
uniformed,?
1?Geo?
police)? ?? ?? 4? 1?
Geo?vill?n?of?
Tskh? ??
?? end?Jun? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? ?? body?found,?mine?accident?
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2006? ?? 12? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 28?Jan? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ??
Geo?vill?n?of?
Tskh? found?dead?
?? 9?Jul? ?? ?? 1?(Oss)? ?? ?? 1? ?? Tskh? head?of?SO?NSC?in?bomb?blast?
?? 14?Jul? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? ?? Tskh? explosion?
?? 8?Sep? ?? ??
3?(Oss)?
police,?1?
(Geo)?
special?
forces? ?? ?? 3? 1? Tbeti? ??
?? end?Sep? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? 2? close?to?CZ? gunshot?
?? 23?Oct? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ??
in?hospital?after?shooting?on?Oct?9?
between?Geo?and?Oss?locals?
?? 26?Oct? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1?
between?
Kurta/?
Kekhvi? mine?accident?
         
CZ?=?Conflict?zone?
LEB?=?Law?Enforcement?Body/?Bodies?
NO?=?North?Ossetian?
?
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ANNEX?3:?Political?events?1989?–?2008??
?
Data?from?OSCE?reports?and?interviews?of?the?field?research?in?Georgia?in?2009?and?2010?(I?n)??
?
      
So militia starts 
to fight against 
Geo police (I 13) 
from 1993, 
low-level viol, 
only crime (I 
29) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Jan 
InterFront 
founded
in Latvia (I 
24)   
          
Feb             
Mar
Start of 
anti-Abkh
demos (I 
25, 29) ( 
SPE)
Gorb
referendum (I 
13, 24)  ; 
Khazbegi
Agreement 
Ru expels 
Geo from 
Rubel (I 7)   
Apr 
Demos
turn into 
pro-Geo 
indep (I 
25)   
Gorb offers 
Gamsa deal (I 
19)   [Apr/ May] 
      
May             
Jun     Yeltsin elected president
Sochi agreement, 
JCC started (I 29)       
Jul             
Aug       Start of war in Abkh (I 29)       
Sept
SO declares 
indep; RU low key 
when SO 
declares indep
    Chib into power (I 8)   
Oct Elections/ Gamsa into power (I 25)   
Yelt´s last 
warning to Geo 
on Chech 
support (I 19)   
      
Nov 
March to 
Tskh (I 
13, 25)   
          
Dec 
Parl abolishes SO 
aut (I 25)  ; 
Violence started 
formally with Geo 
police killed, Tbs 
declared state of 
emerg (I 13)   
Gamsa ousted (I 
19)  ; Shev into 
power (I 29)   
    First Chechen war 
294?
?
1995 - 
1998: no 
events 
accounte
d in 
inteviews 
Change in CZ 
perimeters (I 
17)  ; West 
starts to 
demand
changes (I 7)   
    
Anti-corr 
council of 
Nodia,
Usupa (I 7)  ; 
Intense
NATo policy 
(I 29)   
Snipers killed 
25 police in 
Gori Jan-Sept 
(I 7); Restart 
of SO-Geo 
contacts/ start 
of mil build-up 
(I 23)   
From 2004 in 
general more Geo 
police actions (I 
14)   
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Jan             
Rose Rev policy 
on separatists (I 
9, 13)   
Feb             Constitutionalreform (I 6)   
Mar               
Apr               
May             Ergneti closure (I 1, 6, 8, 9)   
Jun               
Jul     
Baden
Document (I 
8, 14, 01-16)  
        
Aug 
Second
Chechen war 
(I 8)   
      
Int/ IMF say 
Geo to tackle 
corr or funding 
cut    (I 7) 
"Verge of war" 
through Okrua (I 
18)   
Sept       
Bucharest
Pol exp 
group
meeting (I 
14)   
    Saaka bei UNGA 
Oct         
Castelo
Branco Pol 
Exp Group 
meeting (I 
14)   
    
Nov OSCE summit Istanbul       Shev ousted  
Kok-Zhv sign 
disarmament
agreement/
"Sarabuki" (I 9, 
18)   
Dec 
Putin
becomes
(acting)
president
Kok into 
power (I 8, 
9, 28, 29)  ; 
Start of RU 
visa regime 
(I 29)   
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West cuts funds for 
democracy (I 6); 
Start of negos with 
Abkh (I 12) 
      
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Jan Saaka bei PACE     Yakobashvili appointed SMR
Feb Semneby appointed EUSRSC   (I 14) 
Kosovo recognition (I 5, 
14)   
Mar         
Apr       
NATO Summit 
Bucharest (I 6, 7)  ; Ru-
SO start legal relations (I 
5)   ; Drone incident in 
Abkh (I 5, 14, 20)   
May 
Shamba visits Tbs/ 
Saaka at mil base (I 
6, 23)   
Geo parl formally sets 
up Sana admin (I 28)   
Negos on doc with Abkh 
(I 12)    
Jun Mamusrov into power       
Jul     
Ru missile hit close to 
EUDel on way back from 
Tskh (I 14, 20)   
Ambush on Sana (I 5. 9)  
Aug Recapture of Kodori (I 9, 14, 23)   
August war (I 7, 8, 13, 
27)   
Sept     Okrua launches party/ is arrested 2 days later   Sarkozy initiative (I 14)   
Oct       OSCE reports published (I2)   
Nov Karkusov break (I 9)   
Okrua steps down (I 
7, 11)  ; SO 
alternative polls   
November
demonstrations   
Dec 
Ljub doc presented 
(I 9)  ; Kok statement 
on Ljub (I 17)   
Sana inaugurated 
(I1, 2, 4, 14, 28)  ; 
Saaka annual 
address (I 6)   
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ANNEX?4:?List?of?interviews??
?
Total?number?of?interviews:?76,?out?of?these?listed?as?references:?39??
Interviews?that?were?conducted?as?part?of?the?research,?but?that??
do?not?appear?as?references?go?without?codes.?
?
Reference?
code? Occupation?at?time?of?interview? Date?and?place?of?interview?
I?1? Senior?analyst?with?international?human?rights?organization?
May?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?2? Journalist,?Tbilisi? May?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?3? Senior?co?worker?of?UNDP,?former?OSCE?project?manager?on?ERP? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?4? Former?senior?co?worker?of?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?5? Senior?member?of?the?Ministry?of?Internal?Affairs? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?6? Senior?member?of?the?Republican?Party?(opposition),?former?MP? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?7? Senior?member?of?local?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?1?7? Senior?member?of?local?NGO? June?2010,?Tbilisi?
I?8,?I?1?8? Senior?member?of?the?Office?of?the?State?Minister?for?Reintegration? July?and?September?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?9? Political?analyst?and?member?of?Republican?Party?(opposition)?
July?2009,?Tbilisi?
Georgian?English?translation?
I?10? Senior?member?of?the?Regional?Police?of?Shida?Kartli,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
I?11? Member?of?the?opposition?in?Gori,?Senior?member?of?the?city?council?in?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
I?12? Senior?member?of?Our?Georgia?–?Free?Democrats?Party?(opposition)? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?13,?I?1?13? Senior?member?of?United?Georgian?Traditionalists?Party;?Former?senior?member?of?Gamsakhurdia?government?
July?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?14? Senior?member?of?the?EU?Delegation?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?15? Lawyer,?former?co?worker?at?local?human?rights?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?16,?I?1?16? Expert?with?opposition?party,?former?senior?member?of?the?Saakashvili?government?
July?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?17? Expert?on?security?issues?with?international?organization,?Gori;?former?co?worker?with?OSCE?on?South?Ossetia? July?2009,?Gori?
I?18? Journalist?with?international?NGO? July?2009,?Gori?
I?20? Former?senior?member?of?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?21? Journalist?with?local?human?rights?NGO,?Gori? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?22? Senior?member?of?the?Ministry?of?Refugees? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?23? Project?manager?with?international?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?24? Co?worker?with?European?Special?Representative?to?the?South?Caucasus?and?the?Crisis?in?Georgia? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
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I?25? Two?leading?members?of?the?Social?Democrats’?Party?of?Georgia? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
?
I?26? Former?senior?advisor?to?the?Shevardnadze?government?
August?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?27? Senior?member?of?local?NGO,?former?senior?advisor?to?the?Shevardnadze?government? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?28? Senior?member?of?the?alternative?Administration?of?South?Ossetia? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?29? Senior?member?of?local?think?tank,?former?senior?advisor?to?the?Shevardnadze?government? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?31? Senior?member?of?local?think?tank;?former?senior?member?of?the?Shevardnadze?government? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?32? Project?manager?with?local?NGO? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
I?33? Former?senior?member?of?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?34? Journalist?with?public?TV?station,?Tbilisi? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
I?35? Co?worker?with?EU?Delegation?to?Georgia? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
? Senior?member?of?international?research?NGO,?Tbilisi? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Professor?of?history,?formerly?advisor?to?the?Gamsakhurdia?government? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Free?lance?journalist,?Vladikavkaz? June?2009,?Yerevan?
? Senior?Programme?Coordinator?with?international?NGO? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Co?worker?with?EUMM,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
? Co?worker?with?EUMM,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
? Senior?co?worker?with?EUMM,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
? Editor?of?local?newspaper,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Resident?of?Ditsi? July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Resident?of?Ditsi? July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Resident?of?Ditsi? July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Former?senior?member?of?district?administration?in?Gori,?former?OSCE?co?worker?on?South?Ossetia?
July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?
English?translation?
? Member?of?alternative?administration?to?South?Ossetia?under?authority?of?the?Government?of?Georgia?
July?2009,?Tbilisi?
Georgian?English?translation?
? Project?manager?at?local?IDP?advocacy?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Co?worker?at?local?IDP?advocacy?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Senior?member?of?regional?NGO,?Tbilisi? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Senior?journalist?with?local?newspaper,?Tbilisi? August?2009,?Tabakhmela?
? Senior?member?of?international?research?NGO,?Tbilisi? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
? 19?interviews?with?IDPs?at?the?Gori?IDP?camp? July?2009,?Gori?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? ?
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